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Abstract 
This dissertation offers a revisionary account of the seminal French film critic and 
theorist André Bazin (1918-1958) to argue that his work, long considered to be largely apolitical, 
instead offers a model of aesthetic politics that calls for a critique grounded in an affective-
hermeneutic practice. Against the standard account of Bazin as a realist film theorist, it argues 
that not realism but the idea of “mythology” is the cornerstone of Bazin’s work. His 
understanding of cinema as a producer of mythologies conceives of it as a site for both escape 
from ongoing historical experience and for an orientation within it. Putting him in dialogue with 
his contemporaries, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Roland Barthes, I argue that Bazin’s model of 
aesthetic politics confronts the troubling character of all political experience by refusing the 
satisfactions of either expert demystification or heroic commitment. 
The first part of the dissertation reconstructs Bazin’s readings of key genres and films, 
such as the Western and the films of Chaplin, and the debates within which he made these 
readings, to bring out his argument that an essential task of aesthetic critique is to identify the 
ideological contradictions in mythologies in spite of which we become affectively committed to 
them. This is a recognition of the “bad faith” character of the aesthetic, a term that designates, in 
an extra-moral sense, a necessary margin of unconscious self-deception involved in how 
mythologies orient us in history. 
The second part undertakes an excavation of hitherto unnoticed but prominent anxieties 
that Bazin had about the ontological realism of film. It is the context of totalitarianism, heavily 
marking some of his key texts, that gives a special charge to these anxieties. The realism that 
xii 
 
Bazin championed was an aesthetic realism that responds to the model of mythologies developed 
in the first part. 
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Introduction 
Which Aesthetic? What Politics? 
 
The burgeoning revival of interest in classical film theory since the turn of the twenty-
first century has generally been explained by a limited set of reasons. The one evoked most often 
has been that digital technologies have once more rendered the media landscape fluid, so it 
makes sense to turn to theorists who, working under similarly fluid circumstances, asked 
fundamental questions about a medium in relation to which they staked out strong positions: 
what is this medium, what do we want from it, what does it do, and so on. Such a turn could not 
have been self-evident since it meant turning to theorists whom the discipline had happily 
excoriated while paying perfunctory homage due to pioneers. Such a turn has entailed 
discovering that we never understood them very well in the first place.1 Apart from re-readings 
of canonical texts, it has been necessary to discover several others that have never been available 
                                                 
1
 Miriam Hansen has played a central role in the revaluation of Siegfried Kracauer from when he was known 
primarily for his American monographs From Caligari to Hitler and Theory of Film to his status now as an 
important figure in the broadly conceived Frankfurt School of critical theory. Johannes von Moltke has further 
situated Kracauer in his American milieu, revising our understanding of him as a solitary figure in his adopted 
country. Both André Bazin and Rudolf Arnheim have been subjects of major edited volumes where scholars from 
across the discipline have re-reading familiar texts and brought to light lesser known aspects of these authors’ 
works. New translations of Jean Epstein too have been accompanied by critical revaluations. See Miriam Hansen, 
Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor W. Adorno (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2012); Johannes von Moltke, The Curious Humanist: Siegfried Kracauer in America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2016); Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin, ed., Opening Bazin: Postwar 
Film Theory and Its Afterlife (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Scott Higgins, ed., Arnheim for Film and 
Media Studies (New York: Routledge, 2011); Jean Epstein, Jean Epstein: Critical Essays and New Translations, ed. 
Sarah Keller & Jason N. Paul (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Christophe Wall-Romana, Jean 
Epstein: Corporeal Cinema and Film Philosophy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016). 
For critical debates on the renewed significance of classical film theory, see Johannes von Moltke et al., “Dossier: 
What’s New in Classical Film Theory,” in Screen vol. 55, no. 3 (Autumn 2014), pp. 396-420; Dudley Andrew et al., 
“Roundtable on the Return to Classical Film Theory,” in October no. 148 (Spring 2014), 5-26. 
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to the discipline, as well as writers who registered rarely with scholars or not at all.2 This 
enlarging of the corpus has drawn attention to the range of filmic practices that the early theorists 
confronted, thus giving us hope that they might be able to address the variety of image-practices 
opened up by digital platforms. Even more significantly, the fact that most of these writers often 
wrote shorter pieces rather than theoretical treatises, in their roles as cultural critics rather than 
just film critics, also resonates with what some feel is a general crisis in the status of theory in 
the discipline which requires us to understand the media in relation to the broader cultural 
artefacts and concerns. So improving the historical record as well as historical understanding 
stand alongside a sense of uncertainty regarding the status of images and film theory in today’s 
media landscape. Drawing the two aspects together, Johannes von Moltke argues that it is only 
by understanding the historically-specific discursive contexts of the theorists we turn to that we 
can make them speak to our present concerns. 
While I agree with the general assessments about the importance of understanding the 
classical film theorists in their historical contexts, I believe we need a better account of our own 
predicaments as we turn to them if we hope to make them speak to us. To say that we are living 
in a time of technological upheaval as the classical film theorists did is to say too little. One of 
the most remarkable things about the declaration of the “end of history” with the fall of the 
                                                 
2
 In Bazin’s case, the major effort has been the creation by Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin of an 
archive of his complete writings at Yale University and Université Paris-Ouest – Nanterre, La Défense, 
accompanied with an online indexed database at http://bazin.commons.yale.edu/index.php and www.baz-in.com. In 
addition, Andrew has published a translation of Bazin’s writings on television and the new film technologies of his 
time. Johannes von Moltke and Kristy Rawson have edited a volume of Kracauer’s writings from his American 
period that expands his corpus beyond the available monographs. See André Bazin, ABNM; Siegfried Kracauer, 
Siegfried Kracauer’s American Writings: Essays on Film and Popular Culture (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2012). As Stuart Liebman reminds us, the work of recovering the archive of classical film theory has been 
going on since the ‘80s, in particular with Richard Abel’s anthology of French film theory and criticism before 
World War II, Richard Taylor’s translations of the work of Sergei Eisenstein and of Soviet film theorists in general, 
and anthologies of writings from Cahiers du Cinéma. For Liebman’s remarks, see Andrew et al, “Roundtable on the 
Return to Classical Film Theory,” 5-6. 
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Soviet Union was how quickly it was refuted by the genocidal violence and the eruption of new 
nationalisms in the Balkans and the former Soviet Bloc countries in general. This moment also 
brought a critical interrogation of secularism—one of the tenets of modern liberal democracy 
that was said to have emerged the victor of history—as religion in a variety of forms became 
visible in the public sphere. But, for the most part, a sense prevailed at least in the West that a 
new economic-political consensus was established which was the logical conclusion of the long 
historical churning of modernity. If the old demons of nationalisms, religious ideologies, and 
authoritarian regimes still erupted in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, it could only 
be that history has not yet caught up with those parts. This narrative has been difficult to sustain 
in the first decades of the twenty-first century as economic strife, a climate riven by industrial 
processes, global wars, revolutions, terrorism, forced mass migrations, and political 
demagoguery have once again arrived at the shores of post-history, creating a historical 
atmosphere not unlike the one that classical film theorists lived through. 
The re-emergence of an uncertain global condition should also alert us to something in 
the nature of media landscape itself: that it no longer easily coincides with the postmodernist 
discourse of the last quarter of the 20th century wherein media technologies gain their purchase 
on experience through their role as the generator of simulacra that constitute our only reality. In 
lieu of a detailed analysis of this distinction, I will only note that we have been living on the cusp 
of a possibility that the distinction between the gore in the latest splatter film and the beheadings 
of the ISIS videos may matter, as may the difference that beyond the superficial similarity of the 
videogame screens and the target locators of aerial-bombing drones or aircraft there are real 
bodies at the end of the latter, whether in Red Cross hospitals or not. Indeed, it seems strange 
that after more than two decades of Michael Moore and Errol Morris, a documentary filmmaker 
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is once again on the defensive for some strategic editing that (merely?) introduces a pause in the 
speech of its subjects.3 All I am suggesting—without prejudice to splatter films, video games, or 
Moore and Morris—is that the gap between image and referent has not been completely 
subsumed into the image despite digital possibilities, and that what resides in this gap may be of 
great political import in this historical moment. 
So, a renewed stake in the political significance of the image rather than the more general 
question of the status of the image or a crisis in theory may be the more expanded horizon for 
turning to classical film theorists. From this perspective, the work of some theorists should 
resonate more immediately (emphasis on the ‘immediately’) than that of others: say, the Soviet 
montage theorists and the Frankfurt school broadly conceived rather than Rudolf Arnheim and 
Hugo Munsterberg. It must then seem odd that I turn to the work of André Bazin to come to 
grips with the political conditions of the cinema. Criticisms of his theoretical positions—his 
‘naïve realism’—were always motivated in the first place by attempts to invest film with political 
and ideological import.4 
From the battles Bazin fought against filmmakers and critics associated with the French 
Communist Party (PCF) such as Louis Daquin and Georges Sadoul in the late ‘40s, through the 
                                                 
3
 Lois Beckett, “Katie Couric gun control film entangled in #Gungate and a question of ethics”, The Guardian, May 
28, 2016, accessed November 9, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/may/28/katie-couric-under-the-
gun-documentary-criticism. 
4
 For some prominent early critiques of Bazin, see Gérard Gozlan, L’Anti-Bazin (Lormont: Le Bord de l’Eau, 2013 
[1962]); Annette Michelson, “Review of What Is Cinema?.” In Artforum vol. 10, no. 6 (1968), 68-72; Christopher 
Williams, “Bazin on Neo-Realism,” in Screen vol. 14, no. 4 (1973), 61-68; Colin MacCabe, “Theory and Film: 
Principles of Realism and Pleasure,” in Screen vo. 17, no. 3 (1976), 7-28. Williams and MacCabe have since come 
to read Bazin differently and the latter had initiated the project for creating an archive of Bazin’s complete works. 
See his discussion of Bazin in Colin MacCabe, Godard: Portrait of the Artist at Seventy (New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2004); Colin MacCabe, “Bazin as Modernist,” in Opening Bazin, 66-76. 
I will be looking at his critical battles with his contemporaries in chapter 1, but for overall historical accounts see 
Dudley Andrew, André Bazin rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 5; Antoine de Baecque, 
“Bazin in Combat,” in Opening Bazin, 225-233. 
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belated but highly vituperative obituary by Gerard Gozlan in 1962, to the ideology theorists of 
the ‘70s, Bazin emerges for different reasons as an obfuscator of film’s political role. Of course, 
the substance of the various critiques is significantly different, and the critics of the ‘70s would 
always make it a point to mention Bazin’s formation in the social Catholicism of Emmanuel 
Mounier’s Personalist philosophy and the journal Esprit. This would allow them to mark him off 
from what they saw as the more reactionary positions of the younger critics at Cahiers du 
Cinéma. But his social engagement appeared to them as too self-evident and positivist, much like 
his faith in the realism of the film image, and finally subsumed by the mystification of spiritual 
terminology and the sentimentality of love for the world. However, Bazin has been the subject of 
an extensive reassessment in recent years and I’ll first offer a synoptic account of recent 
scholarship on his work as it pertains to my argument before specifying my own intervention 
which argues that Bazin indeed has something to teach us about the conjunction of aesthetics and 
politics in modernity. 
Bazin’s Split Personality 
The question of realism has unsurprisingly been central to recent reassessment of Bazin’s 
work and this has involved a greater appreciation of the complexity of his position on this topic. 
Scholars have tried to complicate our understanding of Bazinian realism by linking him to 
6 
 
Surrealism,5 the Lettrists,6 deconstruction,7 Walter Benjamin8 and modernism in general,9 non-
anthropocentric thought and posthumanism,10 Wittgenstein,11 and much else besides. Either, as 
Dudley Andrew remarks, this is realism “sophisticated beyond our comprehension,” or this is a 
case of scholars reading their own interests a little too hastily into Bazin.12 Then there are several 
scholars who have convincingly broadened the picture we have of Bazin by highlighting his 
interests in a wide range of films, including animation13 and science documentaries,14 and 
television.15 Given this highly complicated picture of realism on the one hand and a seemingly 
                                                 
5
 Adam Lowenstein, “The Surrealism of the Photographic Image: Bazin, Barthes, and the Digital Sweet Hereafter,” 
in Cinema Journal vol. 46, no. 3 (Spring 2007), 54-82; Jean-François Chevrier, “The Reality of Hallucination in 
André Bazin,” in Opening Bazin, 42-56. 
6
 Rochelle Fack, “Bazin’s Chaplin Myth and the Corrosive Lettrists,” in Opening Bazin, 246-253. 
7
 Louis-George Schwartz, “Deconstruction avant la lettre: Jacques Derrida before André Bazin,” in Opening Bazin, 
95-103. 
8
 Dudley Andrew, “Malraux, Benjamin, Malraux: A Triangle of Hope for Cinema,” in Film, Art, New Media: 
Museum Without Walls?, ed. Angela Dalle Vacche (Hampshire: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2012), 115-140; Monica 
Dall’Asta, “Beyond the Image in Benjamin and Bazin: The Aura of the Event,” in Opening Bazin, 57-65. 
9
 MacCabe, “Bazin as Modernist.”  
10
 Angela Dalle Vacche, “The Difference of the Cinema in the System of the Arts,” in Opening Bazin, 142-152; 
Jennifer Fay, “Seeing/Loving Animals: André Bazin’s Posthumanism,” in Journal of Visual Culture vol. 7 no. 1 
(2008), 41-64; Seung-Hoon Jeong, “Animals: An Adventure in Bazin’s Ontology,” in Opening Bazin, 177-185. 
11
 Burke Hilsabeck, “The “Is” in What Is Cinema?: On André Bazin and Stanley Cavell,” in Cinema Journal vol. 
55, no. 2 (Winter 2016), 25-42. 
12
 Dudley Andrew, “A Binocular Preface,” in Opening Bazin, xi. It is not that one can’t find the affinities these 
scholars argue for, but one does need to ask what the point of any such affinity might be and how far each goes. 
Beyond the specifics of the arguments, given my concern with the question of politics, I am a little wary that the 
impulse behind looking for such affinities is to recover Bazin through the ‘radical’ prestige of some of these 
theoretical currents. It is also as if we are willing to listen to Bazin again, but on condition that he tells us what we 
already know and are comfortable with. 
13
 Karen Beckman, “Animating the Cinéfils: Alain Resnais and the Cinema of Discovery,” Cinema Journal vol. 54 
no. 4 (Summer 2015), 1-25; Grant Wiedenfeld, “Bazin on the Margins of the Seventh Art,” in Opening Bazin, 262-
267. 
14
 Oliver Gaycken, “’Beauty of Chance’: Film ist,” in Journal of Visual Culture vol. 11 no. 3 (2012), 307-327. 
15
 Michael Cramer, “Television and the Auteur in the Late ‘50s,” in Opening Bazin, 268-274; Bazin, André Bazin’s 
New Media 
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more diffuse set of engagements with a broad range of films and media on the other, a sort of 
consensus has emerged on the existence of two Bazins. 
Andrew, writing in 2004, distinguishes a ‘pure Bazin’ of the first two volumes of Qu’est-
ce Que le Cinéma? that deal with questions of realism and intermediality from the Bazin of the 
last two volumes dealing with cinema’s relation to sociology and with Italian neo-realism whose 
‘prose [was] meant not for posterity but for a palpable French audience.’16 For Daniel Morgan, 
Bazin’s idea of realism is not restricted to his writings on the cinematic image but designates any 
internally-coherent work that must be understood on its own terms. He argues this from the fact 
that Bazin calls a range of films ‘realist,’ including those of Sergei Eisenstein. Thus, according to 
him, there are two paradigms of Bazinian realism: one, a more limited paradigm, relating to the 
ontological realism of the image and the other an infinitely broad one that applies to any film that 
succeeds in doing whatever it set out to do.17 For James Tweedie too, there are two Bazins: one 
who wrote studied essays about realism and another who ‘has no coherent identity at all, as it lies 
scattered in occasional pieces about individual films.’18 The general drift of this partition is that 
there was Bazin the theoretician who took clearly defined positions on the medium, and then 
there was Bazin the critic who wrote to the vagaries of the films on offer and was flexible 
enough to adapt to the challenges thrown up by them. 
On the question of Bazin’s politics, several scholars have recently either drawn attention 
to his political engagement or provided pointers to the political dimensions of his film theory. 
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Antoine de Baecque has revised our understanding of Bazin as a saintly figure who acted as a 
mediator between competing ideological positions to offer a picture of a critic constantly 
engaged in combat, going out of his way to dispute the positions of those with whom he 
disagreed, and also mentoring a group of younger critics at Cahiers du Cinéma to continue a 
practice of polemical criticism.19 Philip Watts and Karl Schoonover, again in addition to 
Andrew’s detailed account in his biography of Bazin, emphasize the specificity of the postwar 
situation in which the critic’s understanding of cinematic realism was formed.20 Watts speaks of 
Bazin’s search for a ‘stylistic austerity’ as a way of making cinema respond in an adequate 
manner to the horrors of the Holocaust and the war in general. He argues that Bazin’s preference 
for a stylistics of integral realism was formed in relation to the fact that filmed footage of the 
camps served as evidence in the Nuremberg Trials. Schoonover focuses on another fallout of the 
war in which the cinematic image and Bazin’s theorization of it had great stakes. This was the 
discourse of international humanism in which global spectators were called upon to witness the 
vulnerability of postwar Europe from a distance, both desiring a spectacle of suffering and 
reaching out in empathetic identification. Schoonover argues that Bazin’s critical imperative for 
respecting the integrity and ambiguity of reality, that is of what exists, is formed in relation to 
this postwar discourse of international fraternity; further, the locus in the cinematic image where 
this integrity is tested and guaranteed is the suffering body or the body in danger. He, like Serge 
Daney and Pascal Bonitzer before him,21 points to the many instances in which Bazin prizes 
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images of bodies threatened with death and, unlike them, links this interest to Bazin’s program 
for making realism the basis for an international film culture. 
Marco Grosoli argues for Bazin as a theorist of films as social fantasies that are in fact 
documentaries of the gaps in the empirical world. He emphasizes Bazin’s interest in cinema’s 
relationship to the collective unconscious of its time which the filmic image can tap into through 
a dialectic of presence and absence. He links this to the Lacanian notion of the Real as that which 
exceeds representation.22 The idea of an absence in presence is also at the heart of Dudley 
Andrew’s What Cinema Is! as he proceeds from Serge Daney’s characterization of what has 
always informed Cahiers du Cinéma’s orientation towards film: “The Cahiers axiom is this: that 
the cinema has a fundamental rapport with reality and that the real is not what is represented—
and that’s final.”23 Andrew emphasizes the importance to Bazin of the sense of dislocation that 
comes from the fact that the cinematic image points to the presence of something in the past, as 
well as signaling its capacity to survive the present and resonate in an unknown future.24 Morgan 
too sees Bazin as proceeding from the premise that films create worlds on the screen that mediate 
our relationship to the lived world and it in this mediation that the political function of Bazin’s 
aesthetics resides.25 
In this brief review, Bazin emerges as a heterogeneous and even contradictory figure. On 
the one hand, his realism is disruptive and modernist and, on the other, it responds to a call for an 
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empathetic relationship to the suffering of others. Further still, it turns out that realism was one 
concern among others in his writings. While heterogeneity of interpretations of any body of work 
is to be expected, Bazin’s heterogeneity is contained by a strategy of division of theoretical and 
critical labor between a realist aesthetic on the one hand and broader stylistic and sociological 
concerns on the other. In this dissertation, I seek to group this diversity under the rubric of 
aesthetic politics without separating off realism from non-realism or sociology from aesthetics to 
argue that there is a coherent line running through Bazin’s writings which allows us to reclaim 
him on the very grounds he was criticized, which were those of politics. However, this is not an 
attempt to re-contain a body of work whose ecumenism has just been recovered within a new 
dogmatic structure. 
Coherence neither equates to dogma not does it guarantee critical consistency. At the 
level of responding to individual films, Bazin changed his mind about several of them. For 
example, as we will see, he found the montage of Why We Fight (Frank Capra, 1942-1945) 
manipulative in 1946 and then transparent in 1952. He equated Brief Encounter (David Lean, 
1945) to the work of Italian neo-realists only to regret his judgment later. But his ideas of what 
neo-realism was trying to do or how montage works did not change because they were informed 
by a broader or ontological understanding not just of cinema but of the aesthetic with its specific 
political implications. In order to make this argument, I will examine the two terms ‘aesthetics’ 
and ‘politics’ separately to then arrive at a synthesized understanding of aesthetic politics that 
Bazin’s work yields. While I lay out this understanding in this introduction, it will be the 
chapters to follow that demonstrate how Bazin worked it out in the course of writing about 
specific films or when arguing explicitly about the political dimension of cinema. 
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Why the Aesthetic 
In this dissertation, I make Bazin’s ontological account of the cinema a subset of his 
understanding of the aesthetic. This might seem like a counter-intuitive approach to the work of a 
theorist who has been seen as exemplifying the medium-specific discourse of classical film 
theory. Also, the word ‘aesthetic’ has certain long-standing associations that make it seem 
unsuitable for an exploration of cinema’s relationship to politics. In general, we take ‘aesthetics’ 
to refer to questions of style in relation to the specific powers of the medium. Within this 
understanding, the question of aesthetics becomes a priori separable from the question of art’s 
relationship to society and politics. This understanding can lead to a histories of film style as 
exemplified by the work of David Bordwell in which the term ‘aesthetics’ is subsumed within 
‘style.’ It can also lead to an understanding of art as autonomous and self-sufficient to be judged 
based on disinterested pleasure and nothing more where aesthetic value is not only separable 
from art’s social significance but entirely transcends the latter. We won’t find strong expressions 
of this in disciplinary film studies but it is a caricature of the aesthetic attitude for which no 
doubt several empirical examples can be found. Thus, most attempts at giving an account of the 
socio-political dimensions of art itself seeks to overcome the aesthetic, as we see in the opening 
sentence of a collection that seeks to go ‘beyond aesthetics’: ‘Is it useful to see art objects, not as 
bearers of meaning or aesthetic value, but as forms mediating social action?’26 Aesthetic value is 
here expressly opposed to social action. I will argue here for why this need not be the case. 
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Let us first take up the charge, as argued by Noël Carroll, that Bazin’s discourse, as of 
classical film theory in general, was medium-specific.27 Thinking about cinema’s relationship to 
the other arts was not of peripheral concern to Bazin, nor was it an opportunity for merely 
marking cinematic specificity, but a way of inquiring how cinema fit in with a constellation of 
the arts; that is, within a certain idea of the aesthetic. Andrew and Angela Dalle Vacche have 
emphasized the centrality of such intermediality to Bazin’s thinking, and the title of the latter’s 
essay, ‘The difference of the cinema in the system of the arts,’ nicely captures the relational 
nature of Bazin’s question ‘What is cinema?’ where the difference is marked within a larger 
system that holds it together with the other arts.28 We can also get a sense of what is at stake in 
the intermedial nature of the question by attending to the words of Emmanuel Burdeau, a former 
editor of Cahiers du Cinéma. 
When Bazin emphasized the idea of an impure cinema—his famous piece, ‘For an 
Impure Cinema’—this impurity was defined in terms of the position that the cinema 
held in relation to the arts that were born before and which, in this hierarchy, were 
above it. There was literature, theater, music, painting, and, if one continues with 
Rohmer, architecture… Today, the question of an impure cinema remains in its 
entirety. But things have turned upside down. The impurity of cinema might now be 
seen as occupying a new position relative to the media and the arts, as though the 
latter came after; there has been a reversal. Fifty years ago, cinema was the child of 
all the other arts; today it would more likely be the parent of all the arts or certainly 
                                                 
27
 Noël Carroll, Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
28
 Dalle Vacche, “The Difference of Cinema”; Dudley Andrew, “Malraux, Bazin, and the Gesture of Picasso,” in 
Opening Bazin, 153-166. Dalle Vacche seems to be referring to Paul Oskar Kristeller’s foundational essay that 
defined the specificity of the modern arrangement of the arts within an overarching framework of art. See Paul 
Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics I”, in Journal of the History 
of Ideas, vol. 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1951), pp. 496-527; Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History 
of Aesthetics II”, in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 13, no. 1 (Jan. 1952), pp. 17-46. Incidentally, Kristeller, a 
Renaissance scholar, knew Kracauer in Germany and became a close friend and interlocutor in the US around the 
time Kracauer started work on his book on historiography. He would eventually edit the manuscript of this book 
after Kracauer’s death. Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things Before the Last (Princeton: Markus Weiner, 
1995). 
13 
 
of all new media. This reversal should be thought about more deeply: it can help 
define the critical work of today.29 
What I take from these remarks, keeping aside the idea of hierarchy, is the idea that 
cinema can only be understood in relation to the other arts, whether those that came before or 
those that came after and those still to come.30 What this then requires is to ask that 
embarrassingly vague question, ‘What is art?’ before asking about the identity of this or that art 
form. Therefore, when Bazin chose to gather a decade and half worth’s writing on the cinema 
under the question ‘What is cinema?’ he based it on Sartre’s ‘What is literature?’ and both he 
and Sartre explicitly placed their inquiries within a questioning of the general function of art in 
their historical moment. And they were aware that their moment both in history and in art was 
still wrestling with the complex and not always happy legacy of the nineteenth century. If the 
question seems vague to us, it is not because it was so to begin with but perhaps because it has 
been caricatured too easily for too long. 
What had for some time clouded the disciplinary vision with regards to the fact that the 
question of medium-specificity, not only in Bazin’s work but in that of the other classical film 
theorists, was always posed within a cross-medial framework, was the moment of film studies’ 
emergence in the 1970s. Its inquiry into the workings of cinema coincided with a moment in film 
history when several films made the cinematic apparatus and experience itself their subject.31 
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This moment of reflexivity in the cinema made theoretical inquiry the medium-specific discourse 
that was by then commonplace in the modernist moments of the other arts and that we thought 
was what the classical film theorists did.32 The canonical articulation and institution of this 
misunderstanding has been the work of Carroll who has sought to rescue film theory from the 
fallacy of medium specificity.33 
Carroll’s characterization of classical film theory as concerned with defining the 
specificity of the filmic medium places this body of thought in the tradition of Lessing’s 
Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766). This reference to an 18th-
century paradigm is motivated in Carroll’s work by its re-deployment by Clement Greenberg in 
Towards a Newer Laocoon (1940).34 Thus, Carroll sees an essential continuity across centuries 
in the aesthetic discourse within which he places most film theorists, classical and otherwise. But 
by linking a 20th-century modernist discourse of medium specificity, whose North American 
specificity as well as its museum context need to be emphasized, with an 18th-century text and 
20th-century film theories, Carroll effectively placed a red herring in our assessment of the 
history of “classical” film theory. Greenberg’s text picks up from Irving Babbitt’s The New 
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Laokoon (1910) which bemoaned the Romantic legacy of mixing the arts that he traces back to 
Rousseau. In fact, one of Babbitt’s contentions is that Lessing’s text was singularly unsuccessful 
in drawing the boundaries it wanted to.35 Given this discontinuity in the history of medium-
specificity and the historically specific location of Babbitt’s and Lessing’s attempt to restore it, it 
is curious that Carroll could so easily assimilate almost all film theory to this anachronistic 
paradigm.36 
It is not that Bazin or other classical film theorists did not inherit an earlier paradigm of 
art or that did not inquire into the specific powers of the filmic medium. But the paradigm they 
would have been inherited was the one that Carroll neatly skips over and this paradigm meant 
that, contrary to what he argues, they did not inquire into the specificity of the medium for its 
own sake. The meaning of medium specificity in the aesthetic paradigm of the nineteenth 
century, a Kantian legacy, which informs so much film theory until mid-century, is much more 
relational and its stakes are not just the status of one art form or another or the self-referential 
powers of the medium but of the aesthetic as an experiential and epistemological category in 
general. It is therefore important to recognize that the question of aesthetic politics as Bazin 
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raises it is indissociable from this understanding of the aesthetic. Here, raising the question of 
aesthetics has nothing to do with parsing films and other texts into an a priori hierarchy of 
values; such a question would have to be indifferent to whether we are dealing with a 
mainstream film, airport fiction, or the latest set of ‘New Wave’ films from whatever country’s 
production happens to be prominent at the festivals. This also means that one can identify more 
than one paradigm of art to which these different kinds of works respond, and the ‘aesthetic’ as I 
discuss it here is one of them. Under the pressure of proliferating technologies most scholars may 
be highly reluctant to raise the question of politics of the image in this form, with reference to 
‘art,’ or even to ‘cinema,’ with all the ‘spiritual dust and grime’ (Bazin) these terms have 
accrued; to these they may prefer something like ‘media’ or ‘visual culture.’ It only means that 
they are looking to carry out their inquiry under a new ontological paradigm of art. Whatever 
that happens to be would be more compelling if it has a clear view of what it wants to replace. It 
certainly would not be replacing a hermetic medium-specific discourse. This inquiry seeks to 
recover in Bazin’s work the political promise of what for many may be a lapsed paradigm. 
I would now like to briefly address the charge that the idea of aesthetic autonomy is 
explicitly opposed to art’s socio-political function. I referred earlier to arguments by Andrew, 
Morgan, and Schoonover for Bazin’s understanding of cinema as a mediator of social 
experience. If we look at each argument, they all either state or assume that film’s ability to 
mediate historical experience is predicated on some idea of autonomy. Andrew’s idea of 
dislocation captures cinema’s ability to put the world out of our reach by paradoxically making 
present delayed images of the past that will potentially survive the present. The fact that films 
can speak to us differently each time we watch them, that others respond to them differently 
from us, and that the responses they will call forth in the future cannot be predicted is a marker 
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of the autonomy of images. Morgan speaks of “Bazin as committed to a specific movement from 
image to reality. What we learn by watching and responding to films… can be transferred to the 
way we engage reality.” He also specifies that such a movement is possible only in relation to 
“things outside ourselves, things that stand freely of our capacity to impose an order on them.” 
And he calls this commitment moral and political.37 Schoonover’s argument that Italian neo-
realism constructed a model for empathizing from a distance is also predicated on the autonomy 
of Italy on the screen from, for example, the world of the North American spectator but which 
nonetheless are brought into a relationship. These are all models of what we might call a 
relational rather than absolute autonomy, something that is indeed central to the conception of 
aesthetic politics that emerges from Bazin’s work. But rather than take it as the unique 
achievement of cinema or Italian neo-realism, I would like to probe a little more into the origins 
of this idea to which Bazin was particularly attuned. 
M. H. Abrams has argued that the idea of aesthetic autonomy and related notions of 
disinterest and ‘art for art’s sake’ were eighteenth- and nineteenth-century successors to 
longstanding metaphysical and theological ideas in Christian thought, particularly the 
Augustinian tradition which channeled Platonic ideas of beauty and the good as markers of the 
divine and of disinterested love as its contemplation. As ideas that applied to secular art, or 
secular understandings of even religious art, they designated the aesthetic as new theology 
founded on principles of the old Christian religion.38 Abrams traces the two-faced trajectory of 
this new idea: on the one hand, aesthetic experience aspires to being unworldly and is committed 
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to disengagement from the historical world; on the other, the aesthetic is also a site where new 
secular utopic visions are formulated. In Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in 
Romantic Literature, he describes how a Christian philosophy of history, with its structure of a 
determining crisis (‘the Fall’) and a teleological destination, becomes determinant for the 
expression of a range of secular religions in Romantic literature as it was for Hegel’s philosophy 
of history.39 This genealogy of the aesthetic as a secularization of religious concepts, far from 
being an argument against its political significance, will turn out, with some significant 
variations, to be its foundation in the work of Bazin. I emphasize this genealogy in chapters three 
and four in particular, and here I will lay out some markers to demonstrate how deeply Bazin 
was aware of this legacy of the aesthetic. 
To begin with, as Andrew’s biography tells us, Bazin wrote his thesis at the École 
Normale de Saint Cloud on the religious aspects of Baudelaire’s poetry, and he did so in the 
years immediately after the publication in 1939 of the first edition of the monumental work of 
Albert Béguin on German Romanticism, L’Âme Romantique et le Rêve.40 Béguin’s work is an 
exhaustive study of the Romantic tradition as shaped by and in reaction to the instrumental 
rationality of the Enlightenment. It places French Romanticism in this lineage taking in not only 
Baudelaire and the nineteenth century but also the Surrealists who were Béguin’s 
contemporaries. The figures Béguin studies were deeply immersed and familiar with the 
scientific culture of the nineteenth century and who at the same time sought to create intricate 
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worlds of the imagination that could give supra-rational form to the dispersed experiences of 
modernity. As someone who studied a key Romantic figure in Baudelaire, Bazin would have 
been intimately familiar with this dialectic of the religious and the secular and of the rational and 
the irrational that defined Romantic aesthetic philosophy. 
 
Fig. 1: Haydée (Haydée Politoff) reads a work on German Romanticism by 
Albert Béguin in Eric Rohmer’s La Collectioneuse (1967) 
What Bazin understood about the Romantic sensibility is its contention that in a world 
without the theological certainties that used to frame social institutions and practices, the 
imagination needs new structures of belief that can give form to experience. Speaking about 
Kafka, a key writer for him to whose work we will see him compare the films of Chaplin and De 
Sica, Bazin writes: 
[Kafka’] drama is this: God doesn’t exist, the last office in the castle is empty. There 
perhaps is the specific tragedy of the modern world, the passage to the transcendence 
of a social reality which births its own deification.41i 
Bazin believed that the loss, or at least the loss of primacy, of the Christian God in Western 
modernity, calls necessarily, as the phrase ‘births its own deification’ indicates, for new 
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transcendental structures of belief but formed somehow from the very social reality it is 
supposed to ground. The internalization of such structures of belief which then orient our 
experience of the world, consciously or otherwise, we know by the ‘scientific’ term ideology. 
Bazin’s term for this, which recalls the structural substrate of religious belief, is mythology. A 
mythology’s transcendence is not the perfect, vertical transcendence of revealed religion but a 
lateral transcendence which emerges and terminates in the historical world. It is made up of the 
same contradictions and confusions as the historical world but these elements are, to use a 
Hegelian term, sublated; that is, internalized and neutralized. A clear example of such a 
mythology and one that we will see Bazin analyze is that of the Western understood as one form 
of the American national consciousness not only for Americans but also the non-Americans who 
have used it to form a picture of America. Yet, what the genre takes from history is so basic—
some character types, certain ways of dressing, talking, a few recurring tasks—that it would 
stand very little scrutiny as history by any empirical measure. 
As quasi- or pseudo-religious structures of belief, mythologies acquire an internal 
consistency which they then subliminally impose on our imaginations and through it on to our 
world. In order to so impose itself, mythologies must have a semblance of the transcendence that 
characterizes all structures of belief that we learn to take for granted. But as contingent structures 
formed out of history’s contradictions, the hold that secular mythologies have on us is bound to 
decline and their contradictions inevitably show through. This is the ‘tragedy of the modern 
world’ that Bazin refers to, a word not to be taken as indicating regret or nostalgia for revealed 
religion or enduring certainties but as a marker of the openness of the modern political condition 
where new possibilities inevitably come at the expense of the old without for all that constituting 
linear progress towards utopia. A mythology that no longer exercises any force on us is not a 
21 
 
stepping stone to a better mythology but only to one more in tune with historical changes. The 
drama of the politics of the social imaginary is both the inhabiting of historically-contingent 
mythologies as well as the transitions from one mythology to another.42 
The aesthetic understood as a generator of secular mythologies in these senses—as quasi-
theological structures rooted in but relatively autonomous from history—rather than realism, I 
will argue, is the cornerstone of Bazin’s work. Indeed, Bazin’s achievement was to take the 
framework of high Romanticism and argue that it finds its justification not in hermetic utopic 
visions of solitary authors but in an industrialized, democratic, and popular culture where an 
opaque correspondence between a historical moment and its artworks sub-consciously orients the 
political imagination of their spectators and readers. While any solitary spectator watching any 
film engages a mythic imaginary, for Bazin the specifically popular and industrial character of 
cinema made it a pre-eminently political medium that brought together a large number of these 
solitary spectators who together make a film’s mythic imaginary potentially politically effective. 
In this regard, the cinema was an inheritor not so much of Romantic poetic or painterly traditions 
but of the nineteenth-century novel and its origins in the serial format. Therefore, the Bazin we 
will come across is one who was deeply invested in genre films as vehicles for the social 
imaginary and who worried about cinematic realism’s capacity to convert the image as 
imaginary to images that constitute, in his words, ‘a fallacious alibi of [empirical] reality.’43ii 
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To summarize this discussion of the aesthetic, it is a cross-medial paradigm under which 
the work of art is a bearer of social mythologies. In this, it is a quasi-theological structure that 
has a relative autonomy from this history from which it takes its material only in turn to impose 
its form on it. Let us now turn to the other key term, ‘politics,’ that too needs some historical and 
conceptual specificity. The question is in what sense we can call the structure of the aesthetic I 
have described political and what kind of critical response it calls for. After all, it might be a 
commonplace to say that works of art influence our sense of history in ways that we don’t grasp 
clearly. One response to this might be to call for formal strategies that expose the illusory 
qualities of the aesthetic, another might be to sharpen critical strategies of demystification, 
another still might be to call for works of art that give us the ideological orientation that we want 
from them. Understanding the specific attitude that Bazin took towards the ‘bad faith’ inherent in 
the mythic structure of the aesthetic is crucial for understanding the specificity of his idea of the 
political. 
The Bad Faith of Sartrean Politics 
When I said at the outset that some classical film theorists might seem better placed to 
inform us about cinema’s political role at this moment of historical crises, all it meant was that 
an Eisenstein or a Benjamin believed cinema had a role to play in the transformation of 
consciousness at a moment of high political stakes similar to our own. For them, cinema may 
thus have been a political tool in some sense.  But this is just one idea about what cinematic 
politics might be. For the apparatus theorists of the late 1960s and ‘70s, the politics of the image 
entailed the role of cinema in stabilizing the ideology of a self-sufficient subjectivity that in itself 
was a class construct. A political engagement with the image and its apparatus involved 
unmasking its workings. For cultural studies scholars, it involved going beyond the formal 
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constructs of the image to look at how a range of historically-specific interests, identities, and 
expressions intersect within and around it. 
Given the diversity in even a thumbnail listing of only three paradigms for understanding 
the relationship between politics and art, and the fact that so many scholars occupy themselves in 
interrogating it, it should give us pause that neither Raymond Williams’s Keywords nor the more 
recent New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society has an entry on ‘politics’ or 
‘political art.’44 It surely cannot be that the meaning of these terms is self-evident. There clearly 
are varying patterns for how some of the other keywords—society, representation, democracy, 
culture, liberalism, radical, and so on—come together to constitute the ‘political’ character of art 
and aesthetics. In this part of the introduction I will take up the reigning paradigm of aesthetic 
politics in Bazin’s time—Jean-Paul Sartre’s theorization of ‘committed’ literature—that Bazin 
had to contend with, and which was used by his contemporaries to accuse him of formalism at 
the expense of politics. Bazin had a complicated relationship with Sartre’s work that might best 
be described as ‘using Sartre against Sartre’ in the realm of aesthetic politics. The ideas of 
‘surviving politics’ and ‘bad faith’ in this dissertation’s title are meant to capture this and I will 
elaborate upon the significance of these terms in the discussion to follow. 
Sartre too traced the emergence of modern art as a product of its dissociation from the 
theological and political programs of the Church and the Court. He argues that Kant invented an 
empty autonomy of the aesthetic in order to mark this break, but also to prevent art from serving 
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the emergent ruling class of the bourgeoisie.45 However, he argues that this is a self-deceiving 
autonomy since art ends up serving the new ruling class by omission. As the 1945 preface 
introducing the journal Les Temps Modernes makes clear, this stance of aesthetic autonomy 
implicates the likes of the Goncourt Brothers and Flaubert for the events of the Paris Commune, 
not because they sanctioned it ideologically but because they used the idea of aesthetic autonomy 
to remain silent as these events took place.46 
For Sartre, one must always ask ‘For whom does one write?’ since the idea of complete 
autonomy cannot keep literature from serving an ideology if only through omission. For him, 
since the nineteenth-century writer gained his autonomy in the context of class development in 
an industrial context, he should have written for a split class public, raising the consciousness of 
the proletariat and bringing the bourgeoisie to witness its own inequity. If only he had done this, 
‘without doubt, Marxism would have triumphed’ while at the same time become an open 
ideology that is transformed by the rival ideologies that it would have digested.47 As a realized 
ideal, concrete literature would be a synthesis of ‘Negativity,’ which abolishes the self-
satisfactions or inequities of whatever exists, and a ‘Project,’ which outlines a future order.48 As 
such, literature would be a perpetual questioning that keeps the future open, a quality which he 
identifies with an ‘undifferentiated feminine desire’ rather than analytical thinking.49 
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Sartre’s ideal of aesthetic politics requires an appeal to the freedom of the reader by the 
freedom of a writer who writes for his time.50 But since such an ideal situation of perpetual 
questioning did not exist either in postwar France or elsewhere, the role of the writer is simply 
defined by the choice of whether or not he writes for his time. Choosing to write for one’s time 
entailed putting aesthetic autonomy at the service of concrete social requirements: “[E]ach book 
proposes a concrete liberation on the basis of a particular alienation.”51 So aesthetic politics in 
this Sartrean sense requires a clear stance by the writer on the issues of the day that proceeds 
from a negation of what is towards a projection into what might be in the future. We need to here 
link Sartrean understanding of literary commitment to his philosophy and in particular to the idea 
of ‘bad faith’ from which we can then identify some contradictions pertinent to how Bazin 
responds to this discourse. 
The ideas of negation and projection may map on to a philosophy of history in Sartre’s 
work, and they certainly have Hegelian origins, but he had worked them out most sustainedly 
before and through the war in relation to understanding individual being. The key terms in Being 
and Nothingness (1943) are the being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself is pure, 
undefined non-conscious being which through the unavoidable freedom in which it exists must 
come to consciousness as being-for-itself. The undefined character of being-in-itself must be 
understood as ‘undefined by itself’ because it inevitably exists in and defined by a situation not 
originally of its own choosing, such as the fact that one is born in a certain class, in a certain 
place, and a particular time in history. The situation defines the possibilities for being but never 
entirely since there is always a residue of freedom that exceeds the situation. For being to come 
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to consciousness and become for-itself, it must nihiliate or negate the situation and chose its 
possibility. The negation of the situation in a movement towards some possibility at the same 
time negates all the other possibilities that being has not chosen. So far, Sartre’s ontology of 
being appears as a phenomenology of self-realization. However, there can be no self-realization 
because that would mean that the self or being would have arrived at its destination and become 
another in-itself and thus lose the self-consciousness it must always strive towards. If a person 
having been born in a working-class family transcends this class situation into a bourgeois life, it 
would be a mistake for her to take this as achieved self-realization. It is in the nature of being to 
put everything that simply is and its possibilities into question and to forever strain towards 
being-for-itself. This is a picture of a constant disintegration of being since the fact, but not the 
idea, of self-realization is alien to it. When we chose to act in order to become something, there 
is nothing that justifies this goal over others, since there are no metaphysical guarantees. 
Everything happens as if the world, man, man-in-the-world succeeded in realizing 
only a missing God. Everything happens therefore as if the in-itself and the for-itself 
were presented in a state of disintegration in relation to an ideal synthesis. Not that 
the integration has ever taken place but on the contrary precisely because it is always 
indicated and always possible.52 
According to Sartre, we overcome this disintegration of world and being through a 
process of bad faith which is a form of self-deception. It is not strictly a lie because the person 
does not consciously know that he is lying.  Moreover, it is a process rather than a lie about any 
determinate fact other than that of the disintegration at the heart of being. For example, in order 
to be a hairdresser, one needs not only to be able to perform tasks such as cutting hair but also 
comport oneself in a certain manner. A hairdresser may be expected to be gregarious so one 
learns to talk about the trivialities of the day when cutting hair. This is to conform to one’s social 
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role as a given, a facticity, or an in-itself. But then the hairdresser always transcends the role of 
the hairdresser, as for example someone who is also an amateur ornithologist and organizer of 
the local bird-watchers’ society expected to have specialized knowledge about te migratory 
patterns of birds. But she transcends both these roles as a free being which she must deny in 
order to go on inhabiting her customary roles. This constant, unconscious denial of other 
possibilities is the structure of bad faith. We need bad faith in order to go on being true to 
whatever contingent acts we perform. But bad faith also works as necessary denial in another 
way. The moment we decide to shed the roles we have come to play unconsciously and decide to 
acknowledge our freedom and become something else, we are required to confront what we 
are—a hairdresser, for example—and then negate that in order to try and become what we are 
not yet. In this moment of suspension, bad faith consists in in effect denying a fact (‘I am not a 
hairdresser or an expert in ornithology.’) in order to affirm the possibility of something that does 
not yet exist. We return through this version of bad faith to the same instable structure of being, 
what Sartre calls a ‘perpetually disintegrating game of synthesis.’53 
On Sartre’s analysis, either bad faith is inescapable or, as he says in the conclusion of 
Being and Nothingness, it can only be escaped by denying all symbolic values that attach to 
empirical states.54 Such a denial is the constant affirmation of freedom and a constant realization 
of the equivalence of all action, ‘whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations.’55 What 
kind of ethical imperative can come from this realization of the equal futility of all action that 
can then ground political experience? Sartre himself asks, ‘And can one live this new aspect of 
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being? In particular will freedom by taking itself for an end escape all situation?’56 Sartre 
promised a future work that would address these questions on the ethical plane, something that 
he never completed.57 Given such a precipice on which his philosophical inquiries remained at 
the end of the war, we might ask what advance the idea of commitment he espoused in the 
immediate postwar years represent. It seems nothing more than a call for as full an 
acknowledgement as possible of one’s situatedness in history, attended by an ‘anguish as 
conditioned freedom [that] accepts more fully its responsibility as an existent by whom the world 
comes into being.’58 History and politics, in other words, come into being through us, for which 
we are responsible, and since whatever comes to be is futile, acceptance of history and politics is 
a perpetual game of anguish and disintegrating synthesis. In the postwar years, however, this 
consciousness of futility called upon certain strategies of bad faith on Sartre’s own part. 
As Alice Kaplan and Philip Watts have argued, there were some key consequences to the 
fact that Sartre conceived his postwar program for a literary commitment in the midst of the 
postwar purges of collaborators, including by the National Committee of Writers formed under 
the Occupation and in which Sartre participated prominently.59 As Watts writes, his involvement 
in the purge was only one of a long line of involvement in judicial cases—such as his campaigns 
for the release of Jean Genet and the case of Henri Martin, a naval soldier who refused to fight in 
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Indochina—which saw “Sartre consistently [assign] to himself the roles of attorney, judge, and 
jury.”60 Thus, his writings acquired a juridical quality in which ideas and people seem to be on 
trial. What is curious about Sartre’s leading role in articulating such a mandate for the writer is 
the fact that during the Occupation he wasn’t among the most active Resistants. As with so many 
French people, he carried on with his professional duties and his career did not suffer any 
significant setbacks, and he occasionally published by complying with German censors and even, 
in one or two instances, with collaborationist publications and presses.61 Therefore, Tony Judt 
reads Sartre’s postwar rhetoric and practice of commitment, and also the general process of the 
postwar purges, as a compensatory exercise for a less-than-exceptional political record during 
the Occupation.62 
But the indicting mode of argument in Sartre’s postwar writing can already be traced in 
philosophical terms to the end of his prewar novel Nausea where Roquentin, a historian, has 
come to accept the realization about the inescapability of existence’s situatedness. He knows that 
existence cannot be dismissed for its lack of meaning, but that it requires justification in an act. 
He decides to abandon history since “an existant cannot justify the existence of another existant.” 
So he thinks that he might write another kind of book, “A story, for example, something that 
could never happen, an adventure. It would have to be beautiful and hard as steel and make 
people ashamed of their existence.”63 The idea of shame is important here because Roquentin in 
true Sartrean fashion senses that any justification for existence can only be contingent and not 
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necessary. So the closest one may come to escaping bad faith may just be to expose the bad faith 
of others.  So postwar, Sartre set about energetically prosecuting and shaming those who would 
fall short of its demands which also involved him becoming a self-appointed spokesman and 
advocate for the proletariat, the colonized, and everyone else who was persecuted by the state. 
However, in the absence of a clearly defined moral basis, the rhetoric of commitment became 
glibly moralizing. Perhaps the most famous instance of this moralizing disguised as 
philosophical truth was his use of the word ‘salaud’ (‘bastard’) (‘raised,’ as Bazin notes wryly at 
one point, ‘to the level of philosophical dignity’) to characterize those who insist that the 
contingent facts of their lives are in fact necessary, such as for example the idea that their wealth 
is a sign of deserving hard work rather than a certain arrangement of relations of production.64 
The idea of political commitment in Sartre is therefore inseparable from a certain juridical 
attitude and a provocation of guilt as the marker of coming to consciousness which was aligned 
with the historical experience of the Occupation and the Liberation years. 
Another important problem with Sartre’s notion of commitment is its medium-specificity. 
Those in the French film community in the postwar years who wielded the idea of committed 
cinema overlooked a simple point about Sartre’s position, which was that he spoke only of a 
committed prose literature and not even poetry. In the very first part of What Is Literature? 
Sartre invokes a medium-specific discourse to restrict his notion of commitment to prose. 
Literature needs commitment because it deals with words with determinate meaning, that is refer 
inescapably to the world; all other arts, even poetry, essentially explore the nature of their 
material, not how it refers to the world. The meaning of works of art other than prose literature is 
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always inexhaustible and often extraneous to their exploration of material and style. This too-
convenient division allowed Sartre to explore aesthetic complexity when exploring works in the 
other arts and to abandon similar critical acuity in the assessment of literature. 
And yet it was Sartre’s literary criticism of the pre-war and war years that established 
him as the fine critic who appealed to Bazin and Eric Rohmer and their generation. Rohmer 
would write in 1994 “We all devoured his texts in NRF. They renewed criticism. Collected in 
Situations I, these texts have not lost their freshness. It is regrettable that he who spoke so well of 
Faulkner, Dos Passos, Mauriac, Bataille, was not inspired, or was badly inspired, by 
cinema….”65 Initially, Sartre spoke to Rohmer and his generation even on the subject of cinema. 
The inaugural issues of Gazette du Cinéma, a journal founded by Rohmer, published a speech by 
Sartre to school students in 1931—belonging roughly to the generation of the young critics—that 
argues for the cinema as a privileged medium that will mediate the relationship of the new 
generations to the world around them.66  
Sartre’s postwar division of aesthetic labor, exempting the other arts from a clear social 
function while subordinating literature to the political demands of the time was essentially an 
exercise, as Sartre himself admits, in recovering “the professional good conscience” of writers in 
the aftermath of the Liberation and the coming to terms with the fact of writers’ collaboration 
with the Germans during the War. Because of its transparent utilitarianism, it was prose literature 
that had compromised France, and therefore it needed to redeem itself.67 Thus, soon after 
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publishing the last instalment of What Is Literature?, Sartre could write with fascination and 
easy conscience about the artist’s “quest for the Absolute” in the sculptures of Giacometti with 
not a reference to history or politics.68 What was dereliction of history in literature, for Sartre, 
was a valid mystical quest in the other arts. 
There are two key aspects of Sartrean discourse that Bazin would have resisted. The first 
is the rhetoric of shaming and prosecution that counted for politics in his work. We could point 
to the fact that Sartre stood up for important causes such as those of the working-class, the cause 
of the black people in America, and the colonized. But this would be to judge the idea of 
aesthetic politics primarily through the worth of the ideological commitments of specific works. 
The problem of aesthetic politics in Bazin’s work will turn out to be a confrontation with works 
which affect us despite the contradictions of their ideological commitments rather than their 
accordance with our own. As ideology critique understood, with a popular art form like cinema 
in particular, the problem is precisely one of being held in the grip of ideologies that are not our 
own. Sartre was an author speaking to others authors about commitment, worried about the 
political good conscience of authors. Bazin was a critic trying to understand how socio-political 
and historical experience is mediated by whatever works we as spectators encounter. Even if 
individual filmmakers were very important to him, he did not equate the ideological 
commitments of works with the explicit ones of their authors. In fact, for him the modernity of 
cinema as well as the modernity of the aesthetic was precisely its ability to indirectly tap into the 
                                                 
on clarity and transparence. Philip Watts, following Denis Hollier, sees in Sartre’s sidelining of poetry a 
marginalization of a rival literary form, something that he was to rehabilitate in the 1948 preface to an anthology of 
African and West Indian poets. See Watts, Allegories of the Purge, 70; On debates in French poetry during World 
War II on the question of a writer’s responsibilities, see Ann Smock, “1940-1944: The Honor of Poets,” in A New 
History of French Literature, 948-953. 
68
 Sartre, ‘The Quest for the Absolute,’ in The Aftermath of the War {Situations III), trans. Chris Turner (Calcutta: 
Seagull Books, 2008), 333-353; originally published in Les Temps Modernes in January 1948. 
33 
 
historical unconscious distinct from the consciousness of the author. To this end, the second 
aspect that Bazin would have found untenable was the Sartrean split between clear and 
committed prose (in which language is a tool for drawing an exact portrait of reality) and poetry 
(which ‘withdraw[s] [the reader] from the human condition and invite[s] him to consider with the 
eyes of God a language that has been turned inside out’).69 It is rather in the inside-out 
appearance of the world on film, its character as a site for mythologies, that he would locate the 
political character of the aesthetic. But there are aspects of Sartre’s work that deeply informed 
Bazin’s thought and I will now offer a theoretical sketch of how he draws upon them in 
elaborating the mythic character of the aesthetic which is at the same time, unlike for Sartre, a 
political construct.70 
The Bad Faith of Bazinian Aesthetics 
A mythology for Bazin, as I suggested earlier, necessarily takes its material from history 
but gives it an imaginary shape that then imposes itself on how we relate to our world. (I use 
‘history’ and ‘historical’ not only in the sense of ‘the past’ but also and more often to mean the 
publicly shared world in the present. In this sense, it has a close relationship to ‘politics’ and 
‘political.’) In Sartrean terms, what mythologies do is negate the multitudinous character of 
historical experience to give an abstracted image of history. Rather than an ‘in-itself’ with all its 
empirical thickness, history appears ‘for-itself,’ giving us a historical consciousness that orients 
experience. But the world in all its empirical thickness continues to exist behind the mythic 
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image and when we try to explain how this image orients us, we inevitably come up against a 
point where we alternate between the image and the world. 
To take an example, a rudimentary reading of Wall Street (Oliver Stone, 1987) and Wolf 
of Wall Street (Martin Scorsese, 2013) may be that they are images of decadence and corruption 
not just of Wall Street but of a financialized society in which an increasingly intensified 
sensorial, hedonistic reality corresponds paradoxically to an increasingly vanishing world of 
stable objects, as the value of money, no longer tied at the source to the physical standard of 
gold, multiplies as if by itself. A university professor offers a sophisticated version of this 
reading in peer-reviewed scholarship and teaches it to students. The same professor is also part 
of a committee on increasing the university endowment where he sometimes needs to meet and 
convince financial traders that contributing to the university may be a good idea for a variety of 
reasons, neglecting to mention that he firmly believes that university education helps in training 
the next generation of the country’s citizens to think critically about the economic foundations of 
its society and who will then hopefully work to transform it. But apart from these professional 
duties of making rigorous arguments and participating in university administration, the professor 
in watching the films is also drawn to identify with the pleasures such a society affords. All these 
contradictions, especially the last fact of pleasure in the very contents of the object of critique, 
are an effect of aesthetic bad faith. 
Sartre, who quit his academic position and refused the Nobel Prize to avoid being tied to 
the symbolic and practical constraints of these institutions, would no doubt tap into the guilt of 
the unconscious self-deception involved in the hypothetical situation I just described. Bazin 
would resist this line by arguing that since bad faith on Sartre’s own account is unavoidable there 
could be no question of guilt unless perhaps if some sort of conscious deception is involved 
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which does not concern the aesthetic or anything except the individuals involved. A residual bad 
faith is constitutive of all experience and it is constitutive of aesthetic experience. The specificity 
of aesthetic bad faith consists in the fact that it commits us to history and its contradictions 
affectively rather than intellectually. In my example of the Wall Street films, the hypothetical 
argument would have no force unless we are drawn into the film’s pleasures however 
objectionable we might find them. This second aspect of involuntary pleasure is what critics of 
Wolf of Wall Street understand who point out that the film’s depiction of the hedonistic lifestyle 
feels like a validation rather than a condemnation of fraudulent trading. But any aesthetic critique 
needs to pass through at least a vague sense of complicity with what is being critiqued, and only 
reactive pleasure rather than rational argument can be the basis of complicity with contradictions. 
There is another layer of bad faith to the aesthetic that further complicates its political 
function. In my example, the professor whose political imagination is oriented by a reading of 
the films is put in a situation where that orientation seems to have a direct bearing when he has to 
convince financial traders to part with money because the state does not give enough for the 
university to be financially secure. But while the film orients him in the historical condition, no 
particular action necessarily follows from it. He could try and convince the trader or he could as 
well try to recuse himself from the committee and spend the same time trying to lobby the state 
to increase funding for higher education. Assuming, of course, that he is not seduced by the Wall 
Street lifestyle and embarks on a late second career as a stockbroker. The films, therefore, are a 
false alibi for any action that follows from the orientation they provide. To argue otherwise is to, 
like Sartre, reduce the work of art to a tool wielded by the ideology it serves. In which case, 
when Scorsese’s film, instead of a resounding critique of financial fraud that we expected gives 
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us its glorification we would be within our rights to sue the filmmakers as we would sue the car 
company when the air bag fails to deploy in an accident.  
Finally, there is the fact that the pleasure we take in films as aesthetic objects is 
dependent on, in Sartre’s words, the ‘inside-out’ appearance of the world on screen. This ‘inside-
out’ appearance would for Sartre be a turn away from the world and in this Bazin agrees initially. 
We will see that for Bazin film as an aesthetic medium could hope to be political only by first 
accepting its status as a site of escape from a history whose uncertainties or unwelcome 
certainties we seek to survive. As Abrams argues, the theological basis of the aesthetic means 
that it is predicated on a turn away from the uncertainties, conflicts, and discontents of the 
temporal world. However, he points out, these are the same conditions that furnish the material 
for works of art and ‘on which they impose their artistic order so as to achieve their entirely 
human effects.’71 Given this paradox, any relationship that a film as an aesthetic object has to the 
historical world of the spectator is formed on the spectator’s escape route from history. 
Therefore, aesthetics has no direct bearing on politics as action, but it has the potential to re-form 
at a remove the political horizon of experience that is the historical world. 
On Sartre’s account with which Bazin would agree, politics occurs only when one acts or 
speaks freely in situations of ambiguity. The aesthetic gives an imaginary form to the world but 
does not take away the ambiguity of action and speech. This imaginary form is its political 
character. I take this distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ from Chantal Mouffe who 
in turn bases it on Heidegger’s distinction between the ontological and the ontic, but also from 
Hannah Arendt’s theorization of politics. For Mouffe, the ontological level of the political is that 
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which frames a society as a set of antagonisms represented by a range of interests and positions. 
The ontic level of politics is the set of practices and institutions in which the antagonistic 
positions are provisionally contained and given an order.72 For example, representative 
parliamentary democracy in the West has conventionally framed politics as progressive and 
conservative, Left and Right, often with a two-party system. However, the actual politically 
agonistic interests do not naturally align with this arrangement. For a conventional Left program 
working class interests and racial equality may run together but at a given historical moment 
these interests may clash at the political level, and it is the work of politics to re-contain their 
opposition within the shared framework of parliamentary and party representation. 
My use, in relation to the aesthetic, of Mouffe’s distinction between the political and 
politics is slightly different from hers. It is the political, in the form of a work of art, that 
provides a provisional, imaginary form to the historical world and politics is how our actions and 
speech negotiate the antagonisms and ambiguities of the historical world. It is this imaginary 
form imposed on the world that, to use a phrase from Arendt, introduces us into politics.73 In the 
first chapter, we will see how Bazin conceives of the cinema as a medium that potentially forms 
the political horizon of a world that for its spectators is often devoid of politics because it is 
either formless or its form has become unbearable. In giving it a (new) form, films therefore 
make it political again. 
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On Bazin’s account as it will emerge in this dissertation, there is only an indirect link 
between the political form of the aesthetic and the politics that may follow from it. Despite the 
political importance of the aesthetic, the closest we come to an aesthetic politics is when we 
speak about films and argue, from a place of affect, about what they have meant for us and seek 
to persuade others of the validity of our interpretations. In doing this, we attempt to make 
effective the political imaginary offered by a film which would otherwise perhaps not outlast the 
week of its release. But the tension between the political and politics of aesthetics reaches a 
particularly intense pitch when films affectively attach us to contradictions and ideologies that 
we cannot accept rationally, as in the tension for some spectators between enjoyment and 
critique in responding to the world of Wolf of Wall Street. I mentioned earlier that what is 
particularly important to Bazin is the fact that more often than not to watch films is to put oneself 
in front of an ideological picture that we do not control but which controls us. In talking critically 
about a film, everything turns upon giving an account of what ideological picture we become 
attached to and despite what contradictions within it, contradictions that we are otherwise not 
inclined to abide. One important effect of the political, therefore, is the unexpected 
acknowledgement of the force of ideological pictures and therefore historical experiences that we 
otherwise refuse. In this, the aesthetic retains an ability to keep giving us a world other than what 
we are inhabit unselfconsciously. The work of a critic and of critique for Bazin is ‘to prolong… 
the shock of a work of art,’iii a shock that is more often than not felt in the imaginary or, to use 
another word, ideology.74 
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Keeping the Faith 
A last but significant point before I move on to the chapter descriptions concerning the 
quasi-theological elements in this understanding of the political character of the aesthetic. If any 
politics that follows from aesthetic experience must often acknowledge the power of what we 
cannot abide in rational terms, then for Bazin it can only be a politics based on love, particularly 
on the Platonic and Augustinian idea of love for the non-self that Abrams has argued is the basis 
of the modern understanding of disinterested pleasure in the aesthetic. Emphasizing this 
philosophical and theological basis of the aesthetic and arguing for its political character from 
there is bound to touch upon some disciplinary sensitivities that have accompanied Bazin’s 
reception both in France and in the Anglophone academy. Philip Rosen, for example, argues that 
if only Hugh Gray had made different translation choices, the ideology critics would not have 
mistaken Bazin’s theory to be contaminated by Catholic piety.75 Hervé Joubert-Laurencin 
criticizes Marie-José Mondzain for placing Bazin’s discourse within a Christian theological 
framework, particularly her use of the idea of acheiropoeisis or creation without hands to discuss 
Bazinian ontology of the cinematic image.76 His argument, from biography, is that Bazin seems 
to have lost his faith in 1940, and that his time studying at the very secular École Normale de 
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Saint Cloud must have marked him much more than any religious training in his earlier years.77 
Where Rosen tries to bracket and ironize Bazin’s Christian references, Joubert-Laurencin 
attempts to resolve the question at the level of biography and argues for a similarly ironic attitude 
towards religion. 
Blandine Joret has characterized the attitude of Rosen and Joubert-Laurencin as ‘subtle 
hypocrisy’ (with some justification I think) since the pre-eminence of Christian terminology in 
Bazin’s work and ideas cannot be so easily wished away.78 The rather insistent attempts at 
cutting the link between any religious heritage and Bazin’s theoretical commitments speaks less 
about any possibility that Bazin may have been a confessional critic than about a certain narrow 
conceptualization of secularism that cannot stop to question what it might mean for vocabulary 
from a paradigm that no longer commands the social efficacy or adherence that it did in the past 
to persist in other more current paradigms of discourse. The question is not of Bazin’s biography 
and personal faith at all, and it is difficult to see what the point is of denying any piety in Bazin 
when any careful reading of even the long available translations, despite Rosen’s quibbling, 
yields no sign of any. Therefore, the question to ask is if it is possible for religion to be 
secularized, what it means to do so, and also what it meant historically in Bazin’s time. 
Bazin’s intellectual formation, as Andrew describes, was in the milieu of Action 
Catholique and its mandate to forge a social mission for Catholicism. On the eve of the war he 
was a member of the Jeunesse Étudiants Chrétiens (JEC), the student arm of this movement. 
This is important for figuring out what he understood of religion from the experiences of Action 
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Catholique. And we get a clear sign of this in an article titled ‘Cinema and Theology,’ which is 
actually a lengthy essay on Dieu a Besoin des Hommes (Jean Delannoy, 1950). Delannoy’s film 
is about a priest from the mainland serving on an island on the Brittany coast but who quits his 
office after being frustrated for long by the coarse attitudes of the villagers and their practice of 
ransacking shipwrecks. When he leaves, and as the church hierarchy for some time cannot find 
anyone willing to replace him, the villagers feel uneasy and push the sacristan to take up the 
priest’s duties. With the sacristan in his new role and with a manner and thoughts familiar to his 
parish, the church and the villagers once again become responsive to each other. The drama turns 
when the church authorities on the mainland send a new priest with the same haughty attitude as 
of the one who quit, and to whom the villagers prefer their homegrown priest. At one point in the 
essay, Bazin writes: 
In effect, isn’t the highest religious merit of this film to remind us of this eminent 
Christian truth that the last few centuries of Catholic history have perhaps 
dangerously obscured but which the experience of the missions is in the course of 
restoring: the knowledge of the communitarian origins of the priestly vocation?79iv 
There are two things to note in these lines. The first is the idea of the communitarian 
origins of priesthood and the other is the reference to the missions that were restoring this 
insight. The second of these aspects holds the key to the significance of the first. Bazin was not 
referring to the missions in the colonies but those in France. 
While the gradual erosion of the primacy of the church and of faith in public life had set 
in in Western Europe since at least the late eighteenth century, the scale in Catholic France was 
perhaps much smaller through the nineteenth century than in Protestant countries. It is only with 
the growth of the working class population and the rise of Communism in the early twentieth 
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century, along with the separation of church and state under the Third Republic in 1905, that the 
church began to worry about diminishing numbers of those who turned to it. By the onset of the 
war, there was a creeping sense that France was well on the way to being de-Christianized. This 
had been behind the Far Right Action Française’s attempts at re-claiming power from the secular 
Third Republic during the 1930s and what had also made the Vichy regime during the 
Occupation an engine of hope for those who wished to restore the centrality of the church to 
public life. But Bazin had in mind the work of Action Catholique organizations from even before 
the war in thinking about the church’s relationship to the working classes. In 1943, a key work 
by two secular priests from the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétiens (JOC) described the state of the 
church-society relationship in France in its very title: La France: Pays de Mission?80 The 
question mark was moot because the book led to the founding of the missions intérieures, efforts 
towards which had been underway in a muted manner since the 1930s.81 
A key insight of the book was that the church could no longer operate, or operate 
exclusively, on the geographical idea of the parish because the life experiences of the classes had 
formed new lines of community identification. A worker was less inclined to go to the church 
because he had little in common with the bourgeoisie that attended from the same parish. 
Therefore, the community of the church must be located in places, such as the factory, where 
communal bonds were already in place. The implied idea is that the church no longer founds a 
community but goes searching for communities to which it must adapt. It is this change in the 
                                                 
80
 Henri Godin and Yvan Daniel, La France: Pays de Mission? (Lyon: Abeille, 1943). For my account of this 
history as well as of the book, I draw upon Gerd-Rainer Horn, Western European Liberation Theology, 1924-1959: 
The First Wave (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). For a brief but relevant account of what it meant to 
secularize religion in relation to politics in postwar France, see Colin Roberts, ‘Secularization and the 
(Re)formulation of French Catholic Identity,’ in Kay Chadwick (ed.), Catholicism, Politics and Society in 
Twentieth-Century France (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 260-267. 
81
 Horn, Western European Liberation Theology, 235-242. 
43 
 
function of the church to which Bazin referred when he wrote about ‘the communitarian origins 
of the priestly vocation.’ While the drama of the film turns ostensibly on the office of the priest, 
it is the whole theological basis of Christianity that is in play here as indicated by the title of the 
essay. Thus, what Catholicism had forgotten over the last centuries was the communitarian 
origins of its theological elements. Bazin’s lines here echo those of the key theologian of Mission 
de France who, in defending the decision to allow the Communist newspaper L’Humanité as 
well as the works of Marx into the seminary libraries, wrote: ‘Christians committed a grave error 
when, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they believed that one could love 
God without loving other human beings, without that passion for justice, to love human beings 
without knowing them. Christian thought has lost its revolutionary motivation.’82 Through these 
lines we return to the observation which started this digression on Bazin’s understanding of 
French Social Catholicism: that the idea of aesthetic politics that we get from Bazin’s work is 
based on spectatorial and critical love for the world on film, a love that precedes any clear 
understanding of the contradictions films involve us in and, in the end, despite their 
contradictions. We will see this play out in Bazin’s readings of Chaplin’s films, the Western, an 
anti-war documentary, Italian neo-realist films and some others still, with no reference 
whatsoever to theological concerns. 
What I have tried to show here is that Bazin’s redeployment of Catholic terminology 
comes from a historical experience of the secularization of Catholicism in France, much like, as 
Abrams has argued, the aesthetic conception of art itself was a secularization of Christian 
theology. But when Abrams points out that the Ancient Greek heritage subsumed with 
Christianity, in the form of Platonic philosophy, re-appears in this process of secularization, we 
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must note that what is revealed are the pagan origins of Christianity itself. (This point will be 
important to my reading of the ‘The ontology of the photographic image.’) This historical 
genealogy reaffirms Bazin’s point that theology is made out of the material of history and is 
secular in its origins, and I find that this insight serves to cut through the anxieties around the 
appearance of religious terminology in a secular critical discourse such as film theory. 
The final question is why love as an affective attachment to both the unknown and the 
contradictory is a political idea. The answer will emerge in my readings of Bazin’s work over the 
course of the dissertation. Here I will only point out that at a couple of moments in the argument 
I will be drawing upon Arendt’s theorization of love in its Augustinian conception as a secular, 
political experience that can reconcile us to the necessarily unpredictable and contradictory 
character of politics instead of opting to foreclose this condition either through authoritarian 
solutions or through a defeated turn away from politics. As someone who drew on this insight 
amidst sustained analyses of the experience of totalitarianism, Arendt’s contemporaneous work 
is well-placed to complement the broader historical significance of Bazin’s insights. 
Chapter Descriptions 
The argument is organized in two parts, with the first set organized around Bazin’s 
conceptualization of films as vehicles for mythologies and the second set addressing the problem 
of realism within his aesthetic framework. All chapters offer philological readings of Bazin’s 
work to identify the debates he was involved in and to reconstruct some of his key film readings 
with a view to the arriving at an account of his aesthetic politics. While the first part looks at 
popular film genres as the sites of mythologies, it is in the second part that I take up more 
explicitly the quasi-theological structure of aesthetic mythologies as I have discussed it in this 
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introduction. However, as we will see, this structure pertains as much to the discussion in the 
first part as it does to the second. 
Chapter one delineates Bazin’s understanding of modern art as a two-faced structure that 
is at once a site of escape from history and a site from where history acquires a form in the 
spectator’s imaginary. We will see that, in order to affirm this duality in film as an aesthetic 
medium, Bazin equates cinematic realism with a democratic desire for history but argues that the 
medium soon turned to fiction and narrative forms to acquire the ambiguous relationship to 
history that characterizes the political form of modern aesthetics. Chapter two continues this 
exploration with more specific reference to debates in Bazin’s times over the relative political 
significance of subjects (as in the topics of films’ narratives) and style. Through his various 
writings on adaptation, Bazin arrived at an understanding of subject as a mythological form 
embodied in genres, stars, and fictional personae. It is through such forms, he argues, that cinema 
speaks to historical experience. 
Chapter three begins an exploration of the mythological structure theorized by Bazin 
through a reconstruction of some of his most important genre and film readings. Here we see him 
him launch a spirited defense of Chaplin’s Monsieur Verdoux (1947) and using this film to re-
read the entirety of Chaplin’s work in order to sketch the mythology of his alter-ego, Charlot. He 
appropriates Sartrean existentialist terminology to take on Left-wing critics who were 
confounded by Chaplin’s welcome critique of the establishment but did not know how to 
respond to his new misogynistic persona. Bazin reads Verdoux into Charlot to argue that what 
Verdoux is Charlot always was, but that for decades audiences had overlooked his 
contradictions. And yet, Bazin argues, once we recognize Charlot in Verdoux, we cannot 
renounce our attachment to either. This introduces the idea of an “ontological sympathy” that 
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audiences have for screen or aesthetic mythologies; that is, a sympathy not dependent on 
conventional moral categories. 
Chapter four derives theoretical insights regarding the appropriate critical response, on 
Bazin’s account, to mythological contradictions like those we will have seen in the Chaplin 
films. Here I take up additional readings by Bazin, including those of the Western, a Marcel 
Carné film from prewar France, and a pacifist documentary by Georges Franju. Through these 
readings, I arrive at an argument for the centrality of the spectator to Bazin’s conception of 
critique as politics. In the course of the argument, I put Bazin briefly in dialogue with Parker 
Tyler and his somewhat similar reading of Chaplin to Bazin’s and with Siegfried Kracauer who 
reviewed Tyler’s book negatively. Bazin was aware of Kracauer’s work on From Caligari to 
Hitler and I use this triangulate the three critics over the question of what it is to read a film and 
on what counts as an aesthetic and political response to films. This chapter concludes one cycle 
of my argument about Bazinian aesthetic politics and its basis in a criticism of love. 
Part two of the dissertation offers a revisionary account of Bazin’s theorization of 
cinematic realism. Without denying that a complex realist aesthetic is an important part of 
Bazin’s theoretical contributions, I argue that it cannot be understood without first coming to 
grips with so far unnoticed concerns that he had about the ontological condition of the 
photographic and filmic image. Chapter five reconstructs the argument of “The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image” (henceforth, “Ontology”) by taking its historical narrative seriously and by 
reading it alongside Bazin’s other writings that fill in the gaps of the essay. We will see Bazin 
place the specificity of photo-filmic realism in the context of scientific modernity and 
secularization. But his account of secularization, as we have seen briefly here, is much more 
complex than a linear passage from religious to scientific thought. I will elaborate upon this to 
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draw a relationship between Bazin’s theorization of modern mythologies, secular modernity, and 
realism. We will also see that at the heart of “Ontology” is an unease about photo-filmic 
realism’s ability to alienate us from the very world it reproduces. Chapter six will elaborate upon 
one source of this unease: the truth claims embedded in the filmic image that align it with a logic 
of totality. In this chapter, ‘totality,’ and its variations ‘total war,’ ‘total history,’ ‘total artwork,’ 
and ‘total cinema,’ are the key concepts through which I read Bazin’s analyses of various 
propaganda or thesis films. Chapter seven continues this focus by reading the place of the body 
in the totalizing powers of cinematic realism against the background of the totalitarian 
experiences of the Moscow Show Trials and the Holocaust. Realism here appears either 
complicit with totalitarian ambitions or inadequate for providing testimony to the experience of 
totalitarian terror. 
Chapter eight argues that the two cornerstones of the reception of Bazin’s theorization of 
realism—the idea of integral realism (illustrated by the long take and deep focus) and Italian 
neo-realist films—need to be read not so much in relation to cinematic ontology but the 
accommodation of ontological realism within the framework of the aesthetic, and this is as true 
of documentaries as fictional films. It turns out, for example, that Bazin defended Crossfire 
(Edward Dmytryk, 1947) against The Best Years of Our Lives (William Wyler, 1947) arguing 
that the realism of Dmytryk’s film was much more aesthetically compelling and therefore the 
more important document of postwar American experience. His writings on De Sica actually 
provide an argument for how the filmmaker had succeeded in moving away from the 
documentary realism of the earliest neo-realist films which for Bazin had become a mannerist 
trait in global film production by just 1948. Here I conclude with a discussion of Bazin’s reading 
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of neo-realism’s ability to combine a refusal of existing socio-political reality with a love for it, 
returning us to the crux of the political character of the aesthetic in Bazin’s writings. 
The epilogue discusses Bazin’s anticipation in the 1950s of the already impending “end 
of cinema.” Following Sam Di Iorio, but departing from his premises, I take Chronicle of a 
Summer (Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin, 1961) as a historical marker of this crisis in cinema as 
Bazin may have understood it. 
Note on Sources and Translations 
I have drawn upon a much larger corpus of writings of Bazin than those available in 
print, either in French or English. In this I have benefited greatly by a month spent in New Haven 
consulting Dudley Andrew’s archive of the complete writings of Bazin. And I benefited further 
and immensely from the online catalogue of these writings created by Dudley Andrew and Hervé 
Joubert-Laurencin, meticulously indexed with details of film titles and filmmakers mentioned in 
each of the more than 2600 articles. It has allowed me to track several of the writings on my own 
and made it much easier to consult articles relevant to my argument. Without this aid, the work 
on this dissertation would have been infinitely more difficult. 
Depending on availability for close reading, I have relied on certain publications more 
than others in order to track Bazin’s thinking over the years. The publications where Bazin 
published regularly at different periods of time that I was able to consult are L’Écran Français, 
Esprit, L’Observateur/France-Observateur, Radio Cinéma Télévision, and Cahiers du Cinéma. 
The daily Parisien Libéré, where he reviewed all new releases, I could access only partially, but 
L’Observateur and Radio Cinéma Télévision, where he often published longer pieces every week 
than in Parisien Libéré, I hope, compensate to a large extent in tracking his responses to the full 
range of films he came across in the course of his career. 
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For the most part I have translated quotations directly from the French and, where 
available, have cited the corresponding publication and page numbers of the English translations 
in brackets. While I have benefited greatly from consulting the existing translations, wherever 
the original French text is cited with the available translations referenced in brackets, the 
responsibility for the given translations, including any errors, is mine. The original French text is 
given as footnotes, marked by roman numerals, in the Appendix. On the few occasions that I 
have found the existing translations adequate, I have cited them directly. 
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Part I: Mythology and History
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Chapter 1 
Cinema and the Non-Space-Time of History 
 
If we can accept the basic premise that to inquire into political character of the aesthetic 
is to inquire into a work of art’s or a medium’s relationship to history, then an aesthetic idea of 
cinema requires that this relationship be understood as two-faced, both turned towards history 
and turned away from it. Turned towards it because it takes its material from history, and away 
from it because it cannot be reduced to history. In this brief chapter, I uncover Bazin’s argument 
for this two-faced character of cinema. In the first part, I will look at the original version of the 
“The myth of total cinema” (henceforth “Total cinema (1946)”) which is substantially different 
from the 1958 version published in the first volume of Qu’est-ce Que le Cinéma?1 In the 
original, we will see Bazin argue for a privileged relationship between the cinema and the 
historical moment of its emergence in the late nineteenth century, in particular a democratic 
desire for participation in history. Despite this argument, Bazin welcomed the fact that the 
medium soon adapted itself to the narratives of fantasy and escape rather than remain a 
privileged site for the direct appearance of the image of history. In the second part, we will see 
him argue that it is only by making cinematic realism a paradoxical site for an escape from 
history in the form of narrative cinema could the medium, he argues, orient us within this 
history. By drawing comparison with Arendt’s reading of the condition of modern history, I will 
argue that Bazin’s two-faced conception of cinema is not only in line with a nineteenth century 
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conception of the aesthetic but is particularly attuned to the experience of cataclysmic wars and 
ideological impasses that defined the twentieth century. The form of the political the cinema 
takes is that of a “non-space-time” within history. 
The Apparatus 
The general understanding of “The myth of total cinema” (henceforth ‘Total cinema 
(1958)”) is that it calls upon us to understand the significance of cinema’s realist vocation in 
relation to a timeless idea of and desire for a perfect reproduction of reality. Tom Gunning, in his 
re-appreciation of “Total cinema (1958),” recalls how this led a couple of generations of film 
scholars to dismiss Bazin as an idealist. Though he himself attempts a sympathetic reading of his 
idealism, he cannot ultimately remove him from that framework, only shifting the idealist 
paradigm from a Platonic to a Hegelian idealism (because Hegel is a friend of history and Plato 
isn’t), tempered with the phenomenological irresolution of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.2 
However, the Hegelian character of Bazin’s argument in “Total cinema (1946)” is not limited to 
an abstract dialectical structure but can be seen in its insistence on seeing a deep correspondence 
between the cinema’s invention, the particular form it took, and the democratization of history in 
the nineteenth century. This substantial difference between the two versions—between an 
argument for cinema’s ‘timeliness’ and one for its ‘timelessness’—makes the note 
accompanying the later version, “Extrait de Critique, 1946,” less than exact. We can only 
speculate on the reason for the changes, but I will here look at the original argument and how it 
reorients our understanding of Bazin’s working premises. 
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Bazin argues in “Total cinema (1946)” that the subject of his essay, Georges Sadoul’s 
first volume of the Histoire Générale du Cinéma (1946), is a “psycho-sociology of the 
invention” of cinema rather than a purely material or technological one. He asks, “How do we 
grasp with certainty the subjective motive [le mobile subjectif] of an invention? What 
psychoanalysis would give an account of the relative importance of a technical progression, 
sometimes accidental, and of myths more or less confused that consciously or not orient the 
research?”3 i In “Total cinema (1958),” if we recall, Bazin describes the subjective dimension of 
cinema’s invention by arguing that the cinema is an idealist phenomenon because its invention 
cannot be deduced from its scientific history alone. This is the case, he argues, because the 
principles behind its functioning and the rudimentary technology were at least theoretically 
available for a very long time before its actual invention. What explains this delay in cinema’s 
invention is the fact that most people who attempted to invent it were not scientists who patiently 
worked through each step of the process, from finding a suitable base, to fixing the image, to 
adding sound and depth but tried straightaway to invent it whole, full of sound, color, and depth. 
This argument appears in the original too, but its points of reference are very different. The 
argument is no less idealist, even if the explicit insistence is missing, but the historical scope 
does not stretch back insistently through Renaissance to Antiquity and to the Myth of Icarus. 
Instead, the locus of attention is the late nineteenth century and, more particularly, the difference 
between the apparatus and productions of Edison and Lumière. The basic difference is the 
Kinetoscope’s use by individuals whereas the Lumière apparatus was one that projected the 
image for communal viewing. 
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Gunning notes that Bazin does not pay much attention to the history of projection and 
suggests that he is more interested in the history of the recording apparatus.4 But the question of 
projection indeed figures prominently in the first version of the essay and Bazin explicitly 
enquires into its meaning in relation to the camera’s recording function. He writes that where 
Edison was caught up in tying the Kinetoscope to the gramophone, the “fetish of a recording disc 
placed at a narrow window,” other inventors were busy trying to refine his invention for 
projection. Bazin found in the collective audience a manifest metaphor for the extension of a 
political will not just to separate individuals but to whole societies. He places great emphasis on 
this as he repeatedly marvels at Edison’s “failure of the imagination” on the frontier of this one 
crucial feature of the new apparatus he was trying to develop, concluding from Sadoul’s book 
that Edison must be seen as a “specialist of electricity rather than optics”ii because what escaped 
him was precisely what was most important about the historical demand for images of history: its 
collective vision.5 
The question of projection was not all since it is irrelevant whether the Lumières were the 
first to hold a screening or not, and it is certain that they were not. Others might have also 
invented devices that facilitated projection, but what clinched the ‘invention’ for Lumière in 
Sadoul’s account was the combination of recording, development, and projection within the 
same device, and the device’s mobility that allowed it to be transported with ease around the 
world.6 But we are still here at the level of technology and a kind of materialist explanation that 
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Bazin could not be satisfied with. Ultimately, it is not a matter of technical detail but of 
technology’s experiential meaning: 
The genius of Louis Lumière would not have bought him the place that he occupies 
in the paternity of cinema if he had limited himself to technology. He knew how to 
make the first films that responded to a certain expectation of a collective conscience 
when faced with this new invention, and to create at once a true spectacle. While 
Edison, in his Kinetoscope, merely ran some scenes whose interest did not go 
beyond the curiosity of a faithful reconstitution of movement, Lumière, with his light 
camera, could go and catch “nature in the act.” Workers Leaving the Factory, Arrival 
of a Train are the ancestors of our newsreeels and of documentary reports with 
which one whole part of global production is profoundly occupied. It suffices to 
recall Dziga Vertov and the Russian school, or the recent war films.7iii 
Going beyond the opposition of the projection apparatus of Lumière and the personal 
apparatus of Edison’s Kinetoscope, Bazin now places the emphasis on what is recorded and 
viewed. “Nature”, as the Lumière films instantiate, is thoroughly historical, and the desire for 
“the world in its own image” is the desire for an image of history. We need to read these lines in 
conjunction with another important essay he wrote in the same year: a review of Why We Fight 
(Frank Capra, 1942-’45). In that review, he writes, “The taste for newsreel, combined with that 
for cinema, is nothing but the will to presence [“volonté de présence”] of modern man, his need 
to be present at the unfolding of History, in which political evolution as much as the technical 
means of communication and destruction are irremediably mixed up.”8iv Bazin’s emphasis here 
on political evolution and the will to presence at the unfolding of history of the newsreel 
spectator draws a very literal connection between the democratizing forces of modernity and the 
role of cinema, and it links back to the fact of the “collective conscience” mentioned in “Total 
cinema (1946).” Chapters in part two of the dissertation will look at Bazin’s confrontation with 
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the darker side of this desire. For now, the preceding argument should make it clear that for 
Bazin the invention of cinema and its consequent realism lay at complex crossroads of what he 
calls the collective unconscious of history and technological and political developments. 
But for Bazin the conjuncture of historical and political evolution and the technological 
promise of realism was only a point of departure, not a demand-supply equilibrium. At the 
outset, I mentioned that Bazin welcomed cinema’s turn to narratives and fiction and he was well 
aware that there was no inevitability to this. Long before the revisionist historians of our own 
time, Bazin was struck by the fact that the cinema need not have become an art form in the sense 
that it came to acquire with narrative and what we now recognize as feature-length cinema. He 
tried to understand how a technology that could catch history on the run and whose earliest 
production was dominated by newsreels could come to adopt narrative and fictional forms. He 
would also have had to address the question of why a medium so much of its time and with a 
privileged relationship to material reality needed to borrow its categories and conventions from 
pre-cinematic art forms. He raises these questions in “Le langage de notre temps,” where 
reflecting on the material of cinema he remarks that it is radically unlike that of music (sound) or 
painting (color) whose expression exists largely in works of art, and if they have a function of 
communication it is largely indirect. Cinema’s reliance on images could actually be read as a 
dialectical evolution of the relationship between image and writing: it could be traced back to 
hieroglyphs which combined image and alphabet; and to their separation in a non-figural 
alphabet on the one hand and illustrations on the other. If the cinema seems to now include the 
role of direct communication in the image to which written language plays a supplementary role, 
it does so in a strange manner in the light of even the first twenty-five years of cinema’s 
evolution. Rather than use the uncanny precision of its images to become a privileged vehicle for 
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journalism and pedagogy, it had lent itself predominantly to fiction. While newsreels and 
pedagogic films existed in large numbers, “[i]t’s a question of kilometers of film: for every meter 
of technical film, we print a hundred for a fiction film. It’s as if language were used nine times 
out of ten for writing novels and plays.”9v 
There is another way in which cinema had taken a surprising turn for Bazin. If cinema 
had to put the just-mentioned uncanny precision of its images to an uncanny rather than 
communicational use, then it could well have continued doing so in the fairgrounds where it had 
migrated soon after the “passing infatuation”vi of the public with the realistic views captured by 
this new medium.10 According to Bazin, it might have remained a fantastic curiosity by taking its 
place alongside the anomalies of nature displayed in the musées Dupuytren and become a vehicle 
for conjurers’ tricks.11 This is only partly what Georges Méliès did by “restoring paradoxical 
virtues to the moribund realism” of cinema. Taking advantage of its ability to “bear away our 
faith,” he made it a machine for producing “miracles.” But by also narrativizing his spectacles, 
Méliès prepared the ground for turning cinema into “an art of the imagination” in the sense of the 
other major arts.12 So a medium well-placed on the one hand to add to the precision of means of 
communication and on the other paradoxically able to speak to the underbelly of modern 
rationality, somehow chose for the most part to become a means for conventional narrative. In 
doing so, it placed itself recognizably in line with the existing art forms of the novel and the 
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theater while also drawing upon the conventions and material of other art forms such as music 
and painting. Bazin welcomed this much-deplored lack of nerve (or what seems to be such for 
some scholars) on cinema’s part because he saw how cinema had a role in the ongoing 
transformation from within of the role of art in modernity where it depended not on the 
patronage of clearly-bounded communities but on large publics that cut across communal 
identities. Here, he argues, that the seemingly contradictory paths open to the cinema of 
documentary and fiction are reconciled in the essential realism of the cinematographic image: 
realism grounds the imagination as much as imagination animates reality.13 When it cedes 
exclusively to one or the other, it loses the friction necessary to intervene in the experience of 
history and may become just another inert record of this history or become unhinged from it. I 
will take up questions of narrative, style, and audiences that follow from this discussion in the 
next chapter. I will now turn to briefly defining the basic political significance of the two-faced 
relationship of cinema as an aesthetic medium to historical experience. 
A Gap in History 
Rather than work within a duality of high and low forms, Bazin took cinema’s mass 
appeal to be the surest foundation of its aesthetic character. We can understand this best by the 
fact that he did not equate the cinema’s masses exclusively with the working classes but based its 
popular character on its ability to appeal to audiences across class and other identities. This 
cross-sectional appeal of the medium defines what is specific to the modern aesthetics: its 
disconnect from any clear ideological regime, religious or political. It is not that it has no 
relationship to ideology but that this relationship is obscure and indirect. One of the early essays 
Bazin wrote, in 1944, is called “The cinema and popular art” and explicitly addresses the 
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difference in the popular quality of this earlier art and the popularity of the arts since the 
nineteenth century of which the cinema in his time was the culmination. 
Until the nineteenth century the notion of popular art was inseparable from that of 
the community. The typical example we have is that of folklore whose is essentially 
characterized by its rootedness in a given milieu. A dance, a song, a tale, a style of 
furniture or housing is the more popular the more it corresponds to the most limited 
and differentiated human group, and so less assimilable to other human groups. 
Popularity is therefore understood here in the sense of the particular and the 
intensive. It is expressed in tradition and ritual.14vii 
Popular art in a pre-modern understanding has a “positive internal necessity” which expresses 
and conforms to a pre-existing communal self-understanding and therefore appears as its 
enduring culmination. In this sense, even the art of the nobility or the church is popular in an 
intensive sense. The cinema, on the other hand, in order to be popular needs to appeal across 
communities, classes, and even nations, therefore its popular character is extensive and in it 
“[t]he relationship of the artist to the consumer is radically overturned.” 
Cinema… because it does not spring from a communal psychology but from a 
sociology of atomized and gregarious masses, cannot benefit from… spontaneous 
generation. The suitability of the work to the consumer cannot be the result of an 
obscure and infallible thrust of which the craftsman or the artist is only the 
intermediary. At most, one could say that the popular need, for all intents and 
purposes, exists virtually, like an invisible void that the work may fill but by which it 
cannot be automatically molded.15viii 
Because the virtual need that Bazin speaks of here—which we have seen him characterize in 
“Total cinema (1946)” as the collective unconscious of history—can never be directly 
represented in the cinema, films can at most mark an interval in this collective unconscious—, 
indicated by the characterization of an “invisible void”—rather than provide its adequate 
representation. And this invisible void itself is can only be a moving placeholder since it is 
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constituted by masses of atomized individuals. But if the link between the communal need and 
the work is so tenuous, then what needs explaining is why audiences would be drawn towards it. 
Bazin wrote about what draws audiences to an obscure picture of history from the cusp of 
the Occupation years and the Liberation, in an essay titled “Reflection for a vigil of arms.” 
During the Occupation, he says, French cinema had turned to fantastic or distant historical 
subjects because “[t[he public wanted the screen to be its window and not its mirror,” not a 
window opening on to the world but out of it. He goes on to say that this demand for a dream 
world is unlikely to go away with the Liberation since people will continue to be oppressed, no 
longer by an occupying force but “by life itself.”16 Bazin elaborates what he means by “life 
itself” in another essay he wrote during the Occupation years. 
In our mechanical civilization where man is devoured by the technicality of his 
profession, normalized by social and political constraints, the cinema, beyond all 
artistic concerns, responds to the repressed but indefeasible collective psychic 
needs.17ix 
Once again, the horizon of a seemingly timeless condition of being oppressed by life itself is 
actually industrial modernity, and its dual dynamic of containment and release of socio-psychic 
energies. Therefore, when audiences look to cinema for a release from the containments of 
modernity, all one can ask of cinema is that the escape it provides no longer be the same as 
during the Occupation—an undialectical vid—but commensurate with a new historical reality. 
Bazin’s remarks about the intimate relationship between historical reality and the escapism of the 
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cinema go beyond arguing that there is some relationship between reality as it exists outside the 
movie theater and the fantasy on screen. What he is arguing is that modern works of art, pre-
eminently films, can mark their escape from historical reality the better they reproduce this 
reality. Since he found that the cinema during the Occupation had been unable to mark this 
relationship, his example in both “The cinema and popular art” and “Reflection for a vigil of 
arms” is Alain-Fournier’s novel Le Grand Meaulnes (1913).18 
Alain-Fournier’s novel is a Bildungsroman set in the French provinces whose protagonist 
finds love in an enchanted place but loses the way to it. It is a place in the heart of reality, but 
when re-found is not where he thought it should have been. This escape in the midst of reality, 
found and lost repeatedly, gains it traction for Bazin through an “exact evocation of the French 
countryside.” And when we add to this the fact that Alain-Fournier wrote this novel on the eve of 
World War I in whose battlefield he would soon die, and that Bazin evokes this fact in his 
deeply-felt obituary for Maurice Jaubert, the composer for the landmarks of French poetic realist 
films and who died in the few months that France remained at war in World War II, we see the 
depth of Bazin’s estimation for the co-existence of reality and a desire for escape;19 for as Bazin 
himself understood and as Dudley Andrew argues at length, the poetic realist corpus was an 
expression of nostalgia deeply grounded in the polarized historical reality of France’s interwar 
years.20 
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From this discussion, what emerges is Bazin’s understanding of the ambiguous character 
of the experience of the democratization of history in modernity. While we are invited to 
witness, think about, and potentially participate in a vast sphere of experience from which many 
had been excluded either by living under non-democratic political regimes or through sheer 
limitation of means, often either the invitation is illusory or we are incapable of looking at 
history in all its openness and complexity. Writing in the aftermath of the experience of fascism 
that many in Europe had welcomed as a way out of the uncertainties of history, Bazin felt that 
one cannot, like Sartre would soon do, simply lay down an imperative for a direct engagement 
with history. A conception of democratic politics that does not account for a desire for escape 
from it would have seemed deficient to him. The task for him was to understand how cinema as 
the pre-eminent art form of its time could be both the site of such necessary escape as well as a 
re-orientation towards history. In this, he echoes his contemporary Hannah Arendt whom he 
surely never read but who too came to a similar understanding of politics and history in the 
aftermath of totalitarian experiences. 
The key to Arendt’s understanding of modern history is her reading of a parable from 
Kafka in which a “He” is best by two antagonists, one who “presses him from behind” and the 
other who “blocks the road ahead.” Each supports him in his fight against the other, but he 
himself can’t or won’t pick a side. Kafka writes: 
His dream, though, is that some time in an unguarded moment—and this would 
require a night darker than any night has ever been yet—he will jump out of the 
fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the 
position of umpire over his antagonists in their fight with each other.21 
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Arendt at first reads this as a parable of a time in which the past has ceased to shed its 
light on the future and thus marks a breakdown of tradition, making the present a moment where 
past and future collide rather than transition into each other. But she marvels at the fact that the 
point at which the conflict takes place is not only a “He,” human existence, but that the human is 
an actor in this conflict instead of being swept up by these forces as in a historical process: this 
“insertion of [an acting] man breaks up the unidirectional flow of time.” The only problem is that 
this actor engaged in this interminable fight can only dream “the old dream which Western 
metaphysics has dreamed from Parminedes to Hegel of a timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous 
realm as the proper region of thought.”22 
Arendt sees the dream of escape from the space-time of history as the only possibility so 
long as we, along with Kafka, stick to a rectilinear description of historical time. However, the 
very fact that in the fable two opposing forces meet at a point of resistance should suggest that 
they will be deflected, even if ever-so-slightly, from this rectilinear arrangement. In their 
deflection, they create an angle, a third force, at a diagonal to the meeting point in the present of 
past and future. This diagonal, for Arendt, is the “non-time-space [of thought] in the very heart 
of time”23: thought, which is an unending activity that only looks for a beginning. But unlike the 
thought of philosophers which seeks to contemplate unchanging ideas, this thought is turned 
towards history and seeks orientation within it. 
This reading of Kafka’s parable must be seen as an imaginative recasting of the Hegelian 
dialectic. The latter synthesizes the two terms, thesis and anti-thesis, into the third event of an 
ending, and for Hegel philosophical thought is always late to history. Arendt attempts to imagine 
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the possibility of thought taking its distance from history in order to orient itself within it. This 
has a particular relationship to her definition of political action as the freedom to begin 
something new, a beginning that rescues history from a deterministic, processual flow. Keeping 
with this, she describes the non-space-time of history in Augustinian terms as “a beginning of a 
beginning.”24 Where political action normally requires an enduring world, the alienation of the 
world itself into an impersonal and uncertain historical process demands a non-time-space within 
history for breaking out of a processual existence and creating the possibility of beginning 
something new. 
But just like the traditional dialectic which arises out of a despairing attempt to account 
for history’s ungraspable movements, Arendt’s recast version is in danger of remaining nothing 
more than a thought experiment with which to console ourselves. Arendt herself points out that 
the fatal problem with her reading is that the gap in time she locates at the crossroads of past and 
future does not exist in historical or biographical time. 
This small non-time-space in the very heart of time, unlike the world and the culture 
into which we are born, can only be indicated, but cannot be inherited and handed 
down from the past; each new generation, indeed every new human being as he 
inserts himself between an infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and 
ploddingly pave it anew.25 
Though this gap in history that makes historical experience political is so precarious, 
what functions as its placeholder is the aesthetic. Despite the importance of Kant’s Third 
Critique for her political thought, Arendt was unable to give the work of art this role because on 
the one hand she was beholden to an idea of art as memorialization of the past and on the other 
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her tastes led her to deplore “the kitsch of the nineteenth century, whose historically so 
interesting lack of sense for form and style is closely connected with the severance of the arts 
from reality.”26 But that should not prevent us from seeing the special relationship between the 
possibility of a politically productive distance from history and the aesthetic. Kant’s aesthetic 
philosophy, which forms part of his account of epistemology in general, after all conceives of a 
work of art as something that gives form to a nature (to be understood as history) that is either 
too amorphous to grasp or too unbearable to look at.27 And Friedrich Schiller, who sought to 
distill Kant with an explicit focus on the question of the aesthetic’s relationship to politics, posed 
the problem as the need to reconcile the unpredictability and amorphousness of the sense drive, 
which is an expression of boundless temporality, with the similarly inescapable drive to give 
form to nature, which seeks to escape time. It is the work of the aesthetic as play drive which 
effects this reconciliation and which Schiller describes as “annulling time within time.”28 
So we see that there is legacy of aesthetic thought that Arendt was drawing upon in 
imagining the possibility of a “non-time-space in the very heart of time,” and which Bazin found 
illustrated in Alain-Fournier’s novel, and which he took as the model for thinking about cinema’s 
relationship to society. What we need to note is that, for Bazin, cinema’s ability to offer us an 
escape route from history which also orients us within makes it a site for a potential renewal of 
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our experience of history, a “beginning of a beginning” that could make experience political 
again. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has tried to first show that Bazin considered cinematic realism as a 
manifestation of a democratic desire for access to history. This at first reinforces a picture of him 
as a theorist and advocate of realism, only now on political grounds. However, the second part 
shows him arguing that to be properly political for a mass of people across identities and amidst 
an often formless and sometimes intolerable history, the cinema needs to partially turn away 
from the very history it is so well placed to record. Only at such an angle does it acquire the 
proper aesthetic potential to give form to history and renew its political character. In the 
following chapter, we will see him argue for this with greater specificity about questions in film 
history as they relate to narrative and stylistic forms and the formation of specialized as opposed 
to undifferentiated audiences. 
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Chapter 2  
Subject, Style, Audience 
 
In this chapter I will discuss Bazin’s attention to the question of subjects and narrative as 
a way of deepening our understanding of him as a theorist committed to the popular character of 
cinema. For him, subject and style in a commercial art form such as the cinema were the sites for 
the dialectic of expressing as well as molding the collective unconscious of history. The reason I 
will be discussing these two elements in turn is that the distinction between them played an 
important part in debates on the politics of aesthetics in Bazin’s time, as I will show in the first 
part of the chapter. Though Bazin sometimes moves between emphasizing one or the other, he 
resisted an absolute priority of one over the other. The critical task, as he saw it, was to trace 
shifts in balance between the two as a way of understanding how the medium plays the role of 
mediating the social imaginary at any given historical moment. 
In the first parts of the chapter, we will see Bazin theorize and argue for the importance 
of subjects and narrative. This will be important to the next two chapters where we will see him 
reading genre films, but it is also necessary in relation to revising our understanding of Bazin 
because he is generally considered to have been uninterested in narrative. As I attempt to argue 
here and throughout this dissertation, the question of realism in Bazin must be understood in 
relation to overarching questions of subject and narrative rather than as his theoretical point of 
departure. In the later parts of the chapter, we will see Bazin engage his intellectual and 
ideological adversaries over his apparent interest in style at the expense of subject. It is to these 
arguments that we owe the articles that went on to make up what we now know as “The 
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evolution of the language of cinema” where he apparently argues for film history’s inexorable 
evolution towards greater realism. Apart from the fact that the argument of the essay is much 
more complex than is generally assumed, we will see that Bazin tried to understand postwar 
experiments in film style, such as staging in depth and increased attention to material realism, 
against the background of a seeming crisis of subjects in Hollywood. These debates form the 
crux over postwar debates on “commitment” in cinema. In the last part, I look briefly at the 
dilemma Bazin faced as subjects and styles started to address specialized audiences and the 
cross-identity appeal of films started to erode. 
What Is Literature? 
With the exception of Dudley Andrew, the reception of Bazin has discounted his interest 
in narratives to such an extent that for most scholars, if they bother to notice his careful readings 
of the Western or the Chaplin films, they take them as nothing more than digressions in his 
theoretical program.1 Instances where they do look at his writings on Chaplin are even more 
revealing of this neglect of narrative, as I will show in the next chapter. Here we might take 
Jacques Rancière as an example for whom Bazin is a theorist of the incarnation of being on film, 
an “occasional philosopher” who was a precursor to the apparently much more rigorous 
theorization by Gilles Deleuze of the transition in film history from the classical movement-
image to the modern time-image.2 According to him, both Bazin and Deleuze emphasized the 
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coming of a cinema that breaks from narrative and denies the work of the “fable” that is inherent 
in any film. Against this repression, Rancière seeks to theoretically rehabilitate the dimension of 
the fable in order to restore the aesthetic balance between the real and the fictional in cinema.3 
But Bazin uses precisely the word “fable” to argue that the cinema needed the work of narrative 
and imagination in order to become the socially-effective art form that it did: “In order to survive 
commercially, the realism of the Lumière films had needed the birth of a creative cinema which 
would subordinate it to the imaginary economy of the artistic work… [With] Méliès, the cinema 
became a work of the imagination. It enters into fable.”4i 
It isn’t only “occasional film theorists” who work with this caricature of Bazin. Jean-
Louis Comolli, the theoretical spearhead of Cahiers du Cinéma during its radical years of the late 
1960s and early ‘70s, has had a complex relationship with Bazin’s work. After largely critiquing 
him during these early years,5 he now says that Bazin has been a “constant reference” in his 
thinking about cinema.6 And yet at the most fundamental level, he retains an astonishingly 
simplistic idea of Bazin. Comparing Alberti’s window to Bazin’s, Comolli argues that the 
Renaissance conception of the window acknowledged that the picture in the window is an effect 
of construction rather than transparence and that, therefore, it is “the tale that engenders the 
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world onto which [the window of the image] ‘opens.’ As for Bazin’s window, it seems it does 
not depend on artifice, does not proceed from a fiction, does not interfere in the things it 
receives….”7 Comolli thus reinforces the general understanding of Bazin as a theorist primarily 
of the image’s relationship to reality in opposition to narrative and its fictional character. 
As I mentioned earlier, Andrew is an exception in noting the importance of subjects and 
narrative to Bazin’s work. He notes the importance of Hollywood films to Bazin but concentrates 
on the postwar European context where the work of auteurs such as Roberto Rossellini, Robert 
Bresson, and Agnès Varda stand as exemplary of modern subjects that stick close to current 
reality instead of remaining cloistered in the conventions of studio narrative.8 Here I will argue 
that it remains an important task to recover the complex investment that Bazin had in the 
narrative forms of generic cinema throughout his career because it formed a contested site for the 
political import of cinema in his time. It is only with this in view that we can get a measure of his 
interest in realist style. Since these issues were a matter of contestation, I will also be 
emphasizing the debates within which Bazin staked out his positions. 
“For an impure cinema,” dealing with the topic of adaptation, was seemingly 
incongruously published in a book titled Cinéma, un oeil ouvert sur le monde. If Bazin were 
primarily a theorist of realism, one would have expected him to take the proposed title of the 
publication, a clear reference to Dziga Vertov’s ‘kino-eye’ and its documentary realism, to 
perhaps talk about newsreels, or the postwar advances in realist style. Instead, he set about 
arguing for the importance of the cinema drawing upon other arts for its material. To understand 
why this was not an incongruity either in relation to the topic of the book in which the essay 
                                                 
7
 Comolli, Cinema against Spectacle, 62. My emphasis. 
8
 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!: Bazin’s Quest and Its Charge (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), ch. 4. 
71 
 
appeared or within Bazin’s own theoretical program, we need to note, as Andrew too 
emphasizes, that this essay was a culmination of around four years of concentrated thinking 
about the cross-medial basis of cinema. The earliest landmark in this trajectory was his 1948 
essay, “Adaptation, or Cinema as Digest,” (henceforth “Adaptation”) which appeared in the July 
issue of Esprit that year.9 But between these two essays, and even before the first of these, Bazin 
had been involved in debates on the relative significance of narrative and style and was fighting a 
theoretical battle on two fronts. Let us first sketch out the background against which 
“Adaptation” and Bazin’s other articles on cinema’s relationship to the other arts had been 
written. 
Firstly, these were the years when there was still nostalgia for the stylistic freedom of the 
silent cinema and its avant-garde productions. Bazin, as we will see in the next section, did not 
deny the importance of this period, and particularly affirmed the significance of the Soviet avant-
garde which found its justification in its political and historical context. However, he saw the 
French avant-garde as having privileged authorial and experimental freedom over a concern for 
addressing the large audiences that underwrote cinema’s social character. He saw the emphasis 
on stylistic freedom by these filmmakers as a marker of the freedom of authorial subjectivity and 
expression though not in the sense of a transparent and coherent subjectivity. Rather, Bazin 
would have understood it as the irreducible and incommunicable subjectivity of Romanticism. 
Secondly, these were the years when Sartre’s emphasis on clear prose as a marker of literature’s 
commitment to the political issues of the day was contemporaneous with the anti-formalist 
imperatives of the Zhdanovian doctrine in the Soviet Union and in Communist circles more 
broadly. As his colleagues in French film culture denounced American genres and the formalism 
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of Orson Welles and called for the promotion of films with subjects of current political 
importance treated in classical style, Bazin was pushed to theorize his understanding of the 
relationship between subjects and style. We see the beginnings of the debates as early as 1946 
when Bazin acknowledged them in an article on the “new American style” to which I will 
return.10  But what must be noted is that Sartre’s discourse of commitment that Bazin’s critical 
adversaries took up also privileged authorial subjectivity and expression, though in a different 
way. Sartre criticized the Surrealists for critiquing bourgeois subjectivity by merely withdrawing 
into an irrational subjectivity.11 Instead, he called for a heroic commitment on the part of the 
author even in the face of absurdity. Authorial commitment comes through in the choice of 
important subjects and in transparency of exposition in the narrative. We saw in the introduction 
that emphasis on such exposition was tied in Sartre’s work to an increasingly juridical logic that 
we will see Bazin resist in the chapters to come. 
“Adaptation” must be read as a response to both these conceptions of authorial 
subjectivity that take precedence over the subjectivity of the audience. The avant-garde 
subjectivity withdraws into itself and alienates its audiences while authorial commitment seeks to 
force audience subjectivity to face up to historical predicaments without acknowledging the 
audience’s need for escape from history when it turns to a novel or to a film. In either case, the 
result is an alienation of audiences in the older arts. Bazin, in his role as critic, sought to resist 
this involution in the cinema. “Adaptation” points to three characteristics of the modern 
conception of art which have combined to effect a divorce between the arts and the public. These 
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concern the privileging of form over content (applies only to the avant-garde), the absolute 
integrity of the single work of art, and the consequent privileging of the artist over the public.12 
The privileging of form and artist go along with a new premium on originality which is then 
consecrated in the idea of a self-sufficient and original work of art. The significance of these 
remarks to contemporaneous debates in aesthetic politics is best gauged by the fact that in early 
September 1948, two months after “Adaptation” appeared, Bazin gave a lecture, arranged for a 
screening of Laurence Olivier’s Hamlet (1948), and participated in the discussions at the annual 
meeting of Rencontres Internationales de Genève which had emerged as a key annual venue for 
the reconstruction of European intellectual culture after the war. 
In 1948, the Rencontres had for its topic “Débat sur l’art contemporain” which, in the 
midst of the swirling debates on committed art, could not but take up the art and society 
relationship as the central concern. In attendance were the likes of the Italian author Elio 
Vittorini, the philosopher Gabriel Marcel, and the Dada artist Tristan Tzara.13 The published 
proceedings of the conference do not include Bazin’s lecture. However, there are a couple of 
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references to it in the ones that are included and he figures in the transcript of one of the 
discussions. Marcel raises the question of the importance of audiences by crediting Bazin for 
being the only one to bring it up during the whole conference, though, as we will see, Marcel and 
Bazin would go on to disagree on how to address the issue. All other lectures in one way or 
another privilege the role of the artist in the art-society relationship. Given the arguments Bazin 
had developed in “Adaptation” (about to be discussed) and the fact that he brings them up during 
the discussion, the essay must have been written expressly for this conference. The choice of 
Hamlet for the conference screening further underlines this. With this background of debates in 
aesthetic politics and the focus of the conference in mind, let’s look more closely at the argument 
of the essay. 
“Adaptation” looks at cinema as a medium that can play a role in popularizing literary 
works in “digest” form, restoring to literature and theater the audiences that had gradually 
deserted them. This secondary role for cinema as the handmaiden of canonical culture is far from 
the high hopes that Bazin had for cinema as the medium of its time. Jean-Charles Tachella, 
Bazin’s colleague at L’Écran Français, wonders if Bazin’s attitude towards adaptations did not 
contain “something of the generous reaction of the professor—I’d even say elementary school 
teacher—happy that the cinema would allow for a wider exposure to classics.”14 There may be 
some truth to this, but the understanding of literary classics that emerges from this essay could 
and did shock those who represented the culture of classics. Further, as we will see presently, the 
essay is not important for placing cinema in this role but for illuminating the popular origins of 
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even canonical literature, origins with which the cinema alone in the twentieth century seemed to 
retain close contact. 
Bazin was addressing representatives of literary culture to argue that they—in their 
concern with the role of the author and with questions of personal expression and style when 
discussing the social mandate of art—had lost sight of those elements that have fulfilled this 
mandate in modernity: their generic elements. The role of cinema as “digest” tells us that the 
works of Shakespeare, Dumas, the music hall, the burlesque, Hugo, Diderot, to Cocteau and 
Bernanos have all had an audience—very wide for some like the burlesque performers and Hugo 
and limited but significant for others—not primarily because of the style of the authors and other 
finer aspects of the texts but because of the appeal of the elementary blocks of a work: its 
characters and plot. 
Actually, the real obstacles to be overcome in discussing the possibilities of such 
adaptations do not belong to the realm of aesthetics. They do not derive from the 
cinema as an art form but as a sociological and industrial fact. The drama of 
adaptation is the drama of popularization. A provincial publicity blurb for La 
Chartreuse de Parme (Christian-Jacque, 1948) described it as taken from "the 
famous cloak-and-dagger novel." We sometimes get the truth from film salesmen 
who have never read Stendhal.15ii 
Bazin is here arguing that the sociological and industrial reality of the cinema brings out a 
similar reality within works consecrated as self-sufficient and defined by their stylistic 
refinements. The generic elements of Stendhal’s novel make its specific stylistic achievements 
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interesting and not the other way round. Further, the characters in these works have a life of their 
own that exceeds the integrity of single works or authorial intention. 
It is interesting to note that the novelists who defend so fiercely the stylistic or 
formal integrity of their texts are also the ones who sooner or later overwhelm us 
with confessions about the tyrannical demands of their characters. According to 
these writers, their protagonists are enfants terribles who completely escape from 
their control once they have been conceived. The novelist is totally subjected to their 
whims, he is the instrument of their wills. I’m not doubting this for a minute, but 
then writers must recognize that the true aesthetic reality of a psychological or social 
novel lies in the characters or their environment rather than in what they call the 
“style.”16iii 
Don Quixote and Madame Bovary have a life of their own which does not depend completely on 
the reading of the novels in which they appear and it is perfectly legitimate for audiences to 
encounter them first in the cinema instead of the novels. For Bazin, if not for film and radio 
adaptations of these novels, most inhabitants of the twentieth century would have been deprived 
of the opportunity to meet their counterparts from seventeenth century Spain and nineteenth 
century France who too acted out their imaginations soaked in the popular culture of the time. It 
can only make more people first aware of and then probably interested in reading Cervantes and 
Flaubert, and if this is even a handful then there has still been a gain for literature. 
Coming from a critic who wrote complex essays on both the importance of film style and 
fidelity in film adaptations, the intent of the argument in “Adaptation” is clearly polemical. But 
the polemics do not distract from the theoretical insight that Bazin was trying to get at, which is 
to place cinema in line with the popular character of nineteenth century literature. In the previous 
chapter I argued that for Bazin cinema, like any other art form, cannot represent history in all its 
detail but needs to offer its image at an angle. We can now see that it does this through generic 
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narratives, exemplary characters, and other conventional features. “Myth” is the word that 
contains all these conventional elements that characterize popular subjects. Myths return our 
reality to us after having distilled it into forms that the seeming amorphousness of existence 
either already contains or needs or both. “Novels,” Bazin writes, “are the matrices of myths.”17iv 
Three decades before Fredric Jameson reaffirmed the place of narrative as the locus of 
the political unconscious, Bazin looked to it as a site for negotiating the collective unconscious 
of history; he called this function of narrative “myth.” If dictionaries of academic terms are to be 
believed, this term has lost the critical privilege that it seemed to enjoy in the 1950s, following 
the work of Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss in France, the translation into English of 
Vladimir Propp’s Morphology of the Folk Tale, and the work of Northrop Frye in Anglophone 
literary criticism (all in the same decade). The analysis of myths—ancient and modern—became 
foundational to the development of semiology as a science of discourse analysis. But in due 
course “myth” as a critical term gradually ceded ground to others such as “ideology” and the 
“political unconscious.”18 But myth, Bazin tells us from his earliest works in the ‘40s, is a useful 
term for understanding what is perhaps specifically modern in art’s relationship to history: at 
once history’s obscure image and also something that generates forms that it in turn imposes 
upon history. Therefore, so much modern art is obsessed in one way or another with creating 
new myths or refounding old ones. As one extreme example, we may recall the intricate mythical 
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universe of Blake’s poetry. But modern myths that truly resonated with history were to be found, 
as Bazin argues, in the form of the (often-serialized) nineteenth-century novel. 
The characters that populated nineteenth century consciousness—the Werthers, the 
Rastignacs, the Pips, the Emmas, as also many more that may have been more alive in the 
popular literature of the times but which have not survived in our school readings—came from 
fiction. But even more than individual characters, Bazin argues that the mythologies of modern 
art reside in genres: “In fact, the true basis for aesthetic differentiations is not to be found among 
the arts but within genres: between the psychological novel and the novel of manners, for 
example, rather than between the psychological novel and the film based on it.”19 The cinema 
performs the same function as the other arts in modernity. But it not only gives new life—that is, 
new historical significance—to older myths but also creates its own that play upon the 
elementary appeal of myths, as he writes in an article from 1950 on the question of form and 
content in the cinema. 
A large part of the cinematic production still belongs to... primitive literary forms, 
playing at an elementary and collective level with the popular imagination. The story 
that the filmmaker claims to recount is essentially only a pretext for stringing 
together symbols that please us only to the extent that they resonate in our 
subconscious. The most unrealistic pre-war American comedy, with the romantic 
entanglements of millionaires in a universe without the economic crisis, 
unemployment, illness, or suffering, is certainly— for those who know how to read it 
with the competence of a psychoanalyst reading a dream—a documentary of the 
human geography much more rigorous than the Naked Cities of Hollywood neo-
realism.20v 
If generic narratives embody a mythic unconscious, then the cinema has the added dimension of 
stars who in something as simple as the way they walk or look embody such mythologies: “[T]he 
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novelty of cinema in relation to folktales and mythology is that in it the fable can originate from 
a simple physical appearance: from the curve of a face or the moisture of a look (l’eau d’un 
regard].”21vi This play of rudimentary narratives and resonant symbols is what defines Bazin’s 
theory of narrative. More precisely, we could say that narrative for him is a combination of the 
subject—comprising the symbolic, mythic elements—and narration which is a temporal flow of 
an autonomous world into which we escape. He describes this escape eloquently in “For an 
impure cinema” with reference to an experience of watching Louis Feuillade’s silent-era serial 
Les Vampires (1915) at the Cinémathèque Française. The print had no intertitles and only one of 
the two projectors was functional. 
I suppose even Feuillade would not have found his assassins. Bets were on for 
finding out the good and the bad guys. The one we took for a bandit turned out to the 
victim in the next reel. And then the lights coming on for changing the reels 
multiplied the episodes. Presented in this manner, the masterpiece of Feuillade 
revealed in an astonishing manner the aesthetic principle behind its charm. Each 
interruption brought on an “Aw!” of disappointment and each resumption a sigh of 
relief. This story of which the public understood nothing could catch this public’s 
attention and desire through only the pure urgency of its narration. It wasn’t in any 
way a preexistent action arbitrarily broken down with intervals, but a creation 
unduly interrupted, an inexhaustible spring whose flow had been interrupted by a 
mysterious hand. Hence this intolerable unease brought on by the “to be continued,” 
and the anxious wait, not so much for the events to follow, but for the unfolding of a 
tale, of the resumption of a suspended act of creation… the delicious wait for the tale 
which substitutes itself for daily existence which in turn is no more than a crack in 
the continuity of the dream.22 vii 
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What we get here is a distinction between narrative and narration, between something 
self-contained and structured and something indefinitely open, and it is the latter, in combination 
with the concentration of mythic elements, that is the key to understanding the experience of art. 
This dual-character of concentration and flow, Bazin would argue, is true as much for the novel 
as for early film serials; for the Dickenses, the Eliots, the Balzacs, and the Dostoevskys also 
began their lives as serials. And when we read them now as single works, we still read them for 
something of this same need to be absorbed into another continuum than that of our lives. 
Concentration-flow/history-escape is the aesthetic structure we have seen Bazin elaborate 
and which substitutes concerns of authorial subjectivity and personal style with those of the 
historical unconscious and the audience’s need for escape from history. And he did this in 
dialogue with representatives of official culture in Geneva who in his eyes were clearly 
overestimating the role of the author in relation to cultural politics. Marcel, who agreed with 
Bazin that the arts need to think in terms of audiences, proposed cultivating the taste of 
audiences. Taking the example of music, he suggested amateur performances as a way of making 
classical music popular again. This again reduced the question of audience to one of aesthetic 
competence and reinforced questions of style and authorship.23 Bazin pointedly disagreed with 
Marcel arguing that only the work of popularization can renew and create socially-responsive 
works. 
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Even on the question of forms, where aesthetic training reinforces a narrow set of 
standards, something like the radio, Bazin points out, allowed for the spread of Jazz into Europe 
which would perhaps not have happened, at least on such a large scale and so quickly, if left to 
the work of performance. Radio and the cinema, just like the digest form in literature, make 
palatable what is unfamiliar and prepare the ground for a possibly deeper engagement rather than 
pre-empt such an engagement. When one adapts something for the cinema or the radio, argues 
Bazin, one is not adapting in the first place to these media but to the public because they are 
“more public” than the other arts.24 Rather than a “generosity” towards the other arts, this 
argument for popularization must be read as an emphasis on the unconscious processes by which 
modern art responds to the collective experience of history. While as a critic Bazin himself 
would emphasize the need for attention to the history of forms and for a critical engagement with 
products of popular culture, he argued for some distance between these activities and the work of 
the historical unconscious on the production and reception of this culture.  
Bazin’s ideas were met some coldness in Geneva. The Swiss conductor Ernest Ansermet 
leading the discussion was swift in his disapproval as he pointedly redirected the conversation to 
“the substance [fond] of art.”25 When Bazin reported on this conference in Esprit a couple of 
months later, he recalled a bitter joke by Tzara to write that those present were busy “disputing 
over the gender of angels while the atomic bomb is being prepared to resolve the divorce 
between the artist and the public….”26viii 
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The Subject of Style 
Though Bazin was hoping to wake up official culture to the importance of audiences by 
holding the atom bomb over its head, his debates over the importance of subjects were largely 
carried out with French film critics. Here, unlike in Geneva where artists and philosophers were 
preoccupied with questions of style, the importance of subjects was everything in the cultural 
and political battle with America. Within these debates, Bazin’s critics drew a sharp distinction 
between form and subject. The filmmaker Louis Daquin and Georges Sadoul would cast him, 
Alexandre Astruc, Pierre Kast, Jacques-Doniol Valcroze, and the older Roger Leenhardt27 as the 
aesthetes. Daquin would reprise the idiomatic phrase “disputing over the gender of angels” to 
accuse them of being “technico-aesthetico-philosophic” critics.28 In a matter of months, Bazin 
found himself at the end of the very barrel he trained on those present in Geneva. But he was 
surely expecting this given that the debates had been going on since 1945, but the onset of Cold 
War politics did intensify them greatly. The irony would be even more pronounced as he would 
be accused of deemphasizing the importance of the subjects of films in favor of the metaphysical 
implications of techniques such as depth-of-field composition. Daquin, Sadoul, and other 
promoters of ‘committed’ cinema accused the younger critics of a dereliction of duty by not 
exposing American propaganda in the films they reviewed and in giving such high importance to 
questions of form.29 More than anything else, they wanted critics to emphasize the importance of 
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subjects that speak to the problems of the moment and to fight the censorship that stood in the 
way of filmmakers who were willing to take them up. 
Bazin agreed with his detractors that commercial and political factors joined in limiting 
the possibilities of subjects in the cinema. He blamed censorship for this state of affairs, not only 
in France but in America too with the Production Code. As a representative of critics on the 
censor board, Bazin fought against the fact of censorship while trying to limit the damage from 
within. But when cinema was criticized for being less committed than literature he pointed out in 
1947 that writers such as Aragon and Sartre use their greater liberty to move between political 
and thoroughly apolitical subjects at will.30 If these writers wanted to test the censorship of 
subjects, Bazin argued, they should try a literary equivalent of an international film festival 
where the writers read their work aloud, with all the money and the false burden of diplomatic 
relations at stake with film festivals: “One wonders how a book of Miller [Arthur or Henry 
would both work well in this context] or Sartre would withstand such an oral test and if we 
wouldn’t notice a palpable reduction in literary themes…”31 ixStill, of the two sets of reasons, 
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commercial and censorship, he found censorship to be ultimately less determinant in the 
medium’s choice of subjects. 
After nearly a decade of polemics, in 1957 Bazin launched with some authority a sharp 
critique of the same industry that constantly complained about censorship and quotas and whose 
most vocal supporters would denounce Jean Renoir for making period dramas.32 Responding to 
Jean Carta, the critic at the Témoignage Chrétien, a publication with links to the Resistance, he 
argues that even if censorship had prevented anti-colonial and anti-militaristic subjects, there had 
been no attempts to make a fictional film on the pressing postwar housing crisis; he knew 
because he not only hadn’t seen a single such film but he also hadn’t seen a single script on the 
subject submitted to the pre-censorship screening.33 And Louis Daquin’s Point du Jour (1949), a 
film about the lives of miners, fared miserably, especially in the working-class North of France, 
and Daquin made none on the subject since. As for Sartre, whose notion of commitment Carta 
brought up to criticize Renoir, Bazin, after a decade directly or indirectly parrying with the 
writer-philosopher on aesthetic and philosophical grounds, now responded on specifically 
political grounds: “Carta invokes Jean-Paul Sartre. But his support is doubly dangerous. Firstly 
because nothing so far has solidly confirmed the ideas stated [on commitment] in the preface to 
Les Temps Modernes [from 1945], and then above all because the latest commitment of Sartre—
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shoring up, three years late, Stalinism from the outside at the very moment it was about to 
collapse—is an adventure that seems to justify those who in all these years have continued to 
write as if playing dodgeball.”34x 
Amidst these polemics, we must remember Bazin’s theoretical position on the question of 
subjects. Critics like Carta, Sadoul, Daquin, following Sartre, thought that what was politically 
important in cinema were transparently committed subjects, whereas he, Bazin, argued for the 
political importance of generic subjects in an art form beset by severe commercial and political 
constraints. Moreover, subjects at an angle to historical problems are often better placed at 
engaging the affective imagination of the times. In cinema, as in most literature with any degree 
of popular appeal, subjects rely on an apparent simplicity to give a “form” to historical 
imaginary. The work of style in cinema as in literature is to complement this simplicity with an 
affective appeal that would turn a film into a site for the social imaginary. He explicitly drew this 
distinction between “form” that has a mythic function and “style” that pertains to the more 
narrow concerns of technique.35 And this now brings us to Bazin’s critical investment in realist 
style for which he was accused of aestheticism. 
Approaching Realism 
“The evolution of the language of cinema” (henceforth “Evolution”) has given us the 
impression that Bazin argued for a teleological evolution of cinematic styles towards the realism 
of the long take and depth of field. Daniel Morgan has warned us that we should situate this 
essay in its historical context as a polemical response to the nostalgics of the ‘20s avant-garde 
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techniques.36 He is right about the historical specificity of the argument but only partly so about 
the primarily polemical significance; this is not surprising since Morgan is conscious of 
attempting a preliminary (and important) revaluation of Bazin’s realism without exploring the 
historical context. Despite welcoming cinema’s initial turn from its originary realism to an 
imaginative realism, Bazin like the rest of his generation was deeply aware that under the 
pressure of the war cinema in the 1940s had to once again confront its realist powers, and so his 
interest in new realist techniques such as depth-of-field composition follows from these 
developments. But it also follows from what Bazin perceived as a crisis in Hollywood genres 
that had pushed classical realism beyond its equilibrium point to explore the dramatic 
possibilities of the long take and staging in depth. 
As we know from Bazin’s footnote to “Evolution,” he never wrote an essay with this 
title. It was an amalgam of a piece he wrote for an article on “depth of field” in the first issue of 
Cahiers du Cinéma in 1951 and another on “découpage” for the Venice Film Festival publication 
in 1952.37 Of these two, it is interesting to note that the 1951 essay is already called “Pour en 
finir avec le profondeur du champ.” As he indicates at the outset of the essay, it comes towards 
the conclusion of polemics over the relative merits of subject and style that go back as far as 
1946. Given this reference, this essay should be further placed at the intersection over several 
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others that Bazin wrote in which either a “crisis” or the importance of subjects is highlighted 
alongside an interest in realist techniques:38 
 a 1946 article in L’Écran Français on the “new American style”39 
 a report on the 1947 Brussels film festival in Esprit and another for the Cannes 1949 
brochure which discuss at length what was seen in France as a crisis in American film 
production generally and film genres more specifically40 
 four articles in 1949 promoting a new avant-garde in conjunction with the launch of the 
Objectif ’49 film festival41 
 two articles in 1950 and 1951 on the relationship between technique and subject42 
In the 1946 article, Bazin placed his interest in the new explorations of realist technique 
within the context of a “crisis of subjects” and this article contains the germ for all subsequent 
articles listed above. But the early emphasis on the fact that the “depth of field” techniques were 
a way out of the neutral style of classical editing and composition—what he calls the “no man’s 
land” of film style—hardly seemed to address the question of subjects. At this point, he still 
seemed to believe that development of cinema depended on new stylistic breakthroughs. But 
when he wrote the report on the failure of American cinemas in making a mark at the Brussels 
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film festival of 1947, he started to address this question beyond the level of technique. Here 
Bazin starts to speak more clearly about the crisis of subjects in American cinema as a crisis of 
genres. 
Responding to critics who argued for the primacy of subject over style, Bazin argued that 
style may indeed serve the subject in the abstract, but this correspondence cannot be one in 
which a neutral style becomes the ground for laying out the important subjects of the times. This 
was possible in 1930s Hollywood only because the real “forms” there were genres that 
allegorized historical realities. Through and after the war, these genres—the screwball comedy, 
the Western, the gangster—had to negotiate their limits. These generic limits, to be discussed in 
the next two chapters, were the main subject of the Cannes 1949 article, and are still suggested in 
the final version of “Evolution”.43 In view of a historical crisis in genres, the question of film 
technique once again became important, and the question of subject must once again confront the 
enduring fact of borrowing and adaptation from the other arts. It is, therefore, that the peak of 
Bazin’s quarrels over his attention to realist style are framed on the one side by 1948’s 
“Adaptation” essay and on the other by 1952’s “For an impure cinema.” It isn’t that cinema 
automatically channels the mythologies created by the other arts but that it deepens its stylistic 
arsenal as a way of making these mythologies speak to a new historical moment when cinema 
itself remained constrained in its choice of subjects. 
There is another more general aesthetic reason as to why cinema had to confront the 
question of realist film technique more seriously. The classicism of the ‘30s style was a 
consequence of the fact that the inventiveness of silent cinema had exhausted one avenue of 
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stylistic innovation, which had to do with taking the material reality in the cinematic image as a 
point of departure rather than an element of stylistic probing in itself. This first-level reality 
matters to Bazin which is why he could not abide extreme examples of its abstraction such as 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert Weine, 1920), but in all other prominent instances, the 
modification of reality through heightened processes of abstraction had good technical and 
historical reasons. On Eisenstein he writes: 
In 1926, Eisenstein emerged as the realism of the promoter of realism, almost a 
realism par excellence: to the cinema of dreams and escape, Potemkin opposed a 
cinema incarnated in a History it sought to transform. But this reality was of matter 
and not of expression. The confusion lasted only so long as the technical evolution of 
cinema and even of the Soviet Revolution allowed it… With some distance, we can 
see what in Potemkin was on the one hand of Romantic inspiration and on the other, 
in terms of form, an admirable aesthetic machinery perfectly independent of the 
reality it mobilizes.44xi 
Comparing this to the trajectory of all stylistic schools, he argues that it is the fate of them all to 
lose to one degree or another their ability to convince us of their reality: “there is realism and 
then there is realism, and the problem isn’t so much knowing if the production of 1952 is more 
realist than that of 1938 as seeing in what the difference consists.”45xii One era’s realism 
becomes another’s aestheticism as happened with the poetic-realist style of 1930s France when 
filmmakers kept to its conventions after the war when it no longer had any historical resonance; 
as happened also with Soviet montage aesthetics once the Soviet Revolution had changed course; 
as happened also when some French and Hollywood filmmakers employed the same elements as 
the Italians did after the war (location shooting, for example) but failed to produce anything with 
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similar urgency.46 The introduction of sound was a key element in the exhaustion of editorial 
inventiveness, so there are technological reasons too why styles exhaust themselves. 
The exhaustion of stylistic options in an art form also exhausts its ability to speak of the 
world with any confidence. As artists seek personal stylistic signatures, they break the collective 
historical basis of the evolution of the art form. While at their limits, poetry like Mallarmé’s and 
painting like Picasso’s form a peak in stylistic innovation, such a reckoning with limits 
announces an art form’s turning in towards itself and its gradual alienation from the world and, 
therefore, from its audiences. While some artists in these arts will find an audience, the art forms 
themselves become marginal to their times. For Bazin, cinema’s advantage lay in the fact that at 
its limits it still encounters the world and cannot escape it. The medium of cinema is the world 
and not, like a Man Ray might claim, the film strip. It is in this sense that we must read his 
comparison of William Wyler’s exploration of staging in depth in The Little Foxes (1941) to the 
blank page of Mallarmé’s poetry.47 While Wyler’s exploration of space for him is a stylistic peak 
in cinema comparable to Mallarmé’s explorations of the silence inherent in language, his critical 
task was to argue that cinema even at this peak cannot turn away from the world. Through this 
unavoidable contact with the world it might continue to draw audiences by tapping into our 
mythic imaginaries.48 Despite this confidence, Bazin had to confront the fact that the appeal of 
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films to audiences across identities was already beginning to break down with the emergence of 
arthouse cinemas. Audiences and with them films seemed to become increasingly specialized as 
had occurred in the other arts. It is here that Bazin initiated the program of a new avant-garde 
that would retain a popular rather than exclusive appeal. 
For a Popular Avant-Garde 
The political polemics in which Bazin participated were as much a result of him and 
other young critics giving importance to technical questions as of their organization of Objectif 
49, a festival of “accursed films,” giving every indication of an elite group of filmmakers and 
critics. The fact that it was organized as an alternative to Cannes which had a commercial and 
diplomatic as much as, if not more than, an aesthetic mandate, gave further credence to this 
charge. But as Frédéric Gimello-Mesplomb’s comprehensive history of Objectif 49 documents, 
the festival was a crossroads for a range of issues in French film culture whose inflecting by this 
event would resonate long after its short existence.49 It was also a coming together of complex 
and even contradictory interests where elitism confronted upstart enthusiasts.50 In this, Bazin, 
one of the initiators of the project was clear throughout that the festival had a popularizing rather 
than an esoteric objective. This, however, was not necessarily understood or shared by others, 
particularly the president Jean Cocteau.51 A look at the contributions to the festival brochure is 
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sufficient indicator of Bazin’s differences from some of the other prominent voices. In keeping 
with the theme of “accursed films,” the filmmaker Jean Grémillon speaks of the “curse of style,” 
Roger Leenhardt—Bazin’s mentor in many ways—writes of the “curse of intelligence.” Cocteau 
complains about commercial pressures and saw the festival as a bulwark against commercial 
concerns. These were clear signs that several filmmakers were repeating the Romantic excesses 
playing at being misunderstood authors who are forced to address indifferent audiences. Bazin, 
however, was at pains to re-define avant-garde as one that seeks to make way for aesthetic 
innovations that would sooner or later gain the assent of a large public and make a difference to 
the quality of the wider production. As Gimello-Mesplomb notes, the selection of new or soon-
to-be-released films emphasized a present or future-oriented mission rather than one that 
consecrated the classics. 52 To this extent, good films that had difficulty in finding an audience 
must be promoted but not shielded from public scrutiny for the delectation of the initiated, 
something of which he accused the ‘20s avant-garde (which he would rather call a “flanc-
garde.”53) 
To understand the significance of Bazin’s position, we would have to take full measure of 
his activities within networks of postwar popular education as well as his activities in 
organizations that promoted new structures of production and exhibition such as mechanisms of 
state-funding for films and the establishment of arthouse theaters which would go under the label 
“cinéma d’art et essai.” But the contours of his position are clear enough. He resisted a complete 
specialization of either production or audiences—with the popular and commercial on the one 
hand and the rarefied and the initiated on the other. But he also believed that different aesthetic 
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levels of production and a certain differentiation of audiences—provided that this differentiation 
was interactive rather than isolating—would turn the automatic popularity of the cinema into a 
critical engagement with the social imaginary. He never hesitated in defining an important, even 
if insignificant in the large scheme of things, to the critic in times when, as Daquin pointed out 
by citing a study, up to 24% of audiences in France consulted film reviews when deciding what 
films to watch.54 
While Bazin believed that any film, whatever its overall formal merits, could be read for 
historical symptoms, he did not believe that this exonerated a critic or the audiences from the 
need to make space for aesthetic judgments, a space from which the historical moment is 
confronted in a state of affective but critical charge. As early as 1944, in “The cinema and 
popular art,” Bazin writes” “[T]he problem of a popular art is not resolved by the mere 
appearance of a popular art. The popular works of the future will necessarily be cinematic. It 
would be dangerous to believe that they will necessarily find their material without the at least 
negative intervention of an aesthetic politic.”55 He then goes on to compare cinema to 
architecture wherein the latter can always get by with functional constructions so long as people 
don’t demand something more of it; similarly, “on its own, cinema comes up with Emile 
Couzinet or Fernandel films.” These films for him would lack the ability to make us take 
distance from and confront our own historical condition since they purvey “a demagogic 
mythology in which society believes itself represented and to which it ends by unconsciously 
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conforming.”56 As Bazin saw it, the French peasant who went to the cinema knew more about 
the life of an American worker than a French one so long as he had only Fernandel films to get a 
picture of contemporary France. But despite these reservations early in his career, Bazin would 
go on to read the majority of popular films symptomatically without making demystification a 
major part of his aesthetic politics. If his position on the mediocrity of most films may be 
surmised from over a decade and half of writing, it would be that cinema needed this production 
of indifferent quality to remain commercially viable in order to keep the more aesthetically 
ambitious films honest with their audiences. We will see this more clearly in his position of 
postwar Westerns in chapter four. 
It might appear that Bazin’s dream of creating a space of reconciliation between large 
audiences and critical engagement worn thin long ago with distinct audiences for distinct forms 
of cinema, a fragmentation intensified by the personalized viewing practices of our day. To parse 
the question of audiences and forms with all the historical complexity since Bazin’s time would 
require a different project. All this dissertation tries to do is to recover what for Bazin constituted 
the conditions for the political possibilities of the aesthetic that we can then examine to see if 
they still remain possibilities in the current media landscape. The conditions this chapter brings 
out are the need for subjects that give a mythic orientation to history—distilling it into simple 
forms rather than capturing it directly—and an emphasis on the popular character of cinema even 
in its most artistically ambitious productions. 
For the purposes of a discussion about aesthetic politics, Bazin’s critical legacy over the 
years following his death is best glimpsed metonymically at two historical moments: one on the 
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question of subjects in the early moments of the New Wave and another on the question of state 
protection for films decades after the New Wave had entered into history. When Roland Barthes 
reviewed Claude Chabrol’s debut film Le Beau Serge (1958), which tells the story of a young 
man returning to the provinces and getting caught up in the sexual and emotional crises of his 
best friend and his wife, he wrote lines that bear citing at length in light of the discussion here: 
As I recall the opening images of Le Beau Serge, I say to myself yet again that here 
in France talent is with the right and truth with the left, that it is this fatal disjunction 
between form and meaning that stifles us… I would have given a lot to strip Le Beau 
Serge of its plot… it may be that truth resides in the style, while concession is in the 
content; it might be a paradox of structure that the existence of a narrative is merely 
an attribute of its form. Hence the generalized divorce between a truth of signs—the 
whole modern way of seeing the world strictly as surface—and the pretense of plots 
and roles sloppily borrowed from the crudest bourgeois folklore of a Paul Bourget or 
a Graham Greene. A casual gaze may yield sarcasm, or affection, that is, a truth; but 
casualness when it comes to subject matter yields a lie. No other art can endure for 
long under this contradiction; a story’s naiveté quickly spoils the form’s modernity. 
The terrible thing about cinema is that it makes this monstrosity viable. We might 
even say that our current avant-garde lives off this contradiction: true signs, false 
meanings.57 
The remainder of the review is characteristic Barthesian oscillation between a longing for either 
Falubertian ascesis or Brechtian confrontation. Barthes’s theoretical insights are a far cry from 
the blunt accusations of Bazin’s interlocutors in the ‘40s, so he sees the “terrible viability” in the 
cinema of the “monstrous” coupling between seemingly inconsequential plots and modern 
stylistics. But Bazin had spent a decade and a half fighting for the aesthetic possibilities that arise 
in the friction between simple subjects and complex style, between form and meaning, between 
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aesthetic naiveté and sophistication.58 And he had the chance to write a few brief lines praising 
Chabrol’s film before he passed away without the detailed review he promised. 
All of Barthes’s theoretical sophistication cannot prevent his self-righteous distribution of 
truth and talent between the Left and the Right respectively; the ideological truth of the former 
and the stylistic sophistication of the latter. He betrays the same unreflective reflexes that had 
sought to mire aesthetic debates in the desire for ideological clarity rather than ideological 
negotiation. To this ideological impatience, Chabrol simply responded with a short piece for 
Cahiers du Cinéma, titled “Petits sujets” in which he parodied the distinction between big and 
small subjects.59 And so the debates continued while the terms remained the same. 
The other moment when Bazin’s legacy on the question spoke most clearly was in 1993 
in a classroom at the Sorbonne where Eric Rohmer had entered into his third decade of teaching 
film. This pertains to the fact that Bazin had been involved in both fighting for some degree of 
state protection of the French film industry and the development of arthouse cinemas while at the 
same time warning against the aesthetic hermeticism that might come from an excess of 
protection and specialization. 1993 was the year of negotiations over the renewal of the General 
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in which the Europeans felt threatened by the 
possibility that the “cultural exception” clause to free trade would be removed. The film 
industries of Europe, with France among those leading the campaign, called for retaining this 
clause and several filmmakers signed petitions to this effect. Rohmer was among the signatories 
to one such petition. He had never received state funding for his films, but not for lack of 
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applying. Nonetheless, even when he was struggling to establish his filmmaking career, Rohmer 
did not believe that the cinema should be protected by the state.60 Despite signing the petition, 
his actual position stood apart from the thrust of the debates. He laid this position out before his 
students, most of them aspiring filmmakers. He was against complete free trade, he said, because 
it is only viable in an economically homogenous world and not between countries with unequal 
wealth. In this, he was opposed the core of GATT’s raison d’être. But he also argued that film 
had a utilitarian dimension that should not be shielded from competition if it is to remain socially 
relevant. 
I signed the letter of protest against GATT for solidarity and not for protectionist 
reasons. I am a commercial filmmaker, and I can even say that my film [L’Arbre, le 
Maire et la Médiathèque] is the only commercial art film in France because it has not 
benefited from tax exemption. I don't think however that this is what everyone 
should do, or that I want to do this all the time, but I don't think art should be 
completely subsidized as is the case with repertory theatre… I say that it is all 
cinema that one should defend and not just "good cinema"… Even the most 
commercial cinema must be defended, because it must exist, the same as those 
houses must be defended that do not have an "architectural character."61 
As for Rohmer’s “subjects,” the “series” format of his films—Moral Tales, Comedies 
and Proverbs, Tales of Four Seasons—reproduce the generic character of cinema. And as 
someone who was also his own producer with limited means, this format must also be seen as 
much as a way of gaining a captive audience for his films as an aesthetically-productive 
framework, with the two dimensions complementing each other.62 
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Conclusion 
The emphasis on Bazin’s interest in subjects here and the introduction of the idea of their 
mythic character is meant to lay the ground for looking more closely in the following chapters at 
his analysis of some filmic mythologies and what they have to tell us about the political character 
of cinema as a narrative form. But this emphasis is also necessary because classical narrative 
cinema has for long been an object of ideological caricature for political modernism and its 
theoretical heirs among scholars of early cinema. Noël Burch had characterized it as an 
Institutional Mode of Representation that enforced bourgeois ideology.63 Colin MacCabe traced 
its genealogy to the nineteenth century realist novel and its technique of meta-narration and 
omniscience.64 For most of them, its key effect was to reinforce a sense of stable subjectivity. 
Following on from these critiques, Tom Gunning conceptualized early cinema as a vehicle for 
“attractions” that through an unintegrated and excessive sensorial address breaks the stable 
subjectivity posited by narrative.65 The idea of “attractions” as opposed to the illusion of 
narrative continues to be operative in film discourse. Thus, André Gaudreault writes, “One of 
institutional cinema’s principles is to dissolve attractions scattered throughout a films’ discourse 
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into a narrative structure—to integrate them in the most organic way possible.”66 Though 
acknowledging that attractions and narrative often co-exist, Gaudreault asserts an opposition 
between them. 
Bazin would agree with these assessments partly and certainly disagree with its 
ideological basis. We have seen him argue that narratives are an effect of mythic elements such 
as generic patterns and stars integrated within the narrational flow of an alternate, dream world. 
For Bazin, there is no neat distinction between the two. If we follow his argument, cinema did 
come into its own in the second decade of the twentieth century, but not so much because of D. 
W. Griffith and his “invention” of montage or mastery of the long narrative. While, following 
Musser,67 narration may have been important in films before this time and, following Gunning, 
“attractions” may have been the decisive factor in audience pleasure, films from the second 
decade onwards made cinema into an art form because they could reconcile these two poles in 
the creation of myths. In this, it is indeed the heir of the nineteenth century novel, understood not 
as the perfection of a stable bourgeois subjectivity but as a “matrix of myths.” The cinema came 
into its own, Bazin explicitly argued, not with Griffith but with the Fantomas and the Vampires, 
the Tramp, the Stone Face, and the whole gallery of stars who embodied their own myths.68 
What cinema could now do is go beyond the transience of astonishment (and a rather bare idea 
of modernity that some early cinema scholars hold on to) and the inexhaustible flow of narratives 
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to create enduring emblems of historical experience. Bazin argues that we go to the movies for 
both the more or less undifferentiated continuum (narration) and the concentrated intervals 
(myths as “attractions” in an expanded sense and more variably historical). He would agree that 
these narrative films do indeed hold us captive within ideological, mythic pictures, but these are 
not a part of an indifferent bourgeois ideology but expressive, at a remove, of the historical and 
social imaginary that depends precisely on some kind conscious or unconscious interpretation to 
be effectual. In this, the avoidance of narrative by some disciplinary currents may just be an 
avoidance of politics, however much they may fly under the banner of critique.69 
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Chapter 3 
In which Bazin Settles Charlot’s Political Accounts 
 
We have seen that Bazin used the word “myth” to understand the social function of 
popular forms. I will now be looking, in this chapter and the next, at Bazin’s account of myths 
that found their preeminent expression in the cinema and their morphology from their pre-World 
War II to post-World War II historical conditions. I will be concentrating on his reading of 
Chaplin’s Tramp and the Western, and reference other genres in passing. Bazin’s work suggests 
that writing in a time of crisis for classical Hollywood myths allowed him to glimpse more 
clearly both the significance of modern mythologies as well as their contradictory character. His 
writings straddle a period of naïve confidence (in a non-pejorative sense) that the cinematic 
genres inspired and, following the Mythologies of Barthes, the disenchanted exercises of 
demystification of popular culture. As will become clear, he understood the production of 
mythologies, with all their latent contradictions, to be an important, even a central social 
function, of modern art. The concealing of contradictions itself serves a historical need and they 
remain concealed only so long as history allows it. Therefore, the first section will outline 
Bazin’s general understanding of a myth’s relationship to history and his account of the crisis in 
Hollywood’s mythologies. 
The second section examines Bazin’s reading of Chaplin’s Monsieur Verdoux (1947) to 
lay the ground for exploring his deeper assessment of the power of cinematic myths in the next 
chapter. The focus will be on Bazin’s reading of the Charlot myth through the prism of Monsieur 
Verdoux, and this for various reasons. Firstly, Monsieur Verdoux was another occasion for Bazin 
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to explicitly engage advocates of committed cinema, but this time by performing a reading of a 
film’s subject—precisely what these advocates championed but in this case a subject to which 
critics on Left did not know how to respond. Secondly, the unravelling of one of the most 
enduring myths of cinema drew some dramatic writing from Bazin; given the appeal of the 
Tramp, Bazin knew that “unmasking” him through the figure of a serial killer would bring out 
the full affective intensity of being witness to the contradictions of something that had held 
audiences in its spell for a period of time. Bazin’s writings on the Western too, as we will see in 
the next chapter, offer us similar theoretical insights; but there he also had to defend a genre that 
was dismissed to begin with by several of his peers. The fact that he could take the appeal of 
Charlot for granted gave his insights into mythic contradictions added force when writing about 
Monsieur Verdoux. [I will be using “Charlot” and “the Tramp” interchangeably to refer to 
Chaplin’s screen persona.] But both Charlot and the Westerns elicit such strong readings from 
Bazin because they were myths in crisis, past the peak of their appeal. But unlike other prewar 
genres they had not ceased to exercise considerable force on the social imaginary, both in 
America and abroad. 
Myth and History 
So far we have an idea of myths as having the function of orienting us in history. But we 
are yet to properly interrogate the relationship between myths and history as Bazin elaborates it. 
We can start with his preface to a book on the relationship of Westerns to American history. 
Jean-Louis Rieupeyrout was a French historian of the American West who wrote Le Western, ou 
le Cinéma Américain par Excellence (1953) detailing the historical foundations of the Western to 
demonstrate that it is more than a genre of fantasy and based on bonafide events and historical 
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figures.1 Bazin found the book a useful reference for all his subsequent articles on the Western, 
but he cautions Rieupeyrout of losing sight of the significance of his object in an excessive quest 
for historical references. 
[B]y confining itself to films that justify his thesis, [Rieupeyrout’s study] discards by 
implication the other side of the aesthetic reality… For the relations between the 
facts of history and the Western are not immediate and direct, but dialectic… In its 
most romantic or most naïve form, the Western is the opposite of a historical 
reconstruction. There is no difference between Hopalong Cassidy and Tarzan except 
for their costume and the arena in which they demonstrate their prowess. However, if 
one wanted to take the trouble to compare these delightful but unlikely stories [of the 
Westerns] and to superimpose them, as is done in modern physiognomy with several 
negatives of faces, an ideal Western would come through, composed of all the 
constants common to one and to the other: a western made up solely of unalloyed 
myth.2i 
Too much historical specificity, Bazin tells us, defeats the experience of history that myths 
embody. And he goes on to suggest that such specificity completely misses the global resonance 
of the myths, exemplified in the fact that the Western as an idea of America is not just a myth for 
America but for audiences around the world. The fact that myths have a dialectical and not a 
direct relationship to history makes it possible for them to have an intimate but autonomous 
relationship to their historical moments of emergence and to have a trajectory of their own. This 
intimate autonomy reveals itself most clearly in the experience of the origins of myths. 
Bazin calls the Western and the Soviet cinema of the ‘20s the two great mythic bodies of 
film history because they coincided with the founding myths of two national identities.3 On a 
large scale, they reveal the political essence of all myths which is that their origin coincides with 
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some new beginning in society, the hallmark of political experience according to Arendt. The 
fact that myths impose themselves on history is more important than what they borrow from 
history, since the uncertainty of beginnings in history needs the structures of myths to place them 
on a surer footing. 
Like the conquest of the West, the Soviet Revolution is a collection of historical 
events which signal the birth of a new order and a new civilization. Both have 
begotten the myths necessary for the confirmation of History, both had to reinvent a 
morality to rediscover at their living source, and before their mixture or pollution, the 
foundation of the law which would make order out of chaos, separating heaven from 
earth.4ii 
Bazin’s emphasis on “reinvention” of morality and “rediscovery” of law at the source before 
“mixture and pollution” of the historical experiences suggests that these experiences were much 
too complex to be grasped directly, even as the motivations and needs at their origin lent 
themselves to neater distillation. It is to counter the messiness of experience that history needs 
such distillation, to give it a structure that orients experience. This is why myths are necessary 
for “confirming” history. We will return to Bazin’s writing on the Western in the next chapter to 
see how he tracked the genre’s confrontation with the “mixture and pollution” at its core that 
history inevitably laid bare. 
That Bazin does not derive this understanding of myths only from the privileged 
examples of the Western and 1920s’ Soviet cinema, and that he still affirms the dialectical 
relationship of the origin of the myth to the origin of the social phenomenon to which it refers, 
can be gauged from his experience of being present at the birth of a myth on an altogether 
smaller scale. In the summer of 1955, Bazin shared with his readers a filmic experience he had 
on his holidays on the Atlantic coast in France. He recalls feeling as if he was walking through 
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the world of Les Vacances de Monsieur Hulot (1953), the Jacques Tati film of two years earlier 
which was also the first and at the time the only one to feature the eponymous character. He 
describes it as a sense that the film was “reality itself in the way that in some dreams we reassure 
ourselves that we are awake”—so perfectly real that it can withstand the first reflex of doubt. But 
this sense could not withstand any analysis because the analogies were vague. Ultimately, Bazin 
says, Tati’s film may refer to the social reality of leisure, especially in a postwar society on the 
verge of economic boom, but it is a universe to itself. Its humor is not satire that seeks to unmask 
something in reality. Even if “the stupidity of the lodgers [where Bazin was staying] ceded 
nothing to those in the film… Jacques Tati has done much better: he has created, all of a piece, a 
universe perfectly imaginary and completely lifelike, in the sense that the real one, and we along 
with it, can no longer avoid resembling it.”iii In the relationship between the imaginary of myth 
and the reality of the world, it is “the imaginary that takes root in reality and nourishes it… by 
the force of the myth that Jacques Tati has henceforth imposed upon us.”5iv Here we again see 
the primary significance of the aesthetic autonomy of the myth; it is autonomous from reality and 
history only so as to better organize them without our conscious intervention. The Free World 
and the Workers’ State do not exist prior to their mythologization, and the carefully regimented 
rituals of beach holidays yield their joys in the anarchy introduced into them by the knees and 
elbows of Hulot. This last example is significant for underlining the fact that the socio-political 
resonance of aesthetic mythologies is not limited to the grand events of history and accompany 
us through the smaller but also more frequent shifts in our historical experience. And Hulot did 
indeed go on to become the myth of the postwar economic boom in France where he represented 
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the sometimes clueless presence of an older French sensibility in the drab but prosperous new 
suburbs.6 But Bazin’s description of his discovery also underlines perfectly the 
phenomenological experience of Arendt’s phrase “introduction into politics” (see chapter 1) as a 
world is formed on film but which we enter in the historical world unexpectedly renewed by this 
image on screen. 
Even as Bazin argued for the preeminence of characters and genres in art over style, he 
was aware that he was writing at a moment of crisis in cinema’s ability—primarily Hollywood’s 
since it had been the generator of myths like no other national cinema—to respond to the mythic 
imperative of the aesthetic. Not only the mythologies of the silent era, but those embedded in 
talkie genres such as the screwball comedy and gangster films had been exhausted with the war, 
and event that Bazin called the “the grand killer of myths.”7 He writes about the screwball 
comedies with their “heroes rich enough to forget about the fact… living in a universe without 
economic resistance where money acquires the fairytale powers of the magic wand”8v as 
paradoxically speaking to the Depression era not only because they offered an escape but also 
because reflection on anything other than matters of need in those times needed either the 
abstraction of wealth to such a degree that the fact becomes indifferent or a somewhat similarly 
indifferent poverty; Bazin implies that since the latter wouldn’t survive comparison with 
prevailing conditions of poverty, it is abstract wealth that becomes the setting for the moral 
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fantasies of the epoch. But this myth could not survive the much grimmer realities of the War 
and the sharper presence of Communist critique on the political horizon.9  
The energies of the screwball comedy, he writes, dissipated into postwar dramas that 
reflected on moral dilemmas more soberly.10 The gangster film met with a simpler but also more 
dramatic end where it became moralized into “criminel noirs” or thrillers in which the heroes are 
men of the establishment, betraying the increasing authoritarianism that presaged the McCarthy-
era America.11 The same fate attended most film stars. In reviewing Adolph Zukor’s book The 
Public Is Never Wrong (1953), Bazin remarks upon the “hecatomb” of stars, each a myth to him- 
or herself, that paid for the few that still endured in the public consciousness—Garbo and the 
Tramp, for example. But despite this gloomy picture of the demise of the most powerful 
mythologies on film, Bazin here writes something that gives a clue to the paradoxical resistance 
of aesthetic mythologies that can fall out of history but can always re-emerge to join up with it 
later. Most stars, like Clara Bow (Bazin’s example), die with their historical moment, he writes 
and then suggests that for this reason we look out for those stars/genres/myths that are likely to 
endure—that is, inform changing historical experiences. Then he immediately catches himself 
and wonders if we should be condemning future generations to our tastes, suggesting that what 
seems fleeting may resonate much more after an interval of a generation or two.12 And Bow’s 
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restoration to the critical and public pantheon of stardom towards the end of the twentieth 
century vindicates that caution.13 
While most myths die, at least provisionally, at first contact with a different historical 
reality, there are others that are much more stubborn in their demise. And it is these myths that 
reveal the equivocal nature of all myths and participate most intensely in the drama of history. If 
myths impose an order of experience on our world, they do so through a necessary idealization 
of some aspect of socio-historical reality. It then follows that it is also a simplification, from 
which, in turn, follows the fact that at some point its contradictions will be laid bare, not by some 
demystifying critic but by history itself. Bazin is not interested in the demystification process but 
in the drama of the myths’ struggle with histories, their own and of the world. Those myths that 
have maintained a relationship with a long period in history will cede with difficulty to historical 
change, or perhaps history itself is not so easily ready to let go of them. Such were the 
mythologies of the Tramp and the western. Both these mythologies had almost disappeared with 
the war; he notes that the production of Westerns fell drastically and a fugitive version of the 
Tramp got drawn into a joust with Hitler which undermined his essentially ambiguous 
relationship to social reality. But they both reappeared after the war—the rebound in the 
production of Westerns and the release of Monsieur Verdoux—changed by history but not yet 
ready to submit to it completely. 
Even in their hour of crisis and doubt, the Western and the Tramp’s persona belonged to 
the postwar world with as much currency as they did to the historical moments when they were 
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at their peak. This is best seen in the specific crisis that they confronted. Writing a review of 
Hollywood between 1938 and1948 for the Cannes film festival brochure in 1949, Bazin 
identified misogyny as the central fault-line in the crisis of existing Hollywood myths and one 
that limited the resonance of its new genres such as the thrillers. It became an explicit trope in 
several films such as Lady from Shanghai (1947) and Shadow of Doubt (1943), as it did in 
Chaplin’s Monsieur Verdoux (1947) and in some Westerns such as The Outlaw (1943).14 But a 
fault line is not an uncomplicated fault that one can point up to condemn these films and these 
genres. Beyond any historical reference, the fault lines in a myth expose something that was very 
much a part of the myth when it exercised its influence over us but has only now either come 
into view or morphed into something that follows from it. If we set out to condemn a myth that 
we once drew upon to orient our imaginaries, we condemn ourselves. While it may be gratifying 
to a moralist that we recognize and “confess” our misplaced pleasures, such self-righteousness 
suggests that either there are “clean” myths or that we can live outside ideology, to use a word 
that succeeded “myth” in designating the avowed and unavowed structures of thought and 
feeling that inform experience. There is a more complicated way of coming to terms with the 
intricate realities of myths, and Bazin’s writings on Monsieur Verdoux offer a dramatic sketch of 
this process as well as one of the high points in his engagement with the question of aesthetic 
politics. In the remainder of the chapter, I will recount how Bazin seized this opportunity to settle 
some political scores—his own and Charlot’s—and the following chapter draws out the 
theoretical lessons that follow from this account. 
                                                 
14
 Bazin, “ USA 1938-1948.” The topic of misogyny in postwar American films was quite a popular topic among 
Parisian film critics into the 1950s. Apart from articles in Cahiers du Cinéma by Pierre Kast and Michel Dorsday 
early in decade, Jacques Siclier published a monograph, Le Mythe de la Femme Dans le Cinéma Américain, in 1955. 
For references, see Eric Rohmer, "Livres de Cinéma, » in Cahiers du Cinéma no. 62 ((August-September 1956), 56-
59. 
110 
 
Verdoux/Charlot 
The furor in America surrounding Chaplin’s personal character and his politics that 
accompanied the reception of Monsieur Verdoux is well-known. But among the European 
intelligentsia, a different kind of disappointment in Chaplin surfaced with this film. The 
Americans suspected him of being a Communist, but for the European Left Chaplin as Verdoux 
was a confusing ally: a man who went about killing widows for money and who in the end 
doesn’t do enough to justify his denunciation of organized warfare and the legal system. To 
recall the plot briefly, Verdoux had been a bank clerk for over three decades before losing his job 
in the Great Depression. To support his wife (who is confined to a wheel chair) and child, he 
takes to seducing and marrying widows before killing them for their property. Eventually, 
though, his wealth is wiped out in another market crash before the war breaks out. We find him 
looking older and weak by the end, and his wife and child are dead. In the meantime, there are 
two women who survive Verdoux’s attempts to murder them. One is a wife played by Martha 
Raye, already known for her “Big Mouth” persona which is the very opposite of the feminine 
ideal of the Tramp. She survives due to an accident that derails Verdoux’s plans, but her openly 
misogynistic portrayal also sets off the innocuous and mostly unremarkable women that Verdoux 
succeeds in killing. There is nothing in them that would “justify” Verdoux killing them even 
within the realm of satire. The other person to survive is a homeless girl on whom Verdoux plans 
to test a poison but who turns out to have the kind of faith in life despite circumstances that 
recalls the girls from the Tramp films. Verdoux changes his mind about testing the poison on her, 
and he then comes across her after his fall back into poverty. She has by this time married an 
ammunitions manufacturer. Verdoux is spotted by relatives of one of the women he has 
murdered. Even though he has the opportunity to get away, he turns himself in. At his trial, he is 
sentenced to death, but justifies himself by saying that when mass murder is the rule of society, 
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his crime is of minor significance. Remaining his cynical self and seemingly at ease, he walks 
away to the guillotine. 
Even before the film reached France, the ground for its reception was prepared by 
dispatches from America. One from Jean Renoir supporting the film and Chaplin appeared in 
L’Écran Français and another criticizing it came from a correspondent of Les Temps Modernes, 
Nathalie Moffat (both in July 1947).15 Bazin himself did not have to wait for its French release in 
January 1948 to watch it since he was a correspondent for L’Écran Français reporting on the 
film’s European premiere at the Mariénské Láznë Film Festival in the former Czechoslovakia.16 
He files his first (anonymous) notice in September 1947.17 This context is important because he 
would recall in his longer pieces the dissatisfaction of the Marxists at the festival in “not having 
found any socially useful instruction” and who also found the film to be too dark.18 His first long 
piece, “Défense de Monsieur Verdoux,” appeared in the December 1947 issue of Les Temps 
Modernes as a direct and sustained response to Moffat, with a shorter piece the same month in 
L’Écran Français and another longer article for the January 1948 issue of Cahiers du Cinéma’s 
predecessor La Révue du Cinéma.19 The last appeared as a long pamphlet written for a 1948 
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issue of Doc Éducation Populaire, the joint publication of the popular education organizations 
Peuple et Culture and Travail et Culture whose cinema-related activities were headed by 
Bazin.20 
To expand the political context further, Moffat’s piece appeared in the issue of Les Temps 
Modernes in which Sartre concluded his elaboration of the program for committed literature, 
under the rubric Qu’est-ce que la littérature?. Elsewhere, in L’Écran Français the editorial line 
was beginning to split along those militantly opposed to American cinema on ideological 
grounds and those, including Bazin, who insisted on keeping aesthetic and social questions in a 
dynamic relationship, only to be labeled aesthetes. As we have seen, Bazin’s defense of 
American cinema had already begun to bother the ideological critics. The ideological wing of the 
journal might still have been welcoming of Chaplin despite these divides, given his political 
sympathies, but the way Bazin would go about defending the film surely did not help matters in 
the long run. 
“Défense de Monsieur Verdoux” responds directly to Moffat’s criticisms of the film, 
citing extensively from her piece, as well as to those Marxists with whom he watched the film in 
the former Czechoslovakia.21 On Monsieur Verdoux, Moffat’s conclusion is: 
The crimes of Monsieur Verdoux are not dictated by self-preservation, or the need to 
set right injustices, or by any deep ambition, or to set right whatever is around him… 
[N]ever are we given a coherent moral point of view of the murderer. And so it is 
difficult to critique social justice through the death sentence of such a man. I don’t 
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accuse Chaplin of being too bold, as the American critics do, but on the contrary of 
being as little convincing as possible. It is sad to have expended so much energy to 
prove nothing at all, for having succeeded neither in making a comedy or a film with 
social significance, and for having rendered obscure and unintelligible the most 
important problems.22 
I have cited from Moffat’s review not only because Bazin does so but more significantly because 
of the strong echoes it carries of another dispatch from New York on another key American film; 
that of Sartre in 1945 on Citizen Kane.23 There, in the midst of preparing to launch Les Temps 
Modernes, Sartre too had mocked American cinema’s ability to engage political problems 
intellectually. Casting Welles as first an anti-fascist and only then an artist, he had criticized the 
film’s technical “excesses” for drowning out its subject. He read it as a symptom of an American 
intelligentsia at once out of touch with the masses and lacking the cultural institutions of Europe 
that could justify such “artistic” exercises: in short, good intentions perhaps and certainly good 
politics, but bad philosophy and bad aesthetics. He much prefers the studio production that, 
“unfortunately lacks social and cultural intentions, but catches you by the throat.” But Sartre’s 
article was written after the war against fascism had been won for the moment, before the Cold 
War and even just before his call in Les Temps Modernes’ for committed literature. Moreover, it 
had some insightful observations on film technique and temporality and Roger Leenhardt and 
Bazin responded to him on that plane.24 Moffat reprises Sartre’s position amidst the growing 
tensions of the Cold War symbolized by Chaplin’s own travails. She would have Chaplin make 
up his mind—either be the Tramp (“an imaginary character outside the world and of our life” but 
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at least entertaining25) or become a true affront to society, like Raskolnikov she writes, instead of 
a worse-than-mediocre philosopher. 
Bazin argues that indeed the stated philosophies of Chaplin’s characters, whether in The 
Great Dictator or Monsieur Verdoux, have no intrinsic significance, but for this very reason they 
bring out what is essential about these characters: their participation in a myth “which singularly 
overflows all lessons that we set out to deduce on whatever ideological plane.” 
M. Verdoux is like Josef K. [from Kafka’s The Trial], a character plunged into 
certain situations. He has no need to justify himself to anyone. His sole reason for 
existing is to be. His aesthetic existence is sufficiently established if the relationship 
of the character to the situation and their reaction to each other seems true [“s’impose 
comme vrai”]. I mean aesthetically true and not morally, psychologically, 
sociologically or in relation to whichever ideology; because the distinctiveness of the 
myth is precisely its autonomy. The only criticism appropriate to Monsieur Verdoux 
would be the inverse of Nathalie Moffat’s. It would need to proceed by sounding out 
the myth to judge its homogeneity and density, to detect the porosity of situations 
that mythological concretions have not filled up. According to this method, far from 
being able to attribute an ideology to the work, ideology is on the contrary impure 
and heterogeneous to the essence of the myth.26vi 
The myth that Verdoux embodies, Bazin goes on to argue, is that of Charlot, the Tramp. We will 
come back to Bazin’s argument for this and to the question of ideology’s heterogeneity to the 
myth of the Tramp presently. Let us first mark the seeming provocation of affirming the aesthetic 
autonomy of a character whose essence is to react to the situations in which it is placed. Sartre 
had just finished outlining the responsibility of the author (not of characters) to claim the 
historical situation in which he finds himself and to respond to it without appeal to either the 
authority of the past or to the judgment of posterity. But the idea of the “situation” is a little more 
complex in Sartre; its most elaborate discussion occurs in Being and Nothingness (1943) but 
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Bazin’s terminology also evokes Sartre’s novel Nausea (1938). In order to take the full measure 
of Bazin’s reading of Verdoux and its political provocation, we need to take a detour through 
these two aspects: first through this existential terminology that has a special relevance to 
Chaplin’s screen personae, and second through his reading of the Tramp. 
To recall the concepts from Being and Nothingness, Sartre distinguishes being-in-itself 
from being-for-ourself where being-in-itself is at one with its situation, completely determined 
by it, which is also a pure present; as such it has no self-consciousness. Only when a being, an 
individual, tries to become something, projects herself from the present to a desired future, does 
she meet resistance from the situation. This resistance is the precondition for freedom, which is 
also a coming to consciousness, a sense that we are not one with our situation, and thus that our 
project is to become beings-for-ourselves. But being-in-itself is not really a feature of human 
consciousness since such oneness with the situation and a suspension in a pure present is 
possible only for inert, non-sentient objects. The real suspension of human consciousness is 
between being-for-ourselves and being-for-others. Being-for-others is when we accept our 
existence in time and project ourselves, but do so inauthentically by letting ourselves be defined 
by how others see us. The awareness of our situatedness, that we are suspended between these 
distinct states, that there is a disintegration at the heart of being, comes to us as ‘vertigo’ (in 
Being and Nothingness) or as ‘nausea’ as it does to Roquentin, the protagonist of Sartre’s novel 
by that name. 
Bazin’s geological terminology in the lines cited above certainly comes, as Ludovic 
Cortade demonstrates, from his education that emphasized the interrelatedness of geological and 
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historical structures;27 but his idea that a mythology has its concretions and porous parts that 
define the situations in which it becomes active also evokes lines from Nausea in its tactility. 
Roquentin’s coming to awareness of the self’s suspension in the weight of material existence is 
to encounter its sticky resistance. After dismissing existence as meaningless because “[e]very 
existing thing is born without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance,” 
Roquentin immediately feels that “existence is a fullness which man can never abandon.” This 
“fullness,” however, is not one of satisfaction and undisturbed belonging and his realization is 
less intellectual than haptic: 
It was there in the garden, toppled down in the trees, all soft, sticky, soiling 
everything, all thick, a jelly. And I was inside, with the garden… I hated this ignoble 
mess. Mounting up, mounting up as high as the sky, spilling over, filling everything 
with its gelatinous slither… I knew it was the World, the naked World revealing 
itself, and I choked with rage at this gross, absurd being… There had never been a 
moment in which [this World] could not have existed. That was what worried me: of 
course there was no reason for this flowing larva to exist. But it was impossible for it 
not to exist… to imagine nothingness you had to be there already, in the midst of the 
World, eyes wide open and alive… [Nothingness] was an existence like any other 
and appeared after many others.28 
Existential nothingness in these lines is not a consoling absurdity that we can look forward to 
with death, but something that sticks to us in the interstices of porous and concrete situations, 
and resides in the resistance offered by these indeterminate sticky spaces. Confrontation with this 
nothingness then requires an attempt to come into being-for-ourselves even if the “meaning” of 
existence always remains elusive. 
If it seems as if I reading too much Sartre into Bazin’s metaphor of the situation, then one 
could look at Bazin’s article on The Great Dictator (1940) from 1945, subtitled “Pastiche et 
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postiche ou le néant pour une moustache.”29 There Bazin describes, with dizzying philosophical 
humor, how once Hitler “stole” Charlot’s moustache, he ceased to have any existence for 
himself. His being was now solely for Charlot who stole it right back with The Great Dictator; 
from a historically-specific dictator, Hitler was now incorporated into the caricatural myth of 
“The Dictator” which existed with that relative autonomy from history that characterizes all 
myths. But Bazin admits that Chaplin’s audacity could hope to be only partially successful given 
that the presence of the real Hitler was still all-too-alive even watching the film after the war, and 
that the only thing that made such a confusion between the Tramp and Hitler possible was the 
moustache, an overall marginal characteristic of the Tramp’s mythology. Charlot’s essentially 
ambiguous relationship with society had to be denied in order to draft him into the war effort. 
But the relationship between existential thought and slapstick comedy was still on Bazin’s mind 
in 1946, drawn to it this time by a short film directed by the French comedian Gilles Margaritis, 
L’Homme (1946) whose description suggests that it tries to unmask the absurdity of human 
existence. While he found its “species of burlesque existentialism” excessively school-boyish to 
be either really funny or to be enough of a satire, the philosophical resonances of the genre were 
very much on his mind.30 Finally, in an article on slapstick, he speaks about the “terrorism of 
things” that convert humans into “machines of catastrophe,” an idea that we will see is intimately 
linked to Sartrean existentialism.31 Chaplin’s oeuvre was the most elaborate expression of what 
Bazin sees as the existential concerns embodied by a long and shared tradition of the slapstick, 
and it is therefore that the vocabulary of “situations” and “being” is particularly important to his 
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reading of the Tramp and Verdoux. As suggested earlier, Bazin reads Verdoux as a dramatically 
inverted iteration of the Tramp, so an account of Bazin’s reading of the Tramp in relation to the 
existential echoes I have pointed out will complete this detour necessary for tackling Verdoux. 
Bazin offers his reading of the Tramp in the articles he wrote on Monsieur Verdoux in 
Les Temps Modernes and in La Revue du Cinéma, but he worked it out fully in a pedagogical 
pamphlet on the film that followed up on those two articles. In this pamphlet, Bazin describes the 
Tramp in terms that explicitly resonate with Sartre’s philosophy, making him a peculiar model of 
Sartrean inauthenticity. The Tramp has no intention of disengaging himself from situations to 
become a being-for-himself. Even as objects fight him and society keeps running him out, all he 
hopes to do is to turn whatever situation in which he finds himself habitable for the moment. In 
one of the many episodes of nausea that besets Roquentin, and whose full evidence he still flees, 
Sartre’s protagonist becomes aware of the essential heterogeneity of the world of things and 
human consciousness. He tells himself, “Objects are not made to be touched. It is better to slip 
between them, avoiding them as much as possible.” Where Roquentin entertains the possibility 
of indifference to the world with morose rumination, the Tramp, when confronted by the 
violence of the objects, works towards arranging the mutual indifference of being and objects 
with desperate imagination. Bazin writes: 
[Charlot] completely lacks resilience when the world offers him too much resistance. 
He therefore looks to get around the difficulty instead of solving it. A provisional 
situation is enough for him as if the future did not exist. In The Pilgrim, for example, 
he blocks a rolling pin on the shelf with a bottle of milk which he will need to use a 
little later… But if the provisional is always enough for him, in the moment he 
demonstrates a prodigious ingenuity. No situation finds him at a loss.32vii 
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This relationship to things describes Charlot’s equivalent of Roquentin’s urge to slip between 
things, to have things and being inhabit an unchanging and even indifferent relationship to each 
other, whose impossibility Charlot keeps discovering every couple of minutes.33 When forced 
out of a situation, the Tramp’s reflex is to find another—almost any—situation to inhabit 
immediately: “At the limit, Charlot’s defensive reflexes end in a reabsorption of time into 
space.” That the Tramp would like nothing more than to be the same forever is perfectly 
illustrated when in Modern Times (1936) he prefers to remain in jail than to go out into the 
world. In this, he seeks to avoid not only the blows of the world but the “bad faith” that society 
imposes on us when its rules and conventions provide us with the alibi to escape the fact of 
individual freedom. As discussed in the introduction, for Sartre “bad faith” manifests itself in the 
lies we unconsciously and necessarily tell ourselves about our condition in the process of and in 
order to accomplish definite tasks.  But according to Bazin’s reading, the Tramp attempts a kind 
of bad faith that should be impossible for humans; a bad faith of turning into being-in-itself that 
is indistinguishable from its situation. However, society won’t let him be.  
To remain in a situation when thrown into society, the Tramp needs to emulate its norms 
and it is here that, at his own expense, he becomes a truly subversive presence. In imitating 
social practices, he exposes their absurdities. Bazin calls some of the films in which the Tramp 
appears, especially The Pilgrim (1923), “the most anti-clerical body of work that one could 
imagine in the provincial puritanical society of the USA.” But the Tramp is also “outside the 
sacred,” in the sense that, for Bazin, the “sacred” stands for all social rituals and institutions, the 
self-deification of a post-theological society. The Tramp reveals the absurdity of these 
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pretensions but not out of any malice or in any revolutionary spirit, Bazin argues, but by his 
attempts at imitating the social rituals that are devoid of any commitment to or understanding of 
the social pact that underpins them. It may be useful to recall here the Tramp’s appeal to the 
Surrealists in the 1920s when they saw him as the embodied rejection of all social norms and 
their attendant hypocrisy. Bazin is certainly gesturing towards and affirming this reading, but 
then he recalls the flipside of this. The Tramp’s anarchy is attended by cowardice and cynicism. 
He argues that it is the “general rule of his comportment to not hesitate in committing little 
villainies when no one’s watching him.”34 viii Not only is this a part of his subversive character in 
a society by which he is thoroughly outmatched, but it is also an internalized cynicism by which 
he is quite prepared to kick those who can’t kick back. Bazin gives the example of A Day’s 
Pleasure (1919) in which the Tramp beset by motion sickness on a boat kicks a vendor trying to 
sell him snacks. We can add several examples from the many short films featuring the Tramp, 
and there are prominent remnants of this right through till Modern Times. But this is not a list of 
the Tramp’s moral failings. Bazin, once again emphasizing the Sartrean vocabulary, is clear that 
“[o]ur support for the hero, the fact that we are for him and with him, is fortunately not beholden 
only to the moral categories that he embodies.” The point is to probe deeper into the Tramp’s 
relationship with society. So far we can still read the Tramp as a subversive presence in society, 
and if we are inclined to be a little shocked to see the Tramp not only shirking boring work but 
also gratuitously kicking around other workmen (The Tramp), then we can always explain it as 
the sort of perversion to which society pushes those who resist; the over-compensatory defenses 
and the cowardly kicks of the Tramp are employed indiscriminately. 
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What the Surrealists did not notice was that while the Tramp had no social commitments, 
he nonetheless wants to belong to society without those commitments. Since all he wants is to 
be, if that comes with the material comforts and marriage, all the better; and if for that he needs 
to mime the rituals of society, he will give it a shot. Indeed, we are likely to think that the Tramp 
is confronted with the particular hostility of a capitalist-industrial world. But he is even less at 
home with “nature.” In The Tramp (1915), given the task of milking a cow, he wags its tail as if 
it were a water pump, scared of milking it with his hands. And so in Modern Times, the dream of 
a comfortable life is a mechanized cow: the “bourgeois” dream of all the conveniences of 
machines in the guise of nature. Machines are not the antithesis of the guileless Tramp because 
they are in a way the emanation of his central feature, what Bazin calls “the sin of repetition.” 
The Tramp is happy to repeat a maneuver that worked once even when it has become useless and 
absurd, because adapting outside the mere instinct to survive would mean having a palpable 
desire to “be for oneself.” But this reflexive conflict with social existence, in which the violence 
of objects succeeds in turning men into “machines of catastrophe,”35 is not the real fault line in 
the Tramp’s relationship to society; it is rather romance. 
Between the tender and sweet Edna Purviance, the blind young girl of City Lights, 
and the frail invalid of Verdoux, there aren’t any significant differences except that 
he is married to the last. They are all, like Charlot, unfortunate beings and the inept 
of Society, the physically or morally weak of social life. It is this hyper-femininity 
which seduces Charlot, and love’s thunder-strike is at the origin of a striking 
conversion to social and moral norms.36ix 
This is the catalyst for a coming to consciousness, which is also a real fall into society. But, 
Bazin points out, we see the darker side of this only in the shorts. There, as in Payday (1922) or 
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A Day’s Pleasure, we see Charlot married and here romance does not survive the conversion to 
social norms. More than this, romance before marriage itself is not as idealized in these films as 
it would be in the feature-length films. In A Woman (1915), for example, Charlot tries to 
blackmail the patriarch with a healthy dose of queer subversion regarding his sexual infidelities 
so that he can marry his daughter and presumably lay claim to his own share of bourgeois 
hypocrisy. In The Tramp, he tries to steal the money of the girl he has just saved from other 
thieves, but gives in to the girl’s state of helplessness, returns the money, falls in love, and is 
immediately put to work by the girl’s father. 
The ambiguities in the Tramp’s characters are covered over for the most part beginning 
with the feature-length films. Even The Kid (1921) sees the Tramp trying his best to get rid of the 
baby before adopting him, but it is here that he starts laying open claims on our sentiments. “The 
Gold Rush (1925),” Bazin writes, “is the most extended apology for the character, and which 
most clearly solicits our protest against the lot of Charlot.”37 The Tramp may still get married but 
we won’t see his domestic life. This was also the beginning of the Surrealists’ slow 
disillusionment with the character, as he no longer seems to conform to their image of an outcast 
revolutionary. But they had simply missed the signs. Be that as it may, the Tramp now openly 
solicited our love. Bazin explains the reason for this transformation as follows: “[I]t is a law 
common to the evolution of all characters that live by commerce with the public, that they tend 
to justify our sympathy for them by greater psychological consistency and greater moral 
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perfection. The character of Pierrot follows the same curve.”38 xCharlot’s open solicitation may 
have been troubling to a few Surrealists, but we know that a majority of radical intellectuals still 
found in him a symbol of the oppressed of society.39 Elsewhere Bazin writes that “the success of 
[Chaplin’s and Griffith’s works] was built on misunderstandings. But even if Monsieur Verdoux 
had not come to deliver the secrets of Charlot, in time, the retrospectives of ciné-clubs would 
have revealed in the comedy of Chaplin the Kafkaesque universe in which the Little Fellow 
thrashes about [se débat].”40xi But one cycle of the “psychological and moral evolution” of the 
Tramp was complete with Modern Times, what Bazin calls the Old Testament of the myth. With 
Monsieur Verdoux, it’s the New Testament, but the news wasn’t good. 
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Bazin notes the historical source of Verdoux in the real-life figure of Henri Désiré Landru 
(1869-1922) but finds the only relevance of this source in the fact that Landru never explained 
his actions and had remained the kind of fascinating, inscrutable, and blank myth on which 
Chaplin could superimpose his own. As for the misogyny, we have seen that this seemed to be an 
explicit trope in several Hollywood films at the time. The social realities behind this crack in 
Hollywood mythologies remained uncertain for Bazin though he was sure deeper familiarity with 
the American context would reveal something about this.41 But if historical evidence were 
needed, Bazin argued that it could be well be found in the personal life of Chaplin himself who 
had for long now figured as a complementary persona to the Tramp’s. But the films themselves 
offer the internal coherence of a myth which would be sufficient for understanding the 
significance of this misogyny. 
Verdoux is in all ways the opposite of Charlot, but Bazin argues that this must be 
understood as a dialectical opposition mediated by the fact of marriage. His argument is that in 
Verdoux we see Charlot for the first time after marriage since he started appearing in full-length 
films. Bazin writes that the idealization of romantic love in the earlier films came from as a 
palpable reaction to a sense of inferiority complex that Charlot feels with regards to the “hyper-
feminine” woman. This idealization, as we know from some shorts, does not survive contact 
with the mundane realities of domestic life. Monsieur Verdoux is not an exception to this, but 
here Charlot has adapted himself to society in all other ways: “Charlot is in essence socially 
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maladjusted, Verdoux is over-adjusted.”42xii He can plan and execute with great efficiency (that 
is, he no longer seeks to remain one with his situation), and he has exchanged his profligacy with 
any money that used to come his way for an ease with the ways of finance. He uses these skills 
to offset the disappointments of the domestic life by which he was always tempted. Everything 
turns on how we understand the relationship between his social adaptation and his misogyny. 
The critics of the Left were disappointed that the misogyny wasn’t convincing enough as 
satire to condemn organized warfare and the hypocrisy of bourgeois law. The American 
ideologues found it too convincing. This is where we need to return to Bazin’s contention that 
ideology is completely foreign to the myth of Charlot/Verdoux. In light of our post-Althusserian 
understanding of ideology as the unavoidable structure of any experience, we need to remind 
ourselves that in 1947 the word still overwhelmingly meant some openly avowed or denounced 
political framework. “Social unconscious” would be Bazin’s rough equivalent of Althusser’s 
“ideology” and in this sense ideology is very much a part of how Bazin understands the 
Charlot/Verdoux myth. But ideology as an explicit political position is foreign to Charlot 
because, Bazin argues, his mythic essence is similar to Kafka’s K. Bazin does not elaborate his 
choice of K but it must be seen as a direct response to Moffat’s invocation of Raskolnikov. It 
suggests that any similarities between Verdoux and Raskolnikov as gratuitous murderers must be 
mediated through an understanding of K as an inheritor of Raskolnikov’s predicament which is 
that of asking whether individual transcends society of if society transcends the individual. If 
Raskolnikov seeks to use murder to see if he can transcend society, the experience of K is that 
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society is indeed the new “sacred,” as invisible and as inscrutable as a theological God and 
present everywhere. 
Bazin was entering into a thicket of novelistic characters, which included the Meursault 
of Albert Camus’s The Stranger (1942; the similarities between Verdoux and Meursault are 
pronounced), and which would be the site of aesthetico-political debates in postwar France. 
Nathalie Sarraute, perhaps the most prominent of the “New Novelists” at the time, had just 
published “From Dostoevsky to Kafka” in the October 1947 issue of Les Temps Modernes, two 
months before Bazin’s article. The point of departure of this article is a preliminary opposition 
between the psychological novel of the nineteenth century, as represented by Dostoevsky, and 
the novel of “situations” such as those of Kafka. Sarraute is essentially struggling with the fact 
that even novels that try their best to strip characters and events of psychology somehow let 
some psychological coherence slip in, and tries to find in Kafka’s novels that complete 
psychological blankness which would allow the novel form to escape its conventions. This 
problem of psychology is what Bazin invokes in responding to Moffat’s claim that Verdoux 
never manages to lay claim on our sympathies the way Raskolnikov does because his actions 
lack the psychological justification of the latter. Bazin writes: 
I]t isn’t about proving that [Verdoux] was right to kill [the women] according to 
some ideological criterion; it’s enough that he has reason to kill them in relation to 
himself. And this condition seems to me to be sufficiently met [in accordance with 
the myth’s inverted logic of femininity discussed earlier]. As for invoking a feeling 
of sympathy while doing so, the word seems equivocal and insufficient to me 
because it’s still too infused with psychology. I find it more apt to say that we are 
with M. Verdoux, which means more than a feeling, and more a sort of ontological 
sympathy. According to the argument of Nathalie Moffat, there would be no way of 
finding the law in the wrong here. At most we could expect that it would treat 
Verdoux as not responsible for his crimes. But nothing would be more absurd than a 
M. Verdoux in a psychiatric hospital. The judges must condemn Verdoux. Contrary 
to K, Verdoux is in essence the social culprit that the society does not recognize; 
because, let’s be clear, society is incapable of finding him: it is he who lets himself 
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be caught and it’s the judges who are afraid. (Is there a need here to underline the 
similarities of situations with Christ?)43xiii 
Bazin suggests that Kafka’s K is innocent in an elementary way, by the sheer blankness 
of psychology and action he presents—we, like him, are baffled by the lack of any specific 
accusation but this very absence makes any innocence or guilt almost primeval despite any guilt 
he might feel. In Verdoux, there is no Dostoevskian grappling with specific questions of 
conscience such as whether it is permissible for some to kill or of finding one’s way to a spiritual 
conversion, but there is the same challenge to society through gratuitous murder. The elementary 
innocence of K is inverted in the elementary and clear culpability of Verdoux, and the intense 
psychological anguish of Raskolnikov is inverted in the perfect psychological blankness of 
Verdoux. But why then are we with Verdoux, why this “ontological sympathy” for him? Not 
because Verdoux’s openly displayed guilt is of lesser consequence compared to the guilt of a 
society of organized warfare, but because it is simply a mutation of the “vague culpability” of the 
Tramp we all so loved and still love. 
[Charlot’s] awkward and precipitate flight was always the sign of a vague culpability 
which betrayed itself and which could be sufficiently punished with the blow of a 
truncheon. Society was little troubled by this little man with a duck’s walk, and his 
mischievousness and shrewdness never went beyond harmless revenge or the 
minimum of petty theft necessary for his survival. He was an easy victim who 
always escaped them at the last moment but who still remained in the role of the 
guilty one.44xiv 
Because Charlot never adapted to society, his essential culpability remained harmless. 
This culpability, we have seen, was an effect of the disjunction between his temptation to 
become part of society through love and marriage and the fact that he neither really understood 
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nor wanted to play by the social structures that came with it. As for society’s guilt—its 
hypocrisies, its dehumanizing organization of work, and so on—Charlot could highlight it by 
disguising his own in the longer films, but society itself was never aware of its own guilt (“We 
have never known society to [declare its guilt]: Society by its nature only knows how to 
accuse.”45xv) But the moment Charlot got married, met with its disappointments and revenged 
himself while playing by the rules of society, he became unrecognizable as Charlot; “No more 
Charlot, no more culprit! Society suffers from a strange unease…”46xvi It has no one to carry its 
guilt, of which the unsolved murders of the women are only a sign. Charlot and Verdoux have a 
social role to play as the essentially and undoubtedly guilty ones whose crimes society has no 
trouble pointing out and which cover its own. All of Verdoux’s counter-accusations can 
eventually be dismissed as nonsense by the journalists (who nonetheless ask him to give his own 
story a moral) because his specific crimes are irrefutable. 
Our response to Bazin’s intricate dialectics turn on whether we recognize the Tramp in 
Verdoux or not. For Bazin, the irrefutable proof comes in the last shot in which Verdoux 
marches with that shuffling gait to the guillotine, much like Charlot would set out for the 
horizon; “This same road to nowhere, always taken up from one film to another by the little man 
with the walking stick, in which some recognized the Wandering Jew while others preferred to 
confuse it for the road to hope, we now know where it ends. The end of the road is the path of a 
prison courtyard in the morning fog in which we can make out the ridiculous silhouette of the 
guillotine…”47 But in a way this ontological equivalence of Charlot and Verdoux was betrayed, 
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even without any nuanced reading, in reactions from across the political spectrum: “We 
understand that Mr. [Eric] Johnston’s offices [the then President of the MPAA who would 
oversee the beginning of the Hollywood blacklist], the spokesmen of the Legion of Decency, and 
all women’s clubs of America smell something fishy in Chaplin’s latest. Beside it, Scarface is 
but the tale of a children’s choir. M. Verdoux or Charlot the Martyr is avenged.”48xvii 
American society could always turn the gangster’s tale into a moral lesson without 
confessing its prurience, but their satisfaction in condemning Verdoux, and Chaplin with him, is 
troubled by a vague sense that they are also condemning the Tramp they still love and need. But 
this unease is as prominent on the Left. Here, the intellectuals see that Verdoux embodies that 
same affront to society that the Tramp did, but to a degree and in a way they no longer find 
useful. Too busy reading the Tramp as the permanent revolt of the oppressed, they never noticed 
both the depths of his anarchy and his weak spot for the very society whose rules he shuns. 
Though they now sensed the Tramp in Verdoux, they insisted, like Moffat, on distinguishing 
between the two: “Charlot with all his fantasy, his rich intimacy, his view of the world and of 
men, constantly surges, like a devil from a box, out of the narrow frame of the stockbroker 
Verdoux.”49 Bazin sought to show that indeed Charlot is trapped inside Verdoux, and leaps out 
of every time he murders one of the symbols of his feminine ideal’s betrayal. 
While the postwar Left was bothered by the misogyny, the more “radical” Surrealists 
seemed to anticipate in their way Bazin’s thesis that Verdoux’s misogyny was an inverted 
manifestation of the Tramp’s relationship to women; they simply beat Verdoux to an 
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unapologetic misogyny by two decades. In 1927, when Chaplin’s second wife Lita Grey filed for 
divorce and the sexual details of her divorce papers became public, the Surrealist group issued, 
under the title “Hands off Love!”, a little encyclopedia of misogynistic tropes (at least of the 
variety amenable to anti-bourgeois rhetoric).50 They accused Grey of trying to trap the free 
loving Tramp in Chaplin in the codes of a grasping married life and much worse. This was two 
years after The Gold Rush (1925) in which the Tramp went gold-prospecting and found both the 
gold and the girl, so one can only assume that they were avenging the Tramp so that Verdoux 
wouldn’t have to. If only Chaplin knew! But the greatest irony, which was not lost on Bazin and 
most probably neither on the editorial of Les Temps Modernes, was Bazin’s settling of the 
Tramp’s political accounts—describing how four decades of history was taken in by this strange 
exemplar of Sartrean inauthenticity (until he comes to consciousness and murders with clear-
sighted authenticity)—in Sartre’s journal, founded with a political mission and that named itself 
after the “gullible striker of Modern Times.”51xviii Bazin never wrote in Les Temps Modernes 
again. 
Tachella recalls that “Bazin was the only one to attempt rereading the author of Monsieur 
Verdoux based on the film.”52 (Though re-reading the myth of Charlot rather than the author may 
be a more appropriate description for what Bazin did.) And he did so by carrying out a veritable 
campaign across all the important intellectual venues—Esprit, in addition to Les Temps 
Modernes, L’Écran Français, and La Revue du Cinéma even before the film reached Parisian 
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theaters, throwing down a critical gauntlet across the ideological spectrum. This exacerbated the 
divides at L’Écran Français, and by the time Bazin wrote his essay on the Stalin myth, he would 
have to stop writing for the journal which had by then been taken over by the French Communist 
Party (PCF). But the real measure of how much Bazin had begun to bother the ideologues comes 
from an incident at Peuple et Culture for whose publication he had prepared his longest dossier 
on Monsieur Verdoux, destined for the many ciné-clubs around France. Andrew notes that in 
1948, with his Stalin article still more than a year away, Bazin had already become the focal 
point of tension in the relations between Peuple et Culture and Travail et Culture as the latter 
came increasingly under the influence of the PCF. The Stalinists engineered his removal from 
the board, but his reinstatement on the insistence of Peuple et Culture’s president Joseph Rovan 
precipitated the split of the two organizations.53 
What then are we to make of Bazin’s critical intervention? Was it mere political 
provocation riding on a too-clever reading of the Charlot/Verdoux personae, or does it yield a 
more sophisticated reading of the politics of aesthetics whose significance goes beyond the 
historically-specific provocation? I think that the provocation itself has not dated if we realize 
that Bazin’s assimilation of the Tramp to Verdoux goes beyond the habitual condemnation of 
society in the former’s name and undercuts our own complacent denunciation of society as it 
appears in the Tramp films. With Monsieur Verdoux, Bazin writes that we are called upon “to 
condemn the condemnation of a man ‘justly’ condemned by society”xix and with him, 
unsuspectingly, the Tramp.54 But this provocation has very little to do with circumstantial 
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polemics with the ideologues. A clearer understanding of why this is so will teach us something 
about the nature of myths as Bazin explains it. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has started an exploration of Bazin’s understanding of aesthetic 
mythologies, particularly as they are embodied by genres. I have discussed what it means for a 
mythic imaginary to give a shape to history in the face of the complexity of experience. A 
powerful aesthetic mythology coincides with a new beginning in history and creates a political 
horizon for interpreting the world. But we have also seen that aesthetic mythologies run their 
course when history outstrips them, as occurred with the interwar Hollywood genres with the 
coming of World War II. But it is when generic mythologies undergo crises, such as the 
mythology of Charlot, they reveal the contradictions at their core that we often overlook when 
they are at their peak popularity and force. 
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Chapter 4 
Mythological Politics 
 
This chapter continues the focus on Bazin’s analysis of mythological contradictions. The 
lessons gleaned from Bazin’s reading of the Chaplin films—that coming up against a myth’s 
contradictions does not undermine our ontological sympathy for it—will be deepened here in 
relation to Bazin’s analysis of the Western, Marcel Carné Le Jour Se Lève (1939), and a pacifist 
documentary by Georges Franju on the history of a French military institution. While each 
analysis will add a layer of complexity to Bazin’s understanding of the relationship of myths to 
history, the argument that I will be working towards is that what counts as an aesthetic critique 
of the political character of these mythologies is a triple-level negotiation between spectator, 
history, and criticism. I pose this problem in the second section of the chapter where we will also 
see an unexpected conjunction between Bazin and the Siegfried Kracauer of From Caligari to 
Hitler (1948). 
Bazin, it turns out, knew of Kracauer’s work on pre-war German cinema since he 
mentions him in passing in a review of Lotte Eisner’s The Haunted Screen which was first 
published in French in 1952.1 Eisner mentions From Caligari to Hitler to whose historical 
teleology she opposes a more aesthetic analysis. Bazin would most probably have read the 
introduction to Kracauer’s book whose translation had been published in a 1948 issue of Revue 
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Internationale de Filmologie.2 He mentions him in the review parenthetically, but without 
explicitly engaging his work. He mentions Kracauer to point out that like Eisner he is of German 
origin. Noting the paucity of literature on inter-war German cinema despite its considerable 
international influence, he speculates that what is specifically German about this body of films 
may have been forbidding to Latin and Anglo-Saxon scholars. But the review contains a point of 
engagement between Bazin and Kracauer, and the former may even have been at least dimly 
aware of it. I briefly look at Bazin’s analysis of Marcel Carné’s Le Jour Se Lève (1939), the 
exemplary work of the poetic realist corpus in 1930s France, to trace resonances of Kracauer’s 
analysis of prewar German cinema’s relationship to history. This comparison will help to define 
the relationship of the spectator to the critic in Bazin’s work. 
What emerges in the later parts of the chapter is the importance to Bazin of spectatorial 
love as a point of departure for critique. Rather than the love of cinephilia, it is the Augustinian 
idea of love that, as we have seen in the introduction, was key to the formation of the aesthetic as 
a modern, Kantian framework for art. Drawing briefly upon Arendt’s discussion of this as a 
political emotion, I will argue that what turns criticism into an aesthetic politics is the presence 
of the subjectivity of the critic which keeps in play the affective and ideological contradictions in 
which films involve us. I will distinguish such “aesthetic politics” from the “cultural politics” of 
a distanced critic whose exemplar, I will argue in conclusion, was Roland Barthes, the critic we 
most readily associate with the mythological criticism of popular culture. 
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Mythological Negotiations: The Western 
The argument that when confronted with contradictions in mythologies that have 
exercised an affective hold over us we are required to acknowledge these contradictions without 
simply disavowing them plays out in Bazin’s writings on the Western. Such an argument in 
relation to the exemplary American genre, as we might expect, had a special ideological charge 
in the Cold War era. Edgar Morin was still provoking the ire of the Left intellectuals in the 1960s 
not only for defending the Western but also for emphasizing the importance of Chaplin’s appeal 
across classes and societies. These intellectuals included Lucien Goldmann and Pierre Bourdieu, 
the latter of whom tore up Morin’s 1962 book on mass culture, L’Esprit du Temps, for making 
this argument and thus apparently obfuscating the role of mass culture as “an instrument of 
alienation at the service of capitalism to divert the proletariat from its revolutionary mission.”3 
So one can imagine that Bazin not only writing about the Western but elevating it to the ranks of 
the perhaps the great national mythologies in film history would have been enough, for those 
who did not know him or his work closely, to class him as a reactionary critic. Unlike with the 
Chaplin films, however, Bazin’s defense and analyses of the genre seem to have been carried out 
not so much in dialogue with ideological critics but those who preferred the new, self-conscious 
Westerns such as Shane (George Stevens, 1953) and High Noon (Fred Zinneman, 1952) to those 
more typical of the genre. With the opportunity to write the preface for Jean-Louis Rieupeyrout’s 
book on the genre, however, Bazin mounted an analysis of the classical form of the genre against 
which he tried to understand the newer developments within it. 
                                                 
3
 Lorraine Mortimer, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Edgar Morin, The Cinema, or the Imaginary Man, trans. 
Lorraine Mortimer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), xii. 
136 
 
When Bazin wrote his review of American cinema for the Cannes film festival of 1949, 
he classed the Western among the Hollywood genres that had decayed through the war.4 But by 
the early 1950s when he came to write the preface for Rieupeyrout’s book, he was happily 
amazed at its resilience, already indicated in its history by the fact that Westerns had been made 
in places like France and Australia. He felt that the significance of the genre may be revealed 
best by its ability to survive “counterfeiting, pastiche, and parody.”5 Two contrasting types of 
production revealed for him how the genre both registered history and survived its shifts for the 
moment. On the one hand were the “Super-westerns” such as High Noon and Shane which were 
hyper aware of their generic conventions; on the other were films such as The Big Sky (Howard 
Hawks, 1952), Broken Lance (Edward Dmytryk, 1954), and the Anthony Mann Westerns whose 
self-consciousness did not make them take an ironic stance towards the genre’s conventions 
which they instead negotiated while remaining within a broadly classical framework. 
Let us first look at some features of the Western myth as Bazin identifies them. The very 
act of colonization (though Bazin does not use the word, the emphasis is clear) of Native 
American land requires the epic’s Manichean simplicity, with clear distinctions between good 
and evil, between pagan savagery and Christian White civilization. The vast landscapes and the 
task of building and protecting settlements and routes that would assure the existence of white 
society help in creating this fundamental simplicity. This civilizational Manicheanism and 
dramatic possibilities of the classical Western consolidate by World War II.6 But within this 
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simplifying discourse, some fault lines settle in which at first give the myth its distinctive appeal 
and create the necessary internal drama. The basic fault line of the Western are the conflicts 
between law and morality and society and individual which cannot be treated with the same 
Manicheanism as the conflict between the Europeans and the Native Americans because the men 
who can do the job of fighting and protecting cannot be made to conform to the social law easily 
simply because their “familiarity with death cannot keep alive [in them] the fear of hell, scruples, 
or moral quibbles.”7i The law protects the weak against the necessary unruliness of those who 
help consolidate the resources for founding society. Both in its methods and its ambiguous 
betrayal of what the “criminals” have done for society, the law comes to resemble those it 
prosecutes and from whom it is distinguished by nothing more that the badge of an institution: 
“The necessity of law was never closer to the necessity of morality, and their antagonism never 
more concrete and evident.”8ii 
The moral complexity of law in the Western is mirrored in the conventions used for 
representing women. In addition to the difficulties of couple-formation that is one of the motors 
of the spectacular travails of the narratives, the genre also makes room for the figure of the good-
hearted prostitute to draw an idealized picture of women.9 The reason for this, according to 
Bazin, may be understood as the need to cover with virtue a part of society that needed 
protection. And as we have seen, this protection could be purchased not through a “fear as futile 
as the risk of one’s life” but through “the positive force of a myth.”iii But this discourse of 
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protecting women itself came, Bazin argues, from an understanding of them as property, much 
the same as horses and cattle. In a world where mail-order brides were a possibility, the 
idealization of women was nothing more than the idealization of property.10 
So Bazin identifies three contradictions in the genre: the Manichean discourse of 
civilization, the ambiguous character of law’s relationship to morality, and the idealization of 
women as property. This analysis by a lover of Westerns does not sound like that of an American 
apologist, but nor was Bazin one to separate the thrills of the landscapes, the chases, and other 
dynamic aspects of the genre from ideology, denouncing the latter and taking pleasure in the 
former. As with Verdoux, he was interested in whether the genre could continue to play the role 
of embodying the American national imaginary despite becoming aware of these contradictions. 
A wartime film that seemed to tackle one of these contradictions seemed to Bazin to herald the 
beginning of the end. Bazin identified Howard Hughes’s The Outlaw (1943) as one of several 
films across genres that participated in a trend of openly misogynistic narratives. In light of his 
analysis of the Western’s tropes, we can already guess that he would analyze the film’s 
misogyny as well as the genre’s other contradictions as internal to the its logic but revealed only 
by the pressures of history. The general historical pressure is that of World War II, but not just 
the usual horrors of war but also the slow realization of the genocidal violence that lay hidden 
within it, a violence that could not but throw some harsh light on the history of colonization that 
had far from run its course. But this too-difficult-to-acknowledge experience easily gave way to 
something much easier to take on: the place of women in the myth. 
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Bazin analyzes The Outlaw, a film made during the war, in relation to the phenomenon of 
the “pin-up girl” that was the subject of a separate essay.11 The eroticism of the “pin-up girls” 
made popular with the soldiers during the war rubs off on to the representation of women in 
Hollywood cinema including in the Westerns. The Outlaw is exceptional in the way it handles 
this, aided according to Bazin by the Hays Code’s puritanism. The film had trouble being 
released during the war because of apparent nudity which the released version did not contain. 
The eroticism was important to the film’s negotiation with the genre only to the extent that it 
could reveal the treatment of women in the genre. The shock of nudity would have had the effect 
of simply inverting the archetype of innocence with the sensationalism of nudity, but the 
idealization of the Western woman was never tied to an idea of sexual innocence in the first 
place. Rather, sexuality itself was a de-emphasized “virtue” in the naïve Western, but it was a 
functional one not too different from the specific functions performed by cattle and other 
property. The Outlaw exposes this feature of the Western myth not by inverting or changing 
anything in it but by simply playing up its conventions. 
Very briefly, The Outlaw tells the story of a friendship between the Sheriff Pat Garrett 
and his friend Doc Holliday which becomes strained by the Sherrif’s jealousy when the Doc 
acquires a friend in the new arrival Billy the Kid. The Kid is responsible for the death of man 
whose sister, Rio Macdonald, now tries to kill him, but he survives and rapes her. Rio is Doc’s 
mistress but when the Kid is injured in a shootout, it is Rio who nurses him back to health and 
the two start a romantic relationship. Through all this, Doc and the Kid both have an ongoing 
dispute over a horse. When Doc discovers the relationship between Rio and the Kid, he offers to 
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settle for the horse rather than fight over Rio. The Sheriff and Doc fall out over the male 
company they keep and the Doc and the Kid fight not over Rio but over a horse. Therefore, 
Bazin’s title for his review: “The Best of Women Isn’t Worth a Good Horse.” For all her erotic 
appeal, Rio MacDonald isn’t different from any prostitute characters from the other Westerns. 
She is “good” because she performs her role of attending to the “heroes” who need her; men who 
remain the film’s focal point of identification. Everything else in the film too makes it a Western 
like most others, but just an arrangement of situations to play up the homo-sociality of the myth 
is enough to point up the place of women in it—lower than cattle in terms of what needs 
protecting and much easier to share—without disturbing the processes of identification. “In The 
Outlaw no one is antipathic; it is the order of the universe that confers his preeminence on man 
and makes a domestic animal out of woman: pleasant but boring, to which a real animal is 
always preferable.”12iv Bazin argues that the sexual hypocrisy of the censors after all had the 
advantage of not attributing any visually explicit sexuality to the character of Rio. This allows 
the film to bring out the latent misogyny of the genre without disturbing its conventions, and also 
without allowing us to transcend our identification with the men who are the archetypal vehicles 
of this misogyny. 
The Outlaw should have been the beginning of the end of the genre because by remaining 
true to it, it showed up the contradictions that other filmmakers following it could only 
exacerbate. Bazin compares the film to the comedies of Preston Sturges who “understood that 
the mythology of the American comedy had arrived simultaneously both at saturation point and 
the point of exhaustion. There was no way to make use of it other than to take its excesses as the 
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subject of a scenario.”13v They are careful to stay within the limits of the genres but they no 
longer believe in their mythologies: “It is no longer only a matter of a tragi-comedy of comedy 
[in Sturges’s films] but a real derailment where the spectator’s roar of laughter is brought on by a 
questioning of cinema itself.”14vi There is something different about what happens to these 
genres from what happens to Charlot; Chaplin has no sense of superiority over Charlot because 
he personifies the character, but Sturges and Hughes take on such an attitude. This manifested 
itself in the “Super Westerns” (borrowing Rieupeyrout’s coinage) which Bazin defines as “a 
western which would be ashamed to be nothing but itself and looks to justify its existence by an 
additional interest: an aesthetic, sociological, moral, psychological, political, or erotic interest, in 
short some quality extrinsic to the genre and which is supposed to enrich it.”15vii Examples 
include the baroque ornamentation of films such as My Darling Clementine (1946) and Shane, 
and the social critique of High Noon.16 He captures the difference between the classical and 
Super-westerns with an analogy: “If Balzac and Stendhal were filmmakers, they could have 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., 55-56 [WCII 167]. 
14
 Bazin, “U.S.A. 1938-1948”. 
15
 André Bazin, “Évolution du western,” in QQCIII, 148 [WCII 150-151]. 
16
 Bazin actually liked High Noon’s dramatic structure but found that its social critique could have been made in any 
other genre. We can extrapolate from his remarks to see that the critique of McCarthy-era America had no direct 
correspondence with the generic elements since the Sheriff abandoned by the town actually side-steps the 
authoritarianism of the state to critique the social response. Though the Western is a genre about the founding of a 
society, its moral ambiguity is explored in the relationship of to its institutions to social outliers, and not in relation 
to society as people in general, or the masses, or even a certain class, which is what High Noon critiques. See André 
Bazin, “Le Train Sifflera Trois Fois,” in Obs no. 126 (9 October 1952); For Bazin’s criticism of the McCarthy 
witch-hunt, see André Bazin, “L’affaire Chaplin,” in Obs no. 125 (2 October 1952); on Edward Dmytryk’s seeming 
guilty conscience after testifying to the House Un-American Activities Committee, as seen in his plots that too-
obviously create extenuating circumstances for the guilty parties, see Bazin’s review of The Caine Mutiny (1954) in 
André Bazin, “Ouragan Sur le Caine, ou tempête dans une conscience?,” in Obs no. 231 (14 October 1954). 
142 
 
made Westerns, but Jean-Paul Sartre would no doubt make Super-westerns and, for other 
reasons, Cécil Saint-Laurent too.”17viii 
The Western was too much of a foundational myth for a whole nation to disappear as 
soon as its contradictions had been exposed. Bazin found this as Westerns remained a staple of B 
film production and alongside them appeared higher-quality productions with the mark of their 
auteurs and the self-consciousness of the super-westerns but without their condescension. 
Bazin’s preference for these films gives us an insight into his belief that genres are more socially 
significant when they can reinvent themselves both through an internal necessity as well through 
a response to history, failing which he would prefer their exhaustion rather than a self-
denunciation of their conventions. For Westerns such as The Big Sky, Broken Lance, Red River 
(Howard Hawks, 1948), and Johnny Guitar (Nicholas Ray, 1954), the self-consciousness about 
history does not translate into a movement that Bazin describes as one from “[h]istory as 
material to history as subject.” They remain true to his understanding that films, like other 
aesthetic objects, can engage history productively only at an angle. We can see this in Bazin’s 
discussion of how the Westerns respond to the historical experience of genocidal violence by 
undertaking the “political rehabilitation of the Indian.”18ix In a film such as Broken Lance, the 
hero is of mixed race and the social prejudice attached to it is the motor of the plot. This, for 
Bazin, adds to the complexity of the genre because in every other way the film remains true to its 
generic conventions. The mythology still remains about family, property, respect for the woman 
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(this time a Native American princess who is the hero’s mother).19 In another example, The Big 
Sky, a Native American is again the heroine in a mixed race romantic triangle as well as the one 
on whom the fate of a trade expedition into new territory depends. Sometimes, Bazin points out, 
a film like Bronco Apache (Robert Aldrich, 1954) looks into other aspects of the historical basis 
of the myth; in this example, the drama of the Native American protagonist played by Burt 
Lancaster is set in a period after the conflict with the Native Americans and their settlement on 
reservations.20 In Johnny Guitar, Joan Crawford is undoubtedly the Westerner-in-chief despite 
Sterling Hayden’s character. This film, like the others, has “fun with the [genre] but does not 
make fun of it.”21x 
The conventions remain the same but they acquire a degree of what we might now call 
political correctness. This does not mean that the particular contradictions in American society 
had been addressed or would be addressed satisfactorily. The films represent no more than a 
social fantasy of addressing them while retaining the existing mythological superstructure and 
the idea of America it represents. Any guilt behind these changes is not confessed to explicitly 
by the films themselves and therefore do not call for any in their spectators. It would be the 
easiest thing to condemn the genre, its films, and the mythology behind it, but that would leave 
us too free, too righteous. Better, so far as possible, to see if one can confront the contradictions 
by negotiating with the conventions of the myth until maybe a better one comes along to replace 
it. Bazin uses the word “sincerity” to describe this approach, but is keen to point out that by this 
he does not mean the sincerity of the auteur (even though Johnny Guitar and The Big Sky belong 
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demonstrably to the personal thematics of Nicholas Ray and Howard Hawks respectively); he 
means the sincerity of the style to the story.22 He argues that this sincerity was possible because 
there existed a current production of the more naïve Westerns without which the personal 
expression of the filmmakers could easily have turned into disdain for the genre, as it already had 
for some.23 
Though Bazin was happily surprised by the resurgence of the Western after the War, and 
though he hoped it would thrive for a long time to come, he was prepared to recognize the 
pressures it would come under again with the Vietnam War. The renewed assault on the 
mythology of the genre following its reworking by Italian filmmakers and by films such as Butch 
Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (George Roy Hill, 1969) and The Wild Bunch (Sam Peckinpah, 
1969) would have certainly prompted him to write about how the American national myth could 
not but be heavily scrutinized at a time when America’s place in the global consciousness was 
shaped not by movement of peoples to its shores but by its political ambitions in the global 
sphere.24 However he might have assessed this phenomenon, he would probably have reminded 
himself of an article he wrote in 1957 analyzing two American war films, one of which was 
Anthony Mann’s Men in War (1957). Mann’s film is set during the Korean War that had ended 
only three years ago and tells the story of an American platoon cut off from its base trying to 
make its way back. Bazin was bothered by the film’s lack of any ideological framework which 
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reduced the violence of war to “a fact of nature.”25 He noticed motifs of the Western in the 
narrative—such as the platoon’s journey through hostile territory—and in the mise-en-scène—
such as the panoramic shots that pick out distant signs of the Koreans much like the Westerns 
identify the presence of the Indians. But the film isn’t interested in distinguishing the two sides 
on any ideological or moral grounds such as the righteous Americans versus the misguided or 
worse Koreans; it treats them, according to Bazin, as abstract antagonists. The film’s violence 
and its aesthetics reduce the Western’s motifs to pure abstractions. But in doing this, Bazin 
argues, the film makes them “rigorously independent of the historical frame and conditions of 
action.” 
Therefore, this discomfort that I feel. If this war evokes something in us, it is more 
what is taking in place in Algeria, for example, than the battle with Indians. And it is 
of Indians that the Koreans of Anthony Mann force me to think. It is certainly not the 
case that the war against the Indians was particularly moral and brilliant but 
[historical] distance and above all the popularity of the Western have made them an 
almost abstract convention. One can think what one wants of the historical 
justification for the Korean War, but precisely think something rather than nothing. I 
would be more willing to have Anthony Mann make an indirect apology rather than 
present it as a fact of nature, a simple source of action.26xi 
In this war film, Bazin sees the Western becoming an abstract crossroads between as-yet-
unresolved colonial conflicts and the new model of Cold War imperialism. And for Bazin the 
French spectator, the film’s crossing of the Western (with its internalized history of American 
colonialism) with modern warfare evokes the intensified Algerian fight for independence. And 
this was also a time when America was already deeply involved in another French colonial 
legacy; that of Vietnam. Though he criticized Mann’s film in 1957 for its abstraction, he might 
also have seen it in the 1960s as the point zero of the Western’s entry into another phase of 
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American and global history. In this phase, he might have seen on the one hand the revisionist 
Westerns that amplified the genre’s ambiguities to the point of implosion and, on the other, parts 
of an American establishment that continued to work within the genre’s frameworks even after 
its contradictions had been laid bare by history.27 Bazin would most certainly have tracked 
closely this new phase of the drama between myth and history that marked the conclusion or 
mutation of a major cycle in the genre’s genealogy. 
Dangerous Fictions 
With the Western, Bazin engaged a genre’s mutation in step with history and he had clear 
preference for those films that mutate in line with inherited conventions to those which seek to 
overturn them entirely. With his reading of Le Jour Se Lève, taken as representative of the poetic 
realist corpus of 1930s French cinema, I will be looking at his engagement with generic 
conventions that had not survived the war in French film production, or rather did not survive it 
with any sense of urgency despite several attempts to revive them. The parallel with Kracauer’s 
work on pre-war German cinema, apart from highlighting an unexpected affinity between the 
two critics, will sharpen the question of what counts as an adequate critical response in aesthetic 
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terms to mythologies that no longer have a hold on current historical imaginary and may in fact 
be at odds with it. This aspect of the comparison between Bazin and Kracauer is actually best 
approached initially through the latter’s review of Parker Tyler’s book on Chaplin. 
Like Bazin, prominent critics across the Atlantic took Monsieur Verdoux as an occasion 
to rethink the persona of the Tramp. These included Parker Tyler and Robert Warshow, both of 
whose analyses show several points of coincidence with Bazin’s but it is Tyler’s writings on 
Chaplin that have several uncanny similarities to Bazin’s.28 We have seen Bazin argue 
throughout for an understanding of a myth as relatively autonomous from history but not 
ahistorical for that reason. A comparison of his reading of the Tramp and Verdoux with Tyler’s 
will help explain this paradox a little more because their points of departure are as similar as 
their conclusions are contrasting. Tyler’s project is a psychoanalysis of Chaplin and the Tramp, 
treating them as more or less identical; where Bazin’s analysis is psychoanalytic in the very 
rough sense of inquiring into the unconscious contradictions that are alternately repressed and 
manifested over the lifetime of the Tramp, Tyler’s is more closely dependent on some staples of 
Freudian psychoanalysis such as the womb, the Law etc. Tyler treats Verdoux as a manifestation 
of the Tramp who in his previous avatar had been a man-child, wearing a tattered garb and 
satisfied by the mere act of dreaming; that is, as someone outside society. He even sees, like 
Bazin, a premonition of Verdoux in Chaplin’s A Woman of Paris (1923), a film in which Chaplin 
does not act but whose melodrama of tragic bourgeois romance and its violence is for both critics 
an inversion of the Tramp’s romantic dreams.29 They both emphasize the Tramp’s sense of 
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inferiority complex in relation women. Like Bazin’s reading of Verdoux’s misogynistic violence 
as a consequence of an internal contradiction in the Tramp, Tyler finds the Tramp to be 
“ethically schizophrenic.” Tyler writes, “Chaplin’s steady rationalization compels him to ask: 
what tramp does not harbor an inveterate desire to be normal, to be able to work, and gain all the 
rewards familiar to men: women, children, home, possessions and—yes, just because he is a 
tramp—a million dollars.”30 
What’s more, in 1950 Tyler wrote an essay comparing the Tramp to Kafka’s K which 
contains some striking echoes. Tyler writes, “[T]he principle difference between Karl [from 
Kafka’s Amerika] and K [from The Trial] is exactly that between Charlie and Verdoux: one of 
the two in both pairs is essentially innocent, the other essentially guilty,” echoing Bazin’s 
“Contrary to K, Verdoux is in essence the social culprit….”31 Then there is the fact that Tyler’s 
article contrasts the mythologies of America and Europe in the works of Kafka and Chaplin, 
again echoing Bazin’s “Monsieur Verdoux, along with A Woman of Paris, is the only Chaplin 
film in which Charlot does not appear. Both take place in France. From that to infer that for 
Chaplin France is the mythological opposite of America is but a step. I take it cheerfully.”32xii 
Given so many echoes of Bazin across Tyler’s book and article on Chaplin, one might suspect 
that Tyler’s reading material in the late ‘40s included Les Temps Modernes. But that is both 
highly unlikely and besides the point: unlikely because Tyler’s book excerpt on Verdoux 
appeared in The New Leader the same month as Bazin’s article in Les Temps Modernes, laying 
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out a template for his later comparisons with Kafka;33 besides the point because what I want to 
argue for is not Bazin’s hermeneutic ingenuity but the ways in which his interpretation combines 
an emphasis on the immanence of the myth to itself with its place in history. To this extent, the 
similarities between the two critics suggest that whatever the provocation of Bazin’s reading, 
there were others for whom the release of Monsieur Verdoux cast a strong retrospective light on 
certain motifs internal to the Tramp’s character. But the differences on the question of history 
are also telling. 
Apart from the later article comparing Kafka and Chaplin, in 1948 Tyler read the whole 
corpus of Chaplin’s films as the biographical truth of Chaplin’s life by employing heavy 
Freudian symbols. This means that his whole analysis of the Tramp pulls out the features of the 
character that escape right back into the recesses of Chaplin’s mind without touching history. 
This was Kracauer’s complaint about Tyler’s book when he reviewed it upon its release, finding 
“the whole disturbingly fictitious” because its characteristics “made up a universe immune to 
outer contingencies.”34 The allegation that Tyler’s Tramp is cut off from history carried a special 
charge coming from Kracauer since From Caligari to Hitler was published at the same time as 
Tyler’s book. And Kracauer too was examining a filmic mythology that had run its course, that 
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of German cinema of the 1920s and ‘30s but, unlike Tyler, emphatically in relation to the 
catastrophic history of which they were a part. 
Kracauer’s reproach about ahistorical analysis may seem to apply as much to Bazin as to 
Tyler since, as we have seen, Bazin too insists on analyzing the mythology of Charlot/Verdoux 
in relation to its inner consistency and fault lines. But we have also seen in Bazin’s discussion of 
the character of Monsieur Hulot, the Soviet cinema of the ‘20s, and the Western that myths are 
autonomous from history in order to impose themselves on it. Here Kracauer’s trajectory from 
cinema (Caligari) to history (Hitler) suggests that he might have agreed at least partly with 
Bazin. For Bazin as for Kracauer, it is the social imaginary which carries more clearly the marks 
of aesthetic mythologies while the mythologies themselves register history by “condens[ing] 
within [themselves]… social affectivity.”35xiii But there is a real difference between Kracauer 
and Bazin that touches upon how to respond to contradictions in such affectivity. The question of 
“how to respond” is tied for Bazin to the question “who responds.” The social imaginary is an 
abstraction that depends for its expression not only on films and texts but on the specific 
responses of audiences. Therefore, what myths take from history, they return to history through 
these audiences and their affective, performative, and epistemic responses. If Tyler stands at one 
end of the spectrum by removing the Tramp’s mythology from history and putting it back in the 
mind of Chaplin, and if Kracauer, in his response to Tyler and From Caligari to Hitler, stands at 
the other end by insisting on the perfect immanence of mythologies to history, then Bazin places 
them, as I will argue after describing his reading of Le Jour Se Lève, in the spectator. 
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When Bazin reviewed Lotte Eisner’s The Haunted Screen, he took from it the distinction 
between Kammerspiel and Expressionism. He came to understand these two modes to be 
complementary to the extent that they explore the relationship between the human mind and 
space. But where Kammerspiel moves centripetally from the exploration of space to its effects on 
the psyche of the characters, Expressionism is a centrifugal mode which “[recreates] the whole 
space that reduces man to a signifying geometry;” that is, space becomes a mere emanation of 
mind. He then states that it is the Kammerspiel mode that has had great international influence 
across Hollywood, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. This talk of international 
influence has nothing to do with Eisner’s book which is much more concerned than Kracauer 
about insisting on an essential link between German film aesthetics and the “German soul”.36 
Kracauer’s introduction, on the other hand, not only makes explicit note of the international 
influence of these films but also points out that the paralysis which afflicted the German 
consciousness also prevailed elsewhere.37 France, for example. 
Bazin’s example for German Kammerspiel’s influence in France is the work of Marcel 
Carné. He may well have said 1930s’ French cinema generally or poetic realism as its most 
prominent genre, and he certainly had this in mind as we will see. But Carné was not only the 
most prominent filmmaker of his generation but also one whose Le Jour Se Lève Bazin had 
already closely analyzed in 1948 using terms which Eisner’s book retrospectively clarified for 
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him.38 For Bazin, Carné’s film was the apotheosis of the poetic realist aesthetics of ‘30s French 
cinema and his analysis of it came in another pedagogical pamphlet he created for use in ciné-
clubs across France. Among the narrative and other stylistic trends he emphasizes are the use of 
a frame narrative in which the flash back leads inexorably to a tragic present and the importance 
of a décor and music that gradually bear down upon the psyche of the protagonist, enclosing him 
spatially as much as psychologically. This character arc, exemplified often by Jean Gabin, and 
the stylistic elements is a common motif in ‘30s French cinema. This is the Kammerspiel mode 
he learns about in Eisner’s book where the constriction of space is directly tied to its 
psychological significance and whose influence in France is exemplified by Carné. In the 
pamphlet Bazin insists on a distinction of the film’s expressionist qualities from German 
Expressionism because the décor and the human figure remain distinct even as the one 
corresponds to the other dramatically. He compares it to Fritz Lang’s M (1931) to distinguish it 
from the Expressionism of The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (Robert Weine, 1920). So Bazin sees a 
parallel between German and French cinemas but he doesn’t have the word “Kammerspiel” for 
the style that brings them together. 
Bazin’s pamphlet appeared at the beginning of 1948, just around the time that Kracauer 
published From Caligari to Hitler, and Kracauer’s introduction to that book would appear in 
France a little later in the year. Kracauer’s book, as Johannes von Moltke points out, relies 
heavily on spatial metaphors to describe the sense of paralysis that these films mirrored and 
conveyed back to German society. For Bazin too, the analysis of the spatial pressure experienced 
by Jean Gabin’s character in Le Jour Se Lève is a manifestation of the social climate of ’30s 
France. He points out how the working class character played by Gabin shows no signs of 
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political interests, either in his conduct or in what the many significant objects in his room 
convey about his character, and he comes across in his solitude as an anarchist more than 
anything else, a mark of the “individualist anarchism” of Carné’s and poetic realism’s pre-
eminent scriptwriter Jacques Prévert.39 Bazin often emphasized the sociological correspondence 
between the mythic content of the poetic realist corpus and 1930s France but within it he found 
Carné’s films more than any other filmmakers’ intimately dependent on the “metaphors of 
history.”40 The tragic paralysis in these films resonated so deeply with the interwar period that on 
the eve of the war, the soon-to-be-last government of the Third Republic prohibited the 
production of films that were “depressing, morbid, immoral, or distressing to the children,” such 
as Carné’s, and called for “healthy, optimistic” productions.41 And some in the Vichy regime in 
unoccupied France held the Carné-Prévert duo responsible for reinforcing the paralyzed 
atmosphere which led to France’s easy defeat. Finally, right after the Liberation, Carné’s film 
was again banned by the censors.42 It clearly was a film that strongly represented a national 
consciousness that the country wanted to leave behind since it was a reminder of the mood that 
to it had become identical with national defeat and humiliation. 
In Bazin’s reading of Carné’s films, and by extension the most prominent films of ‘30s 
France, as influenced by a German film aesthetic and reflecting a similar kind of paralysis in 
France as in Germany, the parallels with From Caligari to Hitler are obvious. They both 
subscribe to a general idea of a national or collective consciousness that films tap into and, in the 
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particular cases they analyze, trace two disastrous national trajectories in the same historical 
moment. A further parallel is that Kracauer looked back on the German films as a historical 
warning for understanding postwar Hollywood’s revival of these tropes in an increasingly 
authoritarian atmosphere.43 Bazin too often critiqued French cinema’s attempts to revive the 
style and the metaphors of poetic realism immediately after the Liberation since they no longer 
corresponded to the new historical condition. But this is the difference between Kracauer and 
Bazin: the latter often critiqued this return to a now-dead mythology without retrospectively 
disowning the films that he and many spectators in France and abroad were captivated by and 
still held in high regard.44 He did not, like Kracauer, go from seeing in these films a historical 
sensibility (and a terrible one at that) to reproaching them for it. In fact, as Tachella recalls, Le 
Jour Se Lève was for Bazin the first key film in his work promoting cinema through popular 
culture channels in the immediate postwar years. Bazin considered his study of the film to be the 
“first serious thing” he had written (which must be understood as the first serious thing on a 
single film since he had already written “Ontology,” “Total cinema,” and a few other key articles 
by this time.).45 In other words, even though the film’s sensibilities were no longer appropriate to 
the postwar world, for him it was an exemplary testament to the prewar imaginary and remained 
central to the longue durée imaginary of the nation. 
It is in the difference of attitudes between Kracauer and Bazin towards films from their 
past—a difference of critical disavowal from critical acknowledgment—that we need to take up 
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the question of what it means for a reading of a film to be an act of politics. Can one explain 
what the political imagination of a film is in the abstract; do the facts of style, subject, and 
history settle the matter; are film critics, theorists, and academics experts who can arbitrate the 
political import of a film? In relation to these questions, it is striking to note that nowhere does 
Bazin foreground his own subjectivity more than when explicitly ideological questions are at 
stake. Thus, he begins his heated response to Jean Carta on the question of “cinema and 
commitment” with a prologue on the role of the critic. 
Nothing is more stupid than to consider criticism as a specialty if not, in most cases, 
a specialty in stupidity. The authority of the professional critic is known to reside in 
the fact that it is his job, but only one of frequenting the dark halls more assiduously 
that the average spectator. In brief, it is a hypothetical superiority of training 
[culture], not of judgment.46xiv 
Similarly, at the end of his “In Defense of Rossellini,” written in dialogue with the Italian 
Marxist critic Guido Aristarco, Bazin writes: 
I do not hope to have convinced you, my dear Aristarco. And one scarcely convinces 
by arguments. The conviction that one puts into them counts for more. I would be 
happy if mine, where you will find the echo of admiration of some other critics 
among my friends, can at least shake up yours.47xv 
In both these instances, as implicitly or explicitly in all of Bazin’s readings, it is 
important for him to disavow the discursive superiority of the critic in relation to the reader or 
interlocutor beyond professional assiduity at the very moment when criticism turns into politics; 
that is, when a critical argument reveals itself as an exercise in persuasion. Politics would not be 
possible if arguments could be settled by merely pointing to facts; politics indeed appears just 
when facts become ambiguous. If not, the ideological critics of the Western would be on sound 
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ground in arguing that it mythologizes a history of colonization and patriarchy and the only 
reason to watch them would be to critique them. Only a critic who has responded reflexively to 
the mythic appeal can then try to acknowledge both the contradictions and force of the genre, 
and trying to acknowledge both is a matter of aesthetic judgment, which is also a matter of 
persuasion of the self and of others, an almost endless persuasion about our attachment to 
experiences that are often troubling. It is, in the case of Le Jour Se Lève, to keep alive the 
affective experience of past history—an atmosphere of social claustrophobia in this instance—
and feeling its force even when what it represents is potentially counter-productive in the 
present. Since a mythology’s relationship to the history it draws upon and in turn shapes is at a 
remove, older mythic imaginaries retain as much power to disrupt and reshape the present as 
those that emerge in step with it.48 As a political feature of aesthetic experience, this is inevitably 
a danger and a promise that we cannot steer towards a single pole with certainty. 
If Kracauer’s analysis of the collective German imaginary in its cinema has seemed to 
several commentators both important and too insistent in its line of argumentation, it could be 
because, despite his deep familiarity with the films and their history, his affective attachment to 
the films is absent. The films disappear into their history and become a warning to the present. 
Here, von Moltke helps us understand what happened to the spectator in Kracauer’s work on 
German cinema. He cites a letter from Kracauer to Erwin Panofsky at a time when the former 
was completing work on From Caligari to Hitler. In this letter, Kracauer describes himself as “a 
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doctor who is performing an autopsy and at the same time doing a cross-section of a piece of his 
own past, which is now completely dead.”49 Not only is his subject—the German cinema that led 
up to Hitler’s regime—dead, but, in a manner of speaking, so is its spectator, the critic who 
watched them in the Weimar Republic. This becomes clearer when von Moltke points out that 
films such as Karl Grune’s The Street (1923) and F. W. Murnau’s The Last Laugh (1924) which 
had previously made a strong positive impression on Kracauer are now assimilated to the book’s 
grim thesis with only faint traces of their promise now registering with him.50 This suggests that 
when Kracauer speaks of these films they carry little to no affective charge for the spectator 
Kracauer was in the 1940s. But, as von Moltke again points out, Kracauer’s reading of German 
cinema as heralding a totalitarian regime must be read in light of his research activities on 
propaganda films and the expression of authoritarian elements he saw in Hollywood’s “terror 
films.” The affected spectator was not the one watching the old German films but the one 
watching new Hollywood films. This spectator instrumentalizes the old films to respond to the 
historical danger signaled by these new ones. Therefore, a different kind of spectatorial 
subjectivity comes into play here for Kracauer than an aesthetic subjectivity that passes through 
the risk of affective attachment to a potentially insidious ideological picture. We know from 
Kracauer’s other work, whether it be essays such as “The Mass Ornament” and “Photography” 
or Theory of Film, that such complete critical distance is uncharacteristic of his theorization of 
our relationship to the threats of modern experience; threats that, he argues in these other works, 
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cannot be escaped through critical distance but must be passed through in some way for us to 
have a chance at surviving them.51 
We could argue that in relation to this one body of films—those of prewar Germany— 
Kracauer had already passed through their dangers and come out, with the rest of Europe, on the 
losing side of the “go-for-broke game of history” so that the films became indistinguishable from 
their historical moment.52 Outside of these historical and biographical considerations, however, 
his response in this instance to German cinema’s relationship to history may be usefully 
distinguished as “cultural politics” as distinct from the “aesthetic politics” of Bazin. The reading 
of symptoms off the surfaces of history without betraying, however indirectly, that the site where 
those symptoms manifest is the subjectivity of the reader is a mark of the politics of the cultural 
expert. A reading in which the subjectivity of the reader stands as the point of relay between an 
aesthetic world and the historical world is the politics of the spectator and an aesthetic politics.53 
It is thus that Bazin comes to a point, especially in his ideological debates, where he concedes 
that he can only count on the subjectivity of his interlocutors to respond to and experience, 
beyond only logical arguments, what challenges certain films pose to the ideological investments 
of our imaginaries: “The function of the critic is not to place on a silver platter some truth that 
does not exist but to prolong as far as possible in the intelligence and sensibility of those who 
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read, the shock of a work of art.”54xvi I will return to this distinction between “cultural politics” 
and “aesthetic politics” in the conclusion to this chapter. 
Mythic Love and Guilt 
So far we have looked at Bazin’s analyses of three sets of films—the Chaplin films, the 
Western, and a French poetic realist film—all of which have turned out to contain what should 
be intolerable contradictions: misogyny in the Chaplin films and the Western, colonization in the 
Western, social paralysis amidst the rise of Fascism in Le Jour Se Lève. In the face of such 
contradictions, we might indeed prefer a cultural politics of distance to the affective politics of 
the aesthetic. This is where I have not yet tackled the question of why, according to Bazin, we 
need to affirm our “ontological sympathy” for such troubling experiences. We need to be clear 
that he does not mean a vindication of these disturbing attitudes and experiences. As he writes, 
Verdoux must be sentenced to death since there is no excuse for misogyny and murder; after the 
war, the Western must revisit its terms to see if its idea of America can stage an imaginary 
rehabilitation of the Native American; the tropes of poetic realism should not be recycled glibly 
after the Liberation. And yet we are somehow required to love Verdoux and the Western and the 
Carné film. A third American contemporary of Bazin, after Tyler and Kracauer, Robert Warshow 
summed up this difficulty with eloquence when he too undertook a revaluation of Chaplin’s 
oeuvre upon the release of Limelight (1952).  
“Love me”—he has asked this from the beginning… And we have, apparently, loved 
him, though with such undercurrents of revulsion as might be expected in response 
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to so naked a demand. Does he love us? This is a strange question to ask of an artist. 
But it is Chaplin himself who puts it in our mouths, harping on love until we are 
forced almost in self-defense to say: what about you? He does not love us; and 
maybe he doesn’t love anything… It is no part of Chaplin’s function as an artist to 
love us or anyone, and I do not offer these observations as a complaint.55 
Warshow speaks in terms of the artist, but Bazin speaks in terms of the myth. In either 
case, the fact is that the “obvious morbidity in Chaplin’s sentiment” and the “undercurrents of 
revulsion” could be felt with any clarity only with Chaplin’s postwar films. How could this be 
lost on Bazin when only three years earlier he welcomed the sound version of The Gold Rush 
(1925) with the words, “[G]o see again… the little good-hearted, black-and-white fellow of your 
childhood and youth; the Charlot before we found out that somewhere in Europe a housepainter 
had stolen his moustache.”56xvii Therefore, the first reason for emphasizing our ontological 
attachment in an aesthetic response is that it always to some degree precedes the awareness of 
contradiction. The trajectory of Hollywood film genres until the war is a demonstration of this on 
a large historical scale where it took some of them decades to give up their secrets. But we can 
become aware of contradictions even just a minute too late after having first been held by a film. 
Therefore, no spectator or any critic before Monsieur Verdoux was wrong to not see the full 
complexity of the Tramp’s character. To begin with, as we have seen Bazin state, all the moral 
categories we use to describe the Tramp/Verdoux take on an air of neutrality with respect to our 
affective attachment to him. Whatever historical and ideological baggage we bring with us helps 
to suppress some features and emphasize others. For Bazin, to varying degree, all myths call 
upon us to cover over their contradictions in our attachment to them. The first edition of Bazin’s 
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book on Orson Welles contains some of his clearest lines on this subject and which thread 
together all his various mythological treatments as well as his aesthetic philosophy in general. 
I dare say that ambiguity in the cinema is a criterion that never fails… Rare are the 
films which dare to impose on us an image of the world where all is not so simple, 
where we are required to take sides freely, be it against our sympathies. Only the 
figure of Charlot could attain the greatest popularity with the maximum ambiguity (it 
is true that this ambiguity was secret and that in revealing it Verdoux divided 
spectators).57xviii 
This is not an understanding of an indifferent ambiguity but one that does not absolve us from 
the need to take sides; that is, to love the contradictory worlds of the films. What is of value in 
the myth so long as it draws our automatic adherence is its ability to make us love it even if it is 
to some degree or another, without our knowledge, “against our sympathies.” And this for Bazin 
is the most important capacity of the aesthetic: its ability to steer us to things that our reasoning 
and our immediate inclinations won’t allow us to be drawn towards. 
Once again, in an essay on Germany Year Zero (Roberto Rossellini, 1948), he wrote, 
“Isn’t this a solid definition of realism in art: to force the mind to take sides without cheating 
with beings and things?”58xix Keeping aside the question of realism for the moment, this is the 
bad faith behind what we want from the aesthetic. Bad faith here is the necessary camouflaging 
of contradictions in lived, historical experience in order to make it legible and thus habitable. 
“The true problem of bad faith,” as Sartre says, “stems evidently from the fact that bad faith is 
faith.” It is the “adherence of being to its object when the object is not given or is given 
indistinctly.”59 This is what I take Bazin to mean when he writes that realism makes us “take 
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sides without cheating with beings and things.” (As I will argue in the chapters to follow, realism 
for Bazin is another word for the aesthetic rather than primarily the material world captured by 
film.) The world, and beings and things within it, remains indistinct and at the cinema we adhere 
to it through the image on screen. The examples of Charlot and Kafka’s K—and we might add 
Keaton’s Stone Face and Samuel Beckett’s Godot—as mythic figures of utterly minimalist, 
almost absent psychology must be seen as resolving the uncataloguable corpus of contradictions 
of modernity not by representing them but rather by casting a simplifying screen over them. But 
as the examples of film genres demonstrates, the screen works only until such time as history 
forces contradictions back into view. 
If ontological adherence to mythologies under the pressures of history always precedes an 
awareness of contradictions, then Bazin argues we cannot disown them after we come to such 
awareness. To do so would be bad faith of another kind where we disavow what we have already 
been since it is our adherence to these mythologies that has defined our past. In the previous 
chapter, I described Bazin’s argument that mythologies mark a new beginning in the world, and I 
illustrated it with his own discovery that his beach holidays had been re-shaped by Les Vacances 
de Monsieur Hulot (1953) which announced and gave an orientation to a France on the threshold 
of a society of leisure. I will now draw upon a similar description by him of the experience of a 
vague mixture of guilt, nostalgia, and critique that accompanies the confrontation with mythic 
contradictions, even of those which we think we have left behind. This example also has the 
advantage of stepping out of the mythic framework of film genres and to confront even more 
directly a social mythology whose particular references in this example were in Bazin’s postwar 
France. 
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Georges Franju was commissioned by the French state in 1951 to make a film on Hôtel 
des Invalides, the French military hospital in Paris that also houses a military museum and the 
remains of Napoleon and some prominent military generals. Franju’s documentary, named after 
the military complex, focuses on the museum and the church visited by veterans, most of them 
marked for life by grave injuries. It shows us the history of the military from the beginnings of 
French history through its armors, artillery, tombs, and other relics. This history is traced along 
two axes: one is descriptive which plays up the motifs of the army such as its emblems and 
songs; the other is teleological, heading towards the nuclear present (Fig. 2, top two panels). 
These two axes are punctuated by images of injured veterans who are also seen visiting the 
museum and attending the Church service in their uniforms and sporting their decorations. The 
role of music heightens the contradictions by alternating between foreboding and illustrative 
(upbeat military music), and the commentary is punctuated by the voice of the guide who takes 
evident pride in the history that the museum represents. The film recalls in some ways the 
paintings of Goya. Its juxtaposition of the French military heritage with nuclear annihilation and 
the lingering images of the wounded gave it an unmistakable edge of pacifist critique and earned 
the film a ban for some months. 
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Fig. 2: Stills from Hôtel des Invalides (Georges Franju, 1951) 
 
Bazin argues that the film is clearly a critique but one that draws its power not just 
through its obviously critical moments, such as the juxtaposition of ancient and modern artillery 
with images of victims, but by giving space and voice to those who are at one and the same time 
the victims of this narrative (or its most functionary guardians, such as the museum guide) and 
the ones who still worship it. In order for the spectator to make a critique, it takes some effort, 
however small, to get past this evidence that the only people we see upholding, in Bazin’s words, 
an “outdated and ridiculous faith in a ‘Paradise under the shade of swords’”xx are the wounded 
soldiers (Fig. 2, bottom-right panel).60 But it isn’t even about these believers wounded by their 
belief but the always somewhat questionable place from which critique is made. What the film 
shows is “a thousand symbols of war… surrounded by the faith of those who guard them, vestals 
of a little flame of jingoistic patriotism that is in the heart of forty million French.”xxi Therefore, 
the critique that is most potentially effective in the film is that which implicates the spectators’ 
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feelings. The best example of this, for Bazin, is the sequence showing in close detail a famous 
nineteenth century painting depicting soldiers of the Third Republic dreaming of former glories 
of the Napoleonic armies while waiting to avenge French defeat in the 1870 Franco-Prussian 
War. The shots of the painting are accompanied by the tune of a familiar patriotic song with the 
lyrics to the tune printed on the shots (Fig. 2, bottom-left panel). 
An effort of will is necessary to avoid humming the song. The whole theater, like 
yourself, sings on the inside.... Thus is revealed the evidence of conditioned reflexes 
in military music. Surely, the theater feels a vague shame and unease at this patriotic 
tumescence that it feels incapable of controlling. But few spectators would take clear 
note of it. In waking the Déroulède [a French nationalist who came to prominence 
after the Franco-Prussian War] that sleeps in each of us, Franju is simply being 
consistent with his subject whose echo he extends into the theater. It is true that in 
doing this he touches the limits of cinematic atrocity.61xxii 
The sexual connotations of mythic affect and the shame associated with its uncontrolled 
expression in relation to something that we weren’t aware of desiring, and not wanting to desire 
any more, are evident in these lines. While guilt and confession are not productive of anything 
for Bazin except to set us off on a search for new mythologies, it is inevitable that we will 
confront the bad faith of our current or former attachments. Within the realm of the aesthetic, it 
is important that there be no one to confess our guilt to, no one around us who accuses and who 
needs to punish or forgive. Franju’s cruelty is vindicated only because he allows himself and us 
to “admire the admiration of the museum guide”xxiii and witness the wounds as well as the faith 
of the veterans. 
In Bazin’s response to the images of a worn-out mythology of nationalism we detect the 
same love for the intolerable that we find in his readings of the mythologies of film genres. 
Therefore I will now briefly take up this idea of love that grounds the political dimension of his 
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aesthetic philosophy. In the introduction, I referenced M. H. Abrams’s argument that the 
disinterested pleasure of Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetics draws upon Platonized Christianity 
and, in particular, the Augustinian ideal of love. And I have also drawn upon Hannah Arendt’s 
idea of the political as that which marks a beginning in history to theorize Bazin’s understanding 
of how an aesthetic mythology provides an orientation in history. And it is Arendt who uses the 
ideas of beginnings and endings to theorize the political uses of love. For her, in the whole 
mythic framework of Christianity and its devaluation of secular existence in favor of the idea of 
a timeless realm, love is the only theological idea that speaks to the continued possibility of a 
democratic politics. Love, in this Augustinian sense, is an emotion that restores the equality of all 
subjects after the necessary conflict and inevitable injury that attend political experience. If 
politics is to act in freedom, then we inevitably commit to an unpredictable course of action since 
it also depends on and comes into conflict with other subjectivities. On Arendt’s understanding, 
this means that every course of political action inevitably comes up against insurmountable 
contradictions that make it threatening to the possibility of politics itself. At such a point, politics 
requires a new beginning and a new way of framing the world in which the same actors, 
irrespective of their part in the contradictions of the past, can reappear as equals. And it is only a 
gratuitous love that can restore such equality, without which politics would end in its antithesis 
of juridical logic and the mechanisms of accusation, guilt, and punishment.62 Love for Arendt is 
concerned not so much with the “what” of the action but “who,” a distinction which implies that 
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our recognition is given not based on our agreement with the politics of the person but to the 
person herself. 
It is this political idea of love that is operative in the aesthetic understanding of 
mythologies in Bazin’s work. Our love for films on this account acknowledges the political 
orientation they have provided us even after such an orientation has become damaging. And we 
need this love for our past attachments to both acknowledge our past and to justify us in looking 
for new mythologies that will inevitably contain contradictions that we cannot know beforehand. 
This is a tragic idea of politics, not in any pessimistic sense, but as a necessary recognition of the 
irreducible conflict and contradiction that attends all politics. The work of love is to reconcile us 
to this irreducibility of limits so that we can go on attempting new beginnings within them. We 
will return to this idea once again at the end of chapter 7 where we will see Bazin explicitly 
claim this ideal of love as a basis for an aesthetic politics when speaking of Italian neo-realism. 
The basis of Bazin’s aesthetic politics in an ethics of love did not mean that it had no 
place for the demystification of aesthetic mythologies. There is after all demystification involved 
in his analysis of the Verdoux/Charlot and the Western; but demystification for him is justified 
only to the extent that the critic is willing to affirm the power of some mythological framework. 
For Bazin, a position of default demystification would have smacked of a bad faith worse than of 
those mystified.63 
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We Have Always Been Postmodern 
Bazin’s demystification of the detective noir reminds us once again that he was deeply 
aware of writing at a time of general crisis in film genres. That “grand killer of myths,” World 
War II, had pushed cinema into confronting its ontological relationship to reality. But as we will 
see in the next chapter, he feared the possible consequence for political life of mythologies 
deriving their power from cinematic realism. In the final chapter, we will see that for him Italian 
neorealism was a body of work that at once confronted cinema’s ontology and gave an imaginary 
form to the experience of postwar Italy. From his own tastes, he feared the diminished 
possibilities of new genres that could speak to the historical condition in the elementary ways in 
which prewar genres did. But he held out hope for one genre that seemed to have trouble getting 
off the ground: science fiction. His most extensive statement of this hope and frustration was a 
review of The Thing from Another World (Christian Nyby and Howard Hawks, 1951).64 In its 
simplicity and naïve claims on our affect it promised just the kind of genre that the Western 
represented for him, and it also had a tradition of horror behind it. But its specificity in relation to 
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appear a little more ambiguous than it did in most films to cover over the transparent morality of the genre. 
Detective Story (William Wyler, 1951) tries to rectify this by showing a policeman who grimly fights crimes when 
the lives of his own father and wife seem to be tainted. Embittered, he dies at the end at the hands of a criminal 
which convinces one of the characters to reform his life. Though seemingly tragic like Scarface, the film, Bazin 
argues, is only a convenient tale of sacrifice for the institution.  
Jean-Charles Tachella recalls that Bazin could accept murder in Le Jour Se Lève but not in an American noir film, 
and concludes from this that he resisted these films because “they were too far from being documents and 
documentaries.” He also says that “out of a sense of moral honesty, [Bazin] was careful not to thwart other people’s 
pleasure.” However, he sometimes neglected to reserve this modesty for his readers. André Bazin, “Peut-on être 
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a historical moment “of objectively frightening scientific evolution” made it well-placed to speak 
to an important aspect of contemporary and future existence. 
The film tells the story of an American scientific station in the North Pole where the crew 
find a crashed flying saucer. They also find a body frozen in an ice block which is brought to the 
station. While awaiting orders, an accident causes the ice block to thaw and for the body to be 
revealed. Until this point, Bazin argues, the film’s realism is quite conscientious, laying a solid 
foundation for confronting the thrills and horrors of an as-yet-unknown reality. And yet the 
moment this reality is revealed, disappointment follows. The creature looks human and, though 
not human, needs human blood to survive, returning us to the myths of Frankenstein and 
vampires. Bazin finds that this might be too reassuring for the audiences who are withdrawn 
from the technological specificity of the new mythology to the shapes of fear from an earlier 
period in modernity. He wondered if the “authors themselves feared the logic of their script 
which would have taken them beyond well-tested myths: a fear of a fear without a [human] 
face.” The challenge for the genre and of the history to which it belonged, he seems to be 
suggesting, would be to test what it means to imagine a world more than or other than human. 
Had he lived longer, he would certainly have read science fiction films that came to prominence 
after the 1950s— both those that met the challenge and others that did not—with great interest. 
The search for new genres, for Bazin, did not just mean those that were sui-generis. 
Science fiction already started from the horror genre. We have also seen Bazin argue in chapter 2 
against an absolute idea of originality. Originality for him consisted as much in original recasting 
of old mythologies and is first underwritten by a deep historical necessity. We saw a quick 
reference earlier to the Western’s ability to survive “counterfeiting, pastiche, and parody.” These 
terms did not only signal dangers that existing genres would need to overcome. Andrew’s 
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anthology of Bazin’s writings on television serves as a very valuable reminder of the latter’s 
engagement with the forms and consequences, including for cinema, of the new media of his 
time.  Across several articles, we see Bazin dissecting the possibilities of showing old films on 
television, making films for television, using filmed material in plays recorded for television, and 
also anthology programs for the cinema.65 He finds productive possibilities for all of these 
practices, and even summarizes in some detail industrial trends in both America and France. Of 
these possibilities, the one that I am interested in here is his discussion of the use of film clips. 
He is all in favor of anthologies of film clips just as he defended literary digests, not only for 
their more basic pedagogical purpose of making audiences familiar with films they are unlikely 
to otherwise know about, but also for the possibilities of looking at familiar material in unusual 
light by juxtaposing and comparing parts of films, something of which “in ciné-clubs we have 
always dreamed.”66 
The repetition and fragmentation of films on television takes on increased importance in 
the larger scheme of things. Bazin mentions at one point that already in 1956 the stocks of old 
films that could be shown on television in their entirety were being exhausted. So repetition and 
fragmentation seemed to be a major prospect for revisiting film history on television. In these 
remarks, he clearly recognized that film history was on the verge of a “postmodern condition.” 
Bazin welcomed the creative possibilities that could follow from this. But he also asked that they 
be handled with conscientiousness so that film titles are acknowledged correctly and that 
sequences be either representative of the originals or cast them in a new and interesting light. 
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What this entailed in practice is captured by a short piece, “Pastiches ou grossières parodies?” in 
which he reviews a disappointing attempt by a program to create a pastiche of literary and film 
works (Italian neo-realist ones at that).67 While disappointed that the efforts weren’t even proper 
parodies, he nonetheless affirmed the critical possibilities of pastiche; possibilities that involved 
“an intimate knowledge and an imitation of models at once free and precise”xxiv which 
“combined and inverted roles [and] situations”xxv of the originals. But these ideas and practices 
were not new in themselves. To recall what he wrote in “Adaptation” in 1948, “To the defensive 
intellectual and unconsciously aristocratic motto, ‘No culture without mental effort,’ the 
civilization in the making now responds with, ‘Let’s grab what we can.’ So far as progress exists, 
this is it.”68xxvi New possibilities here are no more than whatever we can grab under the pressures 
of history. 
Rohmer, in an important interview from the late ‘80s, said, “Our attitude in relation to 
those in our generation who called themselves ‘modern’ was an attitude that we now call ‘post-
modern’—already a hackneyed word.”69 While I would argue that Rohmer was justified in using 
the term “post-modern” to describe himself and other “Young Turks” in the ‘50s, I hope that the 
foregoing discussion offers a convincing argument on behalf of Bazin. However, postmodernism 
is not a monolithic construct—there are playful, cynical, grim, sober and other postmodernisms; 
adjectives that I won’t distribute too carelessly here among Jean Baudrillard, Salman Rushdie, 
Jean-François Lyotard, Frederic Jameson, and others. Bazin’s postmodernism was playful but 
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“responsible.” Responsible because he called for some care in the mixing and grabbing of 
culture, especially on the part of the producers. A degree of care in these matters would prevent 
cynicism, a mood that even in its playful forms resists the lure of mythologies. Bazin was not 
disposed towards what we know as camp sensibilities. In writing about Limelight, he wrote that 
audiences now tended to “like nothing better than to be able to believe in a melodrama which 
announces itself as such (parodies prove this).”70xxvii  Some wink at the audience from the work 
reassures it of its intelligence. For Bazin, this would be the equivalent of taking out an affective 
insurance policy. To this we can add Warshow’s words from his own essay on Limelight, to 
characterize Bazin’s position that in aesthetic experience we need to “intelligently prepare for 
failure, but not for the particular kind of failure that comes to us, and never dreaming that our 
essential worth can be called into doubt.”71 The intelligence with which we mix up our films 
must actually leave us available for an affective commitment and its unexpected openings on to 
history and its sometimes heavy consequences.72 What I am calling Bazin’s responsibly 
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welcoming attitude towards the condition of modernity takes nothing away from his lesson that, 
to paraphrase Bruno Latour, “we have always been postmodern.”73 
Conclusion 
This chapter concludes one cycle of my argument where I have attempted to provide an 
account of Bazin’s understanding of the political character of the aesthetic not in relation to 
realism but to the idea of aesthetic mythology that film genres embody. Mythology is here 
understood as an image that is both formed out of the material of history and which also imposes 
its forms on the social imaginary. We have seen that such an image is inherently ideological, but 
understood not as some abstract bourgeois ideology, but as any framework that gives form to 
historical experience that may otherwise remain too amorphous, or paradoxically too 
constricting, for subjectivity to find a hold. In this sense, an aesthetic ideology is both a political 
promise and a political threat since it could return the world to the spectator in a renewed form 
where subjectivity can indeed find its place or it can return it to us as another form in which 
subjectivity is held in place. For Bazin, we need to acknowledge that the consumer of modern 
art, an art no longer underwritten by metaphysical guarantees that it must conform, actually 
desires both to be held by a picture of a better world that she inhabits, a “second nature,” and 
also a picture that frees up her subjectivity. For subjectivity to be held in place is for it to 
relinquish its political character and be absorbed into a non-self; but for subjectivity to find 
another frame for its world is also to potentially and provisionally reclaim its political character 
from an alienated world. Therefore, drawing upon Arendt’s reading of a fable by Kafka, I have 
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argued that the cinema for Bazin inhabits a “small non-time-space in the very heart of time” 
where these contradictory desires and possibilities can play out. The work of critique, in reading 
any film that taps into these contradictions, is to affirm both these desires and both these 
possibilities. Bazin’s example tells us that this is only possible when the critic’s own subjectivity 
seems to be at stake in the process, for only then can criticism approach the character of an 
aesthetic politics. 
A critique that identifies the bad faith character of the aesthetic to discredit it may well be 
right that films or any other works of art that lay claim to our affection get us caught up in 
impossible contradictions. It takes its distance and maps the cultural geology to (reprising 
Bazin’s terminology) identify clearly the porous and concrete parts that remain (at least at first) 
indistinguishable to those who actually experience them intimately. I called this approach 
“cultural politics” to distinguish it from the aesthetic politics represented by Bazin’s criticism. 
And an exemplar of this approach is the one we most closely associate with the idea of 
mythologies in relation to popular culture: Roland Barthes. Even though Barthes is understood to 
have renounced the demystificatory mode of criticism of Mythologies and its critical 
superciliousness, its influence on ideology critique has been tremendous. I return to it in 
concluding this part of my argument on behalf of a political Bazin because I am not sure that the 
aristocratic disdain for politics of a critic in whose name Bazin was sometimes criticized has 
been sufficiently registered. 
Barthesian demystification, behind the semiological jargon, was itself little more than a 
complacent mythology and its markers are glaringly obvious. A critique of something called 
modern alienation in the name of an as-yet-unknown non-alienated reality; a critique of the 
pretensions to nature of ideology in the name of some unnamed unalienated condition that might 
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announce its contradictions openly without destroying itself at the same time.74 We have already 
seen that in 1958, in reviewing Le Beau Serge, Barthes had no trouble distributing truth and 
talent between the Left and the Right, respectively. This is because he had already concluded that 
“Left-wing myth is inessential” because “the objects it takes hold of are rare,” “the speech of the 
oppressed… is quasi-unable to lie”; “[s]tatistically, myth is on the right.”75 Such complacency 
combined with a paternalism in relation to the working classes and even the colonized were signs 
of a critical superciliousness which suggests that the critic might have ultimately been uneasy in 
the company of those on behalf of whom he speaks.76 
[T]he mythologist cuts himself off from all myth-consumers, and this is no small 
matter. If this is applied to a particular section of the collectivity, well and good. But 
when a myth reaches the entire community, it is from the latter that the mythologist 
must become estranged if he wants to liberate the myth…. One must go even further: 
in a sense, the mythologist is excluded from this history in the name of which he 
professes to act. The havoc which he wreaks in the language of the community is 
absolute for him, it fills his assignment to the brim: he must live this assignment 
without any hope of going back or any assumption of payment.77 
These lines tell us that the price of critiquing mythologies is an exile from the community. 
Barthes was correct in announcing the death of the author who was above all the Romantic 
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author estranged from the community whose subjective truth he feels compelled to express. With 
Barthes, the critic now steps into this tragic-heroic role. And just as the Romantic author may not 
have been pleased to find the chimney sweep and the cab driver expressing the truth of 
community just as well without his poetry, the critic wasn’t cheered by the sight of every other 
student and newspaper columnist counterfeiting his currency. 
The Barthesian renouncement of demystification did not come only in search of a more 
subtle method or because “he took too much pleasure in the popular” as Philip Watts has 
argued.78 Looking back in 1971 on the Mythologies project and looking around him, he found 
“not one student who does not denounce the bourgeois or the petit-bourgeois character of a form 
(of life, of thought, of consumption).” The method itself had turned “mythic” and a “catechism.” 
So the critic now layers the jargon to reclaim his exile: “it is the sign itself that must be shaken 
up,” the method must move from the “lexical” to the “syntactical” level, from “mythoclastie” to 
“semioclastie,” and the object of critique is no longer the French bourgeoisie but, “historically 
and geographically, the whole Occidental civilization (Greco-Judeo-Islamo-Christian), unified 
under the same theology (the Essence, monotheism)… from Plato to France-Dimanche.”79 In 
short, critique as a desire for the end of all mythology as a desire for an end to politics, with 
politics understood as the necessary adherence of being to a necessarily indistinct picture of the 
world that both emerges from and in turn defines history. 
                                                 
78
 Philip Watts, Roland Barthes’s Cinema (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 20. The popular that Barthes 
seems to have taken real pleasure in was culture that was popular in a class-specific sense, such as wrestling, and not 
the popular character of cinema that seeks to appeal across identities. He must have found cinema’s popularity too 
impure, appealing as it did across classes. See “The World of Wrestling,” in Barthes, Mythologies, 15-25. This was 
the first of the mythologies he published (in 1952), and the only one to appear in Esprit where Bazin may even have 
read it. 
79
 Roland Barthes, “Changer l’objet lui-même,” in Esprit vol. 4 no. 402 (April 1971), 613-616. 
 177 
 
Part II: The Mythology of Realism
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Chapter 5 
Reconstructing Ontology 
 
Bazin’s account of aesthetic politics as seen in part one does not need an ontology of 
cinematic realism. But within this overarching framework, realism was indeed a special, 
historical problem which the remainder of the dissertation will track. The task of part two of the 
dissertation is to argue that Bazin did not posit an equivalence between cinema’s ontology and its 
aesthetic character. Moreover, this and the following two chapters demonstrate that he actually 
worried deeply about how some kinds of realist cinema exploit the impression of such an 
equivalence to close off the political possibilities of spectatorship. This chapter reconstructs 
Bazin’s argument about cinematic ontology as an argument about the political character of 
realism in modern aesthetics. 
I start with a history of the reception of “Ontology” and identify some key problems with 
existing accounts. I make a case for reading “Ontology” in dialogue with Bazin’s other writings, 
not to look for a correspondence or lack thereof from the former to the latter, but to flesh out the 
elliptical argument of the essay. I then argue for a complex account of secularization as the key 
to the essay’s distinction between realism and aesthetic expression. We will see Arendt’s notion 
of a “non-space-time at the heart of time” being given a literal turn in Bazin’s narrative of the 
socio-political character of the aesthetic as he analyzes what happens to space and time on film. 
The concluding parts will show that the argument of “Ontology” leads Bazin to theorize the 
voyeuristic satisfactions and dissatisfactions inherent in cinematic spectatorship. 
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The Reception of “Ontology” 
Steven Rifkin, in his dissertation-length study of “Ontology,” has documented the history 
of the essay’s reception exhaustively and reveals the paucity of close analysis of its argument 
when measured against the amount of polemics it has occasioned.1 Nevertheless, some high 
points in the history of substantive theoretical attention to the essay may be divided roughly into 
readings that use the framework of an indexical relationship between the object and its 
photographic image and those that bring out the idea in Bazin’s essay that the photograph is the 
presence itself of the object.2 Peter Wollen’s inaugural move of reframing “Ontology” through 
Charles Sanders Pierce’s concept of the index emphasized the photographic image’s undeniable 
reference to its object in the past whose trace it contains.3 “But,” according to Wollen, “whereas 
Pierce made his observation [about indexical bonds] in order to found a logic, Bazin wished to 
found an aesthetic.”4 He then concludes that this led Bazin to posit faith in the cinema as an 
instrument of revelation of interiority and spiritual reality.5 The context in which Wollen was 
writing—that of emergent ideology critique—this could only be construed as false 
consciousness. 
Philip Rosen took up the idea of the index to emphasize the significance of the 
photograph’s referential character, and therefore its historicity, for Bazin’s argument rather than 
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its ability to reveal reality.6 He brought out Bazin’s argument that a photograph contains a trace 
of the world because the world was present to the camera at the moment of capture. Moreover, 
since this capture occurs through an automatism and not through subjective representation, it 
guarantees referentiality to the past. But this referentiality does not guarantee the fullness of 
detail or accuracy that would allow us to reduce it to the status of empirical evidence. Rather, it 
activates spectatorial participation in reclaiming the world of the image. More recently, as 
against Wollen’s and Rosen’s differing accounts of indexicality in Bazin’s argument, Tom 
Gunning and Daniel Morgan have sought to dissociate the essay from the framework of the 
index. Instead, they emphasize Bazin’s point that the image is not just an indexical trace of an 
object in the past but that it is the object itself; a point whose uncanniness exceeds the idea of 
indexicality.7 
Rifkin provides by far the most extensive treatment of the essay, and he argues that there 
are in fact multiple modalities at work in it that scholars have generally reduced to one or the 
other.8 The three modalities he identifies are representation, desire, and presence. Each of these 
modalities is tied to three different human needs. Representation, through an image that 
resembles the world, satisfies the need for knowledge of the world. The second modality relates 
to the capacity of the image to induce a consciousness of time that releases a primordial desire to 
defeat its passing. Presence relates to the revelation of a spiritual reality in the material world. 
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Rifkin argues that for Bazin a photograph, or photographic cinema, could respond to any one of 
these three needs. 
A final and important reading, by Adam Lowenstein and Jean-François Chevrier, pays 
attention to Bazin’s invocation of surrealism. Lowenstein argues that for Bazin photographic 
aesthetic, which extends to the cinema, abolishes the distinction between the real and the 
imaginary and the subjective and the objective. Chevrier, on the other hand, traces the genealogy 
of this idea to the nineteenth century French art historian Hippolyte Taine, and shows how it was 
picked up variously by Sartre, the Surrealists, and by Bazin himself. 
Looking at the variety of metaphors Bazin uses to describe the medium, Morgan writes, 
“Each metaphor captures something important about what a photograph is, but each fails in some 
way.”9 I would say the same about these accounts of “Ontology.” Each of them captures 
something important—historicity, presence, multiple modalities, and finally the blurring of 
modalities. But the greatest problem they have all had is in reconciling any of these accounts 
with the plurality of films that Bazin wrote about and admired. Morgan provides the most 
nuanced account of this plurality when he argues that Bazin in fact theorizes the autonomy of the 
cinematic image where multiple ways of relating to the world can be worked out. But this comes 
at the price of cutting it free from the argument of “Ontology.” Indeed, one might then say that 
all media can be worked into such an autonomy. What then might have been the point Bazin 
offering any argument about the ontology of photography and cinema! While Rifkin offers the 
most nuanced conceptual distinctions at work in “Ontology,” he has almost nothing to say about 
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style or even specific films, and ends up with the very problematic notion, as have many before 
him, that for Bazin the cinematic image reveals God in nature.10 
One great problem most scholars seem to have in accounting for the plurality of Bazin’s 
cinematic engagement is that the discovery of this plurality has invariably been against the belief 
that Bazin’s essays on film style follow, however imperfectly, from his ontological arguments. 
We have often read the argument of “Ontology” in combination with the “Total cinema (1958)” 
as a teleological argument about cinema being the realization of a primeval desire to rescue the 
world from its temporal loss by reproducing it in its spatio-temporal exactitude. In a way, Bazin 
himself lay the ground for this in the preface to the first volume of Qu’est ce que le cinéma? by 
writing, “We will, as we should, start with the photographic image, the primitive element of the 
final synthesis, to arrive at, if not a theory of cinematographic language based on the hypothesis 
of its ontogenetic realism, then at least an analytical sketch that is not in contradiction with it.”11i 
Thus, the volume that starts with “Ontology” and “Total cinema” ends with “Montage 
Prohibited,” “The Evolution of Cinematographic Language,” and “William Wyler, or the 
Jansenist of the Mise-en-scène,” but it passes through several articles almost exclusively on 
documentaries, with two articles on Chaplin and one on Monsieur Hulot. 
When Hugh Gray selected his articles from Bazin’s first volume, we got only the first 
two and two of the last three, with an article on Chaplin and “Cinema and Exploration” placed 
after the articles from Bazin’s second volume on “cinema and the other arts.” Gray omitted the 
article on Wyler, but it represents Bazin’s work in an important British Film Institute reader on 
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cinematic realism.12 If there is a real logic to Bazin’s arrangement—and even so I would argue 
that we shouldn’t take it too strictly—then Bazin’s exploration of questions of temporality in 
Chaplin and of documentary films gets pushed out of the passage from ontology to language, a 
passage whose neat line they would have productively interrupted. Without this disruption, we 
get the impression that there is a direct line from his ontological account to his writings on film 
style. 
It isn’t that there is no line from ontology to style but there are at least three qualification 
to be made. Firstly, as I have argued in chapter two and as Bazin himself indicates in the preface 
to the book, the arguments he formed in each article and especially those on style were attended 
by specific historical debates.13 Secondly, even in Bazin’s arrangement for publication, the line 
passes through accounts of documentary realism that do not follow from the standard reading of 
“Ontology” as a vindication of photographic and cinematic reproduction of the world. All the 
essays on documentary, as we will see in the chapters to follow, betray an unease about 
cinematic realism even when offering sophisticated analyses of how some documentaries allay 
that unease productively. Finally, something as narrow as style is a false destination in Bazin’s 
thinking. It is one of the many directions in which his considerations of cinematic realism open 
on to and whose guiding paradigm remains the aesthetic mode of forming a relationship with the 
world. 
Because we tend to think that his championing of the long-take and depth-of-field follow 
from his ontological account, we have been left in the strange situation of finding most of his 
                                                 
12
 Christopher Williams, ed., Realism and the Cinema (London: Routledge, 1980). 
13
 Bazin notes that he has given the date and venue of original publication to indicate that some aspects of his 
arguments are necessarily circumstantial. Bazin, “Avant-propos”. 
184 
 
writing about specific films to be an exception to his first principles. It is not surprising, 
therefore, as I argued in the introduction, that Bazin’s work has been divided into theoretical 
arguments on the one hand and practical ecumenism on the other. This dissertation has been 
arguing that Bazin’s ontological account about cinema must be placed within the larger ontology 
of the aesthetic. This is one way in which “Ontology” can be displaced from a dubious reverse 
teleology in which it lies at the origin of Bazin’s championing of realist styles. Cinematic 
ontology indeed has a privileged place in Bazin’s work but, as we will see, for historical rather 
than stylistic or, well, ontological reasons. The need to displace “Ontology” from its seeming ties 
to Bazin’s essays on style entails reading it alongside his other work in order to elaborate its 
elliptical narrative. Scholars might do this occasionally with parts of the essay’s argument, but 
even then highly selectively. Such a dialogue across essays needs to be extended to the whole 
argument of the essay. 
This brings me to a final problem in the reception of “Ontology.” It has been almost 
exclusively read through an epistemic lens, as if it is making a purely logical argument about 
essences, whether of media or of human psychology. The essay actually offers a grand narrative 
about the arts with the emergence of realism in the Renaissance as the vantage point mediating 
the status of materiality and temporality from the Egyptian origins to the cinematic present. This 
grand narrative is elliptical and rhetorical but not teleological. From differing perspectives, the 
significance of the Renaissance to modern rationality has been registered. For example, Jean-
Louis Comolli sees in it Bazin’s complicity with “raging idealism,” while Rosen, as we have 
seen, offers a more nuanced reading of this subjectivity.14 But without asking what comes before 
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scientific modernity, they have an impoverished account of what comes after. What comes 
before it is Egyptian religion and Medieval Christianity and what comes after is secular 
modernity. But secularization here means something other than the absence of transcendental 
structures of belief, and Rosen’s quibbling over Gray’s translation of “croyance” as “faith” 
instead of his preferred “belief” suggests that he would be resistant to acknowledging this even at 
his most nuanced. This more complicated understanding of secularization is key to 
understanding how Bazin stages the confrontation of photographic realism and modernity, and 
this is what the rest of the chapter will bring out through a reconstruction of “Ontology” in 
dialogue with Bazin’s other writings. 
Approaching Space-Time 
“Ontology” addresses two distinct problems. The first problem is that of the material 
presence of the past in the present and the conditions that authorize such a presence; the second 
is the treatment of spatio-temporal reality by the aesthetic image. The essay starts with the 
discussion of Egyptian mummification in which “to artificially fix the carnal appearance of being 
is to snatch it from the flow of duration and to secure it to life.”15ii This securing of being 
through appearance confers upon it the “active modality”iii of a magical afterlife which interacts 
with the lives of the ones living in a more conventional sense; in Bazin’s example, like the clay 
bear shot with arrows which augurs the real hunt.16 This magical quality persists under different 
conditions into Christian medieval painting where the abstraction of the material world as we 
perceive it is itself meant to signal the presence of a spiritual reality. But, as Bazin reminds us, 
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materiality too remains solidly present—even if mainly in the margins of Catholic Church 
practice—in the form of relics that carry forward in time the presence of the Saints to whom they 
belonged. In all these examples—the mummy, the clay bear, medieval painting, the relic, the 
Turin Shroud, and the souvenir—the objects are spectral beings who participate in the world 
beyond the lifetime of their first existence.17 Such a spectral presence is authorized by some 
transcendental structure of belief, whether the Egyptian or the Christian religion. But this sense 
of the material transfer of being also extends to non-religious contexts in the form of souvenirs 
that Bazin cites alongside relics as analogies for the photograph.18 
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It would be a mistake to think that souvenirs or even secular portraits are devoid of a 
sense of magical presence. In just one line, at the beginning of the second paragraph, Bazin 
passes from discussing the religious mediation of the active material presence of the past in the 
present to the lapse of this paradigm: “It is clear that the parallel evolution of art and civilization 
has detached the plastic arts from these magical functions.”19iv But in the very next line he 
qualifies this idea of lapse: “But this could only sublimate the irrepressible need to exorcise time 
for the sake of logical thought.”20v He writes that the function of the image was still to recall and 
to prolong in memory the existence of a past life. Memory as “re-calling in the present” has a 
dim relationship to the magical and religiously authorized presence of past materiality because it 
disrupts the conception of time as linear and irreversible. For example, recalling Bazin’s work 
and wondering what he may have to say about the new media technologies of the day is to make 
him participate in ongoing dialogue. But our understanding of memory is mostly contained by 
the logical description “remembering the past;” that is, as a way of referring to some moment in 
the past when the person or thing existed. 
Right after the line on the sublimation of the need to rescue the past in the present, Bazin 
makes an abrupt jump in his argument by writing, “Image making is itself freed from all 
anthropocentric utilitarianism. It is no longer about the survival of man but more generally of the 
creation of an ideal universe in the image of the real and conferred with an autonomous temporal 
destiny.”21vi We suddenly move from talking about the rescuing of being from temporal loss to 
the creation of an ideal universe that is no longer utilitarian and extends beyond the rescue of 
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human being to the being of the whole world. This line introduces the notion of aesthetic 
autonomy of the image, and we need to understand why and how such a notion appears and what 
it entails. 
Following André Malraux, Bazin locates the genesis of the need to create an autonomous 
universe “in the image of the real” in the Renaissance. Malraux is explicit about the weakening 
of Christian faith as the background for the emergence of a sense of objective realism.22 This 
background of secularization of the image is key to Bazin’s own narrative. For him, “the parallel 
evolution of art and civilization” has caused “confusion between the aesthetic and the 
psychological [realisms], between true realism, which is the need to express the at once concrete 
and essential signification of the world, and the pseudo-realism of the trompe-l’oeil (or the 
trompe-l’esprit) which is content with the illusion of forms.”23vii Medieval art, as he says, had no 
conflict between the real and spiritual because its spiritual symbolism was a guarantor of its 
realism understood as the concrete expression of the signification of the world. The distinction 
and conflict between symbolism and realism of appearance arrives with the Renaissance and 
with the “decisive event” of the “the invention of the first scientific and, in some sense, already 
mechanical system: perspective.”24viii 
Bazin explains the public’s attachment to resemblance in a footnote by calling it an effect 
of industrial modernity and its bourgeois spirit whose consequence is “the reduction of art to its 
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psychological categories.”25ix By this he means the reduction of art to its correspondence with 
strictly human perceptual psychology shorn of the transcendental presence of art works. 
However, the psychological need for an illusory reproduction of the world not shaped by any 
greater significance, as Bazin notes, becomes no more than a desire for magical presence. This 
magical quality devoid of any potential to re-orient our world lacks any socio-political 
significance and is empty magic. The cinema that satisfies this purely psychological need is what 
Bazin calls the myth of total cinema. At best this is cinema as a scientific and not an aesthetic 
technology. Therefore this psychological need, when it goes beyond our appetite for vacuous 
illusion and magic, speaks to a modern desire for objectivity and empirical logic. If perspective 
was painting’s original sin, then the original sin of the world whose significance art is meant to 
express was scientific reason which puts into crisis the transcendental structures of belief that 
used to underwrite the “essential signification of the world.” 
We cannot grasp Bazin’s account of the antinomies at the heart of the photograph’s and 
cinema’s mechanical reproduction of the world without taking into account his narrative of 
secularization. I have discussed this to some extent in the introduction where I show that for 
Bazin modernity reveals the theological to be communitarian rather than divine in origin. There I 
also discussed the theological legacy that subsists in the Kantian and post-Kantian understanding 
of the aesthetic. I will here bring these two aspects—the sociological and the aesthetic—together 
by looking at other writings by Bazin where he discusses the persistence of quasi-theological but 
secular structures in history, and cinema as a key aesthetic site of this persistence. 
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The Mythology of Secularization 
The concept of “mythology” in Bazin’s work that I outlined in chapters two to four falls 
recognizably in a post-theological or rather quasi-theological conception of art which seeks to 
recover something of the hold on the social imaginary that religious frameworks used to have 
alongside something of the ritualistic dimension to the experience of art within those 
frameworks. Let us recall here the lines I quoted in the introduction where Bazin, in speaking of 
Kafka and De Sica, speaks of modernity’s “passage from transcendence to a social reality that 
births its own deification.”26 To this we can add the definition of the “sacred” he gave in 
describing Charlot as “a man outside the sacred.”x 
But it isn’t only religious rites [that constitute the sacred]. Society keeps up a 
thousand proprieties which themselves are nothing but a sort of permanent liturgy 
which it performs for itself... Religious or not, the sacred is everywhere in social life, 
not only in the magistrate, policeman, and priest, but in the rituals of eating, 
professional relations, and on public transport. It is through this that society 
maintains its coherence as if through a magnetic field. Each minute we 
unconsciously align ourselves to its lines of force.27xi 
He explicitly places cinema in this understanding of the sacred at the end of his essay on Jean 
Gabin’s screen persona. 
It is up to the sociologist and the moralist (singularly up to the Christian moralist 
and, why not, up to the theologian) to look into the profound signification of a 
mythology where, in the popularity of an actor like Gabin, tens of millions of our 
contemporaries find themselves. Perhaps a world without God again becomes a 
world of Gods and their fates.28xii 
As these lines make clear, secularization does not mean the absence of transcendental structures 
of belief but their persistence and even proliferation in modernity even and often without any 
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relationship to revealed religion. As Charles Taylor has argued recently, in modernity revealed 
religion becomes one option of belief among others. One could go to the Christian Church, one 
could become a Theosophist, a Communist, and so on, each claiming a transcendental horizon 
for meaning in the world.29 These structures proliferate because scientific reason is predicated on 
an idea of progressive discovery which leaves any knowledge it generates in a necessarily 
provisional state. Even as it seems to promise perfection of knowledge and thus a world 
systemized and devoid of politics, its open-endedness leaves room for other totalizing 
imaginaries. Since all such imaginaries in turn are threatened by scientific reason’s expanding 
realm, they need to adapt and ground themselves in a constantly shifting material reality. 
At one point in the essay on Gabin, in relation to the working-class settings of Gabin’s 
films, Bazin speaks about the “suburban Thebes” and the “Olympus of factories” and their 
“monsters of steel.” This evocation of Greek archetypes and the signaling of their presence in a 
“world without [a Christian] God” should alert us to a feature of “Ontology.” The argument of 
the latter essay is almost entirely under the sign of a pagan mythology, that of the Ancient 
Egyptian practice of mummification, yoked to a modern secular concern since the Renaissance 
that Bazin argues seeks to rescue the world in its own image; almost entirely except for the 
references in a footnote to Christian relics and icons and the Turin Shroud, all “relics” 
themselves of the pagan origins of Christianity.30 Indeed, as Robert Markot argues, Egyptian 
mummification itself has been understood in analogy with Christian relics since Late Antiquity 
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and the prism of relics informs how the display and reception of mummies is framed in the 
museum space.31 This return to consciousness of the pagan with the erosion in modernity of the 
primacy of Christian theology is the hallmark of modern aesthetic philosophy, and its renewed 
desire to combine materiality and some sort of secular transcendence. For post-Kantian aesthetic, 
the art and philosophy of Ancient Greece, one of Christian civilization’s pagan sources, become 
the ideal and the Absolute that it seeks to recover in its own forms, to its own measure, and cast 
in its own mythologies. 
The truths of modern mythologies no longer appear readymade but are forged from the 
material of history in the process of expression.32 They are, as Bazin writes in “The cinema and 
popular art,” only indirectly formed by history. While they shape history as much as any of the 
institutional forms of belief, any single structure of belief is one option among others and much 
more precarious compared to the former authority of revealed religion.33 Therefore, a modern 
mythology is the constant staging of a tension between the claims of reason and the claims of 
affect, between the chaos of history and its imaginary forms, with neither definitively canceling 
the other. It is in this tension that their political potential resides. As we have seen in part one, 
Bazin recognizes the functionality of myths in helping us come to terms with the contradictions 
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of history and experience, and that they do so not so much by actually resolving those 
contradictions as by masking them, by forcing reality to resemble the mythic construct. 
Modern political philosophy is heavily underwritten by such historically determinant 
mythologies: Hobbes’s “Leviathan,” Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” the “clockmaker God” in 
Deist philosophy, and the “nation” are just some of them, and they all testify to an aspiration 
towards a regulative totality in modernity in the absence of final religious authority on the 
structures of state and society. But the aesthetic has been a privileged site for the production and 
consolidation of these mythologies, and Kantian philosophy marks a key moment in the 
designation of this privilege. The Third Critique’s construction of the aesthetic as an experiential 
mode that provisionally reconciles the conflict between the demands of pure and practical reason 
famously lay the ground for the dominant strains of nineteenth-century aesthetics, particularly in 
its Romantic versions. Wagner gives us the ideal of the “total artwork” (Gesamkunstwerk) that 
captures the ritualistic and quasi-theological ambitions of art in the nineteenth century.34 While 
the Wagnerian ideal may be a limit expression of this ambition, to various degrees this model 
describes most autonomous art that also seeks to give shape to historical experience. 
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There is a difference, however, between the mythologies of political philosophy and 
those generated by works by art. As Bazin writes, “At the end of a traditional film, for a more or 
less long time we feel vaguely inhabited by the characters. The universe of the film is in us and 
we are in it; it is a state at once passive and passionate.”35xiii The broad structure of most 
aesthetic mythologies, including film genres and stars depends, as Bazin argues in his writings 
on the Western, on material taken from history which itself is too chaotic and complex to yield 
stable meaning without an aesthetic construction. It offers us forms of history that give the 
impression of capturing the essence of historical totality. But we confront these forms after self-
consciously escaping history by entering the movie theater, by picking up a book, attending a 
concert and so on. This is why, as we saw at the end of chapter one, Bazin remarks that 
audiences look upon the screen as a window on to a world other than that of their historical 
moment. This is what he means when he speaks in “Ontology” about the “creation of an ideal 
universe… conferred with an autonomous temporal destiny.”36 Or, drawing upon Arendt’s terms, 
we might call it a totality glimpsed through a gap in history. 
The mythologies of political philosophy, on the other hand, inhabit history much more 
emphatically. Though no one may have seen the “invisible hand” or walked the borders of a 
nation, they seem to exist for many as greatly privileged empirical facts, backed up by 
economists, geographers, sociologists, and historians who work the data of history in and out of 
these mythic paradigms. The work of aesthetic mythologies is to keep a minimal distance 
between the empirical reality out of which they are formed and the works in which they are 
manifested so that they never become the kinds of alibis for historical experience that political 
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mythologies are. They inform historical experience from behind our backs but are never there 
when we turn around, so that they do not have an evidentiary purchase on reality. Keeping in 
mind Bazin’s argument that the aesthetic is the site for the persistence of quasi-theological 
structures of belief, let us now see how the image in Bazin’s historical account can claim 
aesthetic autonomy in order to generate its secular mythologies and what problems confront it in 
making this claim. 
The Time-Space of the Aesthetic Image 
To return to the conflict between symbolism and perspectival realism in painting, we can 
now see that this was an effect of competing claims of science and mythological expression over 
the horizon of meaning in the world. The image was now pulled between two different forms of 
knowledge. The demand for a realist image, on the one hand, was for an image that reproduced 
the world as it was or as it is. If it refers to the past as in the depiction of a historical event, it 
does so in order to tell how something was but without giving it an active presence as the 
aesthetic image is required to do. It serves the purposes of positivist historical knowledge. But to 
the extent that how something was may be seen as determining how something is, the positivist 
image also claims explanatory power over the present. Bazin doesn’t explicitly speak of this 
image in “Ontology” but, as will soon become clear, he was highly suspicious of the affinity and 
alliance between scientific rationality and the photographic image. 
The aesthetic image, in distinction from the historicist image, is disinherited from the old 
transcendental structure of belief provided by religion but still seeks to retain its role as the site 
for the imaginative expression of the world’s meaning. Given science’s much more sound 
epistemological claims on the world, if art needed to still claim some hold on experience, it 
needed, as several scholars have argued, to dissociate itself from the procedures of instrumental 
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and scientific reason.37 But if scientific reason holds such strong explanatory claims on the 
world, art cannot do without adopting some of its procedures such as perspectival technique and 
realist detail in order to ground its expressive image. And when it does so, it gets caught in the 
confusion between imitation and expression. In trying to perfect its imitation it runs the risk of 
ending up as a vacuous trompe-l’oeil; vacuous because it satisfies only a “completely 
psychological need whose origin can be found in the magical way of thinking.”38xiv This remnant 
of magical thought is authorized by neither religion nor science, except by the latter in a 
superficial way at the level of technique. But since art cannot let go of this technique which 
brings it to share the same terrain as science—the spatio-temporal world of historical 
experience—it needs to acquire a transcendence that is characterized as “aesthetic autonomy.” 
But since it is now deprived of the vertically transcendental realm, its transcendence could only 
be constructed laterally. 
The idea of a lateral transcendence is based on the fact of the broad conformity of the 
image’s space-time to the conditions of spatio-temporal perception. If the image claims an active 
presence in the same world as ours at the same as it claims to reproduce this world, it will either 
be exposed as illusion or be instrumentalized as a source of empirical information and thus cede 
to the primacy of logical reason. As Bazin writes, “the concept of universe itself is spatially 
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exclusive. For a time, the film is the Universe, the World, or, if you will, Nature.”39xv Similarly, 
about theatrical space he writes, “The stage and the décor or the action that unfolds are an 
aesthetic microcosm forcibly inserted in the universe but essentially heterogeneous to the nature 
that surrounds it.”40xvi About painting, he writes that “the frame of the painting defines a 
centripetal space, from the exterior to the interior, heterogeneous to the depth that surrounds 
it,”41xvii The question is how such a heterogeneity can come to be when the world in the painting 
contains the same material as the world and indeed still expresses something about this world 
and thus refers to it in the process. 
Bazin got the opportunity to describe the process of modern aesthetic creation in an essay 
on Henri-Georges Clouzot’s The Picasso Mystery (1956) and in his other writings on films on 
painting.42 We can take Bazin’s arguments about how these documentaries treat paintings as 
arguments about how the aesthetic treats the world that it records. Clouzot’s film shows Picasso 
painting on a transparent surface and claims to show the mind of the artist at work as we follow 
his hand tracing lines on the canvas. Bazin dismisses any notion that the film explains “how” 
Picasso paints in terms of cause (idea or technique) and effect (finished painting). Instead, he 
argues that the film shows the duration of the act of aesthetic creation that is a supplementary 
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aspect of the finished painting. The idea of duration he has in mind is indicated by the title of the 
essay “A Bergsonian Film.” 
Duration for Bergson is a non-spatial conception of time in which moments do not exist 
separately and numerically as past, present, and future but interpenetrate in experience and 
acquire a qualitative unity that is distinct from the quantitative unity of numbers.43 He describes 
the conception of matter and image that this understanding of duration yields as follows: 
Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of “images.” And by “image” we mean a certain 
existence which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less 
than that which the realist calls a thing—an existence halfway between the “thing” 
and “representation.”44 
The matter of the idealist is a representation of a reality that resides in a non-temporal realm, as 
in Platonic philosophy. The matter of the realist is the object of modern scientific reason. 
Therefore, even though Bazin is analyzing the work of time in his essay on Clouzot’s film, it also 
has consequences for understanding what happens to matter, and therefore space, in aesthetic 
creation. 
The key to the discovery of duration at work in Picasso’s painting is when we see him 
paint something that then gets transformed into something else, a process that continues until 
Picasso stops working on the canvas definitively and calls it finished. The finished painting, we 
know, contains layers of other paintings. For example, the last painting he creates in the film, a 
version of La Plage de la Garoupe (1955), starts as beach scene during the day (Fig. 3, top 
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panel) and ends as a very different scene on the same beach at night (Fig. 3, bottom panel). Bazin 
writes that with each of his paintings, Picasso could stop at any point and we could call it a 
finished painting. But as he continues to paint, we see that what we might call the earlier 
paintings get absorbed in the final painting. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Stills from The Picasso Mystery (Henri-Georges Clouzot, 1956) 
We cannot say about this process that Picasso needed to paint the day scene in order to 
paint the night scene because the contours of figures and objects in the finished painting owe 
nothing to the contours of figures and objects in the earlier one. In “both” paintings we see that 
the house is on the top-left, the terrace café on the bottom-right, the beach in the background, and 
the most prominent figure(s) at center-left. But they are all recognizably different in their very 
outline, and the central figure is no longer the single girl but in her place a much larger dancing 
couple. This is why, as Bazin writes, it would have made no sense to show the evolution of the 
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painting as one would use time-lapse to show a flower blooming.45 That could not have captured 
the intermediate states of the painting that are quite other than stages on the way to the final 
destination. And yet, we who have seen the painting develop, can no longer think of the day 
scene as a separate painting since we have seen it disappear into the final painting. It exists 
nowhere else except as trace in the finished painting.46 
Bazin describes this process as one in which each painting is “destined to devour itself or 
rather to metamorphose until the moment when the painter wants to stop,” and that each of them 
“must be sacrificed to the next painting.”47xviii This is a perfect illustration of the Hegelian idea 
of sublation—the earlier painting is canceled and preserved in the final painting. This finished 
painting, which is no more than Picasso’s refusal to paint on that particular canvas further—and 
thus an arbitrary destination—acquires “the autonomy of the pictorial microcosm crystallized 
forever outside of time.”48xix Bazin calls this spatial microcosm “evoked time” that is realized 
only in the time that the viewer spends inhabiting and exploring it.49 What we see occurring in 
the act of Picasso painting is what occurs to the world in any aesthetic text. The durational flux 
of the material world is taken up in a laterally transcendental space. Its character of flux is 
preserved, whether evoked as in painting or as actual unfolding in a film, play, or a novel. But 
the open character of this flux is canceled in order to arrive at an enclosed universe that the 
                                                 
45
 Bazin, “Un film bergsonien,” 140 [Bazin, “A Bergsonian Film,” 60]. 
46
 Although it is claimed that the paintings exist nowhere but on the film, and so exist only as filmic time, La Plage 
de la Garoupe survives and may well be the same canvas as the one in the film. Another wide-canvas painting from 
the film, and claimed as such—that of a nude perched on her elbow—was on display at the Picasso Museum in Paris 
during the summer of 2015. 
47
 Ibid., 136 [Bazin, “A Bergsonian Film,” 58]. 
48
 Ibid., 134 [Bazin, “A Bergsonian Film,” 58]. 
49
 Ibid. 
201 
 
spectator or reader inhabits for a while. This is a very different processing of material reality than 
the idea of referentiality Rosen privileges. 
But another set of Bazin’s writings on another set of films on art describes a different 
kind of sublation. In several articles on films on finished paintings, indeed canonical ones, he 
sketches a different process whereby the fixed spatiality of the image is temporalized.50 His 
privileged example, Alain Resnais’s Van Gogh (1948), takes multiple works by the painter to 
create his biography. Resnais tracks the camera on different parts, cuts from one to another, 
creates shot-reverse shots, and makes us enter and move about in the world of the painting 
without ever showing us the frame. The crystallized space of the painting becomes potentially 
infinite like the space of perception in the world.51 
The film that results from the encounter between the paintings and the camera is neither 
the world of the original painting(s) nor a passive record automatically yielded by the camera. 
Instead, we get a symbiotic world that exists as an autonomous universe which absorbs both the 
painting and the spectator. This kind of sublation may be seen as the re-temporalization of a 
world that has congealed into the instrumentalized objectivity of reason. We have seen him argue 
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in chapter one that the constraints of such instrumentalized modernity is the key catalyst for 
modern aesthetic imaginaries. Bazin is clear about this point when he writes that Van Gogh and 
Goya aren’t much more than names to most people.52 For them the paintings themselves exist as 
dead objects in the world that require a minimum amount of cultural initiation for their audiences 
to see that they invite us to enter another space and another world.53 Film, by temporalizing the 
abstract space and bringing it closer to the conditions of normal perception, makes this world 
habitable for a large number of people. 
At this point, we may ask, as did many critics of the genre, if paintings such as Van 
Gogh’s or Picasso’s that negate three-dimensional space remain themselves when subjected to 
this procedure. When replying to these critics, Bazin explicitly insists on a certain kind of 
betrayal inherent in his account. 
Having become soluble in the external world, [the painting] henceforth lends itself to 
all combinations of realism. It is delivered, bound hand and foot, to the discretion of 
the filmmaker who could make an apple by Cézanne into a dessert to be eaten with a 
knife.54xx 
This very freedom of the filmmaker to do with the painting what she will opens it up to another 
creation than that of the painting. 
It is perhaps in the extent itself to which a film is fully a work and seems to betray 
the painting that, in the final instance, it serves the painting best.55xxi 
The betrayal is necessary because the spatiality of painting must be dissolved. But in speaking of 
“serving the painting” Bazin invokes fidelity too. Fidelity is important to the extent that the 
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reality of the painting is still a matter of primary importance to the spectator. This paradox 
cannot be mediated through medium-specificity but only by the overarching epistemological and 
experiential structure of the aesthetic. 
In the lengthiest of his articles on the subject of films on painting, after having elaborated 
the ontological encounter between the frame of a painting and that of the camera (which he calls 
a mask), he cautions against making this metaphysics of the medium the final arbiter in 
understanding what any single film in the genre does: whether it betrays at the same time as it 
reveals “some of its secret virtualities”56xxii of a painting; if it simply betrays it; or if it servilely 
reproduces the painting despite seeming to take liberties.57 This can be only determined 
discursively since the ultimate point of this sublation for the filmmaker is a critical 
reconstruction of the world of the painting and for the spectator to confront this reconstruction 
affectively. Bazin emphasizes again and again that the point of confronting the painting 
displaced into another universe is an unpredictable combination of critical and emotional 
responses. It is a critical engagement with the spatio-temporal reality of the painting that is at 
once dependent upon our empirical knowledge of it as existing outside the film as well as on our 
affective belief in the primacy of its reality as we experience it in the film. The film succeeds 
only to the extent that it betrays the given character of the painting in order to affectively 
transform our experience of it in the empirical world. 
Such a transformation, instead of seeming to offer us another painting, releases some 
“virtual” existence of the painting— for example, the lived reality of certain psychological states 
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that Van Gogh’s life furnishes—other than the actual one it had for us—as no more than an 
object in a room, for example. The dialectic that results here is not one of reality and illusion but 
one of virtualities (or possibilities) and actualities, in which the released virtuality becomes an 
actuality for us that absorbs and negates the prior actuality that in turn now exists as a virtuality. 
I make this last point—that the experience of a Van Gogh painting as no more than an indifferent 
objet in turn becomes a virtuality—in order to not fetishize the word “virtuality,” or its 
association here with temporality, as always the revelation of some better reality. For example, if 
we take the Futurists’ celebration of velocity as a vehicle for the destruction and remaking of the 
world to be an expressive precursor to the destruction of the World Wars, we might be tempted 
to hold over it artworks that celebrate the experience of objectivity. But there we might find 
Imagist poetry’s fetishization of the isolated moment in space as the harbinger of European 
fascism and its desire for the ornamentalized state. The point is that all virtualities exist over a 
field of contradictions, and this is what we have seen at the level of narrative in part one with 
Bazin’s analyses of the Tramp and the Western, for example. To be political is to affectively 
actualize a virtuality as a way of provisionally virtualizing actuality, even if eventually all 
virtualities may turn into reified actuality. 
The duration of Picasso’s paintings and the space of Van Gogh’s are very far from the 
spatio-temporal reality of normal perception. But Bazin’s account of how the cinema treats them 
describes the process of sublation of material and lived reality that all aesthetic texts are called 
upon to perform in order to create a “non-space-time at the heart of time” that we can now 
characterize as a lateral transcendence. In distinction from the vertical transcendence of religion 
but just like it, aesthetic transcendence gives an imaginary form—or rather multiple and 
unpredictable forms unlike the religious imaginary—to the spatio-temporal reality of the world. 
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Bazin’s argument about painting in “Ontology” is that it is unsuited to the task of performing this 
sublation while conforming to the conditions of spatio-temporal perception, but also that any 
aesthetic sublation in modernity can only be socially and politically significant when it conforms 
to these conditions.  
Bazin finds two problems with painting’s adoption of perspectival realism in trying to 
fulfill the aesthetic mandate of modernity. The first—the one he mentions in one of his articles 
on films on art—is that the space-time of the canvas is something altogether different from the 
space of the world. 
Until the nineteenth century, the alibi of resemblance constituted the realist 
misunderstanding by which those uninitiated [in the conventions of painting] could 
enter into the world of the painting. And so the dramatic and moral anecdotes 
multiplied to capture the mind while neglecting the genetic secret of the canvas.58xxiii 
The implication here is clear that once the space of the canvas welcomes the world with its 
spatial parameters, it is also forced to take on the time of dramatic events that unfold in that 
space. These elements are the very opposite of the “genetic” flatness and blankness of the canvas 
that, as the last paragraph of “Ontology” argues, is the space of colors and their forms.59 Bazin 
here uses the classical distinction between outline as a property of objectivity and color as a 
secondary quality that is an experiential but not an inherent property of objects.60 Thus, the world 
that painting starts with in aesthetic expression is a world of secondary and subjective qualities 
that exceed the objectivity and linearity of spatio-temporal progression organized dramatically. 
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But under the pressures of logical reason it was forced to conform its visual character to the 
conditions of three-dimensional visual perception. 
The second problem that Bazin identifies in “Ontology” is that perspectival painting 
might create an autonomous world “in the image of the real” but however exact this image it 
cannot claim to be the world itself. This is because, “However skillful the painter [in reproducing 
the world], his work was always indebted to an inevitable subjectivity.”61 Here again we need to 
see the historical specificity of this point. He does not say that painting never succeeded in 
performing the sublation of materiality, and this point will be important to understanding Bazin’s 
argument about the historical trajectory of cinematic realism. 
From the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, most painting attempted to satisfy, with 
some success, both the psychological and the aesthetic modes of relating to the world. Without a 
better procedure for satisfying the psychological need, its imperfections went unchallenged. 
Bazin underlines painting’s success until this point by not only referring to the great painters 
who achieved this synthesis, but even more tellingly in a footnote he added in 1958. There, 
following Malraux, he points out that some of the earliest photographers who wanted to be artists 
tried to imitate the style of paintings, since paintings “in their eyes already imitated nature ‘only 
better’.” It took a while for photographers to understand that in order to be artists they “could 
copy only nature,” with nature to be understood as the historical, material world more broadly.62 
While photography exposes painting’s essential unsuitability to the task of combining the 
psychological and aesthetic needs, the latter nonetheless recovers the freedom to pursue aesthetic 
                                                 
61
 Ibid., 14 [WCI 12; WCB 6]. 
62
 Ibid. 15ff1 [WCB 11-12ff4]. 
207 
 
expression on the ontogenetic grounds of its medium. Photography and film, as Bazin writes, 
redeemed painting from its original sin.63 And yet, the world could not be so redeemed since the 
invention of photography only signified the increasing hold of scientific reason on the world in 
the aftermath of the first wave of industrialization in Europe. Bazin is clear about the heavy price 
painting pays for recovering an autonomy from the world of objects when this world is the only 
one that matters socially. 
It is in the nineteenth century that the crisis of realism really starts (of which Picasso 
today is the myth) and which goes on to put into question at once the formal 
conditions of existence and the sociological basis of the plastic arts. Liberated from 
the complex of resemblance, the modern painter abandons it to the public [peuple] 
which identifies it on the one hand with photography and on the other with the only 
kind of painting that aims at resemblance [à la seule peinture qui s’y applique].64xxiv 
In losing referentiality, painting renounces its tension with the world by ceasing to satisfy the 
psychological need of the social unconscious for the reproduction of the world; its autonomy 
becomes absolute rather than relational. Such an aesthetic autonomy would be devoid of the 
political significance of the aesthetic in modernity. This is clear from the fact that the public, 
when it does turn to painting in the age of photography, looks for the world in ersatz realist 
painting. 
It is not that ersatz realist painting necessarily expressed something more compelling for 
the social imaginary than avant-garde painting. But any compelling avant-garde claims on the 
imaginary can be released for the larger public only by the work of photographic and cinematic 
reproduction. This was Bazin’s claim in a footnote to the original version of “Ontology,” four 
years before he encountered the surge in films on painting and even before Malraux’s 
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theorization of photography’s role in creating a global musée imaginaire. He called such a 
process, “The imaginary seen through the real.”65xxv Thus, the demand for resemblance is 
primarily a sociological demand under the pressures of scientific modernity, and realism is 
literally a public problem. Therefore, the primordial desire to rescue being from time is nothing 
without its historical and therefore socio-political specificity. With this dual insight into Bazin’s 
historical arguments for the secularized persistence of transcendental structures of belief and the 
spatio-temporal form of the aesthetic in modernity, we can now turn to his ontological argument 
about photography. 
Photographic Ontology: A False Friend 
When photography claims to reproduce the world with greater conviction, it is not 
because it offers us greater detail or more clarity, but simply due to its automatic origins and the 
absence of the intervention of human subjectivity: “The solution was not in the result but in the 
genesis.”66xxvi As against painting which represents the world, the photograph in some ways 
gives us the world itself. As mentioned earlier, Daniel Morgan and Tom Gunning have pointed 
out Bazin’s insistence on the ontological identity between the object photographed and a 
photograph of the object. But the nature of this identity is much more complex than their 
accounts suggest. 
When the world is reproduced by the automatism of a technology in which, in principle, 
there is no intervention of human subjectivity, then something uncanny occurs. The object in the 
image does not only conform to the conditions of spatio-temporal perception, but in some way is 
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rescued from them. Through this, paradoxically, the object in the form of the photograph is also 
reintroduced into this same world but seemingly immune to the corrosiveness of space and time. 
Bazin writes, “On the photograph, natural image of a world that we could not or knew not how to 
see, nature at last does more than imitate art: it imitates the artist.”67xxvii He is here arguing—
reversing Oscar Wilde’s summation of nineteenth-century aesthetics in the epigram “Life 
imitates art”— that nature creates its own double by imprinting itself (“like a fingerprint”68xxviii) 
on film.69 It is its own artist in the sense that it rescues its own identity from flux to give itself a 
permanent form.70 Through this, the photograph “actually adds itself to natural creation rather 
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than substituting it with another creation.”71xxix A photograph materially embodies nature as it 
was at the moment of photographic capture, but this past state now persists in a world that is no 
longer what it used to be. As we have seen, Bazin also says that it is nature itself which performs 
this operation on to film. But this has no automatic aesthetic significance. A photograph is much 
like the Egyptian mummy in its ability to persist as the body from the past, but it has neither the 
Egyptian nor any other religion to authorize such a persistence. 
Bazin finds nature the world in the photograph suspended in its own moment of doubling 
and not completely at home in the afterlife into which it thrown: “unlike art, the photograph does 
not create eternity, it embalms time and rescues it from its own corruption;”xxx it “conserves the 
object enfolded in its instant like the intact bodies of insects of a bygone era preserved in 
amber.”72xxxi In saying that the photograph does not create eternity out of material reality, despite 
arguing that it confers upon it a second existence, Bazin points to its failure to create aesthetic 
autonomy. The word “eternity” refers here to the transcendence that aesthetic experience 
requires so that the work is part of our spatio-temporal present but spatially removed from our 
world.73 The photographed object exists in the world. 
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We must be careful not to think that Bazin argued for a substantial difference between the 
suspended reality of a photograph and the temporal reality of film. Though he says that film goes 
beyond the photograph’s static conservation, the fact of its mummified suspension in two 
temporalities does not change substantially. Cinema is not central to the discussion in 
“Ontology” which barely touches it since the essay appeared in a book on painting. However, in 
“On Realism,” a 1944 article contemporaneous with the writing of “Ontology,” he claims that 
unlike works in other arts that are renewed with each performance or reading over centuries, 
“[f]ilm… remains by its very nature anchored in the duration of its birth. What remains in the 
layer of film gelatin is only a fossilized time.”74xxxii “The “mummy of change” in “Ontology” 
describes only a “fossilized time” which is “effectively re-presented, that is to say made present 
in time and in space.”75xxxiii 
The suspension of reality between two temporalities that photo-filmic images create has a 
disturbing effect on us; the presence of people and objects in photographs is a “troubling 
presence” because they have been snatched from their destinies in time: “These grey or sepia 
shadows, phantasmic, almost unreadable, are the troubling presence of lives arrested in their 
duration, liberated from their destinies, not by the prestige of art but by the virtue of an 
impassive mechanism.”76xxxiv The idea that photography is troubling because of its uncertain 
temporal condition might remind us of Cavell’s characterizing of the world on film as productive 
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of an “ontological restlessness” at the fact of being present at a world that is already past.77 But 
the quality of “fossilized time” that Bazin describes here is, unlike for Cavell, an aesthetically 
unproductive suspension that does not really impose itself on the present of the spectator while 
retaining its autonomy. The liberation of people and objects from their destinies is also a freezing 
of identities in time which deprives them of the “becoming” that defines existence. Here Bazin’s 
attitude is much closer to Kracauer’s 1927 essay, “Photography.” 
Kracauer describes photographs as archaeological documents of the past but which strike 
us with little of the factual value of other such documents. Here he describes children looking at 
a photograph of the grandmother they have never seen living. 
The grandmother dissolves into fashionably old-fashioned details before the very 
eyes of the grandchildren. They are amused by the traditional costume, which, 
following the disappearance of its bearer, remains alone on the battlefield—an 
external decoration that has become autonomous… They laugh, and at the same time 
they shudder. For through the ornamentation of the costume from which the 
grandmother has disappeared, they think they glimpse a moment of time past, a time 
that passes without return. Although time is not part of the photograph like the smile 
or the chignon, the photograph itself, so it seems to them, is a representation of time. 
Were it the photograph alone that endowed these details with duration, they would 
not at all outlast mere time; rather, time would create images for itself out of them.78 
This is a description of spatialized time—a displaced and frozen spatiality—in which 
referentiality is suspended between the past of the grandmother and the present of the children. 
What makes the grandmother unsettling is her dress which was a part of her identity at the 
moment the photograph was taken and which, “alone on the battlefield,” now fixes her identity 
forever in the photograph. Time has created an image of the grandmother on the photograph but 
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without conferring on her identity any posthumous existence, or, in Bazin’s words, any eternity. 
The last sentence in Kracauer’s quote, by referencing the idea of duration in the conditional, 
evokes the cinema to deepen the unease that even were it to capture our duration it would only 
deprive us of our existence the better; a mere “mummy of change.” Bazin himself describes this 
as the participation of the photographed object in the existence of the model—“the existence of 
the photographed object participates… in the existence of the model like a fingerprint”xxxv—but 
this must be understood as a fossilized and spectral existence.79 Photography does seem to save 
people and things from time, but by bringing their temporal being in our midst it renders our own 
uncertain. In photographs, as in the painting of Edgar Allan Poe’s story The Fall of the House of 
Usher (1839) and Jean Epstein’s film of it (1928), life is rescued by being drained into the 
photograph which by itself does not refer to the past body but is the body in which past life 
continues to exist spectrally. 
Aesthetic temporality needs an autonomy that exceeds or is different from the suspended 
temporality of photographs or bare film footage. One of the key reasons this qualification has not 
been registered is a precipitate transition in Bazin’s argument, almost an ellipsis, where he goes 
from speaking about suspended temporality to its possible aesthetic consequences. This 
transition occurs with the lines, “The categories of resemblance which are specific to the 
photographic image also determine its aesthetic in relation to painting. The aesthetic virtualities 
of the photograph reside in the revelation of the real.”80 He then goes on to speak about the 
photograph’s ability to rid us of “habits, prejudices, and spiritual grime” when confronting the 
world and making it available to our love. But the phrase “aesthetic virtualities” makes clear that 
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he is not collapsing this aesthetic effect with photographic ontology but drawing an imaginary 
line that connects the two. 
He clarifies this further with a footnote to the word “categories” where, drawing upon the 
philosopher Henri Gouhier’s distinction between dramatic and aesthetic categories in the theater, 
Bazin argues that the power of resemblance in photography is a category that determines its 
aesthetics but the two are not identical. Gouhier’s argument, as Bazin reports it, claims that the 
drama of a play is devoid of any aesthetic quality in itself until a theatrical enactment lends it 
one. In an analogous sense for Bazin, in photographs and film, “the perfection of imitation is not 
identical with beauty. It only constitutes the primary matter in which the artistic fact comes to be 
inscribed.”81xxxvi The move from a temporally suspended resemblance to the aesthetic power of 
resemblance passes through multiple virtual paths, and the ontology of resemblance in 
photographic film can be realized to varying effects. 
The Discontents of Cinematic Ontology 
At one of its limit, the cinema can make us love things that we would not know how to in 
real life through the sheer force of the ontological faith in vision that it calls forth. But because of 
cinema’s ability to automatically confirm spatio-temporal reality, it also calls upon a different 
and more logical response that does not create aesthetic autonomy but confidently places the 
reality in the image on the continuum of history which then becomes unavailable to a revival in 
experience. Because cinema’s primary matter is the world itself, its ontology calls for the 
greatest vigilance regarding its abilities to hypostasize it. Let us look at the following lines from 
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“Langage de Notre Temps,” Bazin’s introduction to Regards Neufs Sur le Cinéma, a book 
published by the popular culture organization, Peuple et Culture. 
All that passes on the screen is effected by a coefficient of realism to which no other 
figurative technique can lay claim. We perceive it as a decal transfer of the external 
world which exists as an object reflected in glass. Film is at once representation and 
language but it is only as representation that it is above all and universally 
understood.82xxxvii 
… 
[Cinema is] a language which presents itself in the forms of the sensible world and 
which aims to merge with it... A formation in cinematic culture is not only necessary 
for… a richer pleasure in works of quality but also for the awareness of ideas that a 
film aims to introduce into our consciousness under the fallacious alibi of reality. I 
do not speak only of films that are explicitly propagandistic… but of almost all other 
films that in one way or another are also implicitly propagandistic. Not always 
systemic and calculated propaganda… but also the diffuse expression of a way of 
life, of a moral; a subtle confirmation of the values of a regime or a civilization. 
Whether he accepts or rejects these implicit ideologies, the educated man should at 
least do so consciously.83xxxviii 
We see here that the ontological understanding of the film image as a decal transfer of reality 
also entails a concern about the illusion of accuracy, a “fallacious alibi of reality,” which 
functions as a vehicle for subliminal propaganda. The Western and the slapstick too can make us 
love the history of colonization and the “terrorism” of modern objects84 through recognizable 
generic conventions that are not entirely specific to the medium, but we give in to them despite 
knowing them to be conventional so that their ideological force works its way through our 
imaginaries into our lives. Films that rely much more heavily on the ontological force of the 
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image as record of reality have the potential to erase the line of irreality through which we 
encounter these imaginaries. 
Bazin worked out, in a sustained manner, the problem of cinema’s ability to collapse real 
and imaginary space-time in the second part of “Theater and cinema,” recalling terms from 
“Ontology,” but this time expanding the consequences for cinematic spectatorship. About 
photographic identity, he says: 
The photograph, through the intermediary of the lens [objectif], captures a truly 
radiant imprint, a mould. As such, it carries away with it, more than an imprint, a sort 
of identity. (The card by that name is conceivable only in the era of 
photography).85xxxix 
The mention of the genesis of the identity card tells us of the power the photograph has over our 
very identity. In a rationalized modernity where everything depends on empirical proof, we 
become unrecognizable without our photographs testifying that we are who we say we are. Bazin 
writes about how, after cinema, theaters began to advertise their stars as being “present in flesh 
and blood”: “This is because, for common sense, the word ‘presence’ now lends itself to 
equivocation, and a pleonasm [in order to establish it] is not out of place in the time of the 
cinematograph.”86xl 
Bazin here speaks about the “metaphysical obscenity” of the cinematic image, a feature 
realized in it absolute state by films that show actual death because it repeats potentially 
indefinitely the most unrepeatable moment of a person’s existence, and thus deprives it of the 
possession of its identity most completely.87 Similarly, Bazin compares the different modalities 
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of spectatorship in theater and cinema by comparing how the (male) spectator relates to 
showgirls on screen and those on stage. 
On the screen, their appearance satisfies unconscious sexual longings, and when the 
hero touches them, he satisfies the spectator’s desire to the extent that the latter 
identifies with him. On the stage, the showgirls awaken the senses of the spectator 
just as they would do in reality, so that there is no identification with the hero. He 
becomes an object of jealousy and envy. In short, Tarzan is unimaginable without 
cinema. The cinema placates the spectator, while the theater excites him.88xli 
These lines indicate that the medium’s obscenity is not tied to sexual presence but to a specific 
way of relating to it: identificatory voyeurism. For Bazin, this is not possible in the theater not 
only because the actors are present in the flesh but because of the footlights that clearly separate 
the space of the spectator from the space of the play. The spectator has to consciously abstract 
away this separation in order to inhabit the world of the play (but without being able to 
participate in its action). He calls the footlights a censor that the audience needs to overcome in 
order to derive its pleasures, just as in a painting one’s pleasure is dependent on avoiding the 
frame that exposes the limits of its worldliness.89 As against these markers of heterogeneity, 
cinema works by completely substituting itself for our world. 
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Since cinema is in essence a dramaturgy of nature, there can be no cinema without 
the construction of an open space, substituting itself for the universe instead of 
including itself within it.90xlii 
A film, so long as it runs, needs to eliminate everything that could reveal its object character. 
And since its realism is a historically driven need, one cannot do without this elimination without 
at the same time refusing the social mandate that the demand for realism represents. But the bind 
is that this same mandate of the medium can easily deprive its spectator of his social 
responsibility.  
The spectatorial activity involved in theater and in painting for Bazin is much more 
satisfying in its critical and affective combination than the activity of the cinematic spectator or 
the reader of the novel, the popular realist medium of the nineteenth century. After a play, we 
feel “something more bracing and, let’s be honest, more noble—or one should perhaps say more 
moral—than the satisfaction that follows a film.”91xliii As against these satisfactions, he writes, 
the cinema and the novel give us a sense of “complacence, a yielding to solitude, a sort of 
betrayal of action through the refusal of social responsibility.”92xliv Therefore, after watching 
even the best films, there is an “inevitable drop in voltage, and some mysterious aesthetic short-
circuit in the cinema [that] deprives us of a certain tension that decidedly belongs to the 
stage.”93xlv From Bazin’s analysis, this aesthetic short-circuit can only be the result of the fact 
that we possess the world on the screen so completely that we feel deprived of it just as 
thoroughly once the film ends. As we will see in chapters that follow, one of the defense 
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mechanisms cinema calls forth against this deprivation is an insistent belief that in some way the 
world on the screen is/was our own world, so that we are neither deprived of our world when we 
enter that of the screen nor lose the world on the screen once a film ends. 
Conclusion 
I have elaborated the narrative of “Ontology” by putting it in in dialogue with other 
writing by Bazin in order to argue for two things. The first is that his understanding of 
“mythology” as we have seen it emerge in the part of this dissertation is tied to a narrative of 
secularization that is the constitutive horizon for the argument in “Ontology.” This horizon also 
determines the political condition of modernity and the participation of the aesthetic within it. 
The second point I have argued is that there is a definite anxiety about cinematic realism running 
through the essay. This anxiety is exacerbated by Bazin’s consciousness of his own historical 
moment as one in which this realism was asked to deliver on its evidentiary capacities and to 
thus close the gap between image and world. The following two chapters will expand upon this 
historical aspect, expand upon Bazin’s concerns, and ground them in specific examples of films 
and the debates within which he read them. The final chapter will look at how Bazin nonetheless 
insisted that cinema needed to pass through these concerns, and work at both meeting the 
demand for realism and creating the minimal abstraction needed for a politically significant 
aesthetic autonomy. 
I will conclude with some remarks on the existing accounts of “Ontology.” I will take up 
Rosen’s and Morgan’s accounts again in chapter seven where Bazin’s readings of specific films 
will help me briefly respond to the fundamental merits and limitations of their accounts. But, 
overall, we have seen how the essay is almost incomprehensible without taking seriously its 
grand narrative. Without it, we end up with partial claims that are bound to be both striking and 
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contentious. It isn’t that the account I have attributed to Bazin cannot be contested, but the easy 
polemics that come from any ahistorical position on image-reality relation would become 
difficult to sustain. Since these polemics have turned often on the question of Bazin’s religious 
investment and his politics (or supposed lack thereof), I will here quickly address them based on 
my argument. 
Most accounts of Bazin caricature his theoretical investment in Catholicism. Thus, even 
sympathizers of Bazin such as Jacques Rancière and Jacques Aumont cannot help making 
condescending remarks on this front. Rancière refers to “a religious agenda firmly in the 
background” of his work.94 According to Aumont, for Bazin “God haunts the world” and cinema 
would reveal his presence, however obscurely.95 In one of his last articles, published just after his 
death, Bazin himself rhetorically marked, with amused weariness, the charges of mysticism that 
he knew would continue to dog him. Catching himself using a religious metaphor, he adds 
parenthetically, “Oh, well! I will yet end up classing myself among the spiritual critics!”96xlvi 
When Rosen rescues him from these caricatures on the rational grounds of historical 
thought, he is at pains to deny any concern with the transcendental. Bazin’s account of 
secularization, as I have brought it out here, takes seriously both the long history of religion that 
frames the social horizon and the impossibility of any single transcendental structure claiming 
universal or indefinite primacy in modernity. For him, nothing authorizes in the absolute a 
structure of belief, but a broad and complex consensus may be reached over one through social 
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negotiations over diverse aspects in which the historical unconscious plays as great a role as 
conscious structural limits. Therefore, even the most rational social structure needs to create its 
transcendental conditions. 
On the question of politics, the only acknowledgement we have ever had of its place in 
Bazin’s work pertains to his key role in promoting cinema in the factories as part of the postwar 
popular education movement. This hardly ever extends to his theoretical and critical work. Here 
too unwitting condescension seeps in. Lowenstein’s exploration of Bazin’s investment in 
surrealism is careful enough to tell us that “Breton’s surreality incorporates a number of 
explicitly political dimensions that Bazin’s photographic realism does not.”97 Without going into 
the politics of surrealism, I will only say that the collapsing of the subjective and the objective, 
and the real and the imaginary, can become mystical formulae without an account of their non-
liberatory dark side. I will now turn to demonstrating how Bazin treats this dark side in great 
detail on the terrain on politics. 
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Chapter 6 
Total War, Total History, Total Cinema 
 
The previous chapter uncovered the historical specificity of the nineteenth century 
demand for realism that for Bazin fed into the inventions of photography and cinema. But just as 
this demand worked its way slowly over centuries and did not establish itself immediately upon 
the adoption of perspectival technique in painting, so the social responsiveness to cinematic 
realism for Bazin was not given once and for all. I had briefly argued in chapter two that Bazin’s 
interest in new stylistic explorations such as staging in depth must be understood as part of a 
larger discourse of the crisis of Hollywood genres and in relation to debates over the political 
importance of the subjects that films treat. We have seen Bazin argue that the “importance” of 
subjects relies less on their manifest content than in their imaginary structures that mythologize 
the present. This is the reason he gave for welcoming cinema’s turn away in its very first years 
from its primary function of recording reality. 
Bazin went on to argue that that the stylistic inventiveness of silent cinema that undercut 
this recording function was also justified by technological reasons and the socio-historical 
experience of photo-filmic technology. Firstly, the absence of sound made the realism of the 
image a point of departure rather than an integral capture of physical reality. Secondly, he argued 
that there was only a slow increase in the importance assigned to the filmic image considered as 
a brute record of an event. Therefore, its claims to being an irrefutable record of reality did not 
immediately become the basis for its epistemological status and affective charge. Bazin 
understood this increase in the realist status of the image not so much in linear but in potentially 
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cyclical terms. While in “Total Cinema (1946),” he argued that the invention of cinema 
coincided with the expanding appetite for historical realism in an expanding public sphere, a 
footnote to the original version of “Ontology” points to the slow work of the adaptation of 
sensibilities. 
It would be interesting to follow… between 1890 and 1910 the competition in 
illustrated journals between photographic reportage, still at its beginning, and 
drawings. The latter satisfied above all a baroque need for the dramatic (cf. the Petit 
Journal Illustré). The feel for the photographic document increased only gradually. 
Today, the most authentic peasant prefers the most insignificant photograph to the 
most pathos-inducing illustration.1i 
When he revised the essay at the end of the ‘50s, he modified this footnote to add, “We note 
moreover that there is, beyond a level of saturation, a return to the dramatic drawing as seen in 
Radar [a sensational, working-class news magazine].”2ii So, on the one hand, he saw that the 
cinema would have to continue to wrestle with what he thought would be the increasing realism 
brought on by new technologies, but also the possibility that technological realities may have to 
contend with a variable socio-historical feel for realism. His own era—1945 to 1959—he firmly 
believed was one of confronting the problem of realism, and this had to do with the War and the 
importance of newsreels and film propaganda within it. The destruction of physical reality on 
such large scale too, Bazin believed, had made filmmakers and the public more responsive to the 
rudimentary realism of the image. By the late ‘50s, perhaps as the effects of the postwar 
economic boom were being felt in France and Western Europe, he sensed that this 
responsiveness may have been diminishing. 
                                                 
1
 André Bazin, “Ontologie de l’image photographique,” in Les Problèmes de la Peinture (Paris: Éditions 
Confluences), 407-408ff. 
2
 André Bazin, “Ontologie de l’image photographique,” QQCI 13ff [WCB 11ff1]. 
224 
 
To summarize the context for Bazin’s interest in cinema’s ontological realism, as he 
himself understood it, there was, on the one hand, a crisis in frankly mythic genres and narratives 
that abstracted reality and, on the other, a heightened demand for the realism of the image as a 
record of history. Therefore, roughly four decades after its invention, cinema finally was asked to 
make good its promise as a site for the unabstracted “confirmation of history,” to use a phrase 
with which Bazin described the function of myths.3 The importance of newsreels to World War 
II propaganda had pushed cinema to become the site for such confirmation by multiplying the 
filmic records of history. Speaking about the resurgence of feature length documentaries after the 
war, he emphasizes their break from the semi-fictionalized format and re-stagings of most pre-
war documentaries. 
 [I]t seems as if the war has recovered the standing of this genre in an original 
manner… by restoring to documentary its nudity and its rigor, the sense of 
exactitude and of sincerity, and consequently educating the public in the sense of 
authenticity.4iii 
Though this sharpened sense of authenticity is indeed a complex cornerstone of his theorization 
of film as an aesthetic form, there has been little attention paid so far to Bazin’s anxieties about 
the powers of cinematic realism to meet the historical demands for “exactitude and sincerity.” 
While I identified these anxieties at the theoretical level in the previous chapter, this chapter and 
the following one will turn to Bazin’s writings on the films of his time that testified to filmic 
realism’s ability to satisfy our desire for history while at the same time excusing us from 
participating in it. 
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This chapter looks at Bazin’s analyses of the Why We Fight (Frank Capra, 1942-’45) 
series and the activist fictions of André Cayatte where he argues that these films exploit cinema’s 
ontological realism in order to align spectatorship with the processes of logical positivism; 
processes that create a very different relationship to history than the aesthetic mode. To 
emphasize that these films occupy the same historical terrain as the ethnographic documentaries 
that signaled a heightened desire for realism, I will take up Bazin’s readings in relation to his 
invocation of the experience of “total war” and “total history,” two concepts that parallel the 
legacy of nineteenth century aesthetics discussed in the previous chapter. 
The films Bazin discusses are not instances of misuse of cinematic ontology but trace one 
possible path from its ontological powers; that is, their ideological effects derive from powers 
embedded in the medium. Otherwise, Bazin’s critique would simply remain at the level of 
denouncing propaganda and thesis films which he was careful not to. Bazin considered 
propaganda to be a valid aesthetic mode and he took its use for this purpose to be a sign of 
cinema’s socio-political importance. In order to emphasize this, the final section briefly discusses 
an article by him on two war-related propaganda films, La Bataille du Rail (René Clement, 
1945) and Ivan the Terrible (Sergei Eisenstein, 1944). This last section will offer supplementary 
proof that Bazin could, under certain circumstances, welcome a very high degree of abstraction 
of reality even in postwar cinema to counterbalance the pull of cinema’s evidentiary claims. 
Total War 
In “On Why We Fight: History, Documents, and Newsreels,” a key theoretical text on the 
role of newsreels in the just-concluded war and its effect on our sense of reality, Bazin writes, 
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“The time of total war is fatally matched by that of total History.”5iv By total history, he is 
referring to the cinema’s function of capturing and archiving events with unprecedented 
exhaustiveness and seeming irrefutability. Total history and total war are also terms that carried 
special resonance in this postwar era. In this section I will describe Bazin’s charting of the 
conjunction of these totalities with the idea of total cinema which is understood here as cinema 
that transforms its ontological capacity to capture reality into documents of proof. Images of total 
cinema are perfectly locatable in the past by being perfectly legible in the present. This 
transforms the ontological suspension of temporality in film into a continuum linking past and 
present. 
World War II has often been described as ‘Total war,’ a concept that emerged around the 
end of World War I and elaborated during the interwar years, so that by 1939 it had been in 
general use.6 As an ideal type, it is meant to identify the “expanding parameters of warfare” in 
the 20th century such as the complete mobilization of a society’s resources beyond the military 
for the war effort, the blurring of distinction between military and civilian targets, and the aim of 
total surrender or destruction of the enemy.7 Bazin’s own reference to it can be best understood 
in relation to the use of propaganda for the mobilization of civilians in the war effort. He may 
have had in mind the most dramatic use of the term and one of particular significance to film 
propaganda. Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, used the term in a February 
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1943 speech to rally civilian participation in the war immediately after the surrender of German 
soldiers at Stalingrad. Arguing that the Soviet Union had mobilized the whole of its society in 
the war effort, he called on the Germans to overcome the “bourgeois” distinction between 
soldiers and civilians and emulate the enemy’s example. Stating that “Total war is the demand of 
the hour,” he ended the speech with “People, rise up, and storm, break loose!”8 
Bazin would have been familiar with Goebbels’s “Total War” speech and its emphasis on 
civilian mobilization.9 While this is important, Bazin’s argument for the conjunction of total war 
with total cinema appears in a review of an American cinematic effort to justify the war to its 
citizens. This must be seen as a recognition of the special relationship of the cinema not just to 
any propaganda but to the totalizing propaganda demanded by a world at total war which itself 
was not the purview of a single nation or a few totalitarian regimes but a generalized condition. 
The essay is a recognition of, among other things, the propitious conditions for cinema’s 
participation in the historical catastrophe of total war, conditions which include half a century’s 
accumulation of newsreel footage that saw a rapid multiplication with the just-concluded war. 
We live more and more in a world stripped bare by film, a world that sheds its own 
image. When the newsreels come one, hundreds of thousands of screens make us 
watch the extraordinary shedding performed each day by tens of thousands of 
cameras. As soon as it forms, History's skin drops on to film. Which pre-war 
newsreel was it that used to be called "the eye of the world"? Hardly a pretentious 
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title today as countless Bell-and-Howell lenses, placed at the crossroads of all events, 
spy on the picturesque, curious, or terrible signs of our destiny.10v 
Here we see Bazin dramatizing the relationship of cinema’s ontology to history, as history 
secretes its own ontological doubles into the skin of film that lives on after it dies. These are 
lines written not in the twilight of a career that, through exposure to thousands of films, has felt 
the promise of the cinematic image degraded, but at its beginning when the promise of the 
talking film was still to be asserted against the nostalgics of silent cinema. This is Bazin “the 
theorist of the image in an archival age” in Paula Amad’s apt phrase, but not a reassuring 
theorist.11 Bazin argues that the exact images of the world and of its history exist more perfectly 
than the world and its history. Jean-Michel Frodon, therefore, is mistaken when he argues that 
the image was not as much of a stakeholder in Bazin’s time as it is in ours and that there existed 
an acknowledged distinction between reality and representation which is now attenuated. The 
lines above indicate that with World War II the cinema had brought about an unsettling of the 
distinction Frodon talks about; an unsettling that it promised from the very beginning and in its 
essence.12 The war and its use of filmed images effected a thorough intensification of this 
condition through some not entirely foreseen developments. 
In speaking about the importance of cameramen to modern war, he speculates on the 
reasons for this beyond the more narrowly political uses of images such as rallying the citizens 
and controlling the war narrative. He talks about the coincidence of the historical moment’s 
appetite for unstaged reality and the war’s ability to produce such reality on an unprecedented 
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scale. Citizens could be mobilized and the war’s narrative could be controlled through the 
guarantee of the filmic image’s “exactitude and sincerity.” It bears citing at length from the 
opening paragraphs of the essay to get a sense of the dramatic picture that Bazin conjures up. 
For us, nothing compares to the unique event, caught on the fly, at the very moment 
of its creation. This theater of operations [that of the war], when compared with the 
other one, has the invaluable dramatic superiority of inventing the play as it goes on; 
a commedia dell'arte in which the layout [canevas] itself is always in question. As 
for the technical means, it is superfluous to insist on their exceptional efficiency. I 
would only like to emphasize that they reach a cosmic scale of grandeur and have no 
fear of competition except from earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, and the 
end of the world. I say this without irony because I believe that the first episode of 
the series Eternal News will no doubt be devoted to a monstrous report on the Last 
Judgment, after which the report on the Nuremberg trials will be something like 
Workers Leaving the Factory.13vi 
A footnote by Bazin when he revised the article in 1958 adds the Hydrogen bomb to complete 
this picture of cinematic contingency on a nuclear scale. And the historical moment is well-
placed to satisfy the appetites of a medium for which its events are ideal material even as the 
annihilation of the world threatens to satisfy this appetite once and for all. However, we need 
further explanation for the desire of the audience for the products of this fateful conjunction of 
history and medium: 
But the war report above all responds to another need which explains its extreme 
reach. The taste for newsreel, combined with that for cinema, is nothing but the will 
to presence [volonté de présence] of modern man, his need to be present at the 
unfolding of History, in which political evolution, as much as the technical means of 
communication and destruction, are irremediably mixed up. The time of total war is 
fatally matched by that of total History. The governments have understood this well, 
which is why they try to give us cinematographic reports of all their historic acts, the 
signing of treaties, the meetings of a few Great Men, etc. Since History is not at all a 
ballet absolutely fixed in advance, it is well to place the maximum number of 
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cameras in its way to be sure of catching it in the act (in the historical act, 
naturally).14vii 
With a judicious pun on Nietzsche’s “will to power” (“volonté de puissance”), Bazin’s “will to 
presence” (volonté de presence) places the cinema between the Nietzschean concept and its 
Foucauldian afterlife. If we think back to Bazin’s lines about the accumulation of images as the 
“skin of history” and link them to the ones here on the “will to presence of modern man,” we see 
a clear connection between the democratization of history and the democratization of access to it 
whose apotheosis might be the spectator’s presence at the end of the world through nuclear war. 
But cinema’s particular road to this spectacle threads historical events on a highly varied scale. 
The will to presence that cinema responds to is extended to a wide range of events, from 
the quotidian to the grand. Workers leaving a factory, a baby’s meal, a child’s prank, a kiss, all 
become part of history. The challenge of access to history is to make sense of this overwhelming 
range. Cinema’s incessant piling up of images and events drives us to fetishize some detail at the 
expense of the larger picture and at the same time frustrates such fetishization by thrusting into 
view other details. Some may want to be satisfied with and marvel at the fact that the “wind in 
the trees” can now be considered a part of historical experience, but what is the connection 
between this wind and the mushroom clouds in Japan? Is there a link between a bourgeois baby’s 
meal and images of world leaders gathering to sign important treaties around a banquet table? 
Attempts to construct such narratives would illustrate what Jay calls a longitudinal understanding 
of totality, originating with the Enlightenment notion of progress and best illustrated by Hegel’s 
phenomenology of history and some prominent versions of Marxist historiography.15 A 
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caricature of longitudinal understanding of history might say that the bourgeois fascination with 
nature and its desire to capture it in all its contingency down to the wind in the trees prepared the 
ground for nature’s controlled annihilation in the form of nuclear bombs. Another might be that 
cinema as a technology of bourgeois consecration of family intimacies was wrested away in the 
next stage of history by Stalinist Communism to consecrate the revolution’s intimate presence in 
the body of Stalin at the side of all Soviet citizens, from their love lives to their place on the 
battlefield.16 Such a longitudinal understanding of history with the help of filmed documents is 
difficult on Bazin’s account of cinematic ontology because the events of the past literally exist in 
the present, alongside the present that is in the process of shedding its celluloid skin. Even 
though cinema freezes time with all its historically contingent detail, its archive at first confers 
an ontological equality upon all the different temporalities it gathers. History on film is not a line 
from the past to the present but the many pasts in the present. It would be necessary to trace one 
of the shorter virtual lines from cinematic ontology to particular kinds of filmmaking to 
disentangle these temporalities and convert them into history placed on a continuum. 
Bazin talks about the importance military cameramen acquired in the war for two slightly 
different purposes. The first is the fascination engendered by the “real” (Bazin’s quotation 
marks) record of the war, and the second is the utility of this record for re-staging the event along 
conventional, dramatic lines. Thus, Bazin refers to Roger Leenhardt’s speculation that we are not 
far from the moment when the recordings of war are made to serve semi-fictionalized 
documentaries starring Humphrey Bogart and Spencer Tracy in the role of the generals. But 
                                                 
16
 This is what we see in The Fall of Berlin (Mikhail Chiaureli, 1949) where a Stakhanovite worker first confesses 
his love for a girl to Stalin before doing so to her, and a general responds to a rumor that Stalin has arrived at the 
battlefront by saying “Stalin is always with us,” a quip that evokes satisfied smiles that suggest the presence of a 
favorite uncle. 
232 
 
more relevant for now is the third development that follows where these images, along with the 
millions of others collected over half a century, become dissociated from their original use and 
become part of a general international archive “complete enough to contain an event as intimate 
in its historical nature as Hitler's war dance at the Rethondes Crossroads.”17viii They can now be 
borrowed for any purpose whatsoever, so that the purpose of using images overrides the occasion 
of recording in a radical sense. Bazin does not state this explicitly but it can be inferred by 
putting this essay alongside the one on the Stalin myth, and I think this point is crucial to the 
overall argument that he makes about documentary propaganda. In the Stalin essay, Bazin talks 
about how newsreel footage of Stalin and other world leaders had existed for a long time and 
often recorded explicitly to glorify the personalities. However, either the newsreels’ quality of 
“fossilized time”18 made them records of a “moribund realism”19 at a time when the public 
responsiveness to the realism of these documents was not completely developed or the 
incorporation of newsreel footage in explicitly propagandistic films always left some possibility 
that those images might be read against the grain.20 Why We Fight uses images that fall 
somewhere in between images shot for the purposes of the film and images summoned from the 
archives since the film relies heavily on the material originating from the Axis powers in order to 
represent them against their own images. It lays out these images from different temporalities 
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onto the Benjaminian “homogeneous empty time” of a single film, realizing the historicizing 
force of the photograph that the Kracauer had written about in the ‘20s.21 
The process of giving history a meaning constructed on a spatial conception of time is a 
mark of, following Jay, a latitudinal rather than longitudinal idea of totality which informs some 
empirically-intensive approaches to history.22 What Bazin had in mind when using the term 
“total history” in an essay that also points to the intense accumulation of visual records of 
historical detail of any scale was most likely the approach of a school of French historiography 
that had already acquired prominence in the discipline: the Annales School. Ludovic Cortade has 
traced Bazin’s considerable exposure to the Annales School in his education at Ecole Normale at 
Saint-Cloud where he was also exposed to a great amount of pedagogical documentaries and 
photographs.23 The adjectives “total history” and “global history” were often used by the Annales 
practitioners to describe their ambitions of making history the sum of all social sciences.24 This 
model of history is dominated by a desire to treat a social formation in all its aspects, starting 
from the geological and taking in climatology, economics, cultural practices, etc. Two things are 
nonetheless downplayed and differentiate this model of ‘total history’ from the longitudinal 
version. Firstly, trying to oppose its methods to the prevailing model of treating history as a 
linear accumulation of grand political events, the Annales School markedly ignored political 
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history and events in this sense.25 Secondly, its focus on the longue durée rather than 
conventional periodization of history de-emphasizes linearity and thus treats large units of time 
in more spatial terms.26 Bazin’s evocation of the idea of total history when discussing the 
accumulation of newsreel footage should first bring to mind this latitudinal version. However, 
the intensely apocalyptic picture that frames the democratization of access to these records of 
history warns us that the Annales conception of total history has not dislodged the longitudinal 
impulse to totality of history but exists in tension with it. Thus, the democratic opportunity to 
participate in an experience of history that on the one hand expands spatially in the form of 
accumulation of record and on the other still defined by the big events is an ambiguous privilege. 
This ambiguity of being thrown into an accumulation of historical records is captured by 
the example of Fabrice in Stendhal’s novel The Charterhouse of Parma (1839) to whom Bazin 
refers in describing the chaotic battle scenes in a Soviet film.27 Fabrice’s desire to participate in 
the Napoleonic moment has him trying desperately to join the French forces in the Hundred 
Days War. He steals a dead soldier’s uniform and catches up with the army on the eve of the 
Battle of Waterloo. Not getting much closer than the chaotic sidelines and inviting the ridicule of 
those around him, he finally catches from a distance the attack on the French and exclaims, “Ah! 
Now we’re under fire at last! I’ve seen action!” But after a period of chaos in which he can’t 
make sense of the action, he asks, “Monsieur, this is the first time I’ve seen a battle, but is this a 
real battle?”, and after the event his doubt is complete when he wonders, “Have I really taken 
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part in a battle?”.28 Fabrice is a young nobleman trying to do what perhaps nobility thought it 
should aspire to, but at a moment when the ownership of history is at least nominally extended to 
the masses, we are all liable to feel the pull that Fabrice does. Why We Fight demonstrates that 
the cinema and its uses by the forces of history address that need while sparing us the 
ridiculousness of Fabrice’s situation. 
Having invoked Annales historiography’s empirical ambitions alongside the confusion of 
modern historical detail, we need to distinguish between methods to see how Why We Fight 
approaches lateral history. A positivist approach would seek to explain the vast records of history 
with logical precision. But like longitudinal historiographies which work within mythic 
structures such as the transition from feudal to bourgeois to proletarian society, latitudinal 
historiographies too sometimes call upon mythic structures such as “folk” and “nation” to get 
past the illusionary precision of positivism. These are models of social depth psychology to 
which even Annales took recourse through the idea of the “collective unconscious.” In the 1920s, 
the psychologist Charles Blondel theorized the idea of “collective psychology” which Lucien 
Febvre, the co-founder of the Annales School, drew on in the ‘30s for the purposes of 
historiography.29 For Febvre, the shift of the subject of history from individual actors to the 
masses posed precisely the problem of reconstituting this collective subjectivity. Febvre argues 
for interdisciplinary holism so that this subjectivity might be located at the intersection of 
objects, practices, and expressions. Bazin, as we have seen, constantly takes recourse to this idea 
of the collective unconscious of history which can only be expressed and lived indirectly. But the 
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precision of the cinematic record promises to lay bare this deep reality, not at points of 
intersection, but in the bodies of facts and to transform contingent mythologies into objective 
truths. In French, the idiomatic phrase Bazin uses for describing film’s capacity to capture the 
contingencies of history, “prendre sur le fait [fact],” translates as “caught in the (sexual) act.” 
And he draws attention to this with the parenthetical remark “sur le fait historique, 
naturellement”—“in the historical act, of course.” In this, it aspires to what Bazin elsewhere calls 
the ontological obscenity of the human body on film which gives the illusion of its complete 
presence.30 
In 1946, Bazin found that Why We Fight illustrated this ontological obscenity of 
embodied facts as history. He grants the essential correctness of the film’s argument as well as 
the cause in which it was mobilized but is damning of its methods, and those methods are neither 
those of montage in itself nor the process of placing them within an overarching frame that 
transcends the context of individual images: “The best montage-based documentaries until now 
have been only narratives; these are speeches.”31ix Narratives are needed to find a balance 
between the latitudinal and longitudinal aspects of history, not least by exorcizing the 
proliferating temporalities of the image archive. But narrative is different from speech. The mode 
of the Why We Fight films is not aesthetic but pedagogic. And unlike the run-of-the-mill 
pedagogic film whose commentary precisely comments on the images, these films use images to 
guarantee the logical coherence of discourse: “The principle behind this genre of documentary 
essentially consists in lending to images the logical structure of speech [discours], and in giving to 
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speech itself the credibility and proof of photographic images.”32 Bazin calls this combination of 
image and language “an abuse of psychology, belief, and perception.”33 It is the principle of 
sobriety, cast in the mould of logical discourse and propped up by the ontological irrefutability of 
the cinematic image that makes this genre of film threatening. There is no sense here of history 
apprehended indirectly that even an empirically rigorous school of historiography such as 
Annales acknowledges. Thus, even if Capra’s films served the right cause in the war, and even if 
the arguments presented were largely correct, it cannot be guaranteed that the procedure will 
always be used for the right ideological reasons. The essay concludes as follows: 
I think that, far from making the historical sciences progress towards objectivity, the 
cinema by its very realism gives them a supplementary power of illusion. The 
invisible commentator, whom the viewer forgets while watching Capra's 
marvelously montage, is tomorrow's historian of the masses, the ventriloquist of this 
formidable prosopopeia that is being prepared in all the film archives of the world, 
resuscitating men and events at will.34x 
This framework of illusory logic that bases itself on the factual claims of the photographic image 
is one of the “virtualities” through which cinema can work upon film’s ontological condition, re-
animating the fossilized images through prosopopeia, incarnating our desires in the perfect 
realism of what they have captured. It would not be entirely correct to say that the reality within 
these images has been compromised because as half-living images of events long dead they can 
be brought to life again only as something else, speaking to the collective unconscious in the new 
historical moment. It wouldn’t even be accurate to say that their subservience to instrumental and 
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logical reason in itself suggests that they are not free to become but are instead coopted. Images 
are always brought back to life by filmmakers, editors, commentators, and others. The necessity 
of this work is captured by Bazin’s concluding sentence in the 1959 version that cinema is also a 
language.35 But language is different from logical discourse, which moreover draws upon the 
ontological proof of photographic images. 
Under the sign of logical positivism, cinema can help us “catch history in the act” but it at 
the same time makes us mere voyeurs of history; the emblematic device of modern power, the 
Panopticon, has in its sights but Peeping Toms. As psychoanalysis insists, voyeurism and 
exhibitionism are closely intertwined in scopophilia. In one characterization of this intertwining 
appropriate to this discussion, Lacan writes, “[The voyeur] believes he desires because he sees 
himself desired, and because he doesn't see that what the other wants to snatch from him is his 
gaze.”36 The democratic gazes of spectators, stemming from a desire to see themselves as the 
subjects of history, remain but its objects. Films such as Why We Fight satisfy the voyeuristic 
instinct by exploiting the realism of the cinematic image, but the exhibitionism in these films is 
that of logical reason itself. 
“Grinding the Grain of Reality” 
Bazin wrote the Why We Fight review in 1946 still under the impact of the screen 
propaganda of the war. By the ‘50s, he saw in this series nothing more than transparent 
propaganda whose manipulation of the footage through montage was obvious and not subsumed 
under the inexorable logic of rational speech. The challenges of documentary realism, as we have 
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seen in Bazin’s remarks earlier in the chapter, had moved into the arena of anthropological 
documentaries after the war (discussed in chapter 7). But the problems inherent in cinematic 
ontology can only be displaced until such time that it loses all capacity to claim our belief in its 
ability to record reality automatically. One part of ‘50s French production in which cinematic 
realism’s temptation of logic now appeared was the fictional work of the French filmmaker 
André Cayatte which is the subject of Bazin’s “The cybernetics of André Cayatte.”37 Cayatte 
made social-problem films that implicated French society and its institutions for a range of 
injustices. For example, Nous Sommes Tous les Assassins (1952) is about capital punishment in 
France and its horrifying mechanisms such as executions carried out without prior notice to those 
sentenced. But the film that Bazin finds particularly illustrative of the effects of Cayatte’s 
methods is Avant le Déluge (1954) in which a group of young people try to find some money to 
escape France and the specters of the Korean War and attendant nuclear fears that hang over it. 
In their attempts, they kill a night watchman. Through flashbacks, we see their familial situation 
and they are all from very diverse middle-class backgrounds. One is the daughter of a stern 
mother who has constricted her life, the other is a Jewish man whose parents died in the Nazi 
camps, another is the son of an anti-Semitic musician, and the last is the son of dubious financier. 
Both historical conditions and personal histories provide attenuating circumstances for the 
accused, but these in turn incriminate the whole (bourgeois) society in all its diversity. 
This film, like all the other Cayatte films, has a tight scenario that both in its social 
purpose and its logical coherence is akin to the plays of Sartre. Bazin writes that Sartre’s plays 
have a “demonstrative rigor”38 that their filmic adaptations lack; but that on the theater stage 
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with its sparse settings (often set in a single room whether the play takes place in Hell [Huis 
Clos] or America [La Putain Respecteuse]) the logic of these plays remains abstract. Cayatte 
exploits the realism of the filmic medium to, as it were, incarnate the logic of the scenario in 
1950s France. The film’s style is above all efficient, based on the principles of continuity editing 
that Bazin argues in “The Evolution of the Language of Cinema” analyze physical reality and 
break it down into clearly comprehensible units. In this, it is quite unremarkable, and the 
problem is not continuity editing in itself which served the Western and the Gangster films as 
much as French poetic realism very well. This was because these films were recognizably 
generic films, lacking the argumentative ambitions of Cayatte’s films. The diversity of Cayatte’s 
bourgeoisie is meant to acknowledge the diversity of social reality only the better to subsume it 
to the film’s logic that the bourgeoisie as a whole is guilty. Physically too, there is no hint of 
typology here. Neither the parents nor the children appear as symbols of their specific conditions. 
Bazin finds all this cruelly efficient and convincing. Indeed, Cayatte’s films were both popular 
and critically acclaimed, winning top prizes at festivals. 
Bazin finds himself terribly conflicted about these films since he did not think he was 
dealing with ordinary thesis films, in itself an unremarkable phenomenon. He has no quarrel with 
Cayatte’s arguments and he indeed finds him taking greater risks in confronting French social 
systems unlike most epigones of Sartre in the film industry who offered little more than cynicism 
by way of social critique. But his critical “delirium” leads him to the conclusion that “Cayatte 
provokes in the mass of public soaked in the cinema a tremor whose novelty alone merits 
consideration.” This tremor is the same one that Why We Fight provoked in him in 1946; that of 
a process of inexorable logic that the film sets in motion but now in a very different way. Like 
with Why We Fight, Bazin is not concerned by the particular arguments that Cayatte makes, but 
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the situation is different because he is not confronted with the misrepresentation of the image. He 
describes what he finds to be a distinct mode by which “the habitual psychological mechanisms 
of the cinema are in some ways turned upon themselves and they ebb back on to the spectator, to 
put in motion little by little his faculties of reason in synchrony with the script and mise-en-
scène.”39xi The habitual mechanisms Bazin refers to are based on “the identification of the 
spectator with the hero…; that is, on the passivity of the spectator.”40xii He gives the example of 
Battleship Potemkin which uses montage techniques to provoke “feeling [through identification 
with the collective protagonist] and through feeling an acceptance of the idea behind it. We can 
leave this type of film enthused and convinced, that is to say in a state completely contradictory 
to the one of intellectual disquiet in which Cayatte leaves us.”41xiii 
The disquiet provoked by Cayatte’s film comes first from the fact that we do not identify 
with any character in the film but with its logical processes which the spectators takes for her 
own. This is what Bazin means in writing that the normal conditions of processes are reversed so 
that the spectator identifies with her own rational ego. The consequence is that the tight logic of 
Cayatte’s film is not limited to its argument but is a process that we are led to use upon the 
physical reality that appears in the film but which too is her own. “In leaving Avant le Déluge, 
the most stupid spectator has been forced to become, if not more intelligent, then at least more 
Cartesian. Once the film has launched in each of us the hand wheel of reason… it continues to 
grind the grain of reality for a while afterwards.”42xiv This intellectual churning demands “a 
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reality without remainder, exactly divisible by the first ideas of which it is nothing more than an 
alibi.”43xv So the problem for Bazin, unlike with Why We Fight, is not that the film is logically 
convincing, but that the spectator has been automatically initiated into an approach to reality 
using the very realism of the filmic image and its automatically captured “physical 
evidence.”44xvi With Why We Fight, we are convinced by the seeming force of facts on the 
screen, but with Avant le Déluge we become arbiters of facts internalized by the mind. To 
consolidate the link of this use of filmic reality to its ontology, Bazin even likens the film’s effect 
to that of a Surrealist nightmare with its “terrorism of intellectual evidence and linkage of facts 
which confer on the work the traumatizing properties of a nightmare whose details we try to blur 
by blinking our eyes.”45xvii The difference of this film from Surrealism is of course that where 
the latter opposes an impossible but hallucinatory logic to given reality, the film fascinates us by 
logical processes into which the facts of the world disappear. 
Despite the fact that Bazin’s analysis of Cayatte’s films so clearly recalls the realist 
ontology that he himself theorized, with its spatializing logic of evidence hallucinating in its 
exactitude, he accuses him of “inventing a genre that is false or more exactly equivocal and 
which betrays at once the realism of the cinema and its dialectically interdependent powers of 
abstractions.”46xviii Bazin’s argument in the essay is that reality always exceeds what analysis 
makes of it, that it has a “margin of mystery and ambiguity,”47xix and that cinematic realism must 
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capture this margin. But it would be a mistake to see him arguing simply that Cayatte should 
have used depth-of-field composition instead of continuity editing. The example he gives of a 
reality that resists complete subsumption by analysis is novelistic reality.48 But the mention of a 
false genre in the quotation also alerts us to the fact that the particular idea of reality that Bazin 
has is first an aesthetic idea more than a specifically cinematic or novelistic one, or rather a 
novelistic one in the sense of a “matrix of myths.”49 Cayatte’s films inaugurate a false genre 
because it doesn’t construct determinate social imaginaries distinct from ourselves the way 
genres do but, using the objective claims of the film image, train us in processes of logical 
thinking that can be applied to the reality around us as much as to the reality in the film. They 
don’t trap us in a world that stands autonomous from us but they trap us in our own minds which 
devour reality so completely that there remains no distance from which to ever confront the 
contradictions in our imaginaries. 
The challenge of cinematic realism would be to locate the “dialectical powers of 
abstraction” that correspond to the realism of its image but which at the same time free this 
realism of its spectral suspension. And these powers of abstraction extend to all kinds of work 
upon the image, including montage as we see in the example of Battleship Potemkin. We saw 
Bazin argue earlier that Eisenstein’s montage techniques were realist in their historical moment 
before acquiring a Romantic sheen once that moment had passed. However, even in the ‘50s 
Bazin welcomed hieratic and baroque styles in the cinema when employed in propaganda films 
which he argued were aesthetically valid and testified to cinema’s importance as perhaps the 
only art form with an irrefutable social dimension. Given that the argument about Bazininan 
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realism so far has found him severely critical of propaganda films, the next section will 
demonstrate that it isn’t this mode itself that Bazin condemns. 
Propaganda: The Lost Aesthetic Secret 
For Bazin, the problem in cinema is not propaganda and theses but their slipping into our 
consciousness “under the fallacious alibi of reality,” as indisputable facts which may or may not 
be so, and which are more likely to be only productive or pernicious dreams. The normative 
commitment that Bazin calls upon the spectators to make is to discern what exceeds or troubles 
the truth claims even when accepting them. Without this openness to the ideological force even 
in the midst of critical vigilance, we would remain nothing but paranoid versions of the ideal 
Cayatte spectator, the one who divides up the reality of which there remains neither sum nor 
remainder. The corresponding commitment that Bazin wants films to make is to create room for 
the contradictions of reality even as they work to obscure them in favor of an overall impression 
of ideological coherence. 
Given the diffuse notion of propaganda in Bazin’s work identified earlier by which 
almost all films qualify as such, some distinctions are called for. A Bazinian typology of 
propaganda films would have three categories. Firstly, there are propaganda films, such as those 
of the Soviet avant-garde of the ‘20s in which the aesthetics manage to find visual forms 
appropriate to the demands of propaganda rhetoric, and such instances remain aesthetically valid 
whatever one may think of the ideologies they support. Paradoxically, in this category of films, 
despite the parallels with linguistic tropes, language as such remains noise to some degree and 
does not acquire logical coherence. Thus, the complete identification of ideology and aesthetics 
remains incomplete. This is propaganda proper because these films open announce their 
rhetorical character. 
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The second category of propaganda films are those in which there is a fatal coincidence 
of image, language, and ideology, as in Capra’s documentary series and, in a different way as we 
will see in the next chapter, Stalinist propaganda films. Despite their explicit function as 
propaganda, on Bazin’s understanding they aren’t propaganda in the usual sense but films that 
make evidentiary claims upon our beliefs. Thirdly, there are the examples of Bicycle Thieves and 
Paisa (Roberto Rossellini, 1946) which play a game of avowal and disavowal with ideology in 
order to go beyond its articulation to something like the imaginary experience of it. But this is 
also, as we have seen, what generic films do. Therefore, these films embody the aesthetic realism 
adequate to the postwar historical moment. The second category, that of an evidentiary cinema, 
has been the main subject of this chapter and in this section I will briefly discuss propaganda in 
the more limited sense that Bazin gives it. Further discussion of the third in relation to Italian 
neo-realism, which is Bazin’s ideal for the political film in his historical moment, will be the 
subject of the final chapter. 
We would be correct in thinking that in the 1940s and ‘50s, the kind of propaganda films 
of the ‘20s Soviet avant-garde would have been unwelcome to Bazin as the dominant aesthetic 
standard because it sidesteps the historical demand for a greater sensitivity to objective reality in 
the image, a demand that cinema must pass through if it is to retain its responsiveness to history. 
However, it did not mean that its explicit rhetorical quality could not or should not be 
rediscovered while giving greater consideration to pro-filmic reality. Moreover, he wanted 
cinema to rediscover a place for frank propaganda that had slowly dissolved into the seemingly 
transparent claims of newsreel realism. In 1951, he wrote: 
The values of didacticism, apologetics, and politics still remain the major scandals 
and the great unknowns of the cinema. Novels, paintings, and plays with theses have 
not survived the nineteenth century… Only the screen has provided the twentieth 
century with unquestionable instances of a propagandistic art that lose nothing in 
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comparison with any of the classical aesthetic categories. But it seems that the 
marvelous conjunction of politics and art that was the glory of Soviet cinema 
between 1925 to 1935 or 1938 remains a lost secret... It would be childish to remain 
blind to the current ideological needs of art. It does not matter if Communism in 
itself is, directly or indirectly, the cause of this blindness: the cinema cannot afford to 
ignore its own propagandistic power, even less so today, in 1951, than in 1925. The 
ideas of our time will use it, with or without artistic merit—and use it with all 
efficiency.50xx 
When Bazin refers to the “marvelous conjunction of politics and art” in the Soviet cinema of the 
‘20s, we need to emphasize the “marvelous” because, writing around the same time he penned 
his articles on Stalinist cinema and Cayatte, he could not have thought that the “conjunction 
between politics and art” itself had been lost. What had been lost was the striving for the sense of 
marvel through which propaganda made claims on audiences. What Bazin most probably means 
in this discussion of the Soviet trajectory of film propaganda is its slide into socialist realism. His 
reference to the possible responsibility of Communism for this change reinforces this impression. 
The evidence for Bazin’s critical desire for the restoration of propaganda as an openly 
rhetorical mode of address even in the context of a demand for greater realism is illustrated in an 
almost made-to-order review essay from 1946 about two propaganda films made in the shadow 
of the war, one realist and the other baroque.51 René Clément’s La Bataille Du Rail (1945; 
henceforth Bataille) was a film made to the glory of the Resistance among French rail workers, 
and Eisenstein’s Ivan the Terrible, Part I (1944; henceforth Ivan) was made to exalt the figure of 
Stalin in the midst of the war. Bataille is steeped in documentary realism down to the actual 
crashing of a train. Its hero is a group with barely identifiable individuals, played by non-
professional actors, and its dialogue is spare. Ivan is a lush and baroque work that Bazin’s 
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describes as a Caligari-esque ornamentation of space to the extent that it does not allow “the 
least bit of nature’s skin to appear.”52xxi On our conventional understanding of Bazin, the former 
should be his preferred film. As it turns out, he is respectful of the first but dissatisfied with it 
because its haphazard detail, despite the subject of Resistance, only sporadically acquires the 
poetic concentration of mythic force. Ivan, on the other hand, he finds to be prodigiously well-
constructed, calling it a Wagnerian work, decadent in its aestheticism to be sure but handled with 
undeniable precision. Its complete divorce from the historical moment’s desire for realism 
nonetheless suits its mandate for state propaganda. 
Bazin writes that the French can’t be scandalized by Stalin’s exaltation in Ivan through a 
historical figure when they draw upon Joan of Arc to mythologize Charles de Gaulle and the 
Resistance. The problem is not propaganda but the ideas being propagated: those of autocracy 
and nationalism. But trusting that the purposes of the film are transparent both at the level of 
subject and style, one can admire the latter without being logically driven to commit ourselves to 
the latter.53 It is ideological advertising and advertising as a genre for Bazin is both a valid 
aesthetic form and escapes the demands of a realist aesthetic.54 He writes, “It could be that one 
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can demand nothing more from an ideological film but a formalism open to the defense of all 
ideas.”55xxii In propaganda, this non-coincidence of style and a specific ideological agenda makes 
it possible for one to appreciate the aesthetic accomplishment, and even the complementarity of 
the style to the generic mode of propaganda, while accepting or rejecting the theses that it 
proposes. One may be enthused and convinced by them, but they do not constitute the fallacious 
logical alibis that Why We Fight and Avant le Déluge sought to provide, alibis that acquired 
legitimacy with the accumulation of “physical evidence” of the spectral remains of history on 
film. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that realism must be understood as a special problem in 
Bazin’s aesthetic philosophy, one which straddles the broader aesthetic principles traced in part 
one of this dissertation and the postwar sensitivity to the truth claims of the filmic image. In re-
reading “Ontology,” I have foregrounded the trajectory of Bazin’s argument as one that places 
realism in the longue durée history of the arts and their socio-political significance. This socio-
political significance is tied to changing paradigms of transcendence from the immanent 
transcendence of the Egyptian mummy, through the vertical transcendence of Christianity, and 
then to a lateral transcendence in secular modernity. Realism as representation that is subject to 
the spatio-temporal conditions of the world is a problem specific to the framework of lateral 
transcendence. The difference of lateral transcendence from immanent and vertical 
transcendence is that in the latter the transcendence belongs not to the work of art but to the pre-
existing religious frameworks in which they exist, whether pagan or monotheistic. Lateral 
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transcendence is an aesthetic transcendence in which the social imaginary is indirectly 
represented and which just as indirectly orients socio-political experience unlike the more direct 
orientation of religion. 
The photograph, Bazin argues, restores something of the immanence of the Egyptian 
mummy but which, in the absence of an overarching religious framework to contain it, hovers 
between the lateral transcendence of modern aesthetics and the positivism of modern science. In 
reviewing Why We Fight, Bazin argued that with the extensive use of newsreels in World War II, 
where propaganda worked on the logic of documentary evidence, the photo-filmic image 
becomes a false tool of logical thinking. It is a false tool because the photograph and the film 
give us the illusion of objectivity of the past when in fact it lifts the past out of the temporal flux 
to which it belonged and hypostasizes it. Not only does the photo-filmic image fix the past but it 
also trains us to subsume present reality into processes of logical thinking. This is the argument 
Bazin offers in writing about the social problem films of André Cayatte. Given Bazin’s anxieties 
about the conversion of cinematic ontology into the logic of evidence, but also his wish to see 
cinema participate directly in the politics of the day, he called for a propagandistic cinema that 
openly announces its rhetorical character and makes claims on our affective adherence to 
ideology. 
It is possible that in critiquing logical positivism, Bazin underestimates the problematic 
effects of openly rhetorical propaganda. Comparing Stalinist film propaganda to Triumph of the 
Will (Leni Riefenstahl, 1934), he writes, “The montage of Leni Riefenstahl on the Nuremberg 
Congress, Triumph of the Will, appears as an argument against Hitler to the democratic viewer. 
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Moreover, these images could be used in an anti-Nazi montage.”56xxiii But there is something 
other than underestimation at work here. It is that Bazin neglects to make explicit his own 
insight, discussed here in chapter two, that the realism of one era stands exposed as rhetoric by 
another. Such neglect also attends his own quiet re-assessment of Why We Fight when he 
compared it favorably with Cayatte’s films. He writes, “[I]t is legitimate to and even 
commendable for the screen to use realism to the benefit of a pure idea, but on condition that 
reality is broken down beforehand and its fragments selected. Thus, for example the famous 
montage of Why We Fight… In other words, abstraction is only legitimate in the cinema when 
the modes of narration designate it as such.”57xxiv If, following Bazin’s implicit hypothesis, we 
mark Triumph of the Will as belonging to an age of fascist pageantry and Why We Fight to a 
project of logical persuasion in the era of newsreels, Cayatte’s French films belong to the age of 
Sartre and a judicial realism that defined committed art. From the perspective of one of these 
historical moments, the propagandistic nature of the earlier films’ arguments seems transparent. 
And when Bazin compared Triumph of the Will to the Soviet films in which Stalin appeared as a 
character, he was dealing with an altogether novel conjunction of realism and propaganda which 
passes not just through the recording of any reality but through the special relationship that 
cinematic realism has to the human body. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 7 
Totalitarianism’s Cinematic Body 
 
The idea of totality was posed in the last chapter in terms of aesthetics and 
historiography. Cinema’s initial suspension between the past and present calls upon filmmakers 
and audience to posit either a clear reference to the pastness of reality in the image (to give it 
historical specificity) or to create a lateral transcendence (to give it an aesthetic presence). In this 
chapter, I will look at Bazin’s writings on cinema’s ability to represent the fact or experience of 
totalitarianism that constituted the nucleus of his historical moment, with the Soviet regime’s 
Show Trials on the one hand and the Holocaust on the other. Despite the undeniable centrality of 
instrumental rationality in the construction of its horrors, the aspect that Bazin’s writings are 
concerned with are philosophical and aesthetic. The philosophical issues at stake concern the 
framework of longitudinal totality espoused by Soviet Marxism and the nature of death and its 
representability in the context of the Holocaust. Both these issues are linked by his writings on 
the screen body: in the case of the Soviet films, the body comes to be central through the state 
consecration of Stalin as the culmination of history; in relation to the Holocaust, the question will 
be whether the cinema can make the body a site for registering the experience of its terrors. 
Before arriving at the question of the body and totalitarian experience in the cinema, it 
will be necessary to explain why, according to Bazin, the human body and its relationship to 
history becomes a privileged site for constructing a totalitarian paradigm of experience. As in the 
preceding chapters, I work out Bazin’s ideas in relation to the discursive field of his time and as 
part of real or imagined debates with his contemporaries. Here I start with what I argue is an 
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unmarked response from Bazin to Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the subject of Marxist philosophy 
of history and its relationship to the Soviet Show Trials under Stalin.1 When speaking of Bazin’s 
historical context and his philosophical milieu, scholars have often pointed to the influence of 
Emmanuel Mounier’s personalism, Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism, and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology. The problem in articulating this influence has been that, since the 
philosophers only occasionally or never wrote on the cinema, and since Bazin’s writings on 
cinema are informed by a larger philosophical framework that remains necessarily under-
elaborated compared to the work of the philosophers, the historical dialogue seems uni-
directional, and Bazin a more or less faithful disciple to the more illustrious figures. 
Only in the case of Sartre has it been possible to complicate the narrative of influence, 
not only because of Bazin’s response to Sartre on Citizen Kane, but also because of a sustained 
rather than occasional aesthetic engagement on Sartre’s part against which Bazin’s own positions 
can be better compared and distinguished. Here, I will attempt to complicate this narrative of 
influence in relation to Merleau-Ponty. Rather than on the question of phenomenological 
aesthetics, it is on that of phenomenology or philosophy of history that I trace Bazin’s response 
to Merleau-Ponty. In a 1984 essay, Janet Staiger points out that Bazin’s “The Myth of Stalin in 
the Soviet Cinema” (henceforth “Stalin Myth”) was written after Merleau-Ponty’s own 1947 
examination of the Stalin trials in the journal Les Temps Modernes, which became the basis for 
the book Humanism and Terror.2 She suggests that we read Bazin’s denunciation of the Stalin 
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myth in light of Merleau-Ponty’s own attempts to distance French communism from Stalinist 
communism. However, Merleau-Ponty in ’47 was much more ambiguous than Staiger suggests 
on the question of the Moscow Show Trials of the ‘30s. Therefore, I will argue that Bazin’s own 
account of the Trials is a direct if unmarked response to Merleau-Ponty’s argument rather than 
following from it. The differences between them turn upon how they understand the relationship 
of human subjectivity to history conceived as a longitudinal totality, exemplified by Soviet 
Marxism. 
After the philosophical debate in which Bazin participates, the second section turns to the 
aesthetic issues involved. We will look at Bazin’s analysis of Soviet films in which Stalin 
appears to mark out their bi-polar structure with the chaos of contingent material reality on one 
end and the stability of Stalin’s body on the other with the two, rather than standing in 
contradiction with each other, forming a totality. This returns us to questions of Bazininan 
ontology of film to see how the insertion of the human body complicates it. I turn to his writings 
on the star body because the representation of revolutionary totality in the body of Stalin is 
predicated on an understanding of it as a star body. But Stalin films also pose a special problem 
in that the body of Stalin as a persona pre-exists the films in a way that star bodies generally do 
not. Bazin’s analysis is based on this special feature of Stalin’s cinematic stardom which allows 
him to stand as a demiurge of material reality at the origins of totalitarian experience. 
In the final section, I take up Bazin’s response to a Czech Holocaust film, Distant 
Journey (Alfred Radok, 1950) where he endorses the film’s expressionist aesthetics as 
appropriate to its subject. As a final confirmation of Bazin’s constitutive skepticism about 
cinematic relationship to history, I read this as his account of the near un-representability of the 
body at the other end of the totalitarian experience from that of the totalitarian leader. 
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Total History, Again 
Bazin begins his essay on the Stalin myth by highlighting and commending the 
originality of Soviet cinema in representing living or recently-dead historical personages. He 
argues that in the Western tradition historically-important personages have to wait for their 
death, even a very long time after it, in order to become fit subjects for representation. He points 
to certain exceptions but notes that such people are almost never politicians and often tend to be 
celebrities who have already acquired a legendary character in their lifetimes. This points to two 
inter-related assumptions in this tradition: the meaning of a person’s life is only fixed after his or 
her death, and only those historical subjects are generally fit for representation whose life had 
already acquired a mythic construct. As such, representations of historical characters in the 
Western tradition is “para- or post-historical.”3 Against this “transcendental” conception of 
human life, Soviet films such as Chapaev (Georgi Vasilyev & Sergei Vasilyev, 1934) and The 
Turning Point (Fridrikh Ermler, 1945) present us characters who participate in recent history and 
figure in it as actively engaged individuals. And yet they do not stand over history as its sole 
engines. What Bazin sees in these films is what he calls the “dialectic between Man and History” 
in which the unfolding of history is what defines the character and the character’s participation 
makes History.4 There is an important difference, however, that would have consequences for a 
historical materialist cinema. An individual’s death greatly curtails the possibility of the meaning 
that can be ascribed to it, whereas the meaning of history has a more paradoxical character. On 
the one hand, history’s meaning is provisional in a radical sense both because it has no end that 
is equivalent to human death (the prospect of nuclear annihilation of the world admits of no 
                                                 
3
 André Bazin, “Le mythe de Staline,” in QQCI, 77 [BW 25]. 
4
 Ibid., 78 [BW 25-26]. 
255 
 
meaning) and also because it depends on the unreliable subjectivities of the humans who live and 
shape it; they cannot be relied upon to toe the demands of historical progress. On the other hand, 
the nineteenth-century progressive conception of history is forever looking over the horizon for 
the next signpost of progress. Some versions of Marxist historical understanding, which is an 
important variation on this conception, actually posit an end to history in the form of a classless 
society. This is an instance of what Jay calls the ‘longitudinal totality’ of history, the 
hypothesized movement towards utopia.5 For Bazin, the challenge for a Marxist cinema, 
understood against this skeletal framework, would have been the negotiation of the finitude of an 
individual and its relationship to the paradoxical nature of history as radically open yet whose 
experience is mediated by a desire for utopic closure. Whatever gains made in this direction by 
the films referred to above are betrayed when it comes to films in which Stalin appears as a 
character. Stalin is seen in these films, played by actors, as both the source of the idea of class 
struggle, the victory of the proletariat, and the engine of this triumph. In short, he appears as 
History realized, as “History incarnate.”6 
The argument that Bazin makes here goes much beyond a simple critique of Stalinist 
propaganda. Its critique is rather aimed at the tendency within Soviet Marxism to insist on the 
perfect immanence of its teleological destination and, worse, the identification of it with an 
individual. Bazin could criticize the emphasis on the individual while remaining within the logic 
of Marxism given its suspicion of individual agents. But what must have been more provocative 
was the critique of the perfection of history itself when, despite the horrors of the previous three 
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decades, many Left intellectuals in France continued to believe in its possibility. Moreover, 
Bazin not only suggests that the movement of history is inevitably compromised by individual 
subjectivity, he goes on to argue for it with a digression on the logic of Stalin’s show trials. It is 
here that he takes on and contests an important meditation on the Moscow Trials and the 
“Communist problem” by Merleau-Ponty. 
The articles collected in Merleau-Ponty’s Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the 
Communist Problem, were a response to the debates around Arthur Koestler’s novel, Darkness at 
Noon. Koestler’s novel was published in France in 1945 (five years after its original publication 
in England) and while the polemical and divisive responses along pro- and anti-Communist lines 
predictably dominated public debate, one troubling aspect of it did not go unremarked. Its central 
character, Rubashov, put on trial for crimes he did not commit in any literal sense (such as 
actively collaborating with hostile nations, falsely implicating loyal Soviet functionaries for 
treason) nonetheless decides to confess to them, recognizing that whatever his intentions may 
have been, however insignificant a tactical error he may have made in his dealings, in an 
“objective” sense he may have betrayed the revolution because his actions—a chance word that 
remained ambiguous and thus could be construed as criticism of the regime by its enemies; an 
ill-judged silence that missed an opportunity to announce potential dangers to the revolution—
rendered it vulnerable. Merleau-Ponty seizes on this aspect of Rubashov’s testimony, and also 
the testimony of the real-life Soviet leader Nikolai Bukharin (1888-1938) on whom Koestler 
based Rubashov, to argue that “the Moscow trials might be seen as the drama of subjective 
honesty and objective treason.”7 Those who read the trials as simply a deliberate judicial error in 
which innocents were convicted fail to understand what even those sentenced to death 
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understood: that they were joined to their prosecutors by the logic of a revolutionary trial in 
which intentions, values, acts find their justification only in their realization and not in 
themselves.8 This is, for Merleau-Ponty, the necessary tragedy of politics: one cannot escape 
subjectivity because one does not know the future, but it is only with the objectivity that comes 
in the future that present action will or will not be justified.9 Seen within this logic, the trials 
appear, not necessary, but still illustrative of the drama of revolutionary politics which 
acknowledges the necessity and justification of violence if it is in the service of overcoming 
violence in the future. The logic of the trials escapes the easy morality of liberalism which hides 
its own history of violence (of past and present colonialism) from itself when condemning 
violence in the abstract.10 Thus, Merleau-Ponty asks, “Why should it be necessary to hide what 
there was of Soviet patriotism in the purges when one reveals what honor there was in the 
opposition?”11 
Bazin never mentions Merleau-Ponty, but in what he says about the trials, it is impossible 
that he was not drawing upon directly and responding to Merleau-Ponty’s arguments.12 On the 
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subject of the trials, Bazin begins by pointing out, as Merleau-Ponty does at one point, “the 
astonishingly subjective character of the political trials in the People’s Democracies.”13i The 
trials are not a simple case of measuring guilt by ordinary legal criteria that seek to establish 
whether certain acts designated as illegal were committed or not, but attempts to bring to the 
surface the tragic conflict of subjectivity with history. Bazin argues that if these trials had indeed 
brought out this dimension of revolutionary politics, the course they had taken, contrary to what 
Merleau-Ponty says, had actually worked to suppress rather than acknowledge this dimension. 
Bazin writes: 
From a rigorously Marxist point of view, it would suffice to declare that Bukharin, 
Rajk, or Kostov embodies tendencies that the Party has decided to combat because 
they are historically incorrect. The physical elimination of these men then wouldn’t 
be any more necessary than that of our own ministers who resign. But from the 
moment that a man has taken part in History, from the moment has been mixed up in 
such and such an event, a part of his biography is irrevocably “historicized.” An 
intolerable contradiction now exists between this definitively objective part, frozen 
in the past, and the physical existence of a Bukharin, a Zinoviev, or a Rajk. One 
cannot reduce man solely to History without in turn compromising this History 
through the subjectivity present in the individual. The living communist leader is a 
god sealed into history by his past acts.14ii 
What he tries points out here is that if these men had contributed in the past to the making 
of history, Soviet Marxism could not tolerate that they ever again stand apart from it. If they did, 
it would compromise a certain version of Marxist historiography which affirms not only the 
reciprocal character of individual subjectivity and historical objectivity but aims to harmonize 
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them in the teleological progression of the revolution. It would suggest that subjectivity can 
engage and disengage from the course of history, be with it one moment, against it at another, 
and even indifferent to it at others. Bazin argues that for the Soviet understanding of History an 
individual’s subjectivity is once and for all either with it or against it: “From the perspective of 
‘Stalinist’ Soviet Communism, no one can ‘become’ a traitor, because this would mean that he 
hasn’t been one all along, that there had been a biographical beginning to this treason. It would 
also mean that a man who has become detrimental to the Party and to History had formerly been 
useful to both, and thus had been good before he became evil.”15iii This explains the practice of 
re-writing the place of individuals in history in order to eliminate what Merleau-Ponty had called 
the “drama of subjective honesty and objective treason.” Bazin concludes, “[O]ur bourgeois 
conscience, ‘hypocritical’ and ‘idealistic,’ can accept at the same time the historical evidence 
that Pétain is both the ‘victor of Verdun’ and the ‘traitor of Montoire,’ whereas the liquidated old 
comrades must disappear from the painting of Soviet history itself,”16iv because “for the 
communist only death can reabsorb all subjectivity into event.”17v Therefore, “the notion of 
objective treason, which first seems to follow so clearly from Marxism, has in fact not survived 
practical politics.”18 
This provocative comparison with the history of the Occupation by invoking Pétain too 
follows Merleau-Ponty in comparing the Trials to the post-war Purge of collaborators in France. 
Merleau-Ponty had argued that there were perhaps cases where the collaborators were in the 
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same position as the Soviet leaders put on trial, where they may have sincerely if misguidedly 
thought that they were acting in the national interest by collaborating with the Nazis, doing the 
only thing that prevented France from being completely overrun by Germany. This still does not 
mean that they were innocent. But the French Purges were a judgment on the past that could well 
be made without putting the collaborators to death, whereas the Moscow Trials of the late ‘30s 
were a wager on the future of the revolution whose course needed securing from aberrant 
subjectivities.19 Bazin might agree with this logic but, as we have seen, would deny that the 
Trials were really oriented towards a political future still in the balance. He speaks of the rare 
cases in the Soviet context where a public mea culpa suffices, generally in the cases of 
intellectuals or artists who have no claims on political power. This form of self-criticism 
functions as a confession in the Christian sense, something that Merleau-Ponty also points out. 
But Merleau-Ponty believes that the parallelism is further evidence of the necessary tragedy of 
politics in an alienated world: 
To the extent that alienation and transcendence persist, the drama of the opposition 
member in the Party, is, at least formally, the drama of the heretic in the Church. Not 
that communism is, as is vaguely said, a religion but because in the one case as in the 
other the individual acknowledges in advance the jurisdiction of the event, and, 
having recognized a providential import in the Church, an historical mission in the 
proletariat and its leadership, having acknowledged that everything that happens is 
due to God or the logic of history, he can no longer back his own opinion against the 
judgment of the Party or the Church.20 
Bazin refuses this logic because he refuses the logic of Christian confession and 
absolution understood as a procedure by which an individual’s life can be rewritten to make it 
suitable for personal or historical salvation. In his review of Federico Fellini’s Il Bidone (1955), 
                                                 
19
 Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, 36-44. 
20
 Ibid., 68. 
261 
 
Bazin would go on to argue that salvation as an idea is valid only to the extent that it allows for 
the acknowledgement of the contradictions of a life but not to overcome them.21 We have also 
already seen this as a normative feature of his theory of genres which too confess to 
contradictions at the end of their trajectories and those in the audience who had been under their 
spell before this confession are required to acknowledge them consciously just as they had 
imbibed them unconsciously; there is a necessarily tragic quality to this experience. In the essay 
on the Stalin myth, Bazin points out that Church and the Party, as Merleau-Ponty describes them, 
are not the instruments of the necessary tragedy of action but help in overcoming such tragedy by 
a process (the confession) that Bazin calls “exorcistic” in relation to history; something that 
conjures away the unwelcome phantoms of the past.22 This exorcist’s role of the Party leads 
Merleau-Ponty to hope that “the Party will perhaps rehabilitate those whom it condemned once a 
new historical phase has altered the significance of their behavior.” The proof: it has made 
available the Report of Court Proceedings and “translated [it] into every language of the 
world.”23 Bazin’s argument suggests that Merleau-Ponty was looking at the wrong document. If 
only he had been to the local film club to watch Soviet films, he would have known that the logic 
of History had already found its culmination, not in a classless society, but in the person of 
Stalin. There he would have seen that the parallel between the Church and the Party is rendered 
explicit, but not as a way of substituting the path towards a classless society for the Kingdom of 
God. In The Vow (Mikhaïl Tchiaoureli, 1946), the classless society gives way to the 
“consecration of History” in Stalin, with the blessings of a now-dead Lenin, represented with 
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explicit Judeo-Christian iconography. Thus, it is cinema that helps Bazin clinch an argument 
with Merleau-Ponty in which he accords with the latter’s understanding of the nature of political 
action as an inevitable and often tragic drama of subjective and objective factors while refusing 
the latter’s desire to eliminate the contradiction between the two. 
As Staiger, Rosen, and Margulies point out, the essay on the Stalin myth reprises the 
central presuppositions of his most prominent theoretical essays, “Ontology” and “Total 
Cinema”: the mummy complex of the first and the myth of teleological history of the second.24 
They point out how in the films both these principles are denuded of their hypothetical and open 
quality in Bazin’s work. The hypostasized counterpart of the “mummy complex” of Ancient 
Egypt that Bazin had argued lay behind the filmic impulse in general turns into the literal 
mummification of Lenin which prepares the ground for the consecration of History in Stalin; and 
the asymptote principle of film history, by which cinema always approaches reality without 
coinciding with it, has its failed counterpart in Bazin’s claim that in Stalin “the asymptote 
between Man and History is henceforth surpassed.”25vi In concluding the essay, Bazin argues that 
cinema’s role in bringing about this consecration cannot be underestimated because, unlike 
language and iconography photographic cinema has, as Bazin had argued in the “Ontology” 
essay, the “irrational power to bear away our faith”.26 
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It might seem astonishing that the essay should end with an observation that the Soviet 
cinema’s representation of Stalin has in fact traded on this basic power of the cinematographic 
image that is understood to be the core of Bazin’s fascination with film. Margulies notes that this 
is a “cut-and-dry” ending very unlike Bazin who was fond of phrases of audacious paradox for 
summing up his essays as a way to keep the experience of the image open. The reason for this, 
she suggests, is that Soviet cinema’s misuse of his cherished powers of the cinematographic 
image points to a “real impasse” in his ontological theory of film, showing up its blind spots. 
Rosen writes, “Clearly, Stalinist cinema diverts the founding myth of total cinema. The irony and 
precision of Bazin’s examination of religious attitudes in the decadent socialist realism of the late 
Stalinism show that the appeals of cinematic realism could be put to what an existentialist would 
call bad-faith uses.”27 These remarks suggest that, in accounting for the Stalinist use of cinematic 
realism which no longer relies on montage editing, Bazin becomes aware of how the asymptotic 
principle may become, or be made, inoperative, and the realist myth “diverted.” But to imply that 
he becomes aware of this in 1950 is to accept the equivalence between Bazin’s ontological and 
aesthetic accounts of the cinema. It is to also to imply that Bazin took cinema’s ontological 
reality to be asymptotic by default. I argued in the last chapter that these assumptions are 
inaccurate since cinematic ontology yields nothing but a suspended reality whose historical 
origins and present meaning remain uncertain even as the image’s claims to objectivity are 
unassailable at this first level. The Stalin films, like Why We Fight, exploit this uncertainty to 
consolidate their ultimate arguments. I will now describe this aspect of the films briefly before 
turning to their particularly novel use of the filmed body rather than logical speech to clinch their 
effect of irrefutable reality on film. 
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Reality on the Scale of Cinematic Ontology 
If Stalin had to be represented as the culmination of the Revolution, then one could 
imagine films that simply thread together the mythic landmarks in its history from Marx or Lenin 
to Stalin, passing through the grand events. This is partly what the films do. In The Vow Stalin is 
seen as the next “stage” in the revolution after Lenin. In both The Vow and the The Fall of 
Berlin, World War II and specifically the battle of Stalingrad figure as the historical events on 
which Stalin and the Soviet Union impose themselves. But the films construct their grand 
narrative through the kind of attention to realist detail that both the war and the state doctrine of 
Socialist Realism, with its call for positive heroes, demanded. Bazin points to the films’ almost 
obsessive use of real-scale war scenes shot from various angles that multiply the effect of reality 
without creating any order. 
In effect, and even as the reconstitution [of the battle] attains a material breadth and 
exactitude not equaled since Griffith’s Birth of a Nation, one could maintain that it is 
the equivalent of the vision that Fabrice had at Waterloo. Certainly not in material 
terms, since we are not spared the physical spectacle of war, but effectively so 
through the impossibility the camera creates of our giving the chaos any order. 
Equivalent in these terms to documentary newsreels recorded on the run, this image 
of war is in some ways amorphous… a species of human and mechanical 
cataclysm… Imagine that you look down from an unassailable helicopter at the war 
operations, giving you as general a vision of the battlefield as possible without for all 
that revealing the fate of the battle nor even its development or orientation.28vii 
This is a view of history at the scale of cinematic ontology which seemingly brings us right into 
the heart of battle unlike Stendhal’s Fabrice who could only catch the action of the battle he was 
supposedly fighting from a great distance. But we aren’t any wiser than Fabrice who can’t be 
sure if he actually saw a war, let alone fight one. It lacks the reassuring logical containment 
through voiceover that Why We Fight provides. 
                                                 
28
 Bazin, “Le mythe de Staline,” 80 [BW 28]. 
265 
 
What does confer the impression of logic upon the exhaustive but disparate reality of the 
Stalin films is the figure of Stalin himself poring over maps of the battlefield and explaining the 
course of action. But these explanations by themselves make little sense. As Bazin describes it, 
the chaos of the battlefield is the base of a cone and the figure of Stalin sitting in Kremlin is the 
tip that confers form on it. However, he says, in between the base and the tip there is nothing but 
an imaginary conductor of the logic proceeding from top to bottom. What Bazin finds amazing is 
that despite the absence of any comprehensible logic, these films succeed in giving the 
impression of a neat schema which claims to be not only historical but also scientific: “[W]e see 
that the means [of recording] were not rigged in order to reconstitute the battle as perfectly as 
possible. How can we then doubt the objective rigor of what we see at the other end of the chain? 
When one has gone to such trouble to show the resistance of Stalingrad in its material ampleur, 
how could we be wrong about that of Kremlin?”29 But this quasi-magical conviction of logic that 
the figure of Stalin exudes cannot completely be derived from the objectivity of filmic image 
since it is the chaos of that very objectivity that cries for form. Since Stalin too offers nothing 
that can be seen as convincing logic, Bazin concludes that “the attributes of Stalin that we grasp 
here can no longer be called psychological but only the ontological ones of omniscience and 
infallibility.”30 In short, it is the body of Stalin that finally convinces us that there is logic to the 
objective chaos of battle. The following is Bazin’s conclusion to the essay. 
Here the supremacy of Stalinian genius is no longer of the order of opportunism or 
metaphor; it is properly ontological. Not only because the significance and the 
persuasive force of cinema are incomparably grander than those of any other means 
of propaganda, but above all because the nature of the cinematic image is something 
else. Impressing itself on our minds as rigorously transposable onto reality, the 
cinema is in essence incontestable like Nature and History. A portrait of Pétain, de 
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Gaulle, or Stalin can be taken down the same way it was put up—in itself it commits 
us to nothing even at the scale of a hundred square feet. A cinematic reconstitution 
of Stalin and one centered above all on Stalin suffices to define once and for all the 
place and meaning of Stalin in the world and to irrevocably fix his essence.31viii 
Bazin argues here that cinema’s ontology serves to fix the essence of Stalin because of its ability 
to capture and mummify identity. But where is this identity when Stalin is played by an actor? 
And what gives us the impression of his ontological omniscience and infallibility? Also, since 
Bazin argues that the battle scenes defeat the logical significance of the image—maximizing its 
ambiguity as it were—even as they affirm its objective precision, the logical relation between 
Stalin’s pencil on the map and the action on the battlefield should not come from the account of 
cinematic ontology that we have so far whose connivance with logical reason is absent here. 
Where films like Why We Fight and Avant le Déluge analyze reality through speech and editing, 
leaving no margin for contradiction, the Stalin films organize their effects of totality around the 
non-rational presence of the star body. What we need therefore is a reconstruction of Bazin’s 
theory of the star body in general, to which I turn in the next section, before returning to his 
specific comments on Stalin’s star persona. It is only with Bazin’s standard account of the star 
body can we understand his analysis of the “genius” of Stalin’s body on screen. 
Corporeal Totality 
The existing accounts of the place of the body in Bazin’s theory have simplified it along 
the same lines as most existing accounts of Bazin’s ontology of cinematic realism have elided his 
anxieties about it. The preferred readings are illustrated by the work of Karl Schoonover and 
Ivone Margulies which I will be engaging in my own reconstruction of Bazin’s ontology of the 
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filmic body.32 Both Schoonover and Margulies ascribe values of contingency and ambiguity to 
the body in Bazin’s film theory, but they ascribe them to different ends. For Schoonover, the 
body as a marker of contingency, particularly the contingency of suffering and danger, is a mark 
of an ambiguous sincerity that facilitates identification. For Margulies, cinema’s ability to expose 
the alternate convergence and disjunction between the actor’s body and the character’s body 
illustrates the indeterminacy favored by Bazininan ontology as well as its special relationship to 
the recording of human death. These accounts are not incorrect but certainly insufficient for 
capturing the complexity of Bazin’s position because they do not sufficiently take into account 
his writings on star bodies.33 I will argue that the star body and the mythic persona that it carries, 
however ambiguous, has the power to confer a non-logical meaning on an indeterminate world 
and paradoxically give it a veneer of logic. The fundamental ontological insight from the 
previous chapter guiding the discussion is that in the photo-filmic image a transfer of being takes 
place from the filmed body to the body on film, so that the body on film is at once identified with 
the person filmed and also continues to have an autonomous existence. 
Karl Schoonover has argued that the body, and more particularly the suffering or 
endangered body, is a privileged mode of identification in Bazin’s theory of realism. He makes 
this point in the context of a compelling argument that neo-realism is part of the construction of a 
new international humanism in the post-World War II world where identification with suffering 
at a distance plays an important role. Schoonover argues that Bazin’s repeated fascination with 
suffering bodies, whether that of Chaplin in a lion’s cage in City Lights (1931) or of the 
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expeditionists in documentaries such as Kon-Tiki (1947), comes from a belief that the body is the 
site of the greatest ambiguity and contingency in the cinema. 
Bazin’s concern for the filmed body follows from an interest in the radical 
potentialities of contingency in the relations between the image and its viewer. For 
him, the inadvertent or unintended gesture stands as a primary means of locating the 
force of contingency in the image… The ambiguity of the image often seems most 
available at moments of urgent corporeality. Figuring the image’s ability to compel 
in a bodily idiom in this sense allows Bazin to emphasize the image’s obligations 
without hypostatizing it. Bazin calls this “the flesh and blood ambiguity of the 
cinematographic image: see and understand!”34 
Schoonover is right to argue that the body is a privileged locus for aesthetic affect but this locus 
is both more complex and often also of concern to Bazin. In “On Realism,” the 1944 essay Bazin 
wrote at the same time as “Ontology,” he writes: 
For the first time the realism of the image achieved entire objectivity and made of the 
photograph a sort of ontological equivalent of the model. (Because of this, the human 
body, a privileged objects in all the plastic arts, is almost inevitably obscene or 
pornographic on the screen.”35 
Schoonover points to this passage, but according to him, Bazin’s understanding of the obscene 
and the pornographic is defined “as much by curiosity, resolve, and resilience as by 
withdrawal.”36 This is too quick an assertion which covers over the context of concern in which 
Bazin makes this and other statements. As we will see, it elides the fact, that Bazin identifies 
specific modes for overcoming this “ontological obscenity” of the body on film without 
defeating the materiality of the filmic image. 
Bazin’s quote in my excerpt from Schoonover above, “the flesh and blood ambiguity of 
the cinematographic image: see and understand!” is from “The Grandeur of Limelight.” Bazin 
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writes it in the context of describing how in the character of Calvero it is Chaplin himself who is 
laying himself bare before the public, bringing the confessional form of narrative to the cinema. 
After having defended Chaplin’s prolixity by identifying it as a standard generic device of the 
confession borrowed from literature, Bazin concedes that there is indeed something disturbing 
about watching a person confess so confidently and blatantly in public. 
Art of the spectacle, hyperbole of incarnation by the monstrous physical proximity of 
the image, the cinema is in effect a priori the most immodest of the arts. For this 
reason, it requires the maximum modesty: the mask and disguise: that of style and 
subject, or of make-up. In Limelight, Chaplin half strips the first two, the third 
completely. Ecce Homo.37ix 
Bazin here first sets up an opposition between the immodest “hyperbole of incarnation” 
that captures the identity of the person filmed and the aesthetic mechanisms that can deflect this 
capture (mask, style, subject, and make-up). But he also congratulates Chaplin for stripping away 
these mechanisms, especially make-up, and revealing the “hyperbole of incarnation” in the 
cinema. He explains this contradiction by arguing that Chaplin can take up the audacious gamble 
of exposing himself so barely because he is confident in the popularity of his mythic persona: “It 
is necessary that he be sure enough of the love of the public to speak of himself to millions of 
men with such gravity and conviction; sure enough also to strip the mask that made him loved.” 
The grandeur of Limelight is here mixed up with the grandeur of cinema itself. It is 
the most striking manifestation of its essence which is: abstraction through 
incarnation. Without doubt, it is only the unique position of Chaplin, the universality 
and vitality of his myth… which allow the dialectical measure of cinema. Socrates of 
the 20th century, Chaplin-Calvero drinks the hemlock in public, the Public, but the 
wisdom of his death cannot be reduced to words. It is first and above all in its 
spectacle which dares to base itself on the carnal ambiguity of the cinematographic 
image: see and understand!38x 
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It is tempting indeed, as Schoonover does, to believe that the ambiguity that Bazin talks 
about is a marker of sincerity in exposure which allows the identification desired by a new 
international humanism.39 But this particular kind of ambiguity, based on the pornographic 
sincerity of the film image, is justified in Chaplin’s case because of a necessary qualifying 
condition: the prior popularity of his screen persona that Chaplin counts on to dare this self-
exposure. Spectatorial identification with Chaplin/Calvero does not follow exposure but rather 
precedes it, and it survives Chaplin’s self-exposure because of the strength of this prior 
identification. Without this qualifying condition, the (aesthetic) essence of cinema remains 
“abstraction through incarnation,” which is the opposite of self-exposure. The challenge is not 
incarnation which cinema yields automatically and hyperbolically but to reach for abstraction 
through this incarnation. The lesson of the essay that Schoonover quotes from is that without our 
prior attachment to Chaplin, his self-exposure and confession would have interrupted our 
identification with Calvero; and the one thing Bazin is not is a theorist whose normative 
commitment is to breaking the identificatory processes of the cinema.40 
As has already been the case in this dissertation, the example of Chaplin reveals in 
extremis a more general theory in Bazin. In this case, the theoretical principle is that the screen 
persona of an actor takes over the ontological identity of the person acting who has an off-screen 
life. Bazin’s approach to screen actors rests on a fascination with the fact that one is never 
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dealing only with characters on film, but always with characters and the actors who play them. 
As actors appear across films, they carry their identities to all the characters they play, however 
heterogeneous. Better yet, as Bazin argues in analyzing the personas of Greta Garbo, Jean Gabin, 
and Humphrey Bogart, these stars carry not personal identities but their mythic identities. The 
historical Garbo, Bogart, and Gabin have no identities in the public sphere except those that 
derive from or are related to their screen personae which themselves have a coherence that 
subsumes the characters they play: “[T]he film star is not just an actor particularly dear to the 
public, but a hero of legends and tragedy, a ‘destiny’ to which scriptwriters and directors are 
forced to conform even without their knowledge.”41xi 
The drama of screen performance is always the drama of the complete coincidence of the 
actor’s persona and the persona of the character being played. Moreover, it is predicated on an 
ontological death of Bogart, Gabin, and Garbo as open subjectivities off screen whose identities 
might change under the force of experience. Bazin finds a literal example of the camera’s 
murderous demand upon the human body to fix itself upon film in Nicole Védrès’s documentary 
Paris 1900 (1947), a compilation film of newsreels from the Belle Époque. The film contains 
footage of a “birdman” who sets himself up to take flight from the roof of a building: “It seems 
clear that the poor fool takes fright and finally realizes the absurdity of his wager. But the camera 
is there to fix him for eternity and he dare not disappoint the soulless eye in the end. Had there 
been only human witnesses, a wise cowardice would no doubt have prevailed over him.”42xii The 
footage shows him jumping to his death. The living body of the star is also in some ways the 
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dead body of the person who became the star who cannot disappoint the camera by a change of 
persona: “Do you see… Gabin as a future father of a family?”43xiii 
Bazin explains the notion of the star persona as an abstraction of the body most clearly in 
his review of Queen Christina where he argues that Great Garbo’s embodied abstraction of 
stardom corresponds to the stylistic abstraction of reality in the cinema of the ‘20s and ‘30s. 
Speaking of the eroticism of the film, he calls it “the highpoint of erotic litote and… of its 
effectiveness” because the sexuality of a fully-clothed Garbo exists at the other pole from the 
mark of authenticity that nudity would provide. The “almost incorporeal” Garbo is the 
“ontological equivalent of this universe where signs shun the gross weight of things… Her 
irreality however is not a lack but a supplement of being. It takes nothing away from her 
femininity but on the contrary adds all the possibilities of which incarnation deprives her. She is 
here Berenice… she could no doubt be all the grand heroines. She is our Eve.”44xiv What Bazin 
celebrates with self-confessed nostalgia is a time in history where corporeal incarnation on film 
could, like the persona of the Tramp, be the abstracted site for multiple social affectivities;45 in 
Garbo’s case, a range of feminine ideals. But in his celebration, he argues that nostalgia cannot 
and should not prevent the cinema from now confronting its own realist “genius,” in the literal 
sense of a source of historical expression. Chaplin’s removal of the mask is at the crossroads of 
this corporeal confrontation that Bazin reads in The Great Dictator (1940). 
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In the speech at the end of The Great Dictator, “for the first time we are present… at the 
sketch of a metamorphosis. The proximity of the camera, and much more perhaps the grayscale 
of the panchromatic film, cause the face of Chaplin to appear as in a superimposition, clearly 
readable under the mask of the little fellow with the moustache.”46xv The war along with a new 
film stock that could register more shades had forced the body of the aging Chaplin to emerge 
from behind his screen persona and to speak to the world. It would be a mistake to read this 
multiplication of personae by film stock too quickly, following Margulies, as a mark of Bazin’s 
aesthetic ontology. For her, as for Schoonover, this multiplication “tracks Bazin’s attempt to 
secure cinema’s alliance with the ephemeral, the faulty, and the contingent.”47 We need to 
remind ourselves that Chaplin’s being at the crossroads of cinema’s confrontation with 
corporeality was also only a chapter in his own mythology. 
The laying bare of Chaplin’s multiple bodies has an internal meaning that is stronger than 
the adjectives “ephemeral,” “faulty,” and “contingent” suggest. Rather this multiplication is in 
fact the necessary revelation of the contradictions of a single mythology which could only come 
towards the end of its trajectory. If Chaplin had started appearing as a young Tramp starting at 
fifty years of age, and the sensitive film stock had clearly shown his wrinkles behind the make-
up as in The Great Dictator, there would have been no Charlot as we know him. Similarly, if this 
older Chaplin, without the popularity of his alter-ego behind him, had also made Limelight, the 
lack of make-up would have revealed nothing that had previously been hidden. In Bazin’s 
account of the cinema, the make-up needs to first be invisible—that is “enduring,” “efficient,” 
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and “firm”—if its ultimate disintegration is to have any meaning. But let us leave Chaplin to turn 
to the postwar persona that for Bazin was the most powerful embodiment of the confrontation 
between a stripped down physical reality and the star body that incarnated its mythology: 
Humphrey Bogart. 
Mourning for an actor dead from “esophageal cancer and half a million whiskies,” Bazin 
calls Bogart a modern myth in the Baudelairean sense because “in the hero of The Barefoot 
Contessa we admire the eminent dignity of our decay.”xvi He “incarnated the immanence of 
death, as well as its imminence… the corpse on borrowed time in each of us.”48xvii But he goes 
on to point out that he does not embody an abstract idea of decay, death, and modernity but an 
abstracted experience of the death and decay brought on by the war: “I would like to… remark 
that this distant modernity which guarantees the profound poetry of Bogart’s persona and no 
doubt justifies his legendary character responds to a more precise modernity of our generation. 
Bogart is no doubt the typical mythic actor of the war and the postwar era.”49xviii He then marks 
his coincidence with the emergence with Citizen Kane of the deep focus film style and its 
ambiguities. So far, Bogart’s suffering body and his ambiguity confirm Schoonover’s argument 
that these are the features of postwar realism that Bazin theorized. But it all depends on to what 
end the ambiguity is employed and if it is as contingent as Schoonover and Margulies argue. 
Bazin distinguishes Bogart from other major star personae of the postwar years: James Dean and 
Marlon Brando. 
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The only thing [Bogart and the method actors of the “Kazan school”] have in 
common is the reaction against psychological acting. But whether taciturn like 
Brando or exuberant like Dean, the Kazan style is based on the postulate of an anti-
cerebral spontaneity. The comportment of the actors is supposed to be unpredictable 
since it no longer translates the profound logic of sentiments but externalizes 
immediate impulsions whose link to the inner life can be read directly.50 The secret 
of Bogart is different. It is surely the prudent silence of Conrad, the phlegm of one 
who knows the perils of rash revelations, but above all [knows] the unfathomable 
vanity of these epidermal sincerities. Suspicion and weariness, wisdom and 
skepticism, Bogey is a stoic.51xix 
Bogart’s is a studied and interiorized ambiguity which will not yield itself to the “vanity of these 
epidermal sincerities” of a Brando or a Dean who too readily put their incoherent contingent 
states on display; it is also a wary ambiguity. But Bazin argues that the uses of such an ambiguity 
were the key to Bogart’s success. 
Unlike a Gabin who could succeed only by playing the romantic character tragically 
cheated by life or most other stars who could convincingly play only the singular characters of 
their personae across all their successful films (Chaplin remains the Tramp even when is 
Verdoux or Calvero), Bogart could play characters with a variable moral compass, from the good 
to the ambiguous to the outright villainous while keeping his persona. Our sympathetic 
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attachment to him is ontological and persists through all such characters he plays. Here we return 
to the Bazinian aesthetic politics of the earlier chapters according to which the aesthetic 
affectively commits us to conditions, people, and things even against our inclinations, beliefs, 
and values. Bogart personified this lesson as a particularly postwar one when he demonstrated 
through his career and his particular deathly stoicism that “beyond all imaginary biographies and 
moral virtues or their absence, our sympathy goes to some more profound wisdom, to a certain 
manner of accepting the human condition which could be common to the bastard and to the 
brave, to the loser and to the hero. The Bogartian man [defines himself]… above all by this 
existential maturity which transforms life little by little into a tenacious irony at the expense of 
death.”52xx Bogart’s stoicism is also different from that of prewar heroes who appeared equally 
reserved. In someone like Gary Cooper, Bazin argues, it drew its sense of conviction from the 
actor’s physical strength. The decrepit body of Bogart gets by in physical fights with 
“perspicacity.” He receives his fair share of blows but lands his own at just the right time, much 
the same way as his dry witticisms. “And then there is his revolver which in his hands becomes 
an argument that disarms.”53xxi What Bazin is describing here is a deflection of the demand for 
intellectual analysis into the embodiment of stoic wisdom. If we recall his analyses of films such 
as Why We Fight and Avant le Déluge in which the physical world on film calls forth logical 
positivism, we can see in Bogart’s body a physicality which abstracts itself into something as 
uncertain as wisdom but which is perhaps more forcefully convincing than logical reason, all the 
while remaining thoroughly exposed. 
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To sum up Bazin’s reading of Bogart, the latter personifies the cinematic demand for 
greater realism by incarnating a decaying corporeality, but this is not the corporeality of 
contingency but of a studied and abstracted ambiguity that affirms the value of a range of 
otherwise contradictory experiences. The persona does not multiply contradictions but absorbs 
them into itself. Therefore, pace Margulies the aesthetic ontology of cinema consists first in an 
absorption of contradictions into a defining myth—in this case, the star body—rather than in 
their corporeal exposure which always comes at the end of the mythic life. The idea of ambiguity 
this reading yields is therefore different also from Schoonover’s who believes that ambiguity for 
Bazin means a suspension of definite meaning. Therefore, he writes the following about Bazin’s 
understanding of ambiguity. 
Bazin wants to find instances of cinema’s radical contingency in specific moments 
when a realist film brings to bear the same uncertainty that confounds us in daily life. 
Always on the lookout for indeterminacy, Bazin sometimes overreaches to find his 
examples, obscuring how films like [Bicycle Thieves] exploit contingency, 
ambiguity, and indeterminacy for their rhetorics of realism… Bazin thus avoids the 
possibility that a film might deploy ambiguity with a particular semantic gain or in 
hopes of producing specific reactions in the viewer.54 
The ideal of merely confounding us with radical contingency or indeterminacy is not a part of 
Bazin’s aesthetic philosophy. The body of Bogart commits us to all the characters with their very 
specific outlines such as those of the “bastard” and the “brave.” To tie this reading of the human 
body to the ideal of the “total artwork” and the post-theological condition in which I have placed 
Bazin’s ontology of film, let us recall Bazin’s concluding lines to the essay on Gabin and his 
tragic persona. 
It is up to the sociologist and the moralist (singularly up to the Christian moralist 
and, why not, up to the theologian) to look into the profound signification of a 
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mythology where, in the popularity of an actor like Gabin, tens of millions of our 
contemporaries find themselves. Perhaps a world without God again becomes a 
world of Gods and their fates.55xxii 
Cinematic mythologies, the preeminent ones for most of the twentieth century, find their 
expression in the transfer of identities around and into human bodies. With this reminder of the 
totalizing ambitions of the aesthetic, let us now return to the case of Stalin’s body in Soviet 
cinema. 
The Filmic Body at the Origins of Totalitarianism 
The argument where we left it was that the figure of Stalin in the Soviet films manages to 
confer an impression of logical order to the chaos of battle scenes recorded and edited without 
consideration for the clarity and analysis of continuity editing. Bazin says that no one is stupid 
enough to believe that the particular pencil manoeuvers of Stalin shown in film were the ones 
that really dictated the war.56 So the films do not convince us by demonstrable logic despite the 
“material ampleur” of the filmic evidence. His conclusion is that it could only be the presence of 
Stalin that by its sheer force embodies that ontological omniscience necessary to give the 
impression of order. However, the body on film is not Stalin’s, but that of an actor playing 
Stalin, so what we see on film is not the embodied intelligence of Stalin the way Bogart is 
embodied intelligence. In these circumstances, is it sufficient for the actor to have the necessary 
physical features both to stand in for Stalin as well as for generating the affective force of Stalin 
himself? Bazin approaches this problem by looking further into what we have seen him remark 
upon, early in this chapter, as an innovation of Soviet cinema: its willingness to portray living 
historical figures in the cinema. 
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Bazin’s argument on the representability of active public figures is that the 
personification of Stalin as the end of History goes against the idea of a human life as an open 
potentiality that can always turn into something else than what it has been until any given point 
of its existence. For Bazin the significance, or signification, of a life is radically incomplete until 
the moment of death.57 The principle of the unpredictability of the meaning of human life has 
special significance in relation to political figures. The meaning of the life of a political figure, as 
with all lives, cannot be defined with any appearance of certainty while he or she lives… except 
through cinema. If a star plays a public figure, her myth does not exist in dialectical tension with 
the character of the political figure, but lends itself to defining that figure in the public 
imagination and robs it of continuing existence and its unpredictability to some extent. But what 
is to be mourned for Bazin is not the existential loss of the life of the politician but the loss of 
politics itself, as an ongoing contestation of meaning, which comes with the fixing of the 
politician’s significance. When thinking of political figures, the example of Marshall Pétain 
hangs heavy on Bazin’s imagination who went from the hero of one war, and subsequently being 
marginal to French political life, to suddenly finding a way at eighty-four years of age to become 
the prime traitor of the next war, much like the politician in a Jacques Prévert story Bazin 
references who goes mad on the day his statue is to be dedicated. Similarly, in the original 
version of the essay, he mocks the monarchic pretensions of Charles de Gaulle, the embodiment 
of French Resistance only five years ago, by referring to him as “Grand Charles.”58 
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As against the figure of the politician, Bazin points out, we find it hardly problematic to 
have representations of living celebrities from the fields of entertainment and sports. The 
meaning of their lives can be abstracted into myths with fewer problems because the lifetimes of 
actors, musicians, or sportspersons in those roles—their careers—do not always coincide with 
their whole lifetimes. This being true, the meaning of their careers may be defined while they 
continue to live their other lives. But a tension does exist in this case when the mythology of 
non-filmic celebrity confronts the particular mythology of the star playing her. One can always 
look for a star who complements the mythic persona of the celebrity, or find a non-descript but 
competent actor who can take on the persona of the celebrity; but at its limits the situation can be 
solved perfectly by having the celebrity play herself. Bazin found such an example at the time he 
was writing. He mentions the case of the French-Algerian boxer Marcel Cerdan who starred in 
two films, one in which he played a boxer, and the other in which he played himself in the lead 
role.  Bazin writes, “But one might say, that was Cerdan in person; certainly, but the difference 
isn’t so great [between Cerdan playing Cerdan and an actor playing him],”xxiii because he is 
playing his own myth.59 This in fact was the option available to Soviet cinema when it wanted to 
define the meaning of Stalin’s existence as the endpoint of History. 
At this point, let us recall Bazin’s argument in The Great Dictator that once Hitler “stole” 
Charlot’s moustache his existence was at the mercy of Chaplin who could rob it any time by 
deciding to present himself as the dictator.60 The Great Dictator’s ambition, only partly realized, 
was to transform the real Hitler into his caricature on screen and to thus deprive him of an 
autonomous existence in the public imaginary. Hitler could not have appreciated this, but this is 
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what Stalin needed, with the qualification of course that not a caricature but an embodiment of 
his own ideal play him. Bazin’s argument is that the unpredictability of the subjective identity of 
an individual was a threat to the Soviet understanding of teleological history. And if that 
individual happened to be Stalin in whom history was supposed to have found its realization, he 
could not afford to have a subjective identity. Rather, he needed to be mummified at the apex of 
his terrifying reputation that had the power to safeguard the Soviet Revolution by keeping in 
check wayward subjectivities, making them confess their sins, at the same time as arranging 
them on chaotic battles from Kremlin. This reputation was forged both by his political actions as 
well as through propaganda through other media such as painting and sculpture. Now it needed 
cinema to secure it. Though Bazin does not spell it out, following the example of the boxer 
Cerdan, the perfect person to play Stalin for this purpose would have been Stalin himself. But the 
option that Soviet cinema took was to have an actor play Stalin. 
Having decided to use an actor’s body, Stalin had to take every precaution to ensure that 
this actor and his body cease to have an identity distinct from Stalin’s. Bazin points out that the 
actor who played Stalin in Soviet films from 1938 until the ‘40s, Mikhail Ghelovani, was 
somewhat of a specialist in the role;61 that is, he had no persona other than Stalin’s. Eventually, 
he was perfectly replaceable as other actors took up the role; except that he would not be free to 
play other roles. For a myth such as Stalin’s, already created and ‘perfected’ outside the cinema, 
there is no need for—indeed, it must do without—the mythical persona of a film star. What 
Bazin perhaps did not know but something he might have wagered on was that even after 
Stalin’s death in 1953 and his denunciation by Khrushchev at the Soviet Communist Party 
Congress, Ghelovani would not be given a screen role. Even for Stalin’s opponents he had 
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become Stalin. His appearance as Stalin would be excised from recut films by embarrassed 
filmmakers who would surely have responded that they were excising Stalin himself. But 
something much more uncanny happened that sealed Stalin’s takeover of Ghelovani’s body. 
Ghelovani died on 21 December 1956, three years after Stalin, on Stalin’s birthday, without the 
obituary that he was entitled to as a People’s Artist of the USSR.62 
To return to the problem of Stalin embodying omniscience and infallibility in Soviet 
cinema, we see now that the films do this by the sheer force of stardom. It is true that his star 
persona was forged outside cinema but it is cinema that embalmed it. What could Bazin accuse 
these films of on ontological grounds? Rosen cites their bad faith use of the medium. But there is 
bad faith in the Western and in the Chaplin films too. Are we to debate degrees of bad faith 
between the mythologization of the history of American colonization and that of the engineer of 
the Gulag? We certainly can and should but that bad faith does not touch cinema’s ontology. 
Contrary to Margulies’s claim, there is no “misuse” of cinematic ontology but only its most 
perfect realization. Even more perfect in that it does not even take recourse to analytic editing 
and the processes of logic, but only to the impression of reason and wisdom embodied by a star 
body which imposed itself on the material chaos of history that cinema was so well placed to 
capture. 
If we remain at the level of Bazin’s ontology of film, all he succeeds is in demonstrating 
that Stalin and the Soviet film industry were film aestheticians of genius.63 At the level of 
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aesthetics the only thing Bazin could accuse these films of was of bad taste and he spends little 
time doing that. Finally, the only significant principle we are left with is a political norm that he 
stated in the debate over the meaning of history and the place of individual subjectivity in it. The 
norm is that both history and subjectivity must be giving meaning in a way that acknowledged 
their contradictions and that they are not ultimately reducible to each other. Therefore, the 
comparison he sets up at the beginning of the essay between the Western, “bourgeois” 
conception of human subjectivity as transcendental in relation to history and the Soviet Marxist 
belief that human subjectivity and history are perfectly indissociable turns out to be ironic. 
On Bazin’s understanding, human subjectivity and history are transcendental to each 
other to some degree. This is also an aesthetic norm by which history and the films that distill it 
and give it shape are transcendental to each other. Only through such lateral transcendence can 
there be a possibility of dialectical relation in which neither is completely subsumed by the other. 
This calls for films that “bear away our faith” while leaving their contradictions in view, 
however obscured. For this norm to be realized, we cannot stay at the level of ontology. Even at 
the level of aesthetics, not all visible abstractions can keep the meaning of ongoing political 
experience sufficiently open. In the Stalin films, the contradictions of material reality are on 
spectacular display but they are resolved by Stalin’s star body. Here we come up against a 
supplemental norm in Bazin’s aesthetics, which is a prohibition of the conjunction of a star body 
and the current political questions of the day involving politicians, public institutions, and policy. 
And the Stalin films and Soviet Marxism were not the only ones who came in for critique in the 
name of this norm. 
In 1951, Bazin devoted half of a capsule review of a film to the advertising short that 
preceded it. This short was clearly marked promotional material for Air France, French tourism, 
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and French fashion. However bad its taste or objectionable its politics, Bazin would not have 
taken the trouble to criticize it if not for the conjunction of the star body with live politics. 
According to his description, the part of the film that promotes French fashion shows a model 
take an Air France flight to present evening gowns in Saigon. But, Bazin writes: 
One needs everything in order to make a world… and war. A few seconds later, the 
weekly newsreel shows the solemn funerals of three soldiers who died in Indochina 
to permit the gentle little Parisian mannequin to present her gowns. All the same, Air 
France would have been better inspired if it had chosen another flight and [the 
filmmaker] Mr. Borderie had avoided casting a star in his film.64xxiv 
What we see in this description is a conjunction of a star mythology—that of the generic 
body the French fashion model—and a colonial narrative. In the short film, this mythology does 
not explicitly come into contact with the war which it abstracts away while presenting an 
Indochina receptive to French culture. But even with an intertextual confrontation with the 
newsreel evidence of the war in Indochina, Bazin believes that the star body provides a 
supplemental consecration of the death of the soldiers and therefore of war. If he did not believe 
this, he would have written about how the unpredictable programming of a film theater exposes 
the complicity of French capitalism and French colonialism. That the unpredictable conjunctions 
of programming disturb the coherence of the texts is certainly a possible reading. But then, in 
this particular instance, one would have to ask if it is sufficient to show a funeral of soldiers to 
put colonialism into question. The mythology of a soldier’s funeral, as distinct from battlefield 
images of soldiers wounded or worse, is never anti-war but a consecration of the idea of national 
“sacrifice” in the star body of the soldier. And Bazin’s broader point here is that uncanny 
conjunctions on film do not only work towards disruption, and when star bodies are involved it 
has the capacity to absorb these disruptions into itself and neutralize them. Two genres of French 
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national stars—the fashion model and the solider—brought together in Indochina by history 
return home via Air France and cinema with the mythology of colonialism. 
I have come to the conclusion of the discussion of Bazin’s anxieties about cinematic 
realism’s participation in the political questions of the day in ways that hypostasize reality and 
close off discourse. I will summarize the main points of this discussion at the end of the chapter. 
In the following and final section, I want to raise the question whether, on his account, cinema 
could or should testify to the horrors of totalitarianism given that its ontological powers could fix 
their reality too easily. The question in his historical moment, of course, pertains to the 
experience of the Holocaust. Here too it is the status of the body and its experience in question. 
The Filmic Body at the End of Totalitarianism 
On Bazin’s account, in totalitarian experience there is a complete unity of body and 
space. In the Stalin films, the space of the battlefield and the body of Stalin are completely 
separated but only so that they can be shown in a top-down unity. Following his analogy, the 
space at the base of the cone is nothing but an emanation of the body at the top, linked through a 
sleight of hand, no doubt, but still using specifically cinematic powers for accomplishing it. 
Eisenstein’s Ivan offers a more integrated expression of this reality where the body of Czar Ivan 
is meant to be the body of Stalin but it is so stylized that the identification is also purely logical 
and devoid of specifically filmic evidence. This abstract logic does find incarnation in the 
symbolization by an actor’s body but this body is thrice removed from Stalin’s body: firstly by 
being the body of the actor, secondly by referencing the body of the Czar, and finally, as Bazin 
describes the bodies in the film, by not being a living body at all but one of the spatial ornaments 
286 
 
in the mise-en-scène like the scepter or the throne that rhyme with each other.65 This 
ornamentation divides the pleasure of aesthetics from the satisfactions of logic which are united 
in a realist film such as Cayatte’s. The film does not even have that initial separation of the 
autocrat’s body and space that the Stalin films had which lay the ground for their top-down 
reconciliation. Therefore, when Bazin compares Ivan to The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (henceforth 
Caligari), we need to recall his description of Caligari’s expressionism in his review of Lotte 
Eisner’s The Haunted Screen. He writes that the expressionism of Caligari makes no distinction 
between the human body and the décor.  In Caligari, Bazin describes a process whereby the 
space is devoured by the mind’s projections so that its apparent dynamization is nothing but a 
collapse of distinction between the human and the non-human. The surprising discovery I will 
discuss in this section is that Bazin found a variation of this expressionist style to be appropriate 
to the fictional representation of the reality of the camps. 
Philip Watts has argued that the opening of the concentration camps after the war and the 
use of filmed evidence in the Nuremberg Trials was the constitutive background for Bazin’s 
theorization of realism.66 His claim that Bazin’s concern for a realist rhetoric devoid of 
ornamentation finds its urgency in a postwar world is indeed nuanced because for the most part 
he insists that Bazinian realism is tied to a mode of persuasion. While Watts’s emphasis on 
rhetoric and persuasion offers a complex basis for understanding Bazinian realism, when 
evoking the camps and the use of filmed evidence in the Nuremberg Trials he also pushes this 
aesthetic into the realm of the evidentiary. We have seen in the previous chapter how skeptical 
Bazin was of cinema’s evidentiary capacities. Indeed, against the background of the Nuclear 
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threat and newsreel footage of atomic bomb testing that appeared in the newsreels not long after 
the footage of the Nuremberg Trials, Bazin wrote. “I ask that we meditate on the bombardment 
of the Bikini Atoll and on these naval lodges to which only those invited had access (a bit like 
those ‘live’ telecasts of television), while multiple cameras record the sensational moment for 
you and me. I ask that we reflect on the Nuremberg Trial which unfolded under the spotlights 
like a reconstruction of a courtroom in a detective film.”67xxv The film spectator of a newsreel is 
quite unlike the experts who preside over the determination of the atomic bomb’s efficiency at 
the same time as they attend its spectacle live, nor are they the judges who confront the 
documentary horrors on film to determine responsibility and guilt of those on trial. What 
happened in Nuremberg was a trial which to the media and its consumers was a spectacle cast in 
the paradigm of a detective film. As for the footage of the opening of the camps itself, even 
certifiably bare and shot with the greatest reserve, to what could it testify by itself? 
It is impossible here to go into the history of the debates on the representability of the 
Holocaust, but it is important to note that Watts’s ascription of this evidentiary quality to 
Bazinian realism is beholden to the recent intervention by Georges Didi-Huberman.68 Huberman 
has argued that we cannot avoid the responsibility of confronting images of the Holocaust by 
hiding behind an inflated rhetoric of unrepresentability. In the France of Bazin’s time, there was 
hardly time to pose the question so neatly in terms of representability or unrepresentability when 
the confrontation with the reality of the camps itself was unforeseen and unpredictable. Claudine 
Drame has analyzed all the French newsreels of 1945 for their treatment of footage of the camps 
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and unsurprisingly found divergent narratives that were constructed from them depending on the 
audience.69 She speaks of a constant subordination of the image to speech, but there is one aspect 
of the production history that is striking. 
The first shots of the camps maintain a distance between the filmed subject and the 
spectator. When the camera comes close, it is to a recumbent figure facing the 
ground. But when there started appearing images of emaciated bodies which no 
longer had a human appearance, of piles of corpses, or close-ups of faces twisted by 
final agony, the referential function of the image’s activity was no longer carried out. 
The interpretive function took primacy.70 
By interpretive function, Drame means the commentary which became incessant.71 Bazin 
wouldn’t have been surprised by this prolixity brought on by the most horrifying documentary 
images. His argument that human bodies on film are ontologically obscene and pornographic 
comes not from an understanding of sexuality in itself but of the reframing of the sexual act 
within an understanding of death. While film robs us of our lived experience everytime it records 
and replays it—which is its ontological obscenity—Bazin argues that its images can still be 
considered of the order of our own memories so that their repetition on screen once again 
becomes part of our existence the way recall of past events is always a part of existence and is 
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our way of reclaiming the past. Though he severely criticized the illusion of self-evidence of the 
past on film, Bazin understood that this broad correspondence of the film image to memory is at 
work in documentaries. 
But two moments of life radically escape this concession to our consciousness: the 
sexual act and death. The one and the other is in its way the absolute negation of 
objective time: the qualitative instant in its pure state. Like death, sex is lived and is 
not represented (it isn’t for nothing that we call it little death), or at least is not 
represented without violating its nature. This violation is called obscenity. The 
representation of real death is also an obscenity, no longer moral as in love but 
metaphysical. One doesn’t die twice.72xxvi 
Bazin’s problem with the filmic record and repetition on screen of actual death is that by 
repeating the most unrepeatable moment of an existence, cinema robs it of its actual existence 
definitively. In death, a human life reclaims its absolute privacy so by dying on film it loses this 
privacy absolutely. But this applies to recordings of already dead bodies too, as we see in an 
article titled “Information ou nécrophagie” where Bazin describes an underwater documentary 
on television which shows a deep-sea diver discovering an airplane on the seabed with its dead 
pilot at his post and then moving on after a brief glance.73 A question seems to have been raised 
on another television program about whether images of death should be allowed. With regret, 
Bazin says that images like the one he described should be censored. 
But not so much for reasons of the phantasmagoric atrocity of an image inserted into 
a spectacle meant for all [television] audiences or even in the name of respect for the 
dead, but because of the gratuitousness and off-handedness which alone make them 
indecent. What is condemnable is not the objective cruelty or horror of the 
document… but the absence of a moral or aesthetic justification without which the 
image simply transforms us into necrophages. The death of a soldier, a lifeguard, 
even a torero or an automobile racer are events that have a meaning, however 
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debatable. From that moment [of screening], the document addresses us through the 
equivocal horror of our senses. But there are no exquisite corpses!74xxvii 
What we should first note here is that this is actually a qualified acceptance of images of death 
on screen, which Bazin also states elsewhere.75 Despite having argued that death on film is 
irredeemably obscene, Bazin could not but be aware that he was living in a time of deaths on 
screen, a problem that could not be avoided and called for some adequate response. But more 
than this, in “Marginal notes on Eroticism in the Cinema,” he points out that the spectacle of live 
death is nothing new: “it has not been too long since assassination has ceased to be a spectacle. 
The executions on Place de la Grève were nothing else….”76xxviii Therefore, the theoretical 
interdiction on recording live for him could only be qualified and also predicated on some further 
understanding of death that is implicit in the lines above. 
For Bazin, the moment of death is not only unrepeatable but it has a specific kind of 
meaning. It is the moment in relation to which “the qualitative time of life is defined 
retroactively.”77xxix The moment of death is unlike any other not only because it is the last but 
also because it retrojects itself onto to the dying life’s entire past and authorizes attempts to think 
about that life’s final meaning, “however debatable,” with all its contradictions. Another moment 
to live and facts of this life and therefore its meaning could have become something else 
altogether. This convergence of multiple temporalities of a life into a single moment Bazin calls 
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“a sort of coitus with time.”78xxx No camera in itself can bear testimony to this because in death 
the body appears as nothing but space. Here depth of field and tracking shots have the opposite 
effect of calling for the acknowledgement of a life’s meaning because they reinforce the body’s 
oneness with space.79 They may be relatively less sensational than close-ups but they also, like 
the deep-sea diver and the camera in the TV documentary, treat the dead body like an object 
among others. This is the ultimate meaning of cinema’s embalmment which does not even have 
the spectral quality of the doubles of live bodies preserved from the past. This may also be the 
spatial experience at the end of totalitarianism where even those alive, the survivors of the 
camps, cannot step outside the thingness of space to enter time. 
The early newsreel footage that Drame describes approached the bodies in the camps 
with the relative restraint that one might adopt towards known but inscrutable facts and to which 
silence could be a response. But the moment the cameras moved in and revealed the damaged 
bodies both of those dead and those reduced to the condition of living objects whose damage the 
camera carefully fragments and scans, Bazin would not at all have been surprised that the 
commentators could not stop speaking and giving these images and these bodies meaning. To not 
do so would have been to announce their own and their spectators’ submission to the 
objectification of death. To overcome the subjection of dead bodies to the “equivocal horror of 
our senses” we need to give them meaning and purpose, even an aesthetic one. However, as 
Bazin says, “there are no exquisite corpses.”80xxxi  
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“The Exquisite Corpse” is the name of a Surrealist game that André Bréton describes in 
an article from 1948.81 Like most Surrealist practices, this game too was predicated on automatic 
juxtapositions that would reveal uncanny realities, more authentic and real presumably than 
given reality. The name of the game itself was taken from the first chance phrase so coined; 
therefore, it has no special bearing on the discussion of corpses. But in describing the graphic 
version of this game in which all players contribute some figure that would create a final 
composite one, Bréton writes the following. 
Drawings using the technique of the Exquisite Corpse, because of their primary 
function as proposed delineation of personalities, tend inevitably to raise 
anthropomorphism to its highest pitch and to accentuate vividly the continuing 
relationship uniting the exterior world with the interior world.82 
In other words, an exquisite corpse is a Surrealist aesthetic ideal for the human body which 
unites it with the spatio-temporal world around it to “delineate a personality.” It is possible, 
Bazin suggests, that the ideal of the Exquisite Corpse may be realizable for the living but not 
when there is a real corpse involved. A real dead body is indeed completely at one with the 
exterior world, but it is also a concentration of its entire interior life understood as the web of its 
lived experiences and which is radically unlocatable in space. And this ideal is certainly not 
realizable when a camera confronts a dead body. So even as Bazin gives a qualified nod to the 
recording and replaying of actual dead bodies, he remains skeptical of our ability to give them a 
meaning adequate to what calls for recognition. Therefore, he would also not have been surprised 
at the self-serving and sensational commentaries that accompanied images of the camps. 
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If bearing testimony to the bodily experience of totalitarianism at the level of newsreel 
and documentary seemed nearly impossible to Bazin, he could not in principle have ruled out a 
fictional engagement. And he did get an opportunity to confront films that attempted this. Two 
such films on the experience of the camps stood out for him, one Polish and the other Czech and 
both made by Holocaust survivors. The Polish film, The Last Stage (Wanda Jakubowska, 1947), 
was the more conventionally realist of the two attempting a degree of documentary precision to 
narrate what is essentially a Resistance drama set in Auschwitz, and this film’s representation of 
the camp became the prototype for several Holocaust dramas over the decades, right through to 
Schindler’s List (Steven Spielberg, 1993). The Czech film, Distant Journey (1949) by theater 
director Alfréd Radok was set in the Terezin ghetto and concentration camp. It tells the story of 
the transportation of the Czech Jewish population to Terezin with an interracial couple at the 
center. The couple gets a brief reprieve, because the husband is non-Jewish, only to watch their 
friends and family sent away first to Terezin and then to the death camps around Europe. 
Eventually, they too are sent to the concentration camp. The film is highly stylized, using 
delirious framing and editing along with a nightmarish mise-en-scène (see Fig. 3). Bazin insists 
on the complete correspondence of Distant Journey’s style with the heyday of German 
Expressionism, and the film’s dynamism indeed goes much beyond the chiaroscuro lighting and 
tall shadows that were the more stabilized remnants of expressionism’s legacy in, for example, 
noir films. It cuts up and superimposes space upon space and on to human figures to create a 
sense of spatial delirium and claustrophobia that is meant to be the equivalent of the 
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psychological experience of the characters; in Bazin’s words “the most formalist film in a long 
time.”83xxxii 
In comparing Distant Journey to the Polish The Last Stage, Bazin writes that despite the 
fact that the reality the films portray goes beyond any possibility of ornamentation it is the Czech 
film rather than The Last Stage that might bring us closer to a certain objective and subjective 
experience of the reality of the camps. He has no criticisms of The Last Stage in itself but is 
much more affected by Distant Journey which he argues represents the sense of futility in 
resistance that might be the specific quality of the “concentrationary universe” which, as 
Kracauer may have agreed, is “the only subject that tragically conforms to [the aesthetic of 
German Expressionism].”84xxxiii In literary terms, he describes the film’s unity of style and 
subject as an expression of a “hyperbolic prophecy of the concentrationary universe” that a 
Dante who had read Sade and wrote like Kafka might have created.85 These references aren’t a 
mere nod to canonical writers but attempt to capture the combination of apocalyptic archetypes 
(Dante) and their utterly physical (Sade) and psychological (Kafka) realization through which he 
understands the Holocaust: “terrestrial hell and objective nightmare.”86xxxiv The experience that 
the film captures for Bazin is an inexorable accumulation of spaces from the initially distant 
German pageantry and the battle fields to Prague to Terezin and from there the death camps;87 or 
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in the case of one character a fall (which we never actually see) through a window which appears 
literally as a dizzying opening out of the space of a room that bears down with the full weight of 
contemporary events. Each instance of falling through or under this accumulation of space is 
individual but also civilizational, and each place gathers within itself the weight of other places 
in Europe. Therefore, “the internal organization of the camp and the relative but effective 
resistance that its cogs can offer seem here not so much impossible as unthinkable.”88xxxv This 
description suggests that the experience of totalitarian horror is not just death but a living in a 
death-like state until the moment it actually arrives. The question is how, according to Bazin, an 
expressionist aesthetic captures this. 
We just now looked at an argument about death’s spatiality and that the difficulty of 
acknowledging it is the difficulty of rescuing the dead body from the space that it inhabits. The 
subject of Distant Journey, a feeling of petrification before being crushed under the spatial 
weight of history, raises a similar challenge. Expressionism like that of Caligari and Ivan would 
not be adequate here since it reduces the human body to space and repeats with great effort and 
ornamentation what the camera captures automatically when recording death. Here we can 
briefly call upon Kracauer and his understanding of the mass ornament to see why either the 
ornate expressionism of Ivan and Caligari or the automatic capture of death are inadequate as 
acknowledgments of the lived terror of totalitarianism. 
The mass ornament, according to Kracauer, subsumes the individual and community into 
a symmetrical mass. Whereas communities of people are free to charge with meaning the 
material world to which they are joined, no such thing is possible with a mass ornament which 
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“hover[s] in mid air” where its actors “never grasp the stage setting in its totality.”89 The 
challenge of acknowledging the experience of totalitarianism after its irreversible consequences 
have come to pass is to register this fearful ornamentalizing ambition inherent in it while making 
room for the body as a subjective register of this ambition, without making it the site of a 
fantastical resistance after the fact; that is, one needs both the sense of spatial homogeneity of the 
ornament but also that margin of experience that can testify to the felt horror of such spatial 
constriction. Something of the order of Kafka whom Bazin references and in whose work 
Kracauer identifies the primacy of the imagery of dungeons in which “[t]he measures provoked 
by existential fear are themselves a threat to existence.”90 Bazin recalls this feature of 
Kafkaesque entrapment when he remarks that the only characters who show a degree of 
resistance are the couple but the fact that theirs is an interracial marriage only means that more 
lives are drawn into the camps as the husband and his father are sent away to the camps and the 
wife herself tries to commit suicide to spare them and precipitate her own fate. But without this 
margin of subjectivity that becomes a threat to itself, nothing but the blank fact of death can be 
registered. 
Given that the matrix of space and subjectivity just described wouldn’t have been 
possible with the expressionism of Ivan and Caligari, Bazin falls back upon the distinction he 
made between the expressionism of Caligari and that of Fritz Lang’s M (1931) when he wrote 
about Carné’s Le Jour Se Lève and which he identified as Kammerspiel after reviewing Eisner’s 
book. In describing Carné’s film as an expression of the prewar mood of social claustropbia, he 
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delineated the meticulous creation of a distinct, and distinctly material, space that bears down 
upon Gabin’s character over the course of the film much like the carefully constructed space of 
M bears down upon Peter Lorre. Similarly, Bazin refers to the “true setting [vrai décor] of the 
Czech film” which creates the particular sense of live horror in the film.91 While he describes the 
sense of cruel claustrophobia in the film, he does not actually carry out an analysis of its formal 
aspects to demonstrate his argument regarding the film’s construction of space.92 A brief look at 
them helps us see the significance of his argument. 
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Fig. 4: Stills from Distant Journey (Alfréd Radok, 1949) 
 
Bazin describes “a feeling, probably justified, of a documentary fidelity to the objective 
and mental reality”xxxvi of Distant Journey to its subject.
93 He neglects to point out the film’s 
heavy and novel use of documentary footage itself. The film starts with images of Hitler and 
other Nazi leaders giving speeches and other documents of Nazi pageantry taken, from among 
various sources, Triumph of the Will. The intertitles giving the names recall the Gothic 
calligraphy of German Expressionist films of the silent era and the voiceover provides Czech 
summaries in a dry, exhausted tone. Once the film’s narrative begins, however, the documentary 
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footage always contains an inset image of the fictional diegesis at the bottom right of the screen 
(Fig. 3, top two panels); the diegetic image also shrinks down to reveal the documentary footage 
before magnifying to cover it up again. Another change in the nature of the documentary images 
is that while they indicate some historical events, they often linger on Nazi symbols or other 
abstract figures (including a photograph of corpses piled up) that signify an ornamentalized 
terror which is echoed by the diegetic image. This petrification in the documentary footage is 
constantly reclaimed by the oppressive dynamization of space94 in the diegesis to both link the 
two but also to exorcize the petrification back into images of lived experience of terror. This 
experience is as much psychological as material, and only a degree away from the petrification 
of death. In that degree of difference, the largely helpless bodies nonetheless become living 
markers of death rather than its blank proof. There is no heroism in this, no shred of subjectivity 
really secure from the ornamentalizing forces; not even in the film’s representation of the 
liberation (Fig. 3, bottom panel). As Bazin writes, rescue too could only come from the outside: 
“The walls of Terezin open with the arrival of Russian soldiers, but at the seventh sounding of 
the trumpets.”95xxxvii The reality of the camp is death even after liberation as shots of the 
graveyard are overlain with a voice reciting calmly the names of the death camps across Europe. 
But these images of death have been given a meaning, “however debatable,” beyond death’s 
sheer facticity. 
There is, of course, no question of a complete adequacy of representation of Distant 
Journey to the reality of Terezin, let alone of the camps in general. But the film had found for 
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Bazin some way of responding to the horror of what happened without either an obscene 
curiosity or a deflection into concerns such as heroic or tragic resistance that are alien to the 
brute experience of terror. Bazin was not the only one in France to think so. Alain Resnais was 
impressed enough by the film to start Night and Fog with some of the same documentary footage 
as Distant Journey.96 But the real similarities lie in the poetic abstraction of Night and Fog: its 
intercutting between the present and past linked by intersecting tracking shots, overlain with 
Hans Eisler’s uninterrupted music against which Jean Cayrol, a survivor of the camps, reads a 
poetic commentary on the voiceover; stylistic elements that recall those Resnais had already 
employed in his documentaries on painting such as Van Gogh (1948) and Guernica (1950). A 
counter-confirmation of Night and Fog’s abstraction comes in the form of unacknowledged 
inserts from the “realist” The Last Stop which pass for documentary footage.97 This was a 
completely different result from the vision of a newsreel-based documentary along the lines of 
Why We Fight that those who commissioned the film had in mind.98 When Bazin reviewed the 
film, he described his feelings at the announcement of the film: reassured by those involved but 
still skeptical of cinema’s ability to bear witness to the experience of the camps. He recalls the 
decade old images that “cannot leave our memories,” but he also mentions the “obsession and 
demagoguery” that remained a threat with every return to those images.99 He then praises the 
film unreservedly and above all for its ability to, without sanitizing history, creating a space for 
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mourning through which we may in turn make perennial room for the memory of what 
happened. 
Night and Fog is above all a look of love and confidence in man, the affirmation of 
hope beyond despair. The grass no longer grew under the foot of Attila; the grass has 
grown timidly, cropped, and rare between the ruins of the crematorium, enough to 
affirm that life is stronger than nothingness. Please understand me! Night and Fog 
neither concludes upon nor incites smug optimism or forgetting. On the contrary, it 
recalls for us the everlasting concentrationary reality and incites us to an examination 
of conscience whose affirmation is stronger and more penetrating for going beyond 
the too easy rage and bursts of horror into this immense zone of serenity which 
follows tears of mourning when the loved one can live again in our memory.100xxxviii 
We are perhaps far here from Adorno’s interdiction of poetry after Auschwitz in this 
response from Bazin where he struggles to express hope in the midst of mourning and the 
“everlasting concentrationary reality.” But Bazin’s response and Resnais’s film can also be seen 
as versions of another somewhat less grim statement of Adorno: “Total remembrance is the 
response to total transience, and hope lies only in the strength to become aware of transience and 
preserve it in writing.”101 As we have seen, for Bazin death calls for the retrieval of all that a 
body has been. But it would be wrong to think of “totality” here as comprehensiveness; it is 
“merely” a search for a form, an aesthetic one, in which to recover the reality of lives other than 
that of the self-evidence of dead bodies. Films such as Distant Journey and Night and Fog 
disturb the spatiality of death in order to construct such provisional forms of recovery.102 
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passages from Theory of Film. There Kracauer speaks about how cinema allows us to confront the horrors of the 
world, for which it has a special affinity, through an indirection of the gaze just like Perseus could only slay the 
petrifying head of Medusa by looking at her reflection in Athena’s shield (305). Given Bazin’s response to Distant 
Journey, we should be careful about a too quick rapprochement between these two theorists on the grounds of 
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Conclusion 
This chapter and the previous one have traced Bazin’s skepticism about cinema’s 
ontological realism even if he recognized the inevitability of film history’s need to respond to the 
historical demand for its capacity to give us seemingly unmediated images of the world. Given 
the violent history of the twentieth century that fed this demand, the discovery of this skepticism 
should not be surprising. To sum up the discussion, on the question of propaganda, Bazin argued 
for cinema’s participation in the political life of institutions and policy on condition that it does 
not rely on two kinds of ontological powers of the filmic image. The first is its capacity to be 
converted into evidence that leaves no room for discourse. The second is the power of the star 
body on film and its ability to short circuit discourse even in the face of obvious contradictions. 
To these, he privileged an openly rhetorical mode of address. The star body itself remained a 
privileged site for cinematic mythologies for Bazin, but paradoxically its high degree of 
abstraction made it particularly suitable for artificially fixing the identity of other public figures. 
A final confirmation of this skepticism comes in Bazin’s endorsement of a film with extreme 
expressionist style as appropriate for representing the experience of the camps. In light of this 
skepticism, we now need to see what place Bazin’s realism as we have conventionally 
understood it finds in his work.
                                                 
cinema’s ontological realism itself. We cannot know if Kracauer would have found Distant Journey’s style 
appropriate to its subject after having written extensively about German Expressionism’s collusion with 
authoritarian sentiment. He might have found it a cruel confirmation of his thesis; or he might have found it as 
paralyzing as pre-war German cinema and unsuited for representing its historical consequences. Kracauer also only 
mentions The Last Stop in passing in Theory of Film as an instance of cinema’s particular interest in the cruel and 
the horrifying (57), and he most probably did not get an opportunity to watch Resnais’s film in time for the book, if 
at all. Night and Fog did not find a distributor in the US for some time. Lindeperg could trace some special 
screenings for the media in 1959 after which it was bought by a TV broadcaster who took it apart and re-edited the 
32-minute film it into an hour long program called Remember Us (1960). Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The 
Redemption of Physical Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); Lindeperg, Night and Fog, 211-222. 
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Chapter 8 
The Bad Faith of Realism 
 
In arguing that ontological realism was a matter of concern for Bazin, I have not set out 
to deny the positive significance of a realist aesthetic to Bazin’s work. But I would argue that this 
significance cannot be appreciated without the background of the last five chapters. Its 
specificity takes its place as a privileged historical concern in Bazin’s work but which 
nonetheless should be considered as a subset of a broader aesthetic philosophy. In this chapter, I 
will link Bazinian realism to the idea of bad faith that I developed in the introduction and then 
again towards the end of chapter four. There I had pointed out that the specific trajectories that 
Bazin analyzed in the Chaplin films and in the Western demonstrated that these bodies of work 
impose themselves on our imaginaries despite their contradictions and “against our sympathies.” 
They orient us in our historical existence, even if indirectly, by sublating its contradictions. 
There is the bad faith of specific films that draw us into deceptively coherent worlds and then 
there is the bad faith of the spectators who are willing to be so drawn. However, we have seen 
that Bazin was careful to strip his account of any moralistic denunciation given its importance as 
a secular social ritual through which we try to grasp a transcendental historical reality not 
underwritten by any metaphysical guarantees, and which we make our own in more or less 
obscure ways through critique as much as through subliminal internalization. 
A properly aesthetic realism in the cinema for Bazin needs to create conditions for an 
indirect confrontation with history while proceeding from the spatio-temporal conditions of 
experience and the material reality of the world. But the danger for cinema is that in recording 
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our world in its exactitude it can curtail the autonomy of its temporal existence beyond the filmic 
record by creating doubles of the world that can be used to manipulate its existence for us. We 
could argue that this is what the aesthetic in general does when it smooths over contradictions in 
experience, such as when the Western sublimates the place of women in society to deny their 
status as property. But the conventionality of all aesthetic experience makes room for the bad 
faith of the spectator who is willing to affirm the reality produced by the work of art. The truth of 
a Western can in theory be denied by those who refuse to take it seriously by citing its 
conventionality. In contrast, Bazin effectively argues, one cannot a priori deny the validity of a 
realist documentary or a realist reconstitution of history even after watching it without taking 
recourse to extraneous evidence. It is possible for realist cinema to evacuate spectatorship of any 
sense of bad faith and affirm our rational capacity for analysis. It is thus that Bazin concerned 
himself with cinema that he found both responsive to the demand for realist images and at the 
same time worked to create this margin of bad faith necessary for aesthetic experience and 
aesthetic politics. 
I will start with a discussion of documentary realism and Bazin’s explicit claim that bad 
faith is a pre-condition for its viability if it is not to slide into positivism.  In the second section, I 
turn to his analysis of conditions of bad faith in fiction films.  
Documentary Realism 
Though documentary realism was first a matter of concern for Bazin because of the 
context of war propaganda, the postwar documentaries that he wrote about with a view to 
understanding cinematic realism originated with a different set of concerns. Several of these 
were ethnographic films whose postwar high point would come with the films of Jean Rouch. 
The ethnographic impulse in twentieth-century French art went back to the Surrealists’ interest in 
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“primitive” cultures at the time of the Dakar-Djibouti expedition in the early 1930s. The links 
between ethnography and art traveled in both directions as one of key members of the expedition 
was Michel Leiris, a Surrealist author and professional ethnologist, whose future colleague at 
Musée de l’Homme would be Jean Rouch.1 In the postwar world, film became much more central 
to ethnographic practice as a medium of record rather than an aesthetic one; that is, ethnography 
called upon the ontological ability of cinema to capture the world which the professionals would 
then analyze. As Bazin remarks, this undercut the impulse to exoticize non-Western cultures as 
bearers of some presumed primeval human condition with which modern civilization has lost 
touch. To this extent, in exploring indigenous cultures, “the white man… as adventurer, in this 
contact [with “primitive” cultures], looks to test and know himself better.”2i Against this 
Romanticism, Bazin argues, ethnology ascribes to indigenous cultures their own parameters of 
experience that the profession aims to study as valid on their own terms and without necessary 
reference to Western standards. However, he is not certain of the possibility of such a radical 
shift. 
This [scientific] observation based on a favorable prejudice is no doubt a good 
sociological method and its moral advantages are evident, but we are allowed to ask 
to what extent it fails to eliminate what after all remains a relational truth of our 
consciousness [conscience], by which I mean the apprehension of mystery and 
anxiety at the approach of a spiritual universe radically different from our own. For 
our young scholars, magic is an interesting and worthwhile occupation of the same 
                                                 
1
 The postwar convergence of film and ethnography was fictionalized in Jacques Becker’s 1949 film Rendez-vous de 
Juillet, to which Bazin refers for illustrating the context in which the new ethnographic film flourished. In it, we find 
the protagonist trying to put together an expedition to the African colonies for making such a film. While he bides 
his time, dropping in on classes at Musée de l’Homme (where we see films being used as part of instruction) and 
making the rounds of the colonial, ship, and airline offices to raise money, we actually get a portrait of a Paris on the 
verge of the explosion of those cultural energies—jazz, automobiles, etc.—that would feed into the French New 
Wave in the cinema and beyond. The other male characters are young and out of work film technicians, presumably 
laid low by the influx of the Hollywood backlog after the war, who are recruited by the aspiring ethnological 
filmmaker for his mission. The film constructs the ethnographic mission as an outgrowth of the restlessness and 
disappointments of Parisian youth culture which the characters both feed upon and flee. 
2
 André Bazin, “L’évolution du film d’exploration,” in Le Monde Nouveau (May-June, 1955), 260 
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standing as our western activities. To be a sorcerer on the banks of the Niger is, 
mutatis mutandis, as honorable as being an ethnologist in Paris. Everything goes on 
as if, having discovered the richness and value of so-called primitive cultures, we 
have exorcised them of fear by projecting them on the one hand on an aesthetic plane 
and on the other on that of science: Negro art and sociology.3ii 
Science, Bazin argues, maintains the same division that the Romantics relied upon in 
their approach to non-western and non-modern cultures. Where the Romantics turned these 
cultures into aesthetic objects, as in the Fauvist painters and the Surrealists, the ethnologists 
convert the non-scientific aspects of these cultures into scientific data. Ethnology, the above lines 
imply, plays a double game of using scientific standards in understanding these cultures but also 
trying to bracket the question of science’s relationship to religion whose tensions have been 
formative for western modernity itself. Therefore, when Bazin talks about “spiritual universe[s] 
radically different from our own,” he doesn’t only mean Christianity and indigenous religions 
but the imbrication of both in their respective social contexts. Since western aesthetics and 
religion have not been untouched by scientific rationality and since scientific methods did not 
develop in a spiritual vacuum, one cannot use only art or only science to approach indigenous 
rituals that combine religious rituals and broader social practices. Doing so not only reduces the 
indigenous experience along the lines of this split, but also forecloses the question of the 
encounter of religion and social practice whose marker is the “apprehension of mystery and 
anxiety.” 
One of the important exceptions for Bazin to the mode of scientific disinterest whose 
shortcomings Bazin analyzes was Forêt Sacrée (Pierre-Dominique Gaisseau) in which the 
ethnographer/filmmaker Gaisseau sets out to record the sacred magical rituals of the population 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 260-261. 
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in a part of Upper Guinea.4 However, these rituals are forbidden to strangers, so Gaisseau needs 
to be initiated by the head sorcerer, a process involving a painful tattooing, to become one of the 
local populace. This already compromises the distinction between the observer and the observed 
on the part of the westerner and also between science and sorcery since Gaisseau tries to 
combine the two in becoming one of the subjects of the magical rituals. But in the moment of the 
ritual, an inevitable conflict arises, where “[i]t is necessary to choose between understanding the 
mystery and living it, between doing a sociological study of magic and entering its circle.”5iii 
Bazin also points out that the whole ritual that the ethnologists set out to understand and/or live 
is itself compromised by the dubious initiation of someone who does not belong to the social 
milieu. 
On top of all the ambiguity of participation of westerners in the indigenous ritual, the 
particular event of the ritual itself is compromised by the presence of the camera.6 Bazin asks if 
the ceremony remains the same when recorded under magnesium lamps. He then argues that the 
success of Forêt Sacrée lies in its acknowledgment of these doubts by showing Gaisseau filming 
with a camera, presumably in the midst of the rituals. Thus, the filmmaker/ethnologist “does not 
at all hide the relative failure of his enterprise, its final decomposition into reciprocal bad 
                                                 
4
 Of the films discussed in this section, I have only been able to watch Kon-Tiki (1952) and Victoire sur 
l’Annapurna (Marcel Ichac, 1953). With regards to Naufragé Volontaire (1953), I could watch a recent television 
documentary on Alain Bombard’s attempt to survive as a castaway on sea and the documentary he made from the 
footage shot as part of the experiment. The TV documentary, Bombard, le Naufragé Volontaire (Didier Nion, 2012), 
contains clips from the original film and extensive interviews from those involved, including Bombard. 
5
 André Bazin, “Avec Naufragé Volontaire et Forêt Sacrée, le reportage filmé devient une aventure spirituelle,” in 
RCT no. 275 (24 April 1955) 
6
 Bazin refers to the fact that the head sorcerer may have initiated Gaisseau to slight his own society and that he 
might be subject to ex-communication. It is possible that the film shows something to suggest these possibilities, or 
Bazin may be speculating on the validity of the initiation. Bazin, “L’évolution du film d’exploration,” 262. 
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conscience.”7iv The presence of cinema at this encounter is as a catalyst and record of failure; 
failure of both cinematic and ethnological objectivity. However, the failure is relative because it 
manages after all to record the experience of the encounter of such heterogeneous life-worlds, 
with its “anguish and vertigo” without dividing it up into art and science. The film restores “the 
aesthetic of magic” by showing its social function as when the film shows women tracing figures 
on the walls of their huts to strengthen them, but it is a sociology which the westerner can neither 
fully participate in nor explain from a distance.8 
The failure of cinema to be an objective record of the experience at which it is present is 
demonstrated in an even better manner by a few of the other documentaries about which Bazin 
wrote. These were adventure documentaries, some of which also had a scientific interest tied to 
the adventures. Annapurna (Marcel Ichac, 1953) is a record of an expedition to scale the 
eponymous summit, but Kon-Tiki (Thor Heyerdahl, 1952) and Naufragé Volontaire (Alain 
Bombard, 1953) had specific inquiries linked to their audacious experiments. Kon-Tiki records 
Thor Heyerdahl and his team’s attempt to cross the South Pacific from Peru to the Polynesian 
islands on a raft in order to prove that it was possible for the Incas to migrate over this route with 
the rudimentary rafts they had at their disposal. In Naufragé Volontaire, Alain Bombard sought 
to reconstruct the experience of a castaway on an inflatable lifeboat to both test the limits of 
human endurance as well as to test the conditions in which castaways on seas are more likely to 
survive. He recounts that the motivation behind his attempt was an increase in the number of 
sinking ships around the late ‘40s as well the question of bodily suffering to which he became 
sensitive in the aftermath of reports of the camps to which one of his friends had been sent. 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 262.  
8
 Ibid., 262-263. 
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Bombard started out with a colleague Jack Palmer who dropped out part of the way into the 
experiment so that there was no one left to be filmed. 
A common aspect that Bazin identities in all these adventure films is that in foregoing 
documentary reconstitution in favor of raw footage they almost give up on any footage of 
dramatic interest. Given the perilous conditions of each adventure, the crew can be prepared to 
film the most interesting events only by increasing the danger of their enterprise. In an era of 
limited film stock and unwieldy amateur cameras, almost the only footage these filmmaker-
subjects manage to capture is of the most unremarkable moments of their journeys. Some chance 
exceptions occur such as the sighting of a white whale in Kon-Tiki and the loss of the boat sail in 
Naufragé Volontaire but nothing that can truly constitute an objective record of the high point of 
the journeys. Nonetheless, “these rare images in the middle of the stream of film without any 
objective interest are like the invaluable and deeply moving flotsam on the monotonous swell of 
the ocean.”9v The importance and beauty of these images lies less in what they capture than in 
their status as signs of what the films fail to capture: the many real events that made up the 
journeys at which the camera could not be present. Thus, Bazin writes, “Kon-Tiki is the most 
beautiful film but it doesn’t exist!”10 And he is entirely serious to the extent that the voice-over 
narrates all the dramatic events of the voyage that we do not see. At the most dramatic of these, 
when the raft is about to crash into a reef, all we see is a calm sea which gives way to an 
animated map charting the course of the crash. And yet Kon-Tiki the film offers itself as a record 
of the journey. 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 259. 
10
 André Bazin, “Le cinéma et l’exploration,” in QQCI, 51 [WCII 160]. My emphasis. 
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Thus, we could say of these films that they are significant, admirable, and moving 
only to the extent that they do not exist. But naturally, if they didn’t exist at all, we 
wouldn’t be able to judge. Therefore, I’ll say that they are more precisely like 
cannons, composed of a void surround by bronze. But it is this void that is their real 
substance. And the more or less interesting images that surround these lacunae are 
there to authenticate them and to give them, as we say about cannons, their soul [âme 
in French refers both to “soul” and to the lining of a field gun’s barrel].11vi 
The use of spiritual terminology here is very pointed and curious. The layman’s 
understanding of the body-soul distinction, for those who make it, is that the body is a visible 
manifestation of an invisible soul. But here Bazin is talking about the material presence of 
documentary images as the soul of the invisible body of the adventures. It is important to 
emphasize that this is not a discourse of absolute unrepresentability of reality. Reality is 
something that cannot ever be represented totally but we do try to grasp its totality indirectly 
through material signs. Therefore, the spiritual reality here is of the order of the “lateral 
transcendence” that I argued in chapter five is a mark of aesthetic autonomy. The aesthetic world 
is always at the threshold of our world but does not collapse into it, and this can be as true of 
documentary worlds as fictional ones. It is only through discourse and interpretation that we try 
to bring them into our own but no meaning we ascribe to them can completely possess them. 
In the context of the films he was writing about, Bazin emphasized that film was only one 
media for recording the events that were their subjects and among the least comprehensive of 
them. He pointed to the books that accompanied these films as well as lectures by the 
participants that attempt to give a more precise idea, both factual and experiential, of the events. 
Thus, such an adventure or ethnographic “film is conceived rather as an illustrated lecture where 
the presence and word of the lecturer-witness perpetually completes and authenticates the 
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 Bazin, “Avec Naufragé Volontaire et Forêt Sacrée”. 
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image.”12 The need to complete and authenticate the images, to wrest them from their place of 
lateral transcendence and make them fully immanent remains “perpetual” because these images 
have abstracted themselves from our world but still offer themselves as historical testaments. 
This is what Bazin calls their “bad faith.” 
With Naufragé Volontaire and Forêt Sacrée, I would like to bring to notice a specific 
variety of this condition of reportage [whereby these films are most moving in their 
near absence]: “bad faith.” I am placing this expression in quotation marks to signal 
that I understand its meaning in a purely psychological sense and not a moral one. In 
fact, I am not sparing in my respect for these courageous and sincere men who knew 
exactly how to push their courage to the point of assuming this bad faith.13vii 
To “the reciprocal bad conscience” of Forêt Sacrée mentioned earlier, these films add a 
bad faith that impresses us with their open and unavoidable contradictions. Without these filmic 
records, the lectures and the books describing the expeditions may have remained only scientific 
tracts or personal testimonies. And documentaries whose claims to objectivity remained 
untroubled would also have merely illustrated scientific or objective claims and, like the images 
in Why We Fight, have “giv[en] to speech itself the credibility and proof of photographic 
images.”14 But the specifically aesthetic quality of these documentaries has transformed 
documentation and testimony into an ancillary discourse that “perpetually completes and 
authenticates the image” much like all critical discourse about aesthetic objects. If this were bad 
faith in the usual sense of deception, then we would dismiss them as fraud and wouldn’t think 
that what we see on screen is an integral part of a reality that discourse is called upon to 
authenticate. But Bazin does not believe that the expeditions and adventures undertaken by the 
filmmaker/subjects are any less worthy of respect or that they were finally unsuccessful. We do 
                                                 
12
 Bazin, “Le cinéma et l’exploration,” 48 [WCII 156]. 
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 Bazin, “Avec Naufragé Volontaire et Forêt Sacrée”. 
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 Bazin, “A propos de Pourquoi Nous Combattons: Histoire, documents et actualités,” in QQCI 35 [BW 190]. 
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after all get to see some extraordinary images of these extraordinary adventures, such as the 
white whale alongside the raft in Kon-Tiki and images of sacred rituals that are unfamiliar to us. 
Fictional Realism 
The problem of realism, understood as respect for the integrity of spatio-temporal reality 
or “integral realism” as Bazin once called it, in fiction films is an extension of the basic problem 
of film aesthetics which we have seen Bazin describe as “abstraction through incarnation.”15 The 
abstraction in generic and star films too proceeds from physical reality whether it be the Western 
landscapes or the bodies of Garbo and Bogart. They achieve a great degree of abstraction 
through conventions of narrative and star personas. We have seen Bazin argue that a large part of 
postwar production could no longer rely so surely on the power of conventions. It needed to 
represent material reality with greater precision which undermined the power of conventions. 
However, the problem remained the same: to give expression to the historical unconscious that 
exceeds the given world even when films were forced to represent this world in all its detail. 
Perhaps the clearest indicator that the demand for integral realism did not preclude the 
construction of mythic reality is that the essay “Editing Prohibited” draws its examples from 
Crin Blanc and Le Ballon Rouge, two children’s films by Albert Lamorisse, and Une Fée Pas 
Comme les Autres (Jean Tourane, 1957).16 Bazin describes the purpose of the essay as follows: 
“starting with the astonishingly significant examples these films offer, to analyze certain laws of 
editing [montage] in their relationship with cinematographic expression and, even more 
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 André Bazin, “Grandeur de ‘Limelight’,” in QQCIII, 130-131 [WCI 138]. 
16
 This essay is a combination of two articles that appeared in Cahiers du Cinéma, one of which on Crin Blanc was 
titled “Le réel et l’imaginaire” and I will refer to both this source and to the extended article in Qu’est Que le 
Cinéma? André Bazin, “Le réel et L’imaginaire (Crin Blanc),” CdC no. 25 (July 1953), 52-55; André Bazin, 
“Montage Interdit,” in QQCI, 117-130 [WCI 53-75; WCB 73-86]. 
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essentially, its aesthetic ontology.”17viii So Bazin’s main purpose is to tackle cinema’s aesthetic 
ontology which I have argued must be distinguished from basic cinematic ontology which can 
also be converted into an ontology of image as evidence. Despite its title, which is ironic, I will 
argue that the essay analyzes the limits to which cinematic realism can be pushed while keeping 
it in the realm of the imaginary. It is not, contrary to what one might expect given the general 
understanding of Bazin’s work, an absolute denunciation of editing in favor of raw realism. 
Let us first look at the subject of Lamorisse’s films. Crin Blanc is set and shot in the 
wetlands of the Camargue region in the south of France. It is about a child from a fisherman’s 
family who watches some ranchers trying to tame a wild horse, Crin Blanc. The horse keeps 
running away from them until they seem to give up. The child manages to tame Crin Blanc 
mainly by holding on to him with a rope while being dragged around the swamp until the horse 
stops and then allows the boy to ride him home. In the meantime, the ranchers come for Crin 
Blanc again and claim him. After some back and forth, in the final escape, Crin Blanc and the 
child are chased by the men until the horse and child fall into the river and are swept away to the 
sea. The fairy tale voiceover describes them as sailing away to a land where horses and men live 
peacefully. The compositional high points of the film are the scene where the boy holds on to the 
horse while being dragged, another in which the child riding Crin Blanc chases a rabbit, and then 
the final one of them both being swept away by the river. All these are shot for the most part in 
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 Bazin, “Montage Interdit,” 118-119 [WCI 43; WCB 75]. My emphasis. Barnard’s translation of the phrase 
“ontologie esthétique” as “ontological aesthetic” perfectly illustrates the power of the narrative that Bazin’s 
aesthetics (as in style) follow from his ontology. No wonder that, despite his very astute philological work on 
Bazin’s use of the word “découpage,” he still thinks that editing is Bazin’s “bête noire.” See Timothy Barnard, 
Découpage (Montreal: Caboose, 2014), 60. 
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long shots which accentuates the drama by highlighting the risks to the child and the horse and 
giving to the rabbit chase a spatial tension. 
Le Ballon Rouge is about a child who finds a red balloon on the way to school and which 
follows him wherever he goes. This creates trouble for the boy first at school where the principal 
frowns upon the balloon and tries to get rid of it, then at home where the parents throw it out of 
the window, and finally in the streets where other kids try to get hold of it. Through it all the 
balloon dodges its attackers and keeps up with the boy until the group of children get hold of it 
and “kill” it. At this moment, all the balloons in Paris fly to the boy who collects them all and in 
turn is borne away by them. The film is shot entirely on the streets of Paris where the balloon and 
the human characters always appear together in the frame with the city around them. This makes 
for a lot of long takes and tracking shots giving us the sense of integral reality that is the subject 
of this discussion. 
Bazin’s primary concern in discussing these films is not to appreciate the images of 
Camargue and Paris that they give us. Though these documentary images are the exceptional 
aspect of the films, he goes on to identify their specifically aesthetic function. In relation to Crin 
Blanc, he writes: 
The landscape of Camargue, the life of the cattle ranchers and the fishermen, the 
conduct of the herds of horses constitute the foundation of the fable, the solid and 
irrefutable point of support of the myth. But precisely on this reality is based a 
dialectic of the imaginary of whose split Crin Blanc is an interesting symbol… More 
than one scene among the most spectacular was shot almost without special effects 
and in some cases in contempt of sure danger. And yet it is enough to reflect on it to 
understand that if what the screen shows and signifies had to be true, effectively 
carried out in front of the camera, the film would have ceased to exist because at the 
same time it would have ceased to be a myth. It’s the fringe of trickery, the margin of 
subterfuge necessary for the logic of the narrative which allows the imaginary to at 
once integrate reality and to substitute it… What is needed for aesthetic plenitude of 
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the enterprise is that we are able to believe in the reality of events while knowing that 
they are rigged.18ix 
What Bazin is arguing here is that if the spectator had been completely drawn into 
thinking about the risks taken by the boy and the horse in shooting some of the sequences, or if 
the sociologist in us observed the actors and the landscape as primarily the reality of Camargue 
rather than as the dramatic elements in the narrative, then there would be no aesthetic text. We 
would then either be present at a pure spectacle in the case of the stunts or be dealing with 
sociological data rather than be under the mythic spell of a fairy tale on film. It is in order to 
abstract away from raw reality that even at its most realist moments the film must find a margin 
for subterfuge. The same argument is true for Le Ballon Rouge which, Bazin says, would be a 
documentary of a miracle if it were all real rather than a fairy tale.19 
The point is to understand what is specific to the trickery of the cinema of integral 
realism if it does not visibly use editing to create meaning that exceeds raw reality. Bazin rules 
out rear projection since audiences by the 1950s would find it too artificial a solution. What is 
needed is the rigging of reality itself: “The illusion is born here, as in prestidigitation, from 
reality.”20x One of the ways in which Lamorisse rigs reality is by using multiple balloons for the 
character of the single red balloon and multiple horses for the one Crin Blanc.21 The realism of 
the image tells us that, “Crin Blanc is at once the true horse who still grazes the salty grass of 
Camargue, and the dream animal who swims eternally in the company of little Falco. His 
cinematographic reality cannot do without documentary reality, but for it to become the truth of 
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 Bazin, “Le réel et L’imaginaire,” 53. 
19
 Bazin, “Montage Interdit,” 122 [WCI 46; WCB 78]. 
20
 Ibid., 121 [WCI 45; WCB 77]. 
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 Ibid., 123 [WCI 47; WCB 79]. 
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our imagination, it must be destroyed and reborn in reality itself.”22xi For this mythic horse to 
exist on the screen, the reality of the actual horse(s) playing him had to be rearranged, that is 
“destroyed” and created again within the landscape of Camargue itself. For the red balloon to 
follow the boy at the latter’s command, the balloon had to be invisibly maneuvered while 
retaining its integration with the Parisian landscape. In their combination of integral realism and 
imaginative narration, these films are “imaginary documentar[ies].”23 
Given their fairy tale narratives, Lamorisse’s films are limit cases illustrating the work of 
integral realism for Bazin. The abstract moral register of their narratives24 grounded in integral 
material reality conforms to the description Bazin provides of a myth’s relationship to reality 
when discussing Les Vacances de Monsieur Hulot: “[Tati] has created, all of a piece, a universe 
perfectly imaginary and completely lifelike, in the sense that the real one, and we along with it, 
can no longer avoid resembling it.”xii In Lamorisse’s films as in Tati’s, “the imaginary that takes 
root in reality and nourishes it….”25xiii These films also illustrate the concluding lines of “The 
Evolution of the Language of Cinema”: “Because it leans on a much greater realism, the 
image—its plastic structure, its organization in time— has at its disposal many more means for 
inflecting and modifying reality from within. The filmmaker is no longer only a rival of the 
painter and the playwright, but finally the equal of a novelist.”26xiv Bazin’s argument is that the 
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modification of reality from within rather than its manipulation on the editing table or through 
other special effects had become the threshold of aesthetic realism on film at the time he was 
writing. 
Here we need to revisit Philip Rosen’s and Daniel Morgan’s somewhat competing 
accounts of Bazinian realism to arrive at a more precise characterization of it.27 On Rosen’s 
account, cinema is an indexical capture on film of the world. This indexical capture does not 
guarantee any accuracy of what has been captured but it guarantees that it had once existed in 
front of the camera. Thus, the filmic image is an indexical trace of reality but without the 
fullness of presence of the original reality. This causes a gap between image and referent despite 
the indexical bind between the two. He designates this gap as an “asymptote of reality,” using a 
word from Bazin’s article on Umberto D.28 Cinematic realism, riding on technological and 
stylistic evolution, approaches closer to capturing the world in greater integrity and detail but 
without ever collapsing the distinction between image and world. This causes the spectatorial 
subject to invest the image with belief and meaning that is always illogical because of the 
inevitable gap. This belief is in the past existence of the world which through film has been 
carried forward into the time of spectatorship.  
According to Rosen, the spectator is led to posit illogical belief in the world on film 
“from the desire to counter threats to its own existence, its own being.”29 But it is unclear how 
and why investing belief in a fictional world shot in a studio can reassure the “defensive subject” 
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about cinema’s ability to rescue her own existence from time. It is also unclear how this could be 
true of even a documentary world to which the spectator never belonged. Since home movies are 
not the standard movie watching experience, one can only conclude that Rosen has overinvested 
in the idea of the historicity contained in the image. All one can say is that the asymptote 
principle of cinematic realism holds good for documentaries such as Kon-Tiki and Naufragé 
Volontaire where they can be said to have captured the reality in front of the camera with great 
precision but that this reality is one that is most marginal to the subjects of the films. If anything, 
Bazin argues for making room for spectatorial subjectivity to be formed in opposition to the 
threat of complete presence of the past on film. Therefore, in writing about Nicole Védrès’s 
compilation film of the Belle Epoque, Paris 1900 (1947), Bazin says that “aesthetic joy is born 
out of a tear, because these ‘memories’ do not belong to us.”30xv Documentary authenticity is 
most productive for subject formation when it is accurate but incomplete because their images 
must not belong to us. But this does not touch the problem of reality in fiction films. While 
Rosen acknowledges in passing the importance of abstraction for Bazin and the range of films 
about which he wrote, he maintains the prior existence of the object that appears in the image as 
the baseline of Bazinian aesthetics.31 
Morgan, as we have seen, contests the argument for a necessary gap between image and 
referent by emphasizing Bazin’s investment in the idea of transfer of reality into the image. 
Through this transfer, the image does not refer to a past existence of the object but brings it 
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wholly into the present. However, he finds the idea of transfer to be a “metaphor” and a 
“conscious overstatement.”32 I have argued in chapters five and six that Bazin was entirely 
serious about the idea of transfer but one that inhabits an uncertain temporality between past and 
present. Because Morgan does not ultimately take the language of transfer seriously enough and 
so does not register the uncertain temporal status of the image in Bazin’s work, he effectively 
draws a line separating Bazin’s interest in perceptual realism from his broader film aesthetics. He 
argues that Bazin judged films based on the internal coherence of their worlds irrespective of 
their investment in perceptual and integral realism. I have argued that for Bazin, under historical 
pressures, there was a greater demand on films to make spatio-temporal coherence the basis of 
the coherence of their diegetic worlds. 
Both Rosen and Morgan are involved in arguing whether the impression of integral 
reality, as trace or transfer, is the baseline for Bazin’s film theory or not. What they both miss is 
the fact that these ideas of reality are the ontological baseline of the medium that Bazin theorized 
but that the extent to which films are required to take them into account is a special, historical 
concern. And the framework in which this “taking into account” must be understood is an 
aesthetic one which is not identical with “aesthetics” understood as film style. What it involves is 
not the maintaining of a gap between image and its non-diegetic referent, but preventing the 
image from having any such direct referent at all (something that Morgan too notes) even when it 
captures it with documentary precision. Therefore, it is important that even when the horse in 
Crin Blanc is a horse that continues to exist somewhere in Camargue that we not think about this 
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fact when watching the film. However exact the geography of Paris as seen in Le Ballon Rouge, 
it remains a Paris of the imagination. 
At one point in his writings, Bazin, a great lover of animals, writes that “the visible death 
of a rabbit in The Rules of the Game affects us in the same way as the narrated one of the little 
cat of Agnès [in Molière’s L’École des Femmes].”33xvi Clearly, with a different understanding of 
animal rights now, this is no longer true for many if not most spectators who, like Vivian 
Sobchack, in watching the hunting scene in The Rules of the Game, find themselves jolted out of 
the diegesis.34 We need disclaimers, preferably validated by a bona fide organization, to keep us 
in the diegesis with similar scenes of animal cruelty in more recent films. But the point is that, in 
Bazin’s time, all the virtuosic tracking shots in Renoir’s film which keep up with the flight of 
rabbits and birds only served to better integrate their real deaths into the imaginary deaths of the 
diegesis. This is a limit illustration of the specifically aesthetic mode of capturing integral reality 
for which the word in Bazin’s writings is not “asymptote,” which signifies a gap from reality, but 
“litote,” a word that, as we will see in the next section, Bazin uses to characterize the work of 
style in the films he privileged. 
A “litote” is an understatement which signifies something by stating its negation; for 
example, saying “It isn’t cold today” on a scorching summer’s day to mean “It is very hot 
today.” Cinematic realism plays on this paradoxical condition in which both the given statement 
and its opposite are true; a typical bright summer’s day isn’t cold and the rabbit really died 
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somewhere in the French countryside where Renoir shot his film, but these “banal” truths are 
less important than the “reality” they signify; this day is hotter than a typical summer’s day and 
the rabbit did not die somewhere in France but dies in the world a decadent haute-bourgeoisie, 
and we see it die in such integral detail because we will not get to see the human death at the end 
of the film at the hands of a gamekeeper who will have been just fired from his job. Unlike an 
asymptote, in which the angle of a line approaches the tip of another but which will never meet it 
even when the two are extended to infinity, a litote signifies passing through integral reality and 
subsuming it into the reality of imagination, “abstraction through incarnation.” This is what we 
have seen Bazin argue by emphasizing how important it was for Lamorisse to capture integral 
and contiguous reality to make his fairy tales more convincing. However, as I will now 
demonstrate, for Bazin the use of the long take and depth-of-field composition to maintain 
respect for integral reality did not in itself guarantee that the aesthetic balance between the 
imaginary and material realities of the postwar world would be politically compelling. 
Long-Take Politics 
Bazin, as we have seen, characterized Greta Garbo as “the highpoint of the “erotic litote” 
because her sexuality depends on her often being fully dressed in extravagant clothes which in 
themselves have little obvious sexual charge. Therefore, we “see” something when only its 
opposite is present. He also uses the words “ellipsis and litote” to describe the style of Monsieur 
Verdoux and of the work of Chaplin in general.35 The Verdoux we see on screen in largely a 
suave person and we never actually see him kill anyone. The only time we see him try is with 
Martha Raye’s character whose comical presence and luck make him look ridiculous. And yet, 
on Bazin’s account this is simply a continuation of the Charlot myth in which we see only the 
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sentimental tramp rather than the ambiguous and inauthentic figure he is. In writing about Diary 
of a Country Priest (1951), he argues that the hyperbolic style of Georges Bernanos’s novel finds 
its equivalent in the “ellipsis and litote of Robert Bresson’s découpage.”36 In comparing the neo-
realisms of Giuseppe De Santis and Vittorio De Sica, he draws a distinction between the 
“romantic eloquence” of the former with the “discretion full of litote and finesse” of the latter.37 I 
return to De Sica below to examine the “litote” character of Bicycle Thieves (1949). To continue, 
“litote” is also the word Bazin uses to describe Welles-Toland’s depth-of-field composition. 
[T]he frequent use… of what we could call the counter-emphasis (contre-mise-en-
valeur) of the subject has never been pushed so far, by which I understand the refusal 
to let the viewer see clearly the culminating events of the scene. This dramatic 
procedure, which is linked to the litote, should not be confused with ellipsis which 
we insist (perhaps excessively) constitutes the fundamental rhetorical figure of 
cinema. With Welles, the entire film is partially withdrawn from our reach, and it is 
the whole action acquires a margin of inaccessibility.38xvii 
He then describes how the lighting in Welles’s film is such that some of the most 
important dialogue comes from characters placed in badly lit corners. What we should note here 
is the distinction between ellipsis and litote. While ellipsis is an important method for abstracting 
reality for aesthetic purposes, it is one that skips over parts of reality instead of passing through 
it. Bazin’s concern here is with understanding the conditions in which certain films have made it 
possible to capture reality in an integral sense so that the space and time of action is wholly 
present to the spectator and yet what remains just out of reach is the clear perception of the 
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dramatic events of the film. Bazin is certainly not arguing that techniques such as the long take 
and depth-of-field composition give us absolute ambiguity—the films of Welles and Wyler are 
perfectly legible in their plot developments—but that they make us perceptually strain to get past 
what is obvious to what is obscure. 
The question, however, is to what extent long takes and depth-of-field were the 
preeminent stylistic devices for Bazin; one that he addresses explicitly towards the end of 
“Editing Prohibited.” He argues that a formal respect for spatio-temporal integrity needs to be 
motivated by the dramatic demands of certain scenes rather than be taken for a categorical 
imperative. Thus, he argues that The Rope (Alfred Hitchcock, 1948) could well have used 
classical editing techniques rather than the choreographed long takes in which it was shot 
without losing its dramatic effect. Scenes that need this respect for reality would include hunting 
scenes, like the seal hunting one in Nanook of the North (Robert Flaherty, 1922), or slapstick 
comedy. Both are Bazin’s examples. Films such as Citizen Kane and The Magnificent 
Ambersons use them only for certain scenes rather than the whole film: “[F]or reality to be 
restored to the narrative, it is sufficient that one suitably chosen shot gathers together the 
elements dispersed beforehand by editing.”39xviii And even if films provide for greater sensitivity 
in our relationship to the spatio-temporal world by retaining its integrity, they do not necessarily 
speak more compellingly about historical reality. 
It wasn’t The Best Years of Our Lives (henceforth Best Years) that evoked the social and 
sensorial reality of the postwar America in Bazin but Crossfire (Edward Dmytryk, 1947). Both 
films are about the difficulties that soldiers returning to America after the war face in 
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reintegrating with society. In Crossfire, an investigation into the murder of a war veteran who 
was seen just before his death having drinks with recently decommissioned soldiers. In piecing 
together, through character flashbacks, the events surrounding the murder, we come to know that 
the motive of murder was anti-Semitism. The film’s dialogue contains as much commentary on 
the difficulties awaiting returning soldiers as on racism. (“Soldiers either go crawling, or they go 
crazy.”) Among its characters is the initial suspect Mitch, a painter who is anxious to return to 
his wife, but also anxious about it since he has been away and his artistic ambitions reduced to 
painting signboards. His friend Keely who looks after him is cynical about postwar America. The 
actual killer Monty vaguely tries to justify his anti-Semitism by brooding bitterly on the 
difference between “professional” and “civilian” soldiers. And, finally, the murdered character, 
Samuels, is seen explaining the postwar condition as an exchange of a definite purpose (that of 
winning the war) for a much more uncertain restoration pre-war responsibilities. 
The plot of Crossfire unfolds over twenty-four hours and moves through some locations 
that, as we will see, caught Bazin’s interest. Mitch meets a dance-hall girl who asks him to go up 
to her apartment and wait. We see both the backyard of the dance hall now in disuse as well as 
the bare apartment which is just a room with a curtain separating the kitchenette, and a door 
separating it from another room occupied by someone who may or may not be her estranged 
husband. There is also the all-night movie theater where Mitch hides while his friends try to 
piece together what happened. Finally, there is the hotel where all the soldiers are put up. The 
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production values are those of a B film in accordance with the budget and the film was shot in a 
stock noir style with expressionist lighting, which Dmytryk says was done to save money.40 
Best Years follows three friends from different social situations and who are dealing with 
a range of problems. Al Stephenson returns to his wife and two kids and to a bank job where he 
is discouraged from giving out loans to soldiers since they may not be able to reintegrate into the 
economy well enough to repay them. Fred Derry returns to his job operating a soda machine 
since the postwar economy cannot accommodate his superior skills and greater social 
aspirations. This strains his relationship with his wife who is embarrassed by his job. Homer 
Parrish has lost both his hands in place of which he has to learn to use metal forks. Because of 
this, he seeks to break the engagement with his fiancée, Wilma. The film unfolds over several 
months, was one of the more expensive films, and the long take and depth-of-field composition 
required more elaborate settings. Homer Parrish is played by the real-life war amputee Harold 
Russell. The aviation junk yard towards the end of the film where Fred recalls the war as a time 
of heroism and promise is a real junkyard.41 
Both films had been criticized to some extent in France for abstracting away American 
social realities. In the same article in Les Temps Modernes where Nathalie Moffat criticized 
Monsieur Verdoux, to which Bazin responded so vigorously, she had also expressed 
disappointment with the happy ending of Best Years.42 Writing in L’Écran Français, Georges 
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Altman, in a response to Bazin, criticized Crossfire for not touching upon the experience of 
black Americans at all even when tackling the question of racism in America and for being 
summary in taking up the problem of anti-Semitism.43 Bazin himself compared Best Years with 
Crossfire to come to some surprising conclusions; surprising that is in relation to our current 
understanding of Bazininan realism as integral realism.44 Given the widely divergent production 
qualities of the two films but their shared mandate for exploring the social problems of postwar 
America, particularly as they relate to demobilized soldiers, Bazin explicitly raises the question 
of cinematic realism’s relationship to historical reality. 
Bazin notes that more and more postwar American films had been looking to exchange 
the unreality of studio decor for the authenticity of the streets, trying to create an aesthetic that is 
an “intermediary between the documentary and the newsreel.” He places Best Years in this 
context and, despite admiration for its fluid composition, is skeptical about this drive towards 
authenticity. 
The concern for truth, social preoccupations, and material honesty are moral qualities 
rather than aesthetic values… Authentic settings, the true revolver from the true 
crime, the true amputee from the true war is all very well; the truth of art passes 
through this, but it cannot stop there… It is perhaps in following this Ariadne’s 
thread of lost reality that American cinema will find its way out of the labyrinth of 
artifice where it’s lost. On condition that upon exiting it does not confuse life with 
the process of blood transfusion.45xix 
We see here Bazin’s abiding suspicion of the truth claims of the filmic image. In using the word 
“blood transfusion” to characterize this false realism, he cautions against a transposition of 
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material reality on to the screen in order to make the film and the world coincide, giving forth a 
sense of immediacy and truth that is devoid of the dividing line of the aesthetic.46 What bothered 
Bazin was the combination of realist and exhaustive detail with the film’s scrupulous concern for 
being representative of the entirety of postwar social reality. He calls it a “kind of civil epic 
where the scriptwriters have inventoried as many exemplary situations as possible,” making it a 
“grand lesson of things.”47xx This combination of exhaustiveness of social detail with the 
exhaustiveness of material detail made the film, despite Bazin’s admiration for Wyler’s style, 
into a moral lesson on postwar America rather than an aesthetic mediation of that history. 
Here I will take a bit of a detour to address a seemingly glaring contradiction from what 
he know of Bazin’s bibliography. If Bazin had severe reservation about the realism of Best Years 
in October-November 1947, we might be inclined to think that he changed his mind when he 
wrote “William Wyler, or the Jansenist of the mise-en-scène” (henceforth “Jansenist”) in 1948.48 
But things are a little more complicated than that since he had already analyzed and defended the 
importance of depth-of-field composition of Citizen Kane in the February 1947 issue of Les 
Temps Modernes and acknowledges the significance of this technique in Wyler’s film in the 
1947 review of Best Years.49 Moreover, his first use of the adjective “Jansenist” to describe 
Wyler’s style was in the 1946 article in L’Écran Français on the “new American style” where he 
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talks about The Little Foxes (1941), an adaptation of a play.50 This is important to underline 
because Laurence le Forestier, in his haste to explain Bazin through some overall Foucauldian 
grid of French discourse, argues that it shouldn’t be surprising if he defended Crossfire in a 
“committed” journal such as L’Écran Français and talked about a Jansenist style in a more 
“aesthetic” journal such as La Revue du Cinéma.51 
The record tells us that Bazin defended Crossfire against the “committed” Georges 
Altman who preferred Best Years to it L’Écran Français. And he first brought up the “non-
political” concern with depth-of-field in the “committed” L’Écran Français and then elaborated 
it in the “committed” Les Temps Modernes and in the “aesthetic” La Revue du Cinéma, in the 
same way that he defended the ideologically-confusing Monsieur Verdoux in Les Temps 
Modernes and La Revue du Cinéma. If Foucauldian historians are to let themselves be bothered 
about the work of individual critics at all, then they would do well to note Bazin’s argument that 
individuals are indissociable from history but not reducible to it. In “Jansenist,” Bazin treated the 
work of Wyler, or some of his films, along the lines of experimental films that have yielded 
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important stylistic discoveries that would feed into broader film production; that is, the kind of 
popular avant-garde that his critical program promoted and that I discuss in chapter two. In 
“Jansenist,” Bazin mentions the impact of the war and of the opening of the camps on Wyler’s 
style by quoting him on the subject to underline the importance of this style to postwar 
sensibilities, but he calls Best Years, without stressing the negative connotations, a “civic rather 
than artistic work” and likens it to the “didactic films” of the Army.52 Thus, even in “Jansenist,” 
Bazin drew attention to the postwar theme of the film and the effect of war on Wyler’s style, but 
did not argue that the one corresponded to the other adequately in Best Years itself. 
To return to Bazin’s comparison of Best Years with Crossfire, he first draws them 
together on the level of the subject. While Altman and, presumably others, treated Crossfire 
primarily as a tract against anti-Semitism and found it wanting on this front, Bazin read the film 
as much more about the condition of demobilized soldiers and of postwar America in general, 
much like Best Years. Except for a sermon by the investigating officer to a potential decoy for 
trapping the killer, Bazin finds that the film is much more concerned with the condition of the 
soldiers and the postwar society represented by the dance-hall girl whom Mitch, the initial 
suspect, meets and to whose apartment he returns to wait.53 
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even in New York if it’s a play. But no producer would be foolish enough to commission a film banned in advance 
by half of America. The scriptwriters [of Crossfire] have gone as far as they could with the racial question. It seems 
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I simply continue to claim that despite the oblique angle and inadequacy of the attack 
[on anti-Semitism], Dmytryk goes much deeper into the subject [of postwar 
reintegration] than Wyler. And above all that the “realism” of Crossfire is 
aesthetically much more convincing. Because finally it’s a matter of art and not 
pedagogy. Dmytryk gives me perhaps less information for a monograph on 
demobilization in America, but in the brief burst of magnesium of Crossfire I take 
away a much more tragic feeling for the moral situation of the GI.54xxi 
The way to understanding the moral dimension of historical experience in cinema, as we see 
here, is through aesthetic rather than exhaustive reality; that is, through an abstracted materiality. 
And the proof of this is that Bazin registers this moral dimension by registering the material 
details of Dmytryk’s film. 
Dmytryk realized his film in twenty-four days with an evident poverty of means. 
Few sets, often partial and of exceptional bareness, of which only four have a real 
dramatic role: the corner of a bar, three seats in a cinema hall in the last rows of the 
balcony, the semi-public room of a girl with a curtain to hide the kitchen, and the 
policeman’s office (as dreary as possible)… Within this little space, however, I can 
strain to find out… how one goes to the cinema in America and until what time. I 
know how the hotel rooms are, and I have seen a kitchen without a refrigerator but 
with a gas stove where milk can overflow and leave the same grime as at my place 
(if I had milk).55xxii 
Bazin notices all these “documentary” details through the bare studio sets of Crossfire, 
and while these are much meagre compared to what Best Years provides they are much more 
affecting, not because they stand outside the narrative as for a cinephilic audience which 
fetishizes detail over plot, but because of their integration into the plot. Given the fact that the 
plot unfolds while the soldiers are still stationed at a hotel with no clear indications about where 
they are headed, Bazin reads the geography of the film as a “no man’s land” and a “social 
swamp” through which “a line of extraordinarily pure action passes” that leads through two 
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murders to the death of the killer. Speaking about the image of America the film conjures up, he 
writes, “[T]hese images stick to this sick world like an insipid chewing gum chewed through to 
despair.”56xxiii 
To understand Bazin’s aesthetic grasp of historical reality through the descriptions I have 
cited, we need to note certain movements here. The first level of movements is at the level of the 
text, between convention and reality and between metonymy and metaphor. The generic story 
frames historical detail which is not specific to the genre of detective films: that of de-mobilized 
soldiers and racism. The equally generic studio sets and lighting capture the bits of material 
reality of postwar urban America. But they are all contained by the overall sense of despair that 
Bazin describes with the metaphor of the insipid chewing gum. This sense of despair applies 
both to America and to postwar Paris. On a second level, he goes on to describe the 
overpowering nature of this mood, collapsing the worlds of the film, of postwar America, and 
postwar Europe: “At dawn, we finally leave this story stinking of tobacco and alcohol, and the 
fresh air of the day returns hope to life. But the head is still heavy with bad whisky and above all 
with that other much more sickly hangover of the war.”57xxiv By abstracting away reality, 
Crossfire engages history and the French spectator-critic Bazin much more completely than the 
“blood transfusion” of Best Years, to the extent that for a while its mood prevails over any signs 
of postwar hope. It succeeds in this because “we never sense that Dmytryk needed to make true 
[faire vrai] in order to be sure of being true.”58xxv 
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A closer look at the touchstone film of what we take for Bazinian realism, Best Years, 
turns out to have ceded in his estimation to a genre film dealing with the same subject and 
evoking the same material reality. I would not take this to mean that “Jansenist” does not stand 
as a key engagement with the potential of integral realism for transforming spectatorial 
experience and making it more participative. This and other essays, especially “Theater and 
Cinema,” contain much more complex insights on this question than we have credited Bazin 
with. In chapter five, I briefly sketched his exploration of the problem of spectatorial 
identification. I would argue that taking this up in greater detail would add further layers of 
complexity to Bazin’s account of aesthetic experience without changing it. What Bazin was 
working out was how exploration of integral realism, under historical pressures, can create 
techniques that would fulfill, in new ways, the same aesthetic mandate for engaging spectators in 
the social imaginary that the older conventions had met so well. But then again, the question of 
subjects was just as important as ever and indissociable with questions of style. 
Italian Neo-Realism, or Narrating Pre-revolutionary Reality 
No body of films is more associated with Bazin’s critical program than Italian neo-
realism. While the films of Welles, Wyler, and Renoir are invoked in relation to his writings on 
style, we all take Italian neo-realism (henceforth “neo-realism” but always to indicate Italian 
neo-realism unless otherwise specified) to represent his humanist ideal where questions of style 
and technique efface themselves until, invoking that notorious sentence from his essay on 
Bicycle Thieves, “No more actors, no more story, no more mise-en-scène, which is to say that in 
the perfect aesthetic illusion of reality there is no more cinema.”59xxvi If over more than six 
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chapters I have argued for an understanding of Bazin that is the very opposite of what these lines 
seem to convey, then either Italian neo-realism is a separate area of Bazin’s critical work 
protected from his broader theoretical commitments or nothing illustrates better around five 
decades of misreading Bazin than the reception of his writings on Italian neo-realism. To make 
my argument that these writings indeed best represent our collective misreading of Bazin, and 
that he saw in neo-realism an explicitly political aesthetic, I will start with his analysis of the 
movement in the late ‘40s as contained in “Cinematographic Realism and the Italian School of 
Liberation” (henceforth “Italian School”), an essay which appeared in a special 1948 issue of 
Esprit on postwar Italy. Following this, I will concentrate upon his reading of Bicycle Thieves 
where the broader claims are illustrated with reference to a key text of the movement. 
Like with the question of realism, where I have not taken up Bazin’s analysis of the 
perceptual positioning of the spectator, I will not be able to touch upon a range of issues that 
define Bazin’s engagement with Italian neo-realism. These include his analyses of its different 
phases from Rome, Open City through Rossellini’s later films with Ingrid Bergman to Fellini’s 
early films with a range of other neo-realisms in between. What is at stake in these phases are not 
only different styles—including pronounced baroque tendencies in a film like Il Cristo Proibito 
and the comparison of these films with the style of American novelists such as William Faulkner, 
John Dos Passos, and Ernest Hemingway—but also the mix and opposition between Marxist and 
Catholic ideologies which made Italian neo-realism such a resonant body of work for the French 
critics who worked in a social context somewhat ideologically similar but much more polarized. 
While I discuss the ideological background and questions of style here, a deeper exploration of 
this and the other issues would thicken the historical context within France and deepen the 
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discussion of the post-theological function of art as a producer of social mythologies without 
however contradicting anything in what follows. 
There are two characteristics specific to neo-realism’s emergence that Bazin identifies at 
the outset to mark its special status in postwar production. The first is that its interest in 
exploring the conjunction of material and social reality predates the Liberation by a few years. 
He highlights the various institutions in Fascist Italy that prepared the ground for practical and 
critical training for most of the filmmakers who stood out in the postwar production. The Venice 
Film Festival and the Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia date back to the early and mid-
thirties and directly influenced the postwar film culture of Europe with its burgeoning film 
festivals and film schools. He names around ten films from before the end of war that had 
pronounced affinity with postwar neo-realism. Bazin’s purpose in laying out this background is 
to point to the gestation of a critical aesthetic rather than its sui generis emergence with the 
Liberation. Another important thing to note here is that the impulse towards greater realism in 
Italian films developed in a more considered and gradual manner, perhaps in reaction to the 
spectacular super-productions that Italy was famous for, rather than exclusively to the pressures 
of evidentiary realism of wartime newsreels. Bazin mentions the influence of Jean Renoir on 
Italy in this regard. 
The second characteristic identified by Bazin, and which emphasizes rupture rather than 
continuity, is the socio-political context. Here he compares the respective Liberations of Italy 
and France. In France, the Resistance immediately became the stuff of legend while the country 
pretended to pick up its history from before the Occupation. In Italy, the Liberation was followed 
by a complete rupture from a long-established political regime, and then occupation by the 
Allies, and social and economic upheaval. Therefore, while the French were happy enough 
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making films that consolidated the national imaginary around the mythology of the Resistance, 
the Italian filmmakers were denied such comfort and had to keep up with the uncertainty of the 
times. It is amidst this uncertainty where coherent mythologies had difficulty emerging that neo-
realism sticks to the details of social and material reality to cultivate a sensibility which Bazin 
calls “revolutionary humanism.” 
This perfect and natural adherence to topicality [actualité] is internally explained and 
justified by a spiritual adhesion to the epoch. In a certain sense, Italy is only three 
years old. But the same cause could have produced other effects. What is ceaselessly 
admirable and assures Italian cinema a very large audience in the western countries 
is the meaning that attaches itself to the painting of topicality. In a world again and 
already obsessed by terror and hate, where reality is almost never loved for itself, but 
only refused or defended as a political sign, Italian cinema is certainly the only one 
which conserves a revolutionary humanism in the midst of the epoch it depicts.60xxvii 
This evocation of Cold War polarization in Europe—“a world again and already obsessed…”—
and the congealing of reality around it gives the uncertainties of Italy a special charge and makes 
its humanism revolutionary “from which terror seems as yet absent.”61xxviii It is this historical 
reality that is the subject of Italian neo-realism much before it is any concern for integrity of 
space and time, which is why Bazin often uses the word actualité to refer to the topicality of its 
subjects rather than to any newsreel quality of its images.62 
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By “revolutionary humanism” Bazin means an openness to engage across ideological 
barriers, a “communicative generosity,” in the construction of postwar society. While this does 
not mean keeping aside ideology, since the construction of reality is necessarily an ideological 
operation, ideologies, particularly institutionalized ones like Marxism, Communism, and 
Catholicism, exist amidst a reality that palpably exceeds them. This makes “Italian cinema, for 
the moment, much less political than sociological.” A range of social problems related to 
unemployment have prevented “a priori political values” from acquiring preeminence in socio-
political experience. Within this fluid situation, ideological positions are forced to improvise 
together as much to salvage society as to keep themselves relevant. This improvisation has a 
paradoxical character in the films which have a range of collaborators across ideological divides, 
particularly on the scripts, but the films themselves are careful to emphasize individual 
experience in relation to the social context rather than group experience. Bazin likes this 
ideological and artistic improvisation to the “interdependence of improvisation of the commedia 
dell’arte or even of hot jazz.”63xxix And here we come upon the aesthetic difference of neo-
realism from the standard generic or dramatic film in tapping the social unconscious.64 
Genre films tap into as well as impact the social imaginary from an aesthetic remove. 
This construction thrives and keeps its relevance through repetition across films which 
presupposes some continuity in society. Neo-realism is denied this continuity which forces it 
keep up with a reality that changes along unpredictable lines. Italian society exists amidst global 
ideological hardening, but within Italy ideology is forced to improvise along with rather than 
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stabilize reality. People have not stopped believing in the possibility of a workers’ utopia or 
Christian transcendence or range of other ideals, but they cannot ground them in a reality that 
can be relied upon, however deceptively, to hold them in place. Therefore, unlike the usual 
bodies of work built around genres or national film movements, the paradox of neo-realism is 
that it cannot but reject this reality that it is forced to keep up with, without however knowing 
where it is headed. 
To take the case of the Soviet avant-garde to which Bazin likens neo-realism’s political 
importance, it had the mandate for constructing the social imaginary along the lines of an 
ideology in power so that for it reality was not to be rejected but to be actively seized and 
reshaped in keeping with this ideology. Therefore, its montage-based aesthetic was a historically 
sanctioned realism which could not be revived in postwar Italy. Or to take the example of the 
Western, all narrative incidents, even improvisations and modulations, derive their meaning 
within an overall mythology. These national bodies of work emerge in the wake of completed 
revolutions or historical movements and in that sense they are “post-revolutionary” unlike the 
Italian films. 
The recent Italian films are at the very least pre-revolutionary. They all refuse, 
implicitly or explicitly, through humor, satire, or poetry, the social reality that they 
draw upon. But they know even when taking up the clearest positions to never treat 
this reality as a means. To condemn it is not necessarily to be in bad faith [in the 
moral sense unlike the psychological one discussed above]. They do not forget that 
before being condemnable the world quite simply is.65xxx 
We need to note here both the refusal of the world and its acknowledgment to realize 
Bazin’s point that you cannot refuse what does not exist as well as the fact that the Italians could 
not but refuse what existed. It is the kind of situation in which revolutions are made but not the 
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kind of situation in which a revolutionary reality has begun to establish itself. For the Soviet 
filmmakers a reality that they refused—for example, farms that had not been collectivized, the 
hold of the Church on people’s minds—had an ideological alternative, whereas for the Italian 
filmmakers there was only an unpredictable reality. We take this historical argument made by 
Bazin for neo-realism’s specificity to be a general affirmation of political quietism. Let us now 
see the specific stylistic solutions with which Italian filmmakers responded to this condition 
through the example of Bicycle Thieves. 
Bicycle Thieves: A Thesis Film 
Bazin analyzes Bicycle Thieves as a thesis film which like other works of neo-realism 
refuses existing social conditions, but which, also like other neo-realist films, is aesthetically 
revolutionary in how it draws us into taking up this attitude. 
The thesis implied is of a marvelous and atrocious simplicity: in a world where in 
order to subsist this worker, the poor, must steal from each other. But this thesis is 
never posed as such. The linking of events is always of a verisimilitude at once 
rigorous and anecdotal. Basically, the worker could have found the cycle in the 
middle of the film; only, there would have been no film.66xxxi 
The whole argument turns upon the problem of how a thesis as clear as “the poor must steal from 
each other to survive” can be carried by a story composed of episodic and accidental events with 
no clear logical or dramatic progression from one to the other. Among these assorted incidents 
there could also have been one in which the worker finds his bike and this hypothetical 
possibility should take away from the force of the thesis. To understand how the thesis 
nonetheless holds, the question which needs answering is why the narrative actually needs to be 
episodic rather than constructed along causal lines. 
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There are different reasons for this according to Bazin. The first is that Bicycle Thieves 
acquires its full dramatic force only in the context of Italian social reality in 1948 where the theft 
of something as simple as a cycle can lead to indefinite unemployment.67 As we have seen him 
argue, the blame for such dire social conditions is carried at once by all social institutions and 
ideologies, and therefore by no one in particular. Bazin compares the character of the Church and 
the Party as they appear in the film. Antonio goes to a union branch to ask his friends for help 
and only these friends in their personal capacity try to help him. There could be no question here 
of asking the union to either officially organize a search for the stolen cycle or to find him a 
replacement, “because the unions work for justice and not for charity.”68xxxii On the other hand, 
the paternalism of the Church “is intolerable, because its ‘charity’ is blind to this individual 
tragedy without [unlike the Party] doing anything to really change the world which is its 
cause.”69xxxiii 
While it would be difficult to place the blame finally at the doorstep of the Church when 
state failure, best represented by the police, is more immediately implicated in Antonio’s crisis, a 
Church that claims authority over social life cannot escape criticism. The scene that captures the 
ambiguity of this critique for Bazin is the one where Antonio and his son are taking shelter from 
the rain and a group of Austrian priests surrounds them while doing the same: “We have no valid 
reason for blaming them for being so talkative and for speaking in German on top of that. But it 
would be difficult to create a situation objectively more anti-clerical.”70xxxiv The Church’s 
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indifference at the same time its glibness is captured “objectively” in the chatter of the priests 
and a language that becomes a metaphor of incomprehension. Then there is the scene in the 
restaurant where Antonio and Bruno enjoy a meal with Antonio forgetting for a moment that it is 
his last bit of money only for him to be reminded of it by the wealth of those dining around him. 
Finally, there are incidents that interrupt the search and have no connection to social reality, such 
as the one where Bruno needs to urinate in the middle of a chase and the rain storm that forces 
father and son to take shelter. So the episodic structure does at least two interrelated things: it 
gives a cross-section of social reality that makes the loss of a cycle a crisis of such proportions 
for a worker; but it also breaks a direct causal relationship between social reality and the drama 
of the search for the cycle. 
For Bazin, the breaking of the causal link both among narrative events and also between 
the social reality and the drama of the search for the cycle lies at the heart of the political 
efficacy of the film. He explains this by comparing what Bicycle Thieves does with what a usual 
thesis or propaganda film would have done. 
[A] propaganda film would have demonstrated that the worker cannot find his cycle 
and that he is necessarily caught in the infernal circle of his poverty. De Sica limits 
himself to showing us that the worker can not [peut ne pas] find his cycle and 
because of this he will no doubt be unemployed again. But who cannot see that it is 
the accidental character of the script which constitutes the necessity of the thesis, 
whereas the least doubt about the necessity of the events in a propaganda script 
would have rendered the thesis hypothetical.71xxxv 
We thus return to the claim at the outset that because in the logic of an episodic script 
Antonio could have found the cycle, the film’s thesis is much more effective than it would have 
been in a causally constructed script whose logic would have required that Antonio must not find 
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the cycle. The reason these lines give us is that if the thesis is linked to logic, then it would pass 
from the realm of the aesthetic to the realm of reason. Apart from Bazin’s resistance to such a 
reduction (as discussed in chapters five and six), he implies that those a priori ideologically 
resistant to the thesis could argue from the complexity of social reality to easily weaken it. The 
film simply shows that Antonio tries everything he could to find the cycle but that he fails to find 
it, and because of this simple theft, in itself a random occurrence perhaps, is himself reduced to 
stealing, and this is not his personal failing but one for which the whole social reality we see in 
the film is responsible. It does not show that he had to fail in finding the bicycle, which would 
have meant demonstrating what specifically is wrong with society that can then be set right. 
As we have seen… the events and beings are never solicited for a social thesis. But 
the thesis emerges from them fully armed and that much more irrefutable for being 
given to us as a surplus. It is our mind [esprit] which brings it out and constructs it, 
not the film.72xxxvi 
The fact that Antonio and his predicament exist first for themselves before serving the 
film’s thesis means that as spectators we are engaged in a process of identification with him. 
Therefore, the words, “It is our mind that brings it out and constructs [the thesis],” should not be 
taken to mean that we are above all distant and critical spectators, as when watching the films of 
André Cayatte (chapter six), who draw reasoned conclusions. Therefore, the next move in 
Bazin’s argument is to explain how the film constructs the personal dimension of the narrative. 
We see Antonio’s wife pawning the bedsheets to redeem the bicycle he needs to take up 
the new job, and also consulting a soothsayer earlier about his prospects, to be told that her 
husband will find a job soon. This combination of irrational faith and decisive, effective action 
makes her an outlier in a film where consequences never follow as decisively from action, let 
                                                 
72
 Ibid., 50 [WCII 52]. 
342 
 
alone consequence from prediction. Therefore, she disappears from the film once the search 
begins and with her the most likely site for registering the personal consequences of Antonio’s 
predicament. Instead, it is the son, Bruno, who provides this personal dimension but whose 
presence constantly distracts from the search, who sometimes walks alongside Antonio, 
sometimes lags, and sometimes runs ahead. Bruno marks the alternation between the personal 
and the social, showing their inter-relationship, but cutting any economic determinism between 
the two. He is “the intimate witness, the private chorus attached to [the father’s] tragedy.”73xxxvii 
No economic explanation for Antonio’s plight could give an account of the moral humiliation 
that is the consequence of social conditions without this personal witness blind to that 
explanation. If politics is more than just economic efficiency, if social solidarity is grounded in a 
sense of personal dignity rather than an abstract commitment, then a social tragedy must have a 
personal and moral dimension that accompanies social reality (like a chorus) but not reducible to 
it. Therefore, the fact that the film constructs this personal dimension never completely in sync 
with the social even when it is completely tied to it makes the affective basis of the thesis 
immune to rational argumentation. 
From the argument so far, it must be clear that Italian neo-realism’s greatest innovation 
for Bazin was at the level of narrative rather than at the level of style. He likens the episodic 
structure of Bicycle Thieves and neo-realism in general to the structure of slapstick narratives and 
to commedia dell’arte with the difference that they have been transposed into an explicitly tragic 
mode. Where conventionally tragic narratives move inexorably towards catastrophe, neo-realist 
films arrive at it through indirection and detours. And yet such narrative innovation did in turn 
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call for stylistic innovations: “no more actors, no more story, no more mise-en-scène.” If the 
discussion so far demonstrates how intricately constructed the narrative of Bicycle Thieves is, 
then it should be clear that Bazin’s “no more story” means something else than what it literally 
says: that everything appears in the film as representative of some social or personal reality 
without all of these aspects following logically from each other. Let me now look briefly at “no 
more actors” and “no more mise-en-scène.” 
If neo-realist narratives cannot repeat themselves because they have to keep up with a 
society in flux, and if all they have in common is an attitude, then they cannot have any stock 
characters or personae. If this is the case, then they generally cannot use stars or otherwise 
recognizable actors who, as we have seen Bazin argue, bring their own personae with them. 
These films could and often did use professionals but used them against type (Anna Magnani, 
Bazin points out, was a singer and so had a public persona); or they sometimes picked non-
professionals but in accordance with suitability to character and not for the similarity of their 
lives to the characters. “What is important is to not to use the professional in the usual capacity. 
The rapport that he builds with his character must not be marked for the public by any a priori 
idea.”74xxxviii “It can no longer even be a question of whether an actor
75 performs more or less 
well, as much as that man is identical with his character… It is not the singular excellence of this 
worker or this kid that makes for the quality of their performance, but the whole aesthetic system 
in which they come to be inserted.”76xxxix This is no different from how star performance works 
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except for one crucial difference. The star persona, once established in some indirect accord with 
a relatively enduring social reality, has characters written for it to ensure its persistence from one 
role to another. In neo-realism, the character precedes the actor in keeping with a fluid social 
reality and therefore the actor is picked for his or her suitability. Therefore, “no more actors in a 
recognizable sense” rather than “no more actors tout court.” 
In one of the more unfortunate translation errors, Hugh gray translates “plus de mise-en-
scène” as “no more sets.” Bazin begins the essay on Bicycle Thieves by worrying about a 
possible impasse in neo-realism of which the main sign was a reflexive use of real locations. The 
documentary authenticity of the early postwar films “was inseparable from a certain historical 
conjuncture… [b]ut the novelty and above all the sharpness of this technical crudity [has] lost its 
surprise….”77xl 
But worst of all is the appearance of a sort of “neo-realist” super-production where 
the search for real location, manners, the depiction of the working-class milieu, the 
social background has become an academic cliché, and in this regard much more 
detestable than the elephants of Scipion l’Africain (1937).78xli 
As should be expected by now, Bazin speaks about the need to integrate material realism 
into an aesthetic structure, and then gives no importance to the real locations of Bicycle 
Thieves.79 The discussion of mise-en-scène actually refers to the film’s editing which he argues 
seems as neutral as that of a Chaplin film, giving the impression of long takes in which the action 
unfolds without interruption. But then he points out that upon a closer look the film will turn out 
to be conventionally edited, and much more so than Paisa. The only difference from the standard 
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films is that classical editing in Bicycle Thieves never works along the causal logic of action, 
because its action itself lacks that kind of logic. A cut never links consequence to action because 
they are not so linked in the narrative. 
So, no more actors, no more story, and no more mise-en-scène, in favor of an “aesthetic 
illusion of reality” which is the social reality of Italy in 1948. In fact, Bazin wrote an article titled 
“Néo-réalisme et ‘réportage à thèse’” in 1952 arguing that in France and in Hollywood several 
films had employed the clichés of Italian neo-realism—non-professional actors, or actors cast 
against type, documentary realism, and above all subjects of current social relevance—but 
without the historical conditions that would allow them to create an “aesthetic illusion” they have 
turned out like “curdled mayonnaise” in which one can easily distinguish the “oil of realism” 
from the “yolk of good intentions.”80xlii In Italy, however, it yielded an aesthetic illusion of 
reality with a clear purpose: that of leading the audience to adopt an attitude of refusal towards a 
reality that it at the same time cannot deny, so that it may feel compelled to change it. 
It is stupid and perhaps as naïve as Beaumarchais’s praise for the tears of 
melodrama, but tell me if, upon leaving an Italian film, you do not feel better, if you 
do not desire to change the order of things, preferably by persuading men, at least 
those who can be persuaded and who have been led only by blindness, prejudice or 
misfortune to hurt their own.81xliii 
This is indeed as “naïve” a faith in the political efficacy of cinema as one can find—that 
it will enthuse people into changing the world—but we must emphasize the “preferably by 
persuading men” which underlies the essentially discursive basis of this enthusiasm. And this 
discursiveness cannot draw upon anything other than images of a society without any logical 
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causality built into them. The enthused spectators can only speak from a place of affect because 
to say that the Church or the Party or even the police is singularly responsible for Antonio’s 
condition would be absurd based on the filmic evidence; to say that they are collectively 
responsible would be true enough but the film offers no alternative except their rejection. But 
then again, as Arendt reminds us, when we say that everyone is guilty then no one in particular 
can be held responsible. And that is the intolerability of the Italian situation, its pre-revolutionary 
character, according to Bazin.82 We see an indifference of these institutions but there is no direct 
line from there to a program for changing the world; and a simple rejection of them is not such a 
program. Therefore, the most remarkable line of Bazin’s essay is not the one about no more 
actors etc., but “De Sica wins every play on the board… without having placed a bet.”83xliv His 
thesis stands after the film has been put through every political logic because it testifies only to a 
condition and escapes those logical structures. 
The aesthetic accomplishment of neo-realism is summed up by one of Bazin’s subtitles in 
“Italian School”— “love and the refusal of reality.”84xlv Here “love” is nothing but the reflexive 
affirmation of whatever is even if it is unacceptable, an affirmation that could be the first step in 
transforming it without drawing the trajectory for it. Bazin develops this line of thought 
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extensively in a long article on De Sica for an Italian publication where he equates love with 
poetry in the sense of poiesis as the fabrication of something: “Poetry is nothing but the active 
and creative form of love, its projection on to the universe.”85xlvi And yet, rather than being 
comforting, the idea of love Bazin has in mind is its capacity to unsettle. He argues that the 
quality of “naïve love” that is the basis of De Sica-Zavattini’s work is best gauged by the fact 
that critics of diverse political persuasions have tried to claim their films for their own 
ideological line. When diverse ideologies claim the same object of experience, whether they like 
it or not, they are brought to share the same terrain and run the risk of identifying with each 
other. This possibility that in aesthetic experience one may end up identifying with experiences 
and ideological positions that we are opposed to cannot and should not be comforting. 
No one, hopefully, can persuade us that in accepting our “ontological sympathy” for 
Verdoux we need to accept his misogyny. We need critical vigilance to love Verdoux while 
rejecting his misogyny, and this is a strange thing to do. This is why Bazin distinguishes the 
capacity of poetic love to cross ideological barriers from any sense of optimism or pity. As with 
Chaplin, he compares the work of De Sica to Kafka to explain why we sometimes need to 
dissociate our affective responses to the world and to people from our necessary ideological 
commitments. 
[Kafka’s] drama is this: God doesn’t exist, the last office in the Castle is empty. 
There perhaps is the specific tragedy of the modern world, the passage to the 
transcendence of a social reality which births its own deification. The troubles of 
Bruno [from Miracle in Milan] and Umberto D. have immediate and visible causes, 
but we sense that there is also an insoluble residue made up of the psychological and 
material complexity of social relations that neither the excellence of institutions nor 
the good will of our neighbor can make disappear. The nature of this residue is no 
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less positive and social, but its action sometimes comes from an absurd and 
imperative fatality.86xlvii 
The kind of social love that is characteristic of aesthetic experience is here once again 
placed in the context of a post-theological world. “A social reality which births its own 
deification” is a reference to all the secular ideological constructs which seek to shape the world 
in their own image, and this is not only valid but necessary for organizing complex societies. But 
we need to keep coming up against the awareness of this “insoluble residue” of absurdity which 
derails all attempts at perfection. If this were not the case, “the earthly paradise would be in 
Sweden where the bicycles remain day and night on the pavements.”87xlviii The idea of politics as 
the organization of society, Bazin writes, has no regard for subjectivity, and therefore a perfectly 
functional politics in this sense “would no longer call upon love which would then become a 
private affair between man and man.”88xlix It is essentially a recognition of the inevitably tragic 
character of modern existence that makes love a political virtue. The alternative would be an 
accusatory denunciation of society like the thesis films of André Cayatte which, as we have seen 
Bazin argue, subsume reality into this denunciatory logic, leave nothing untainted by guilt and is 
more likely to lead to an erosion of reality after which it would be absurd to speak of politics or 
transformation. 
Conclusion 
I mentioned earlier that if his writings on Italian neo-realism are not to be considered as a 
part of Bazin’s work separate from his interest in generic films or from his anxieties about the 
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realism of the filmic image, then perhaps nothing illustrates the misunderstandings that have 
attended his reception better than these texts. Therefore, I will conclude this chapter and my 
reading of Bazin by looking briefly at what these misreadings might tell us about the epistemic 
conditions in which his work has been received. Let us start with Christopher Williams’s 1973 
review of Bazin’s writings on neo-realism which consisted of extended excerpts. He starts by 
citing at length Bazin’s lines on revolutionary humanism that the latter had placed under the sub-
heading “Love and the refusal of reality.” Williams’s conclusion is, “Bazin does not confront the 
problem of how a film might simultaneously refuse reality and yet be an expression of love for 
it.”89 I have argued here that that is clearly what Bazin does—“love and [not or] the refusal of 
the real”—and the lines Williams cites state so plainly. He then brings up Bazin’s argument that 
De Sica’s thesis in Bicycle Thieves stronger because the worker could not find his bike rather 
than insisting that he cannot find it. Williams uses this to suggest that Bazin does not care for 
propaganda rather than attending to the emphasis on a propaganda based on logical reasoning.90 
Noting that for Bazin questions of style, if they come up at all, are a means to the end of a 
passive revelation of meaning that lies hidden in reality, he writes, “If this is an aesthetic, it is 
one that has effectively abdicated.”91 Thus, he cites Bazin at length describing the necessary 
work of abstraction in cinema, where the latter’s examples of such abstraction are Arnheimian 
elements of “black and white, plane surface” and Eisensteinian “laws of montage.” This is also 
the paragraph where Bazin goes on to argue for the importance of lying to art. Williams 
concludes that nothing illustrates better than these lines Bazin’s ideal of “integral realism”—the 
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term he uses in “The myth of total cinema” to describe the perfect reproduction of spatio-
temporal reality. Earlier in the paragraph he cites from, Bazin writes that without the necessary 
selection of reality, we will simply and unacceptably return to the pure reality of total cinema.92 
For Alessia Ricciardi, Bazin and the French critics simply mined Italian neo-realist films 
for the “redemption of cinema” without regard to their historical specificity. 
Regarding neorealist works solely in terms of their fidelity to “the ambiguity of 
reality,” rather than say, their unambiguous critique of social and political 
inequalities, Bazin sacrifices the historical specificity of the films in order to uphold 
his theory of the ontology of the medium.93 
Better still, Karl Schoonover, who painstakingly creates a Bazinian theory of the cinematic body 
to offer his own reading of Italian neo-realist films, draws upon Kristin Thompson’s argument 
that Bicycle Thieves’ narrative is carefully engineered to produce certain effects. This “corrects” 
Bazin’s supposed understanding of it as predicated on chance.94 And then he writes: 
Always on the lookout for indeterminacy, Bazin sometimes overreaches to find his 
examples, obscuring how films like [Bicycle Thieves] exploit contingency, 
ambiguity, and indeterminacy for their rhetorics of realism… Bazin thus avoids the 
possibility that a film might deploy ambiguity with a particular semantic gain or in 
hopes of producing specific reactions in the viewer.95 
We have seen Bazin make his argument for Bicycle Thieves as a thesis film predicated entirely 
on a carefully engineered episodic narrative. 
If I have cited these scholars at length, it is not at all suggest that they did not read the 
very words they so scrupulously quoted and cited, nor is to single them out for their misreadings. 
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What they offer instead is an illustration of something that Bazin as he appears in this 
dissertation should help us understand: Bazin has been a victim of the mythology of “realism” 
erected to understand him. And since mythologies serve some historical purpose, the Bazinian 
myth may have been a necessary foil for the putatively more politically grounded arguments of 
these scholars. But that would still leave some room for the possibility that they deliberately 
created a straw man out of him to buttress their own arguments. Given that Williams cites at 
great length lines that state the very opposite of his conclusions, and that Schoonover is actually 
trying to deepen our understanding of Bazinian realism, we cannot accuse them of bad faith in 
the sense of deliberate obfuscation. One can only conclude that something occurred to make the 
very words on the page opaque and allowed for the myth to take shape. It has made statements 
like the following nearly incomprehensible to a couple of generations of scholars: 
 I dare say that ambiguity in the cinema is a criterion that never fails… Rare are the films 
which dare to impose on us an image of the world where all is not so simple, where we 
are required to take sides freely, be it against our sympathies.96 
 Isn’t this a solid definition of realism in art: to force the mind to take sides without 
cheating with beings and things?97 
 The recent Italian films are at the very least pre-revolutionary. They all refuse, implicitly 
or explicitly… the social reality that they draw upon. But they… do not forget that before 
being condemnable the world quite simply is.98 
 De Sica wins every play on the board… without having placed a bet.99 
These are not statements from the thousands of articles Bazin wrote and that have not 
been in print since their first publication. No archival recuperation was needed to come across 
them and the arguments in which they occur. And scholars like Williams drew upon their own 
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French language skills to modify Hugh Gray’s translations. Several of them, including Ricciardi, 
have noted his interest in genre films to only demote them in his mythology, when Gray’s 
translations included the essays on the Western and on Chaplin. But there must be something 
lacking in the terms of their discourse whereby it becomes difficult to mark in particular that the 
notion of ambiguity in the lines above explicitly rules out endless indeterminacy that might then 
be a sign of political quietism, but rather designates the condition for an affective as opposed to a 
reasoned commitment. 
A few terms offer themselves for understanding what had to become opaque for Bazin’s 
mythology to be created. “Aesthetic” to begin with. Invariably, most scholars either understand 
this term in the narrow sense of style and technique or dismiss the whole paradigm as a quasi-
religious model imbricated with bourgeois ideology in all its dominant forms. Bazin was deeply 
tuned into what it meant for the aesthetic to be a quasi-religious structure of experience in secular 
modernity and one that was thoroughly political. The Augustinian idea of love as not predicated 
on the attributes of what is loved grounds this understanding of aesthetic experience and would 
also certainly have been too contaminated by just by the adjective to warrant an effort to 
understand. Not Bazin but Williams and most of his contemporaries had most probably no idea 
what it meant to “confront the problem of how a film might simultaneously refuse reality and yet 
be an expression of love for it.” But it is perhaps at the level of understanding politics itself that 
there had been a complete incommensurability of paradigms. 
The word that designates this incommensurability is “tragedy” and its centrality to 
Bazin’s understanding of the inevitable limits to all utopic politics. Rita Felski points out how 
with the prominence of Brechtian aesthetics in the latter part of the twentieth century, tragedy 
came to be discredited as “the enemy of politics in promoting a sense of hopelessness, fatalism, 
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and resignation.”100 It is not the least irony of the ideological critique of the Enlightenment 
subject that it put its faith in the Brechtian discourse of distantiation that challenges the 
spectatorial subject towards epistemological clarification and critique. But in a way all 
recognizably Marxist philosophies of history implicitly acknowledge the inevitability of the 
tragic to only reduce it to an engine of progress; that is, to an instrument called dialectical 
conflict for overcoming all tragedy. We see this in what I have argued is Bazin’s implicit but 
clear response on the question of Moscow Trials to Merleau-Ponty. The latter calls tragedy the 
conflict between the “subjective innocence” of the leaders who acted in good faith and the 
“objective treason” of the Revolutionary state that was the result of their actions. The Trials were 
a recognition of this tragedy as a necessary engine of overcoming violence in the future. This 
would have struck, and did strike, Bazin as a farcical understanding of tragedy that can only end 
in a travesty of utopia such as the Stalin on screen. 
Tragedy for Bazin as for Arendt designates the limits at which political experience needs 
to resume on new terms if it is not to be terminated by those limits. Films for Bazin tap into the 
unconscious processes of history by which these limits are shaped, at a partial remove from 
history, into possibilities, or rather virtualities, of experience. The task of critique is draw the 
imaginary lines of discourse, from a place of affect, in which these virtual shapes reveal 
themselves along with their inevitable contradictions. It is an affective critique (whose 
exemplary genre is perhaps the essay form rather than a research monograph) that allows for 
some acknowledgment that the contradictions of an aesthetic object and the possibilities of 
experience they make possible had been reflexively accepted by the critic in the experience of 
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“disinterested pleasure.” On Bazin’s understanding, only this would count as an aesthetic 
politics, and like all politics it is as troubling as it is potentially enabling for renewing 
experience. To measure the historical and epistemological distance between this conception of 
aesthetic politics and ideology critique is a project yet to be undertaken. It would require not just 
an internal analysis of the discourse of ideology critique or political modernism but a clearer 
understanding of the political contours of history against which it took shape. And this would 
have to go beyond the ritualistic invocations of 1968 and the supposed betrayal of its spirit by the 
very people who participated in it.101 There is no dearth of critical analyses and biographies 
which historicize the luminaries of post-’68 critical thought, but within film studies what may 
need to be centered is the following question: what unease have film texts and affective-
hermeneutic responses to them evoked that they had to be first subsumed into the doctrinal 
metaphysics of psychoanalytic Marxism and then buried under the ever more excavated archival 
material that we now need to “perpetually complete” them.
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Epilogue 
The Image and Its Politics After Bazin 
 
If, as I have argued in this dissertation, we understand Bazin’s concern with realism as a 
historical question and one concerned with the medium’s response to public desires, then to pose 
the question of how he can help us understand developments in our own landscape of images 
would also require us to ask how he can help us revise the role of film and media images in the 
time between his death and our own moment. We can do worse than start with a short 1953 
article by him titled “Is cinema mortal?”1 It addresses two kinds of crises facing cinema: reports 
of rapidly diminishing audiences in America and the appearance of television. Faced with the 
withdrawal of capital from the industry on the one hand and the promised ubiquity of the smaller 
screen on the other, Bazin speculates on the possible demise of cinema as an art form and its 
return to being a tool for the simple reproduction of reality. He recalls here his argument from 
“Total Cinema (1946)” according to which film had to learn to abstract the world it 
automatically reproduces in order to become a site for aesthetic expression. And just a little over 
half a century later, at the time he was writing, this achievement seemed about to exposed as an 
“optical illusion.”2 He expressly anticipates that the omnipresence of the televisual image may 
put an end to the idea of “art” that cinema had come to adopt from its predecessors; that is, the 
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image may no longer be able to take its distance from the world but come to inhabit it 
emphatically, and that this is what audiences will find “more satisfying.” 
As we know, just over two decades after Bazin’s words—the timeframe he grants before 
some young critics would scoff at the idea of cinema as an art form—mainstream and narrative 
cinema came under a sustained theoretical and practical assault. Not that such cinema 
disappeared, but it wasn’t untouched by the developments since the late ‘60s which put its norms 
under question. It would be impossible to take up this history in any detail at this point, but I will 
offer some broad pointers to how Bazin may help us reorient our sense of film history and the 
history of film theory since his time. I will take up the much-discussed Chronicle of a Summer 
(Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin, 1961; henceforth Chronicle) as a text that is symptomatic of the 
shift that takes place in the film-spectator relationship after Bazin. The hypothesis I will be 
proposing is that the film tries to shield itself from the anonymous spectator in order to make 
itself the site of a known community. This both corresponds to the condition of people learning 
to live with their own technological images and to a renunciation, even denunciation, of the idea 
of the cross-communal popular that informed the aesthetic mode theorized by Bazin. Following 
this discussion, I will more briefly address the status of the mechanically-recorded image in our 
own time and how Bazin’s work can still help us in understanding its terms. 
Chronicle is a much-discussed document not only in the history of cinematic technology, 
with its use of portable camera and sound-recording devices, but also in its ambition to chronicle 
a France in crisis at the peak of the Algerian War in 1960.3 It can be seen as consolidating the 
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techniques of the postwar ethnographic documentary, the nascent North American developments 
in Direct Cinema, and even the 16mm fiction aesthetic of a film such as Shadows (John 
Cassavetes, 1959). Though offering itself under the label cinéma-verité, we might call it as a 
landmark in “portable realism” that responds, consciously or not, to the ubiquity and liveness of 
the televisual image. And yet, Sam Di Iorio reads the film as landmark of crisis in realism rather 
than one consecrating the triumphal expansion of cinema’s ability to reproduce the world in all 
its immediacy.4 Working from the standard reading of Bazin, he sees in it a failure of the faith in 
cinema to reveal the truth of the world through its ability to reproduce it automatically. He sees 
this failure as heralding the crisis of representation in the cinema following ’68; a crisis that 
became the prerequisite for cinema as a site for political action. After describing the film briefly, 
my own reading would concur with Di Iorio that the film does indeed mark a break from Bazin’s 
positions about the cinema but they are not what he takes them to be. Similarly, rather than a film 
whose failure paves the way for a cinema that builds itself on more radical terms, I will argue 
that far from failing, Chronicle inures itself against failure and in the process actually defines 
new terms for conceptualizing the political character of cinema. 
In Chronicle, Rouch and Morin transpose the ethnographic film to the home terrain and 
gather together a cast of office and factory workers, French and African students, and bourgeois 
families: all part of their circle of friends, acquaintances, and colleagues. A multiplicity of 
histories and political concerns are enmeshed in the encounters we see. I will here describe a few 
key scenes, including the concluding ones where the participants react after watching it 
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themselves, following which Rouch and Morin discuss their reactions. The scenes I have picked 
are the ones that are discussed by the participants themselves towards the end of the film. 
In the earliest scene, we see Angelo, a factory-worker employed with Renault, meet 
Landry, a student from the Ivory Coast in France, as they get to know each other and exchange 
their thoughts on the lives of workers and the experience of race. Landry wonders about the lives 
of French workers since he associates factory work with poor workplace conditions and yet he 
sees most French workers owning cars. Landry explains both the poor work conditions and the 
aspirational lifestyle built into his job despite the inadequate pay for most workers. Angelo in 
turn explains what it has been like to be a black immigrant student in France and how he has 
overcome his inferiority complex over time. The two seem to become good friends. 
A later sequence shows us French and African students, among them Landry, again 
discuss race relations and the ongoing struggles for de-colonization in Africa. This sequence is in 
many ways the political heart of the film. A key presence here is Morin’s assistant Marceline 
whom we had seen earlier with her boyfriend Jean-Pierre. Their relationship is emotionally 
strained by the disillusionments of political participation. Marceline is also a Holocaust survivor 
and carries the tattooed number from the concentration camp on her arm. The topic of discussion 
is supposed to be the events unfolding in Congo immediately after its independence. We see 
headlines from French newspapers relaying desperate cries of help from Belgians to their home 
country following the mutiny of the Congolese soldiers against the continued presence of 
Belgian officers. Before they get to this topic, we see them get into a discussion on interracial 
romance, as Marceline says that she cannot imagine being in a relationship with a black man, 
though she remembers a fourteenth of July dance—her first dance with a black man—that was 
an extraordinary experience. She waves off Rouch’s amused accusation of “sexual racism” even 
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as her friend Nadine joins in by saying she can’t think of being in such a relationship either, 
“above all for the children’s sake.” Landry protests at this perception of black people as good 
only for dancing with.5 
As the conversation finally moves to Congo and to whether the students living in Paris 
feel connected to the events there. Landry affirms a sense of African solidarity against European 
colonization. Marceline says she understands this position from her own sense of being a part of 
a global struggle against anti-Semitism. At this point, Rouch asks Landry and his friend 
Raymond what they think is the reason for Marceline’s tattoo. They don’t know and make some 
lighthearted remarks about fashion and phone numbers, only for their mirth to be cut short by the 
explanation they receive from Marceline. What immediately follows this conversation is a 
planned sequence of Marceline walking through the Place de la Concorde and Les Halles 
addressing her father who died in the camps. The portable recorder she carries with her registers 
her address—a sort of interior monologue—and the camera is mostly at some distance from her, 
except for a short passage when she is framed in close-up. The sequence also has three cuts 
which further emphasize the staged character of the sequence. 
A final set of sequences of relevance here pertains to Marilou, an Italian immigrant from 
a middle-class family, who has been in Paris for some time. We see Morin interview her, and 
they both seem to know each other well. As with most other characters, Marilou is part of the 
filmmakers’ circle of friends and acquaintances. In the first of her sequences, we see her agitated 
and breaking down as she describes her alienation and sense of entrapment within herself, her 
unhappiness with her work, her housing, and her relationships. She says that even to kill herself 
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would be false. We then see her again in a later sequence, in a similar set-up with Morin. She 
once again appears high-strung and starts by describing a difficult experience, only to reveal that 
she is free of her phantoms, has found some happiness, and is now also in a relationship. Unlike 
the sequence of Marceline addressing her father, Marilou is filmed in a medium shot, often 
turning into an extreme close-up. 
Before we proceed further, we could note that though the film offers itself under the label 
cinéma-verité, it might more accurately be described, following Bill Nichols, as an interactive or 
participatory documentary rather than an observational one such as a film by Frederick 
Wiseman. It is in line with Rouch’s earlier works in which he and his camera are constitutive 
presences in the drama. Similarly, Rouch and Morin set up the situations and attempt to guide the 
discussions, revelations, and “confessions” of the participants.6 It is also, for the most part, very 
different from a reflexive documentary that comments on the nature of representation itself, 
except in its opening and two closing sequences. At the beginning, we watch Rouch, Morin, and 
Marceline discuss the possible difficulties in having people like her open up for the camera. 
Rouch even promises self-censorship if anything recorded makes her uncomfortable. 
At the end of the film, Rouch and Morin show some rushes to the film’s participants, 
only to encounter some unexpected reactions. Morin in particular had hoped that the film would 
provoke recognition among the participants of their shared historical condition, that cinema 
would play the role of, in Di Iorio’s felicitous phrase, “a utopian Panopticon.”7 The reactions we 
are shown pertain to the encounter between Angelo and Landry, Marceline’s walk through Place 
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de la Concorde and Les Halles, and Marilou’s sequences. Some find Angelo and Landry’s 
conversation to be full of generalities and not convincing, to which Angelo protests the sincerity 
of the friendship which developed in that moment. The strongest reactions are to Marilou and the 
rawness of her emotional vulnerability. More than one spectator-participant calls it indecent and 
exhibitionist, whereas Marilou herself believes that the truth of someone can only be captured on 
the verge of a nervous breakdown. On the other hand, Marceline’s monologue strikes them as 
truthful but because it seems enacted. Even then, one spectator-participant finds her monologue 
to be as “embarrassing’ as Marilou’s sequences, because they are both essentially talking to 
themselves about things that only concern themselves. Marceline herself confesses that although 
the sentiments she expressed were a deep part of her emotional life and while she experienced 
them during the shooting, she nonetheless felt distant from them between shots. In response to a 
questionnaire given to the participants after the film, she recalls having “cinematographic 
fantasies,” in particular drawing upon lines from Hiroshima, Mon Amour.8 
Morin seems quite upset by the reactions of the audiences, especially those towards 
Marilou and Angelo-Landry and says that such reactions are “against the emergence of truth in 
the world, in social life, and among people.” We then cut to Rouch and Morin discussing the 
reactions of the participants in the Musée de l’Homme, the official site of French postwar 
ethnography as well as the site of the scene where the students discuss colonialism, racism, and 
the Holocaust. Here Rouch asserts that Marceline did not act when she was speaking about and 
to her absent father, and they would know since they were there. Morin speaks about how this 
film, unlike standard filmmaking, makes us enter into life itself without telling us how to react to 
it. And yet he says that he wanted to make a film in which the spectator would love the people he 
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loves. The irony here is pronounced as Morin tells us exactly the kind of film it was (is?) 
supposed to be, while at the same time speaking about how it is meant to leave the spectator free 
and disoriented, “as in life.” Their conversation ends with the phrase, “Nous sommes dans le 
bain,’ which roughly translates as, “we are in a tough spot.” 
Di Iorio rightly cautions us against reading the reflexivity at the end of the film as a 
means of putting the mechanisms of the production on display in order to break identification. It 
does seem much more like an effort to recuperate the film from the reactions of its own 
participants.9 Di Iorio calls this a failure of Bazinian realism, which he characterizes as 
“representational,” by which he means a framework predicated on the adequacy of an image to 
its object. Similarly, he frames this failure as a transitional period on the way to anti-
representational politics of the cinema. In analyzing Chronicle, Di Iorio indeed identifies the key 
text in a paradigm shift of cinematic politics but he at the same time misidentifies the paradigms 
and the place of Chronicle within them. As this dissertation argues, Bazin’s position on realism 
cannot be conflated with a representational paradigm. But also, Chronicle’s failure to provoke a 
recognition of its participants takes nothing away from its inauguration of a mode that would 
only become more important in the years to come. I would argue that the innovation of 
Chronicle is to foreground a mode of film experience from which the spectator is excluded 
unless she is also a part of it, either on screen or with the community to which it belongs. 
Ivone Margulies traces the genesis of this film, as well as of Rouch’s earlier films, to the 
influence of American psychodrama techniques used in group therapies. Techniques here include 
role play, role reversal, and feedback sessions, among others.10 These were meant to break rigid 
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patterns and to create new and more flexible selves. For the most part, the psychodrama of the 
film resides in the encounters across classes, race, and generations, rather than in explicit role 
playing. The feedback mechanisms are built into the differences across which the encounters 
take place, except for the fact that the biggest such mechanism appears in the form of cinema at 
the end, a point ignored by Margulies. Even if the hoped for mutual recognition does not take 
place here, and even if a community does not form, the participants have defined the failures and 
successes of the film in relation to themselves. Recall also the reference to self-censorship at the 
beginning which effectively disavows the film as an open record of the truth of the encounters. 
We can here turn to Bazin and see what he has to tell us about this psycho-dramatic use of the 
cinema where the characters are also their own spectators and their need to thwart the 
anonymous spectator. 
Though Margulies mentions that the techniques of psychodrama were introduced in 
France beginning in 1954, Bazin already referred to them in “Theater and Cinema,” written in 
1951, in order to illustrate the processes of theatrical identification. If we recall, in this essay 
Bazin argues that, unlike with theater, cinema is without a line of demarcation that separates the 
world of the spectator from the world of the film. In the theater, this is marked by the footlights, 
which he calls a “censor,” that the spectator must overcome in order to enter the world of the 
play. He illustrates the work of the censor by citing the techniques of psychodrama and their use 
as a pedagogical tool to help children overcome their psychic inhibitions.11 
Isn’t it significant that psychiatry has here taken up the term “catharsis” from 
Aristotle? Modern pedagogical research in relation to “psychodrama” seems well-
placed to open up some fertile insights into the cathartic processes of the theater. In 
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effect, they make use of the ambiguity still existing among children between the 
notions of play and reality in order to lead the subject, through theatrical 
improvisation, to liberate himself of the repressions from which he suffers. This 
technique amounts to creating a sort of uncertain theater where the play is serious 
and the actor his own spectator. The action that develops here is not yet divided by 
footlights which, by all evidence, are the architectural symbolic system of the censor 
that separates us from the stage.12i 
In this description of the use of the psychodrama, Bazin speaks of a practice of vicarious self-
transformation by which the child plays out a role that will liberate her from her inhibitions. She 
is her own spectator to the extent that she both knows it to be playacting and reality. Transposing 
this to the experience of the theatrical spectator, Bazin argues that the theatrical spectator 
similarly crosses a frontier to enter another world. But she starts with an awareness of the 
distinction between herself and the actor who are present to each other in the same space but 
separated by the footlights. And at the end of the play, she not only returns to her own world but 
also recognizes once again the essential separation and opposition between the actor and the 
spectator. The child may return to her world too, but the therapeutic purpose of the psychodrama 
is to bring back a less inhibited self. In any case, there is no distinction of bodies in which 
distinct identities can be located. As against the child’s crossing of a frontier of which she is only 
dimly aware, the footlights, Bazin argues, ensure that theatrical identification is finally 
incomplete and thus protect us from being completely assimilated into another world. 
As against the identificatory possibilities in the theater and pedagogical psychodrama, the 
cinema, we have seen Bazin argue, gives us a world through a keyhole or half-open blinds. 
Unlike the footlights, the keyhole is not a frontier but a part of the world of the film that hides us 
                                                 
12
 André Bazin, “Théâtre et cinéma,” in QQCII, 95. [WCI 100-101; WCB 188-189]. My emphasis. Bazin uses the 
word “symbolique” and not “symbole” to indicate the systemic nature of the footlights. It is also a word he uses to 
describe Charlot’s mythic persona. To call these symbols would be to suggest that they refer to something absent, 
whereas for Bazin both Charlot and the footlights impress us as social presences that carry symbolic charge. 
365 
 
from the characters who are unware of us watching. But unlike the process of psychodrama that 
works to give us another self, the processes of voyeurism give the film spectator both a 
heightened sense of identification and as thorough a loss of identification following the film, and 
this loss always carries some faint sense of embarrassment at involvement in the voyeuristic 
processes. To be clear, for Bazin this is the ontological condition of film spectatorship that is not 
all-determining of film experience. This is what each film both works with and against to create 
specific experiences, and this is what Chronicle too had to take into account in its experiment 
with self-revelation and community-building. 
From the perspective of Bazin’s work, what we see towards the end of Chronicle is that 
the film itself is meant to be a feedback mechanism for the participants. And what the 
participants confront are their own selves, a fact that short-circuits the normal processes of 
identification and its loss at the end in the cinema. They are called upon to identify with 
something that they no longer are, in however minute a sense. Unlike the images of a normal 
film that exist in a non-space-time, these images have the spectral of character of both being 
from the past and existing in the present. Some of them confront the “ontological obscenity” of 
the medium as they become voyeurs of each other’s’ lives. Some of them confess to being 
“completely taken” despite their discomfort. Marceline claims the truth of her experience while 
disavowing its expression as performance. It isn’t surprising that the specifics of their 
experiences, the political or personal issues, are abstracted (at least in what the filmmakers 
choose to show us of the reactions) in order to focus on the display of and response to personal 
identity itself (“I wouldn’t want to meet some of the people after watching this film.” “I would 
now like to get to know her.” “What she speaks about concerns no one but herself.”). At the 
same time, the inclusion of these avowals and disavowals becomes a mechanism on the part of 
366 
 
the filmmakers, who care about their community of participants, to protect their images from 
external spectatorial arbitration. 
The key change in film history that Chronicle perhaps marks is a film’s relationship to its 
audience and the politics that follows from it. The aesthetic mode through which Bazin framed 
his understanding of cinema was predicated on a spectator who remains largely unknown to the 
text. His concept of the popular is not posited as a working-class category in opposition to the 
bourgeoisie but as one that reaches across class and other identities. This was not a utopic 
construct in which differences are dissolved but one in which their frictions work upon the 
collective imaginaries to produce and mask contradictions. It also does not deny that certain 
films or genres drew particular audiences and not others, or that studios pre-tested their films on 
certain audiences. But the address to specific audiences still remained an indeterminate process 
of identifying and meeting some uncertain need and at the same time shaping it. This irreducible 
anonymity of text and spectator to each other has allowed us to draw a distinction between the 
political character of films and the politics that they inform indirectly but in which they do not 
directly participate (unless they get caught up in censorship and other public controversies in 
which they are mobilized). 
Against this essential anonymity, Chronicle’s subject and its audience is the same. 
Without the last two sequences of the projection of rushes and of the discussion between Rouch 
and Morin, the film may have remained a participatory ethnographic documentary addressed to a 
broad audience. But with these sequences, it is clear that the film was meant to be a site for the 
formation of some sort of community among the participants, and one in whose images it would 
find itself confirmed. Neither the failure of this vision nor the fact that the filmmakers still 
attempt to recuperate it at the end—only to confess their failure once again—is as important as 
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the fact that its success or failure is arbitrated within the text itself. The prospective and 
anonymous spectator is merely called upon to witness the events but from whose imaginary she 
is finally excluded because she never participates in the events on screen. We can certainly see in 
the film a compelling record of the political challenges that had marked France and the French 
Left in 1960, but both censorship and self-censorship had reduced these to generalities. We don’t 
know where any of the characters stands on specifics or about the activities in which they have 
participated. But even this is less significant than the fact that in responding to themselves on 
film, the participants do not once name the class and racial confrontations that they do see. The 
responses target the perceived sincerity or its lack in the participants on screen. Even before the 
audience gets a chance to respond at the end of this chronicle, it has been reclaimed or disowned 
by its participants, and also reduced to themselves. 
In Chronicle’s self-containment of the subject-spectator, it posits cinema as a technology 
that defines and is defined by an identifiable community. This gesture is what ultimately 
separates it from another landmark “summer” documentary on the political discontents of Paris, 
Le Joli Mai (Chris Marker and Pierre Lhomme, 1963). Despite being inspired by Chronicle, Le 
Joli Mai remains a much more conventional documentary and for that reason much more open to 
the anonymous spectator. What Chronicle anticipates is the use of cinema in the events around 
May ’68 when filmmaking and screening of these films was an integral part of the debates and 
political action. Most of these films reposed as much faith in the filmic image as a feedback 
mechanism as Rouch and Morin did, even if they more explicitly conceived this as an open 
process rather than one that would be rounded-off by the image. It was thought necessary that 
workers and students use cameras to make their own films and in the process both come to know 
their conditions better as well as reject the illusions of institutionalized cinema. 
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Here we can begin to see the new political paradigm within which cinema is now placed 
and which Margulies again helps us understand. She traces the “confessional” character of 
Chronicle to Morin’s attempts at recuperating the notions of confession and autocritique from 
their Stalinist history and to make them available once again for a participatory politics.13 The 
idea of confessing in Chronicle has its counter-part in free and even experimental expression 
within groups that characterized the ’68 moment. And both are linked by a suspicion of large-
scale political structures and a preference for organization within groups not contained by any 
single overarching structure. Di Iorio speaks of post-’68 uses of cinema for political action as 
predicated on anti-representationalism. However, if we look at the films made as part and 
following these events, they all appear to be standard but non-expository documentaries. The 
realism of the image and sound is respected, we see a lot of talking heads, and raw footage of 
street protests.14 What Di Iorio calls anti-representationalism is generally associated with the 
work of Godard from this time, especially as part of the Dziga Vertov Group, but his work might 
be an exception that has more to do with Godard’s place in film history and the political need to 
disown it. For the rest, we see a basic belief in the ability of film to be both record and catalyst of 
political debate and action. 
Within the emergent political model of the ‘60s, the polarization of a transcendental state 
and the atomic citizen is refused and, with it, the polarization of a transcendental filmic text and 
the atomic spectator. The filmic image itself is no longer called to express an impersonal ideal 
that we are invited to temporarily make our own through identification, but now records any and 
every person—and not just the spectacular events of Bazin’s newsreels—and plays their images 
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back to the world. It is interesting, therefore, that the radical aspirations of film discourse and 
practice that came out of ’68 were not aimed at transforming the cinema aimed at a mass public. 
They did not ask that films replace their dubious idealizations with the real selves of real people. 
Neo-realism had already experimented with making the ordinary person the subject of a popular 
cinema, but this was largely through enactment and still subject to a sort of idealization. Instead, 
they sought to dismantle popular and even art cinema aimed at an anonymous public. I believe 
that we can use Bazin’s theorization of the medium to detect some essential anxiety in the refusal 
of a new politics to allow a wide and anonymous circulation of images of people who had newly 
acquired the ability to record their lives. 
A separate project would be needed to research the distribution and exhibition of these 
films, but the broad point remains that they were not meant to be part of an industrial structure 
that would make their images available to unknown spectators. If historical analysis bears out 
this point, then we might see the “discovery” of the voyeuristic and “illusory” dimensions of the 
standard film experience by theorists in the late ’60 and ‘70s as stemming both from a critique of 
the top-down society of the spectacle and from the experience of a generation—not of one or 
another theorist in particular—that found the reproduction of its own image to be liberating and 
alienating at the same time: liberating from the condition of being addressed and “interpellated” 
by the impersonal apparatuses of the state and the cinema, and alienating because of the 
“ontological obscenity” of the mechanical capture and storage of their identities outside of lived 
time and their availability to absent gazes. 
This sharpened sense of personal stakes in the image may serve to explain the theoretical 
assaults on institutional cinemas, whether mainstream or art cinemas, that followed this moment. 
Both these models correspond to a politics of anonymous collectives that are finally defined 
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through some top-down identity—for example, the nation or the bourgeoisie. The examples of 
Chronicle and the use of film in a variety of grassroots political movements corresponds to the 
search of new and alternate collective identities that are no longer addressed by images; these 
identities become the source and destination of the images. These images become imbricated in 
sub-cultural identities, however fluid. Clearly this mode of filmmaking and viewing was not the 
norm from the ‘60s onwards since mainstream and art cinemas continued to exist and be viewed. 
And the successes, failures, transience, or permanence of the alternate identities of the ‘60s is a 
matter of debate. But the theoretical consequences of this moment for approaching institutional 
cinema have been enormous. 
In addition to the ideological critique of Hollywood since the ‘60s, we must also take into 
account the importance identity politics acquired in understanding it. Even if the ‘60s’ 
movements did not necessarily produce new enduring identities and film practices, they brought 
to the surface a range of marginalized or subsumed identities. Identity politics both furnished the 
terms for critique—exclusion or misrepresentation of minority identities—as well as became a 
prism through which some forms of institutional cinema could be recovered, even against their 
own terms. Thus, for example, feminist scholars have not only critiqued the default address of 
institutional cinema to the male spectator, but they have also sought to understand the specific 
modes through which female spectators are positioned and respond to a genre such as the 
melodrama. Other marginalized or local identities have also been thus mobilized in order to 
disrupt the claims of the cinematic image to an anonymous address that could ideally be claimed, 
as Bazin argued in relation to De Sica’s films, by a range of ideological positions at the same 
time. As against this ecumenism of the imaginary, for anyone exposed to the political stakes of 
identity as they emerged since the ‘60s, a film can cease to primarily be a site of escape from 
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identity, and therefore the world, and can become a site for exploring the place of a specific 
identity in the social imaginary. Under these circumstances, one does not enter the world of the 
film as an atomized spectator but self-consciously as part of a social sub-group. We might even 
say that we let the film into our worlds rather than step into it. 
For better or for worse, what I would argue has been attenuated, if not lost, with the 
containment of images within broadly known collectives is a model of aesthetic politics in which 
we escape our world in order to orient ourselves. The image becomes part of a feedback loop that 
the aesthetic image at its most representational could not be. Cinema, so long as it worked or 
works with the aesthetic mode outlined here, responds to our desires and we respond to its 
images, but it essentially remains an encounter at an angle from our historical world and not 
within it. This does not call for blindness to identity but it involves taking the risk of inhabiting 
identities other than our own and the potential for both ideological compromise and ideological 
reorientation implicit within this process. This is what on Bazin’s account could be lost once 
cinema ceases to be an art form. We can understand what is at stake here by turning to a scholar 
with whose work Bazin’s has a great affinity and whom no one can accuse of ignoring identity: 
Richard Dyer. 
What Bazin calls art, Dyer calls entertainment. In a 1977 essay, “Entertainment and 
Utopia,” Dyer starts by distinguishing as Bazin did at the very beginning of his career, capitalist 
entertainment produced by professionals from the art forms of closed communities that were the 
norm in the West before the spread of capitalism.15 This professional character, he says, means 
that what works of entertainment express has only an indirect relationship to both dominant 
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ideology and spectatorial desire that may or may not be in conformity with this ideology. He 
calls this a “relatively autonomous mode of cultural production”16 that negotiates conflicting 
interests and does so through “temporary answers to the inadequacies of the society which is 
being escaped from through entertainment.”17 As with Bazin, he does not discount that this 
involves “playing with the fire of contradictions”18 and that this implicates us in ideologically 
unpredictable ways. But this is the specificity of the political character of entertainment. 
Writing again at the turn of the twenty-first century, Dyer discovers that he was 
theorizing this political character at the very moment of its decline or, as he prefers to call it, 
“waning.”19 Echoing Bazin’s words in “Is Cinema Mortal?” on the “miracle of ubiquity” that 
televisual images promise, he writes that it is not that entertainment ceases to be produced but 
that it now invades the world rather than placing itself in a place where we might escape to it: 
“What may be in eclipse… is the provision of entertainment in artefacts and performances based 
on a dynamic of separation of escape.”20 This makes life as it is seem entertaining and 
pleasurable rather than life as it might be. The mechanism Dyer describes here is broadly akin to 
the one I analyzed whereby the portability of the image recording and display closes the circle 
between the spectator and the content of the image. In either case, there is a collapse of world 
and image so that they share the same time and space. As Dyer writes, maybe this is a good thing 
and signifies the democratization of pleasure. But he is also alert to the fact that, contrary to 
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appearances, not everyone has access to this utopia and many labor in conditions of deprivation 
to make it possible for a few. There is distinct hope in Dyer that entertainment may wax again in 
order that the distance of utopic imaginaries from the world can become politically productive. 
I think that the imbrication of the ubiquitous image in recent global events offers us 
additional reasons to think of why we need to look for possibilities by which the world and the 
image can recover a relative autonomy with regards to each other. The role of social media in 
grassroots political movements across the world, from those in the Middle East and North 
African regions to Black Lives Matter in the US, has been a subject of extensive debate. At this 
level, the digital image, on a much more intensified scale, seems to reinforce the spectator-image 
loop that I have suggested may be traced back to the ‘60s, creating alternate communities that 
undermine top-down hierarchies. But some events have worked to alert us to complexities in this 
way of framing digital images. We are now being asked to take note once again of the stubborn 
persistence of top-down appropriation of image-based media by governments around the world. 
As in Bazin’s day, political leaders once again systematically fake improbable photographs to 
consolidate their public personas, holograms of strong leaders now campaign for office in their 
stead, and, in looking at the history of US presidential elections, the importance of an 
appearance of sincerity (now aligned with a critique of the ‘insincerity’ of political correctness) 
overrides others forms of scrutiny on the path to public office.21 What pushed the Turkish people 
to choose between an undemocratic coup and a democratically elected but authoritarian leader 
seems to have been the live appearance of Recep Tayip Erdoğan on a video-chat app, urging 
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them to resist a faceless coup. The image, in other words, can no longer be so easily contained 
within self-defined communities but has to a significant extent returned to mediating the 
polarized encounter between the overarching state—embodied in individual leaders—and, if not 
the individual spectator-user, specific sub-groups. 
Even apart from these instances of the uses of the image by top-down structures of 
power, there are other instances which speak of the fact that the instant distribution of images in 
the digital era can no longer be easily contained within an image community. The successful 
European campaign for the “right to be forgotten,” by which people can have their online records 
removed under certain circumstances, and the phenomenon of online identity curation underline 
this change most clearly. Every image and every piece of information has “viral” potential, 
subject to unpredictable factors. Unlike the ‘60s, when a limited distribution of images 
encouraged expression unconstrained by ideals of the perfect image, the era of Instagram calls 
upon us to project our most remarkable selves. As one Web feature on risky Instagram pictures 
writes, the site “is the place to post the most saturated, picturesque version of your life.”22 We 
can think back to Bazin’s lines on the “Birdman” who proceeded to jump to his death from a 
Parisian building despite hesitating because he was in the presence of an unforgiving witness: the 
movie camera.23 The dynamics on Bazin’s terms here are complex. The camera fixes and 
alienates our identities in an image even after we have changed. On the one hand, this alienation 
could be a promise against the corrosiveness of change and so we submit our most saturated 
selves to it. But the scale on which the collection and display of images takes place, our records 
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are forever under threat of being submerged by others, causing us to produce more of them.24 All 
this without taking into account Bazin’s insistence on the literality of the mechanically-recorded 
image’s appetite for real death. A veteran of the short history of online news writes, “In charge 
of an international news website during the Iraq war, I saw graphic footage on the wire service 
feeds, but I have seen more people dead or dying through Facebook in the past few months.”25 
In this media landscape where we find identities slipping from image to image or slipping 
away into image, it might remain one of the urgent critical tasks to identify and attend to 
instances of the aesthetic image or, in Dyer’s terms, the entertaining image, that would allow us 
to take some distance from the world of images. This does not mean a rejection of the world 
imbricated in images, but a necessary escape in order to return to it. And indeed films of the kind 
that interested Bazin and Dyer hardly ceased to be made at any point, and an unprecedented 
archive has been made available on home video. While this does not mean that they play their 
role on the same scale as at the time when Bazin theorized their socio-political role, these films 
retain many of the features that allowed him to theorize such a role. His response to the 
anticipated crisis of cinematic art in 1953 may still provide a way of dealing with the persistence 
of cinema in a world of images: “In the meantime and while waiting [for cinema to die], let’s just 
play dodgeball; I mean, let’s go to the cinema and treat it as an art.”26 The challenge may be 
learning to play dodgeball. 
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Appendix: List of Original French Quotations Cited from André Bazin’s 
Articles 
 
Introduction 
i Le drame… consiste en ceci: Dieu n’existe pas, le dernier bureau du château est vide. Voilà 
peut-être la tragédie spécifique du monde moderne, le passage à la transcendence d’une réalité 
social qui enfante d’elle-même sa propre déification. 
ii l’alibi fallacieux de la réalité 
iii prolonger, le plus loin possible…, le choc de l’oeuvre de l’art. 
iv Le plus haut  mérite religieux de cette œuvre n'est-il pas de nous rappeler en effet cette 
éminente vérité chrétienne, que les derniers siècles de l'histoire catholique ont peut-être 
dangereusement estompée  mais que l'expérience des missions est en train de remettre au jour : à 
savoir l'origine communautaire du sacerdoce. 
Chapter 1 
i Comment tenir avec certitude le mobile subjectif d’une invention? Quelle psychanalyse rendrait 
compte de l’importance relative d’un progress technique, parfois accidental, et des mythes plus 
ou moins confus qui orientèrent consciemment ou non les recherches? 
ii spécialiste non de l’optique mais de l’électricité 
iii Le génie de Louis Lumière ne lui vaudrait pas la place qu’il occupe dans la paternité du 
cinéma, s’il s’était borné à la seule technique. Lumière a su réaliser les premiers films répondant 
à une certaine attente de la conscience collective devant l’invention nouvelle, et créer du même 
coup un véritable spectacle. Alors qu’Edison ne faisait guère passer, dans son kinétoscope, que 
des scènes dont l’intérêt ne dépassait pas la curiosité d’une fidèle reconstitution du mouvement, 
Lumière, avec sa caméra légère, put aller prendre « la nature sur le fait ». La sortie des Usines 
Lumière à Lyon, Entrée du train en gare de la Ciotat sont les ancêtres de nos actualités et du 
documentaire de reportage, dont toute une partie de la production mondiale est profondément 
imprégnée. Qu’il suffise de rappeler Dziga Vertov et l’école russe, ou les films de guerre récents. 
iv Le gout de l’actualité, joint à celui de cinéma, n’est que la volonté de présence de l’homme 
moderne, son besoin d’assister à l’Histoire, à laquelle l’évolution politique, aussi bien que les 
moyens techniques de communication et de destruction, la mêlent irrémédiablement. 
v C’est une question de kilomètres de pellicule : pour une mètre de film technique on en 
impressionne cent de film de fiction. C’est comme si le langage servait neuf fois sur dix à écrire 
des romans ou des pièces de théâtre. 
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vi engouement passager 
vii Jusqu’au XIXe siècle, la notion d’art populaire est inséparable de celle de la communauté. 
L’exemple type nous est fourni par la folklore caractérisé essentiellement par son rattachement à 
la milieu donné. Une danse, un chant, un conte, un style de mobilier ou d’habitation, sont 
d’autant plus populaires qu’ils correspondent à un groupe humain plus restreint et plus 
différencié, qu’ils sont moins assimilables à d’autres groupes humains. La popularité s’entend 
donc ici dans le sens du particulier et de l’intensif. Elle s’exprime dans la tradition et le rite. 
viii Le cinéma au contraire parce qu’il ne procède pas d’une psychologie communautaire, mais 
d’une sociologie de masses atomisées et grégaires, ne saurait bénéficier des ces générations 
spontanées. La convenance de l’œuvre au consommateur ne peut être le résultat d’une poussée 
obscure et infaillible dont l’artisan ou l’artiste ne serait que le truchement. Tout au plus peut-on 
penser que le besoin populaire existe virtuellement, comme un vide invisible que l’oeuvre peut 
venir combler mais dans lequel elle ne saurait se mouler automatiquement. 
ix Dans notre civilization mécanique où l’homme est dévoré par la technicité de son métier, 
normalié par les contraintes politiques et sociales, le cinéma avant tout souci artistique, est là 
pour répondre à d’imprescriptibles besoins physiques collectifs refoulés. 
Chapter 2 
i Pour se survivre commercialement, le réalisme des films de Lumière avait besoin que naisse un 
cinéma de création qui le subordonne à l’économie imaginaire de l’œuvre artistique… Avec lui 
[Méliès] le cinéma devient œuvre d’imagination. In entre dans la fable.  
ii En réalité, les véritables obstacles à surmonter dans l’hypothèse de telles adaptations ne sont 
pas d’ordre esthétique ; ils ne relèvent pas du cinéma comme art, mais comme fait sociologique 
et comme industrie. Le drame de l’adaptation, c’est celui de la vulgarisation. On a pu lire dans un 
pavé publicitaire de province cette définition du film La Chartreuse de Parme ; « D’après le 
célèbre roman de cape et d’épée ». La vérité sort parfois de la bouche des marchands de pellicule 
qui n’ont point lu Stendhal. 
iii Il est singulier que ces mêmes romanciers s qui défendent si farouchement l'intégrité de leur 
texte soient ceux-là mêmes qui nous abreuveront un autre jour de confessions sur les exigences 
tyranniques de leurs personnages. A les entendre, leurs héros sont des enfants terribles dont ils ne 
sont plus les maîtres une fois conçus. Le romancier est l'esclave de leurs caprices, serviteur de 
leurs quatre libertés. Nous n'en doutons point, mais c'est alors qu'il faut bien admettre que la 
véritable réalité esthétique d'un roman psychologique ou social c'est le personnage ou le milieu 
avant que d'être ce qu'on appelle « le style ». 
iv sont des matrices de mythe. 
v Une large fraction de la production cinématographique s’apparente encore…, à des formes 
littéraires primitives, au jeu élémentaire et collectif de l’imagination populaire. L’histoire que le 
cinéaste prétend raconter n’est au fond qu’un prétexte, un enchainement des symboles qui ne 
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nous plaisant autant qu’en raison de leur résonance dans notre subconscient. La plus 
invraisemblable comédie américaine d’avant-guerre avec ses marivaudages de millionnaires dans 
un univers sans crise économique, sans chômage, sans maladie, sans souffrance est certainement, 
pour qui saurait la lire avec la compétence d’un psychanalyste interprétant un rêve, un 
documentaire de géographie humaine beaucoup plus rigoureux que les Cités sans voile du néo-
réalisme hollywoodien. 
vi Mais la nouveauté du cinéma par rapport aux contes du folklore ou de la mythologie, c’est que 
la fable y peut naître d’une simple apparence physique : du galbe d’un visage, de l’eau d’un 
regard. 
vii [Je] suppose que Feuillade lui-même n’y eût pas retrouvé ses assassins. Les paris étaient 
ouverts pour savoir quels étaient les bons et les méchants. Tel, qu’on tenait pour bandit, se 
révélait victime à la bobine suivante. Enfin la lumière, rendue à la salle toutes les dix minutes 
pour recharger l’appareil, multipliait les épisodes. Ainsi présenté, le chef-d’œuvre de Feuillade 
révélait de manière éclatante le principe esthétique de son charme. Chaque interruption soulevait 
un « Ah ! » de déception et la reprise un espoir de soulagement. Cette histoire, à laquelle le 
public ne comprenait rien, s’imposait à son attention et à son désir par la seule et pure exigence 
du récit. Elle n’était en aucune manière une action préexistante arbitrairement morcelée 
d’entractes, mais une création indûment interrompue, une source intarissable dont une main 
mystérieuse aurait retenu le flot. D’où la malaise insupportable provoqué par « la suite au 
prochain numéro » et l’attente anxieuse, non pas tant des événements suivants, que de 
l’écoulement d’un récit, de la reprise d’une création suspendue… la délicieuse attente du conte 
qui se substitue à la vie quotidienne, laquelle n’est plus que la solution de continuité du rêve. 
viii de discuter du sexe des anges cependant qu'on préparait la bombe atomique qui résoudrait le 
divorce de l'artiste et du peuple… 
ix  on se demande du reste comment un livre de Miller ou de J.P. Sartre pourrait affronter cette 
épreuve orale et s'il n'en résulterait pas une sensible réduction des thèmes littéraires… 
x Carta invoque Jean Paul Sartre. Mais c'est une caution doublement périlleuse. D'abord parce 
que rien n'est venu bien solidement confirmer jusqu'ici les idées exposées dans la préface des 
Temps Modernes, ensuite et surtout parce que le dernier engagement de Sartre ayant consisté 
avec trois ans de retard à étayer de l'extérieur le stalinisme au moment qu'il allait s'effondrer, son 
aventure donnerait plutôt raison à ceux qui pendant ce temps ont continué à écrire comme on 
joue à la balle au chasseur. 
xi En 1926, Eisenstein s’imposait comme le promoteur d’un réalisme, presque du réalisme par 
excellence : au cinéma-rêve, au film-évasion, le Potemkine opposait le cinéma incarné dans 
l’Histoire pour la transformer. Mais ce réalisme dans la matière, nullement dans l’expression. La 
confusion n’a duré qu’autant que l’évolution technique  du cinéma et celle même de la révolution 
soviétique l’ont permise…. Avec le recul apparait bien mieux ce qui, dans le Potemkine est 
d’une part, quant à la forme, une admirable machinerie esthétique parfaitement indépendante de 
la réalité qu’elle mobilise. 
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xii Il y a réalisme et réalisme et le problème n’est pas tant de savoir si la production est plus 
réaliste que celle de 1938, que de voir en quoi elle en diffère. 
Chapter 3 
i Son étude, s’attachant surtout aux films qui illustrent sa thèse, rejette implicitement dans 
l’ombre l’autre face de la réalité esthétique… Car les rapports de la réalité historique avec le 
western no sont pas immédiats et directs mais dialectiques. Tom Mix est le contraire d’Abraham 
Lincoln, mais il en perpétue à sa manière le culte et le souvenir. Sous ses formes les plus 
romanesques ou les plus naïves, le western est tout le contraire d’une reconstitution historique. 
Hopalong Cassidy ne diffère, semble-t-il, de Tarzan que par son costume et le cadre de ses 
prouesses. Pourtant si l’on veut bien se donner la peine de comparer ces histoires charmantes 
mais invraisemblables, de les supposer, comme on fait en physiognomonie moderne de plusieurs 
négatifs de visages, on verra apparaître en transparence un western idéal fait des constantes 
communes aux unes et aux autres : un western composé de ses seuls mythes à l’état pur. 
ii Comme la conquête de l’Ouest, la Révolution soviétique est un ensemble des événements 
historiques marquant l naissance d’un ordre e d’une civilisation. L’un et l’autre ont engendré les 
mythes nécessaires à la confirmation de l’Histoire, l’un et l’autre aussi one dù réinventer la 
morale, retrouver à leur source vive, avant leur mélange ou leur pollution, le principe de la loi 
qui mettra de l’ordre dans le chaos, séparera le ciel et la terre. 
iii Leur ridicule ne le cédait rien en rien à ceux du film, mais… Jacques Tati a fait beaucoup 
mieux : il a créé de toutes pièces un univers à la fois parfaitement imaginaire et totalement 
ressemblant, en ce sens que le vrai ne peut plus s’empêcher d’y ressembler, et nous avec. 
iv ce sont les racines qui relient l’imaginaire au réel e l’en nourrissent… par la force du mythe 
que Jacques Tati nous a désormais imposé. 
v les héros n’en sauraient être qu’assez riches pour pouvoir l’oublier. Ils vivent dans un univers 
sans résistance économique où l’argent tient lieu de puissance féerique de baguette magique. 
vi In en est de M. Verdoux comme de M.K., c’est un personnage plongé dans certaines situations. 
Il n’a à se justifier d’aucune. Sa seule raison d’être est d’être. Son existence esthétique est 
suffisamment établie si le rapport entre le personnage et la situation, leur réaction mutuelle, 
s’imposent comme vraies. J’entends esthétiquement vraies et non pas moralement, 
psychologiquement, sociologiquement ou par rapport à quelque idéologique que ce soit ; car le 
propre du mythe, c’est précisément son autonomie. La seule critique appropriée à Monsieur 
Verdoux serait l’inverse de celle de Nathalie Moffat. Elle devrait procéder par sondage dans le 
mythe pour juger de son homogénéité et se sa densité, déceler les porosités des situations  que les 
concrétions mythologiques ne sont pas venues combler. Selon une telle méthode, loin que la 
valeur idéologique puisse être portée a priori à l’actif de l’œuvre, elle est au contraire d’essence 
impure hétérogène au mythe. 
vii Ainsi le manque complet d’entêtement quand le monde lui oppose une résistance trop grande. 
Il cherche alors à tourner la difficulté au lieu de la résoudre, une solution provisoire lui suffit 
 
380 
 
 
comme si l’avenir n’existait pas pour lui. Dana Le Pèlerin par exemple, il bloque un rouleau à 
pâtisserie sur l’étagère avec une bouteille de lait dont il devra se servir quelques instants plus 
tard… Mais si le provisoire lui suffit toujours, il fait preuve dans l’immédiat d’une ingéniosité 
prodigieuse. Aucune situation ne le laisse jamais désemparé. 
viii C’est du reste une règle générale de son comportement de ne pas hésiter à commettre des 
petite vilenies quand on ne le regarde pas. 
ix Entre la tendre et douce Edna Purviance, la jeune aveugle des Lumières de la ville, la frêle 
infirme de Verdoux, il n’existe pas de différences très sensible sinon que Verdoux est marié avec 
la dernière. Elles sont toutes, comme Charlot, des êtres malheureux et sous-adaptés à la Société, 
des infirmes physiques ou moraux de la vie sociale. C’est cette hyperféminité qui séduit Charlot, 
le coup de foudre amoureux est l’origine d’une conversion foudroyante aux normes sociales et 
morales. 
x Mais c’est une loi commune à l’évolution de tous les personnages vivant du commerce avec le 
public, qu’ils tendent à justifier notre sympathie par une plus grande cohérence psychologique et 
plus de perfection morale. 
xi Tout au plus peut-on prétendre que le succès éventuel de ces œuvres se construit sur des 
malentendus. Même si Monsieur Verdoux n’était pas venu livrer les secrets de Charlot, les 
rétrospectives des ciné-clubs nous auraient révélés, avec le recul, dans le comique de Chaplin, 
l’univers Kafkaïen où se débat le Petit Homme. 
xii Charlot est par essence l’inadapté social, Verdoux un suradapté. 
xiii il ne s’agit pas de prouver qu’il a raison de les tuer selon n quelconque critère idéologique, il 
suffit qu’il a raison de les tuer par rapport à lui-même. Et cette condition ma paraît suffisamment 
remplie. Quant à engendrer ce faisant la sympathie, le terme même paraît équivoque et 
insuffisant parce que encore trop imprégnée de psychologie. Je trouve plus juste de dire que nous 
somme avec M. Verdoux, ce qui implique beaucoup plus qu’un sentiment, une sorte de 
sympathie ontologique. Selon l’argumentation de Nathalie Moffat il n’y aurait même aucun 
moyen de donner tort à la justice. Tout au plus, attendrait-on de celle-ci qu’elle traite M. 
Verdoux comme irresponsable. Mais rien ne serait plus absurde qu’un M. Verdoux en maison de 
santé. Les juges doivent condamner Verdoux. À l’inverse de M.K., Verdoux est par essence le 
coupable social que la Société ne reconnaît pas. Car notons-le bien, la Société était incapable de 
le trouver : c’est lui qui se livre à la justice et ce sont les juges qui ont peur (est-il besoin à ce 
propos de souligner la similitude des situations avec le Christ). 
xiv Sa fuite maladroite et précipitée a toujours été l’indice d’une vague culpabilité qui se dénonce 
d’elle-même et qu’il suffit du reste de sanctionner d’un coup de bâton blanc. Il leur causait au 
find bien peu de souci, le petit homme à la démarche de canard, sa malice et son astuce ne le 
poussaient jamais au-delà de revanches, bénignes ou du minimum de larcins nécessaires à sa 
subsistance. C’était une victime facile qui leur échappait toujours au dernier moment, mais qui 
savait rester dans son rôle de coupable. 
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xv on n’aurait jamais vu ça: la Société, par essence, ne saurait qu’accuser 
xvi Plus de Charlot, plus de coupable! C’est la Société qui souffre d’un étrange malaise… 
xvii On comprend que M. Johnston, les porte-parole de la Légion de la décence, et tous les clubs 
de femmes d’Amérique aient trouvé que le dernier film de Chaplin sentait le brûlé. Scarface, à 
côté, n’est qu’une histoire d’enfant de chœur. 
xviii naïf gréviste 
xix “condamne la condamnation d’un homme « justement » condamné par la Société 
Chapter 4 
i la familiarité avec la mort n’est pas entretenir la peur de l’enfer, le scrupule et la ratiocination 
morale 
ii La nécessité de la loi n’a jamais été plus proche de la nécessité d’une morale, jamais non plus 
leur antagonisme plus concret et plus évident. 
iii plus que la crainte d’un risqué aussi futile que celui de la vie: la force positive d’un mythe. 
iv Dans Le Banni personne n’est antipathique: c’est l’ordre de l’univers qui donne à l’homme la 
prééminence et fait de la femme un animal domestique, agréable mais ennuyeux, auquel le vrai 
bétail est encore préférable. 
v a compris que la mythologie de la comédie américaine était arrivée à la fois à saturation et à 
épuisement. On ne pouvait plus l’utiliser qu’en prenant son excès même comme sujet de 
scénario.  
vi Ce n’est plus seulement ici de la tragi-comédie de la comédie, mais une véritable 
désintégration en chaine où l’éclat de rire du spectateur est amorcé par la mise en cause du 
cinéma lui-même. Vous riez, mais votre rire s’élève sur les cendres d’un film dont la matière 
s’est entièrement volatilisée en énergie comique.  
vii un western qui aurait honte de n’être que lui-même et chercherait à justifier son existence par 
un intérêt supplémentaire : d’ordre esthétique, sociologique, moral, psychologique, politique, 
érotique…, bref, par quelque valeur extrinsèque au genre et qui est supposée l’enrichir 
viii Balzac et Stendhal, s’ils avaient été cinéastes auraient pu faire des westerns, mais Jean-Paul 
Sartre sans doute ferait du sur-western ; pour des autres raisons, Cécil-Saint Laurent aussi. 
ix la réhabilitation politique de l’Indien 
x S’il s’amuse il ne se moque pas. 
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xi D’où le gène que j’éprouve. Si cette guerre évoque en nous quelque chose, c’est davantage ce 
qui se passe en Algérie, par exemple, que la lutte avec les Indiens ; et c’est aux Indiens que me 
font forcément penser les Coréens d’Anthony Mann. Ce n’est point certes que la guerre contre 
les Indiens fût particulièrement morale ou brillant mais le recul et surtout la popularité du genre 
western en ont fait une convention presque abstraite. Or on peut penser ce qu’on veut de la 
guerre de Corée, tout sauf précisément n’en rien penser. Et j’admettrai davantage qu’Anthony 
Mann s’emploie à en faire indirectement l’apologie qu’à nous présenter comme une donnée de la 
nature, une simple source d’action. 
xii Monsique Verdoux est avec L’Opinion Publique le seul film de Chaplin où Charlot n’apparaît 
pas ; l’un et l’autre se passent en France. De là, à inférer que la France est pour Chaplin le 
contraire mythologique de l’Amérique, il n’y a qu’un pas. Je la franchis allègrement.  
xiii Il condense en lui (comme disent les psychanalystes) trop d’affectivité sociale…. 
xiv Rien n'est plus sot que de considérer la critique comme une spécialité sinon, dans bien des 
cas, pour une spécialité de la sottise. L'autorité du critique professionnel se saurait résider dans le 
fait que c'est son métier, mais seulement dans celui de fréquenter plus assidûment que le 
spectateur moyen les salles obscures. Bref, c'est une hypothétique supériorité de culture non de 
jugement. 
xv Je n’espère pas, mon cher Aristarco, vous avoir convaincu. Aussi bien ne convainc-t-on guère 
aves des arguments. La conviction qu’on y met compte souvent davantage. Je serais heureux si 
seulement la mienne, où vous trouverez l’écho de l’admiration de quelques autres critiques de 
mes amis, pouvait au moins ébranler la vôtre. 
xvi La fonction du critique n'est pas d'apporter sur un plateau d’argent une vérité qui n’existe pas, 
mais de prolonger, le plus loin possible dans l’intelligence et la sensibilité de ceux qui le lisent, 
le choc de l'œuvre d'art. 
xvii Allez revoir… le petit bonhomme blanc et noir de votre enfance et de votre jeunesse ; le 
Charlot d’un temps où l’on ignorait encore que quelque part en Europe un peintre en bâtiment lui 
avait volé sa moustache. 
xviii J’oserai affirmer que l’ambiguïté est au cinéma un signe de valeur qui ne trompe pas… Rares 
sont les films qui osent nous imposer l’image d’un monde où tout n’est pas si simple, où tout 
n’est pas si simple, où nous devons prendre parti librement, fût-ce contre nos sympathies. 
xix N’est ce point là une solide définition du réalisme en art : contraindre l’esprit à prendre parti 
sans tricher avec les êtres et les choses. 
xx foi surannée et dérisoire dans le Paradis à l’ombre des épées 
xxi mille symboles de la guerre, mais tout autour de d’eux la foi de ceux qui les gardent, vestales 
de la petite flamme de patriotisme cocardier qui est au cœur des quarante million de Français 
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xxii Il faut alors fait un effort de volonté pour éviter de fredonner la chanson. Toute la salle, 
comme vous-même, chante intérieurement… Ainsi est mis en évidence le réflexe conditionné de 
la musique militaire. Certes, la salle éprouve une vague honte, une gêne diffuse de cette 
turgescence patriotique qu’elle se sent incapable de contrôler. Mais bien peu de spectateurs en 
prendront une conscience lucide. En éveillant le Déroulède qui sommeille en chacun de nous, 
Franju est simplement conséquent avec son sujet, il en prolonge l’écho dans la salle. Ce faisant, 
il touche, il est vrai, aux limites de l’atrocité cinématographique. 
xxiii admire… l’admiration du guide 
xxiv une connaissance intime et une imitation, à la fois libre et précise des modèles 
xxv combiné, en inversant les rôles, les situations  
xxvi À la devise de défense intellectualiste et inconsciemment aristocratique : « Pas de culture 
sans efforts », la civilisation qui se fait oppose celle du : « C'est toujours ça de pris ». Pour autant 
que le progrès existe : c'est en un.  
xxvii n’aime plus autant qu’on le pourrait croire le mélo qui s’avoue tel (les parodies le prouvent) 
Chapter 5 
i Nous partirons, comme il se doit, de l’image photographique, élément primitif de la synthèse 
finale, pour en arriver à esquisser, sinon une théorie du langage cinématographique fondée sur 
l’hypothèse de son réalisme ontogénétique, du moins une analyse qui ne lui soit point 
contradictoire. 
ii Fixer artificiellement les apparences charnelles de l’être c’est l’arracher au fleuve de la durée : 
l’arrimer à la vie. 
iii modalité active 
iv Il est entendu que l’évolution parallèle de l’art et de la civilisation a dégagé les arts plastiques 
de ces fonctions magiques…. 
v Mais elle ne pouvait que sublimer à l’usage d’une pensée logique ce besoin incoercible 
d’exorciser le temps. 
vi La fabrication de l’image s’est même libérée de tout utilitarianisme anthropocentrique. Il ne 
s’agit plus de la survie de l’homme, mais plus généralement de la création d’un univers idéal à 
l’image du réel. 
vii la confusion entre l’esthétique et le psychologique, entre le véritable réalisme qui est besoin 
d’exprimer la signification à la fois concrète et essentielle du monde, et le pseudo-réalisme du 
trompe-l’œil (ou du trompe l’esprit). 
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viii évènement décisif… l’invention du premier système scientifique et, en quelque sorte, déjà 
mécanique: la perspective 
ix la réduction de l’art à ses catégories psychologiques 
x Un homme hors du sacrée 
xi Mais les rites religieux ne sont pas les seuls. La société entretient mille convenances qui ne 
sont elles-mêmes qu’une sorte d’Office permanent qu’elle se donne à elle-même… Religieux ou 
non, le sacré est partout présent dans la vie sociale, pas seulement dans le magistrat, le 
policeman, le prêtre, mais dans le rituel de la nourriture, des rapports professionnels, des 
transports en commun. C’est par lui que la société maintient sa cohérence comme par un champ 
magnétique. Inconsciemment, à chaque minute, nous nous alignons sur ses lignes de force. 
xii Il resterait sans doute au sociologue et au moraliste (singulièrement au moraliste chrétien t, 
pourquoi pas, au théologien ?) à se pencher sur la signification profonde d’une mythologie où se 
retrouvent, en la popularité d’un acteur comme Gabin, les dizaines de millions de nos 
contemporains. Peut-être un monde sans Dieu redevient-il un monde des dieux et de leur fatalité. 
xiii À la fin d’un film traditionnel nous nous sentons pendant un temps plus ou moins long 
vaguement habités par les personnages : l’univers du film est en nous ou nous sommes en lui : 
c’est un état à la fois passif et passionnel. 
xiv Tout mental, inesthétique en lui-même, dont on ne saurait trouver l’origine que dans la 
mentalité magique 
xv le concept même d’univers est spatialement exclusive. Pour un temps, le film est l’Univers, le 
Monde, ou si l’on veut, la Nature. 
xvi la scène et le décor où l’action se déroule sont un microcosme esthétique inséré de force dans 
l’univers mais essentiellement hétérogène à la Nature qui les entoure 
xvii le cadre du tableau est orienté de l’extérieur vers l’intérieur, qu’il définit un espace centripète 
hétérogène au fond qui l’entoure 
xviii qu'il fallait sacrifier au tableau suivant 
xix l'autonomie du microcosme pictural cristallisé à jamais hors du temps 
xx Devenue soluble dans le monde extérieur elle se prête désormais à toutes les combinaisons du 
réalisme, elle est livrée pieds et poings liés à la discrétion du cinéaste qui peut vouloir faire d'une 
pomme de Cézanne, un dessert à manger au couteau. 
xxi C’est peut-être dans la mesure même où le film est pleinement une œuvre et, donc, où il paraît 
le plus trahir la peinture, qu’il sert en définitive le mieux celle-ci.  
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xxii certaines des ses virtualités secrètes 
xxiii Jusqu’au le XIXe siècle l’alibi de la ressemblance constituait le malentendu réaliste par 
lequel le profane croyait pouvoir entrer dans le tableau, et l’anecdote dramatique ou morale 
multipliât encore les prises par l’esprit ignorant de la génétique secrète du tableau. 
xxiv C’est au XIXe siècle que commence véritablement la crise du réalisme dont Picasso est 
aujourd’hui le mythe et qui mettra en cause tout à la fois les conditions d’existence formelle des 
arts plastiques et leurs fondements sociologiques. Libéré du complexe de la ressemblance, le 
peintre moderne l’abandonne au peuple qui l’identifie désormais d’une part à la photographie et 
de l’autre à la seule peinture qui s’y applique. 
xxv L’imaginaire vu à travers le réel. 
xxvi La solution n’était pas dans le résultat mais dans la genèse. 
xxvii Sur la photographie, image naturelle d’un monde que nous ne savions ou ne pouvions voir, 
la nature enfin fait plus qu’imiter l’art : elle imite l’artiste.  
xxviii comme une empreinte digitale 
xxix Par là, elle s’ajoute réellement à la création naturelle au lieu de lui en substituer une autre. 
xxx la photographie ne crée pas, comme l’art, de l’éternité, elle ambaume le temps, elle le 
soustrait seulement à sa propre corruption 
xxxi [conserve] l’objet enrobé dans son instant comme, dans l’ambre, le corps intact des insectes 
d’une ère révolue  
xxxii Le film… reste par nature même ancré à la durée de sa naissance. Dans la couche de gélatine 
ne se conserve que du temps fossile 
xxxiii effectivement re-présenté, c’est-à-dire rendu présent dans le temps et dans l’espace 
xxxiv Ces ombres grises ou sépia, fantomatiques, presque illisibles, ce ne sont plus les 
traditionnels portraits de famille, c’est la présence troublante de vies arrêtées dans leur durée, 
libérées de leur destin, non par les prestiges de l’art, mais par la vertu d’une mécanique 
impassible…. 
xxxv participe au contraire de l’existence du modèle comme une empreinte digitale 
xxxvi la perfection de l’imitation ne s’identifie pas avec la beauté ; elle constitue seulement une 
matière première dans laquelle le fait artistique vient s’inscrire 
xxxvii Tout ce qui se passe sur l’écran est affecté d’un coefficient de réalisme auquel nulle autre 
technique figurative ne peut prétendre. Nous le percevons comme comme un décalque du monde 
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extérieur ; cela existe comme l’objet qui se reflète dans une glace. Le film est à la fois 
représentation et langage, mais ce n’est qu’en tant que représentation qu’il est d’abord et 
universellement compris. 
xxxviii le cinéma est un langage qui se présente sous les aspects du monde sensible est qui vise à 
se confondre avec lui… La culture cinématographique n’est donc pas seulement nécessaire à… 
une plus riche jouissance des œuvres de qualité, elle l’est aussi à la conscience des idées que le 
film vise à introduire dans notre conscience sous l’alibi fallacieux de la réalité. Je ne parle pas 
seulement des films explicitement de propagande, leur étiquette les dénonce déjà à notre 
attention, mais de presque tous les films qui d’une manière ou d’une autre sont aussi 
implicitement de propagande. Propagande pas toujours systématique et calculée, répondant à un 
mot d’ordre précis, mais expression diffuse d’un mode de vie, d’une morale, confirmation subtile 
des valeurs d’un régime ou d’une civilisation ; qu’il accepte ou refuse ces idéologies implicites, 
l’homme cultivé doit du moins le faire sciemment 
xxxix Le photographe, procède, par l’intermédiaire de l’objectif, à une véritable prise de 
l’empreinte lumineuse : à un moulage. Comme tel. Il emporte avec lui plus que la ressemblance, 
une sorte d’identité (la carte même de cette nom n’est concevable que dans l’ère de la 
photographie). 
xl C’est que pour lui le mot « présence » prête aujourd’hui à équivoque et qu’un pléonasme n’est 
pas de trop au temps du cinématographe. 
xli À l’écran, leur apparition satisfait des aspirations sexuelles inconscientes’ et quand le héros 
vient en contact avec elles il satisfait au désir du spectateur dans la mesure où celui-ci s’est 
identifié au héros. A la scène, les girls éveillent les sens du spectateur tout comme la réalité le 
ferait. De sorte que l’identification avec le héros ne se produit pas. Celui-ci devient un objet de 
jalousie et d’envie. En somme Tarzan n’est concevable qu’au cinéma. 
xlii Le cinéma étant par essence une dramaturgie de la nature, il ne peut y avoir cinéma sans 
construction d’un espace ouvert, se substituant à l’univers au lieu de s’y inclure. 
xliii Je ne sais quoi de plus tonique et, avouons-le, de plus noble—ou peut-être faudrait-il dire 
plus moral—que la satisfaction qui suit un bon film. 
xliv une complaisance à soi-même, une concession à la solitude, une sorte de trahison de l’action 
par le refus d’une responsabilité sociale 
xlv un dévoltage inévitable, quelque mystérieux court-circuit esthétique nous privait au cinéma 
d’une certaine tension décidément propre à la scène 
xlvi allons bon, je vais encore me faire classer dans les critiques spiritualistes 
Chapter 6 
i Il serait intéressant de suivre… la concurrence dans les journaux illustrés de 1890 à 1910 entre 
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le reportage  photographique, encore à ses origines, et le dessin. Ce dernier satisfaisait surtout le 
besoin baroque du dramatique (cf. le Petit Journal illustré). Le sens du document 
photographique ne s’est imposé que peu à peu. Aujourd’hui le paysan le plus authentique préfère 
la photographie la plus insignifiante à l'illustration la plus pathétique. 
ii On constate du reste, au-delà d’une certaine saturation, un retour vers le dessin dramatique du 
type « Radar ». 
iii [I]l semble que la guerre ait revalorisé le genre de façon originale… en resituant au reportage 
sa nudité et sa rigueur, le sens de l’exactitude et de la sincérité, en éduquant par voie de 
conséquence, le public dans le sens de l’authenticité. 
iv Aux temps de la guerre totale répond fatalement celui de l’Histoire totale. 
v Nous vivons de plus en plus dans un monde dépouillé par le cinéma. Un monde qui tend à faire 
la mue de sa propre image. Des centaines de milliers d’écrans nous font assister, à l’heure 
d’actualités, à la formidable desquamation que secrètent chaque jour des dizaines de milliers de 
caméras. A peine formée, la peau de l’Histoire tombe en pellicule. Quel journal filmé s’intitulait 
avant guere « l’œil du monde » ? Titre à peine présomptueux aujourd’hui où d’innombrables 
objectifs de Bell-Howell épeint, à tous les carrefours d’événements, les signes pittoresques, 
curieux ou terribles de notre destin. 
vi Rien ne vaut pour nous l’événement unique, pris sur le vif, à l’instant même de sa création. Le 
théâtre des opérations a, sur l’autre, l’inestimable supériorité dramatique d’inventer la pièce au 
fur et à mesure. Commedia dell’arte où le canevas même est toujours en question. Quant aux 
moyens mis en œuvre, il est superflu d’insister sur leur exceptionnelle efficacité : je voudrais 
seulement souligner qu’ils atteignent un ordre de grandeur cosmique et ne craignent la 
concurrence que des tremblements de terre, des éruptions volcaniques, des raz de marée et de la 
fin du monde. Je le dis sans ironie, car je crois que le journal filmé no. 1 des Actualités éternelles 
ne manquera pas d’être consacré à un reportage monstre sur le Jugement Dernier auprès de quoi 
celui de procès de Nuremberg sera quelque chose comme La Sortie des Usines Lumière. 
vii Mais le reportage de guerre répond surtout à un autre besoin qui explique son extrême 
généralisation. Le goût de l’actualité, joint à celui de du cinéma, n’est que la volonté de présence 
de l’homme moderne, son besoin d’assister à l’Histoire, à laquelle l’évolution politique, aussi 
bien que les moyens techniques de communication et de destruction, la mêlent irrémédiablement. 
Aux temps de la guerre totale répond fatalement celui de l’Histoire totale. Les gouvernements 
l’ont bien compris, c’est pourquoi ils s’efforcent de nous donner le reportage cinématographique 
de tous leurs actes historiques, signature des traités, rencontre des trois, quatre ou cinq Grans, 
etc. Comme l’Histoire n’est tout de même pas un ballet absolument réglé à l’avance, il convient 
de dispenser sur son passage le maximum de caméras pour être sûr de la prendre sur le fait (sur 
le fait historique naturellement). 
viii assez complètes pour contenir un événement aussi intime dans son caractère historique que la 
danse du scalp d’Hitler au carrefour de Rethonde. 
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ix Les meilleurs documentaires de montage n’étaient encore que des récits, ceux-ci sont un 
discours. 
x Je crois que loin de faire aux sciences historiques un progrès vers l’objectivité, le cinéma leur 
donne, par son réalisme même, un pouvoir d’illusion supplémentaire. Ce commentateur ivisible 
que le spectateur oublie en regardant les admirables montages de Capra, c’est l’historien des 
foules de demain, ventriloque de cette formidable prosopopée, ressuscitant à volonté les hommes 
et les événements, qui se prépare dans les archives cinématographiques.  
xi les mécanismes psychologiques habituels au cinéma sont en quelque sorte retournés contre 
elles-mêmes, refluent vers le spectateur pour mettre peu à peu en branle ses facultés de 
raisonnement en synchronisme avec le scénario et la mise en scène 
xii l’identification du spectateur avec le héros… c’est-à-dire encore sur la passivité intellectuelle 
du spectateur 
xiii provoquer le sentiment et du sentiment pour faire admettre l’idée. De ce type de films on peut 
sortir enthousiaste et convaincu, c’est-à-dire dans un état tout contraire à l’inquiétude 
intellectuelle où nous laisse Cayatte 
xiv En quittant Avant le déluge le plus bête des spectateurs est dévenu. De force, sinon plus 
intelligent, du moins plus cartésien. Le film ayant lancé en chacun le volant du raisonnement… 
continue quelque temps encore sur sa lancée à moudre le grain de la réalité 
xv une réalité sans restes, exactement divisible par les idées premières dont elle n’est que l’alibi 
xvi l’évidence physique 
xvii terrorisme dans l’enchaînement et l’évidence intellectuelle des faits qui confèrent à l’œuvre, 
si peu qu’on cligne des yeux pour en estomper les détails, les propriétés traumatisantes du 
cauchemar 
xviii a inventé un genre, mais c’est un genre faux ou plus exactement équivoque et qui trahit à la 
fois le réalisme du cinéma et ses pouvoirs d’abstraction dialectiquement solidaires 
xix la frange de mystère et d’ambiguïté 
xx Or la valeur didactique, apologétique et politique reste encore le grand scandale et l’inconnue 
majeure du cinéma. Roman, peinture et théâtre à thèse n’ont pas survécu au XIXe siècle… Seule 
l’écran a fourni au XXe siècle d’incontestables exemples d’un art de propagande qui ne le cède 
en rien aux catégories de l’esthétique classique. Mais il semble aussi que la merveilleuse 
conjonction de la politique et de l’art, qui fit la grandeur du cinéma soviétique de 1925 à 1935 ou 
1938, soit un secret perdu, partiellement et épisodiquement retrouvé dans la production 
soviétique contemporaine, à la dimension d’une séquence, au détour d’une scène, mais jamais à 
l’échelle de l’œuvre et dans son principe même. Or il serait puéril de se voiler la face devant les 
actuels besoins idéologiques de l’art. Il n’importe que le communisme en soit, par réaction ou 
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directement la cause ; le cinéma ne peut ignorer son pouvoir de propagande, en 1951 moins 
encore qu’en 1925. Les idées de ce temps se serviront de lui, avec ou sans art, mais efficacement. 
xxi la moindre surface de la peau à la nature 
xxii Il se peut qu’on ne puisse rien demander de plus à un cinéma idéologique qu’un formalisme 
ouvert à la défense de toutes les idées. 
xxiii Le montage de Leni Riefensthal sur le Congrès de Nuremberg, Triomphe de la volonté, 
apparaît au spectateur démocrate comme un argument contre Hitler. Ces images peuvent 
d’ailleurs utilisées dans un montage anti-Nazi. 
xxiv il est légitime et même recommandé à l’écran d’utiliser le réalisme au bénéfice de l’idée 
pure, mais à condition de briser préalablement la réalité et d’en sélectionner les fragment. Ainsi 
par exemple, des fameux montages « Pourquoi nous combattons »… En d’autres termes, 
l’abstraction n’est légitime au cinéma que dans les modes de récits qui la désignent comme telle. 
i le caractère étonnamment subjectiviste des procès politiques dans les démocraties populaires 
ii D’un point de vue rigoureusement marxiste, il pourrait suffire de proclamer que Boukharine, 
Rajk ou Kostov incarnent des tendances que le Parti a décidé de combattre comme 
historiquement erronées. Leur liquidation physique ne serait pas plus nécessaire que celle de nos 
ministres démissionnés. Mais du moment qu’un homme a participé à l’Histoire, qu’il a été mêlé 
à tel ou tel événement, une part de sa biographie est irrémédiablement « historicisée ». Une 
contradiction intolérable se constitue alors entre cette part définitivement objective, pétrifiée 
dans le passée, et l’existence physique d’un Boukharine, d’un Zenoviev ou d’un Rajk. On ne 
peut réduire l’homme à n’être que l’Histoire sans compromettre réciproquement cette Histoire 
par la subjectivité présente de l’individu.  Le dirigeant communiste vivant est un dieu terme 
scellé dans l’Histoire par ses actes passés. 
iii Dans la perspective communiste soviétique « stalinienne » nul ne peut « devenir » un traitre, 
car il faudrait admettre qu’il ne le fut pas toujours, qu’il y eut un commencement biographique à 
cette trahison. Il faudrait d’autre part qu’un homme devenu néfaste au Parti et à l’Histoire ait pu 
antérieurement lui être utile et donc avoir été bon avant d’être mauvais. 
iv notre conscience bourgeoise « hypocrite » et « idéaliste » supporte encore une fois cette 
évidence historique que Pétain soit à la fois le « vainqueur de Verdun » et le « traitre de 
Montoire », tandis que les anciens compagnons liquidés doivent disparaître de la peinture 
historique soviétique 
v pour le communiste c’est elle seule [la mort] qui peut résorber toute subjectivité en événement 
vi l'asymptote de l’Homme et de l’Histoire est désormais dépassée 
vii En effet, et bien que la reconstitution atteigne à une ampleur et une exactitude sans doute 
inégalées depuis Naissance d’une nation de Griffith, on peut soutenir qu’elle est équivalente à la 
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vision que Fabrice eut de Waterloo. Non certes matériellement, car on ne nous épargne pas le 
spectacle physique de la guerre, mais essentiellement, par l’impossibilité où nous met la caméra 
d’ordonner son chaos. Equivalente en cela aux reportages d’actualités pris sur le vif, cette image 
de la guerre est en quelque sorte amorphe… une espèce de cataclysme humain et mécanique… 
Imaginez que vous assistez aux opérations du haut d’un hélicoptère invulnérable, vous donnant 
du champ de bataille une vision aussi générale que possible, sans pour autant rien vous révéler 
du sort des armes ni même de son développement et de son orientation. 
viii Ici, la suprématie du génie stalinien n’a plus rien d’opportuniste et de métaphorique : elle est 
proprement ontologique. Non seulement parce que la portée et la force de persuasion du cinéma 
sont incomparablement plus grandes que ceux de tout autre moyen de propagande, mais encore 
et surtout parce que la nature de l’image cinématographique est autre : s’imposant à notre esprit 
comme rigoureusement superposable à la réalité, le cinéma est par essence incontestable comme 
la Nature et comme l’Histoire. Un portrait de Pétain, ou de de Gaulle ou de Staline, se décroche 
comme il s’accroche—au fond ça n’engage à rien, même sur cent mètres carrés. Une 
reconstitution cinématographique de Staline et surtout centrée sur Staline suffit à définir sans 
retour la place et le sens de Staline dans le monde et à fixer irrévocablement son essence. 
ix Art du spectacle, hyperbole de l’incarnation par la monstrueuse proximité physique de l’image, 
le cinéma est en effet a priori le plus impudique des arts. Il requiert par la même le maximum de 
pudeur ; le masque et le déguisement : celui de style, du sujet ou du maquillage. Chaplin dans 
Limelight, dépouille à moitié les deux premiers, totalement le troisième. Ecce homo.  
x La grandeur de Limelight se confond ici avec la grandeur même du cinéma, elle est la 
manifestation la plus éclatante de son essence qui est : l’abstraction par l’incarnation. Seule sans 
doute la position unique de Chaplin, l’universalité et la vitalité de son mythe… permettaient de 
donner la mesure dialectiquement du cinéma. Socrate de XXe siècle, Chaplin-Calvero boit la 
ciguë en public, le Public, mais la sagesse de sa mort ne se réduit pas à des mots, elle est d’abord 
et surtout dans le spectacle qu’il en donne, elle ose fonder sur l’ambiguïté charnelle de l’image 
cinématographe : Voyez et sachez ! 
xi la vedette de cinéma n’était pas seulement un comédien ou un acteur particulièrement chéis du 
public, mais un héros de légende ou de tragédie, un « destin » auquel scénaristes et metteurs en 
scène, fût-ce même à leur insu, ne pouvaient que se conformer. 
xii il paraît évident que le pauvre fou prend peur et juge enfin l’absurdité de son pari. Mais la 
caméra est là, qui le fixe pour l’éternité, et dont il n’ose pas finalement décevoir l’œil sans âme. 
N’eût-il eu des témoins humains, une sage lâcheté sans doute l’emportait 
xiii vous voyez… Gabin en future père de famille ? 
xiv l’équivalent ontologique de cet univers où les signes répugnent à la pesanteur grossière de la 
réalité… Son irréalité n’est pourtant pas un manque, mais un supplément d’être. Elle ne lui retire 
rien de sa féminité. Elle lui ajoute au contraire tous les possibles dont la priverait l’incarnation. 
Elle est ici Bérénice… elle pouvait sans être sans doute toutes les grandes héroïnes féminines. 
Elle est notre Eve. 
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xv pour la première fois on assistait… à l’esquisse d’une métamorphose. La proximité de la 
caméra, est plus encore peut-être, la gamme de gris de la panchromatique faisaient apparaître, 
comme en  surimpression sous la masque du petite homme à la moustache, le visage clairement 
lisible de Chaplin 
xvi chez le héros de La Comtesse aux pieds nus l’éminence dignité de notre pourriture 
xvii incarné l’immanence de la mort, son imminence aussi 
xviii je voudrais… remarquer qu’à cette modernité à longue portée qui assure au personnage de 
Bogart sa poésie profonde et justifie sans doute typiquement l’acteur mythe de la guerre et de 
l’après-guerre 
xix Ils n’ont en commun que leur réaction contre le jeu de type psychologique ; mais taciturne 
comme Brando ou exubérant comme Dean, le style Kazan est fondé sur un postulat de 
spontanéité anti-intellectuel. Le comportement des acteurs s’y veut imprévisible puisqu’il ne 
traduit plus la logique profonde des sentiments mais extériorise des impulsions immédiates dont 
le rapport avec la vie intérieure saurait se lire directement. 
xx L’homme bogartien ne se définit pas par son respect accidentel ou son mépris des vertus 
bourgeoises, par son courage ou son lâcheté, mais d’abord par cette maturité existentielle qui 
transforme peu à peu la vie en une ironie tenace aux dépens de la mort. 
xxi Et puis il y a le revolver qui devient entre ses mains une arme quasi intellectuelle, l’argument 
qui désarçonne. 
xxii Il resterait sans doute au sociologue et au moraliste (singulièrement au moraliste chrétien t, 
pourquoi pas, au théologien ?) à se pencher sur la signification profonde d’une mythologie où se 
retrouvent, en la popularité d’un acteur comme Gabin, les dizaines de millions de nos 
contemporains. Peut-être un monde sans Dieu redevient-il un monde des dieux et de leur fatalité. 
xxiii Mais, dira-t-on, c’était Cerdan en personne : certes, mais la différence n’est pas si grande. 
xxiv Il faut de tour pour faire un monde… et la guerre. Quelques secondes plus tard, les actualités 
de la semaine présentaient les obsèques solennelles de trois soldats, mots en Indochine pour 
permettre au gentil petit mannequin de Paris de présenter ses robes. Tout de même, Air France 
aurait été bien inspiré en choisissant une autre ligne et M. Borderie en évitant de mettre son film 
en vedette. 
xxv Je demande qu’on réfléchisse sur le procès de Nuremberg se déroulant sous les sunlights 
comme une reconstitution de cour d’assises dans un film policier. 
xxvi Mais deux moments de la vie échappent radicalement à cette concession de la conscience : 
l’acte sexuel et la mort. L’un et l’autre sont à leur manière la négation absolue du temps objectif : 
l’instant qualitatif à l’état pur. Comme la mort, l’amour se vit et ne se représente pas—ce n’est 
pas sans raison qu’on l’appelle la petite mort—du moins ne se représente pas sans violation de sa 
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nature. Cette violation se nomme obscénité, non plus morale comme dans l’amour, mais 
métaphysique. On ne meurt pas deux fois. 
xxvii Mais non pas tant en raison de en raison de l’atrocité fantasmagorique d’une image insérée 
dans un spectacle autorisé à tous les publics ou encore au nom du respect des morts, mais à cause 
de la gratuité et de la désinvolture qui font seules son indécence. Ce qui est condamnable ce n’est 
pas la cruauté ou l’horreur objective du document… mais l’absence de justification morale ou 
esthétique faute de quoi l’image nous transforme en simples nécrophages La mort du soldat, 
celle du sauveteur, voire celle du torero ou du coureur automobile sont des évènements ayant un 
sens, fût-il discutable. Le document dès lors s’adresse à notre esprit à travers l’horreur équivoque 
de nos sens. 
xxviii il n’y a pas si longtemps que l’assassinat n’est plus un spectacle. L’exécution en Place de 
Grève n’était pas autre chose… 
xxix se définit rétroactivement le temps qualitatif de la vie 
xxx d’une sorte de coït avec le temps 
xxxi Mais il n’y a pas des Cadavres exquis ! 
xxxii le plus formalistes qu’on ait vu depuis longtemps 
xxxiii jamais l’expressionisme au temps de sa gloire n’a rencontré un sujet aussi tragiquement 
conforme à son esthétique 
xxxiv Enfer terrestre et cauchemar objectif 
xxxv L’organisation interne du camp, la résistance, relative mais efficace, que pouvaient opposer 
ses rouages à l’écrasement concentrationnaire, semblent ici, non pas tant impossibles 
qu’impensables. 
xxxvi le sentiment probablement justifiée d’une fidélité documentaire à sa réalité objective et 
mentale 
xxxvii Les murailles de Terezin s’ouvrent à l’arrivée des soldats russes, mais à la septième 
sonnerie de trompettes. 
xxxviii Nuit et brouillard est avant tout un regard d’amour et de confiance en l’homme, 
l’affirmation d’espoir au-delà de la désespérance. L’herbe ne poussait plus sous les pas d’Attila ; 
l’herbe a repoussé timide, rase et rare entre les ruines du crématoire, assez pour affirmer que la 
vie est plus forte que le néant. Entendez-moi ! Nuit et brouillard no conclut n’incite à 
l’optimisme béat ou à oubli, bien au contraire, il nous rappelle la pérennité de la réalité 
concentrationnaire et nous incite à l’examen de la conscience, mais son affirmation est d’autant 
plus forte et pénétrante qu’elle se situe au-delà des trop faciles colères et des sursauts d’horreur, 
dans cette zone d’immense sérénité qui succède aux larmes du deuil quand l’être aimé peut 
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revivre dans notre souvenir d’une seconde vie. La vérité de la Nuit et brouillard, c’est la douce 
lumière de l’homme.  
i l’homme blanc… en tant que aventurier il cherche dans ce contact à mieux connaître lui-même 
ii Cette observation avec préjugé favorable est sans doute de bonne méthode sociologique et ses 
avantages moraux sont évidents, mais il est permis de se demander dans quelle mesure elle 
n’élimine pas ce qui demeure toute de même une vérité relationnelle de notre conscience. Je 
veux dire l’appréhension de mystère et l’angoisse à l’approche d’un univers spirituel radical 
différent de nôtre. Pour nos jeunes savants, la magie est une occupation intéressante et méritoire 
au même titre que nos activités occidentales. Etre sorcier au Niger est, mutatis mutandis, aussi 
honorable que d’être ethnologue à Paris. Tout se passe en quelque sorte comme si, ayant su 
découvrir la richesse et la valeur des civilisations dites primitives, nous en avions exhorcisé la 
peur en les projetant d’une part sur le plan esthétique et de l’autre sur celui de la science : l’art 
nègre et la sociologie. 
iii Il faut choisir entre comprendre le mystère et le vivre. 
iv ne point cacher l’échec relatif de l’entreprise, sa décomposition finale dans la mauvaise 
conscience réciproque 
v ces rares images au milieu au milieu d’un flot de pellicule presque sans intérêt objectif sont 
comme des épaves inestimables et bouleversantes sur la houle monotone de l’océan 
vi Ainsi pourrait-on dire de ces films qu’ils ne sont significatifs, admirables et émouvants, que 
dans la mesure où ils n’existent pas. Mais naturellement, s’ils n’existaient pas du tout, nous n’en 
pourrions pas juger. Je dirai donc que qu’ils sont précisément comme les canons : composé de 
vide avec du bronze autour. Mais c’est ce vide qui est leur vraie substance. Et les images plus ou 
moins intéressantes qui cernent ces lacunes sont là pour les authentifier et leur donner, comme on 
dit justement des canons, une âme. 
vii Avec Naufragé Volontaire et Forêt Sacrée je voudrais pourtant mettre en évidence une 
variante particulière de cette condition de reportage. La « mauvaise foi ». Je place l’expression 
entre guillemets pour signifier que je l’entends dans son sens purement psychologique, non 
moral. Je ne ménage pas au contraire mon admiration et mon estime à ces hommes courageux et 
sincères qui ont su justement pousser leur courage jusqu’à assumer cette mauvaise foi. 
viii à partir de l’exemple étonnamment significatif qu’elles en offrent, certaines lois du montage 
dans leur rapport avec l’expression cinématographique et, plus essentiellement même, son 
ontologie esthétique. 
ix Le paysage de Camargue, la vie des éleveurs et des pêcheurs, les mœurs des manades, 
constituent la base de la fable, le point d’appui solide et irréfutable du mythe. Mais sur cette 
réalité se fonde justement une dialectique de l’imaginaire dont le dédoublement de Crin Blanc 
est l’intéressant symbole… Plus d’une scène parmi les plus spectaculaires ont été tourné presque 
sans trucage et en tous cas au mépris des périls certains. Et pourtant il suffit d’y réfléchir pour 
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comprendre que si ce que montre et signifie l’écran avait dû être vrai, effectivement réalisé 
devant le caméra, le film cesserait du même coup d’être un mythe. 
x L’illusion est naît ici, comme dans la prestidigitation, de la réalité. 
xi Crin Blanc est-il tout à la fois le vrai cheval qui broute encore l’herbe salée de Camargue, et 
l’animal de rêve qui nage éternellement en compagnie du petit Folco. Sa réalité 
cinématographique ne pouvait se passer de la réalité documentaire, mais il fallait, pour que celle-
ci devint vérité de notre imagination, qu’elle se détruise et renaisse dans la réalité elle-même. 
xii Jacques Tati a… créé de toutes pièces un univers à la fois parfaitement imaginaire et 
totalement ressemblant, en ce sens que le vrai ne peut plus s’empêcher d’y ressembler, et nous 
avec. 
xiii ce sont les racines qui relient l’imaginaire au réel e l’en nourrissent 
xiv L’image—sa structure plastique, son organisation dans le temps—parce qu’elle prend appui 
sur un plus grand réalisme, dispose ainsi de beaucoup plus de moyens pour infléchir, modifier du 
dedans la réalité. 
xv la joie esthétique naît d’un déchirement, car ces « souvenirs » ne nous appartient pas 
xvi la mort visible d’un lapin dans La Règle du jeu nous atteint tout autant que celle, racontée, du 
petit chat d’Agnès 
xvii l’emploi fréquent… de ce qu’on pourrait appeler la contre-mise-en-valeur du sujet n’a jamais 
été poussé si loin. J’entends par là le refus de laisser clairement voir au spectateur les 
événements culminants de la scène. Il ne faut point confondre ce procédé dramatique, qui 
s’apparenterait plutôt à la litote, avec l’ellipse dont on répète peut-être abusivement qu’elle 
constitue la figure de rhétorique fondamentale du cinéma. Chez Welles le film tout entier est 
partiellement soustrait à notre atteinte, c’est tout l’action qui est comme frangée d’inaccessible. 
xviii il suffit pour que le récit retrouve la réalité qu’un seul de ses plans convenablement choisi 
rassemble les éléments dispersés auparavant par le montage 
xix Ce que le souci de la vérité, les préoccupations sociales, l’honnêteté matérielle sont plutôt des 
qualités morales que des valeurs esthétiques… Le décor authentique, le vrai revolver du vrai 
crime, le vrai mutilé de la vraie guerre : c’est bien ; la vérité de l’art peut passer par là, elle ne 
saurait s’y arrêter. Mais il faut peut-être à Hollywood cette discipline un peu primaire. Ce n’est 
peut-être qu’en suivant ce fil d’Ariane de la réalité perdue que le cinéma américain retrouvera 
l’issue du labyrinthe d’artifice où il s’est égaré. 
xx une espèce épopée civique où les scénaristes ont recensé le maximum de situations 
exemplaires… cette espèce de grande leçon des choses 
xxi Je continue simplement à prétendre qu’en dépit de cet angle d’incidence oblique et de 
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l’exiguïté du champ d’attaque, Dmytryk va bien plus profond dans le sujet que Wyler. Et surtout 
que le « réalisme «  de Crossfire est esthétiquement beaucoup plus convaincant. Car enfin il 
s’agit d’art et non de pédagogie. Dmytryk me donne peut-être moins de renseignements pour 
constituer une monographie de la démobilisation en Amérique, mais j’emporte du bref éclair de 
magnésium de Crossfire un sentiment beaucoup plus tragique de la situation morale des G.I. 
xxii Dmytryk a réalisé son film en vingt-quatre jours avec une pauvreté de moyens évidente : très 
peu de décors, le plus souvent partiels et d’une rare sobriété, quatre seulement ont un véritable 
rôle dramatique : un coin de bar, trois fauteuils de cinéma, aux derniers rangs de balcon, une 
chambre de fille semi-publique, avec un rideau pour cacher le cuisine, et le bureau (aussi terne 
que possible) du policier… Je me fais pourtant fort de trouver en si peu d’espace, sinon autant 
renseignements sur la vie américaine que dans les décors des Plus belles années de notre vie, du 
moins ce que Wyler ne nous a pas montré. Je sais comment on va au cinéma en Amérique et 
jusqu’à quelle heure. Je sais comment sont les chambres d’hôtels, et j’ai vu une cuisine sans 
frigidaire avec un réchaud à gaz où le lait peut déborder et laisser la même crasse que chez moi 
(si j’avais du lait). 
xxiii Ces images collent à ce monde malade comme un chewing-gum insipide mâché jusqu’au 
désespoir. 
xxiv À l’aube nous sortons enfin de cette histoire puante de tabac et d’alcool, et l’air frais du petit 
jour nous rend à l’espérance de la vie. Mais la tête est lourde encore de mauvais whisky et 
surtout d’une autre gueule de bois bien plus malaise : celle de la guerre. 
xxv sans que on sente jamais que Dmytryk ait eu besoin de faire vrai pour être sûr d’être vrai. 
xxvi Plus d’acteurs, plus d’histoire, plus de mise en scène, c’est-à-dire enfin dans l’illusion 
esthétique parfaite de la réalité : plus de cinéma. 
xxvii Cette adhérence parfait et naturelle à l’actualité s’explique et se justifie intérieurement par 
une adhésion spirituelle à l’époque. Sans doute l’histoire italienne récente est-elle irréversible. La 
guerre n’y est pas ressentie comme une parenthèse, mais comme une conclusion : la fin d’une 
époque. En un certain sens l’Italie n’a que trois ans. Mais la même cause pouvait produire 
d’autres effets. Ce qui ne laisse pas d’être admirable et d’assurer au cinéma italien une audience 
morale très large dans les nations occidentales, c’est le sens qu’y prend la peinture de l’actualité. 
Dans un monde encore et déjà obsédé par la terreur et par la haine, où la réalité n’est presque 
plus jamais aimée pour elle-même mais seulement refusée ou défendue comme signe politique, 
le cinéma italien est certainement le seul qui sauve, au sein même de l’époque qu’il dépeint, un 
humanisme révolutionnaire. 
xxviii d’où la terreur semble encore exclue 
xxix interdépendance de l’improvisation de la commedia dell’arte ou même du jazz hot 
xxx Les films italiens récents sont à tout le moins pré-révolutionnaires : tous refusent, 
implicitement ou explicitement, par l’humour, par la satire ou par la poésie, la réalité sociale dont 
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ils servent, mais ils savent, jusque dans les prises de position les plus claires, ne jamais traiter 
cette réalité comme un moyen. La condamner n’oblige pas à la mauvaise foi. Ils n’oublient pas 
qu’avant d’être condamnable le monde est, tout simplement. 
xxxi La thèse impliquée est d’une merveilleuse et atroce simplicité : dans le monde où vit cet 
ouvrier, les pauvres, pour subsister, doivent se voler entre eux. Mais cette thèse n’est jamais 
posée comme telle, l’enchaînement des événements est toujours d’une vraisemblance à la fois 
rigoureuse et anecdotique. Au fond, au milieu du film, l’ouvrier pourrait retrouver son vélo : 
simplement il n’y aurait pas de film. 
xxxii car les syndicats travaillent pour la justice et non pour la charité 
xxxiii est intolérable, car sa “charité” est aveugle à cette tragédie individuelle, sans rien faire pour 
changer vraiment le monde qui est en la cause 
xxxiv Nous ne avons aucune raison valable de leur reprocher d’être aussi bavards et, par surcroît, 
de parler allemande. Mais il était difficile de créer une situation objectivement plus anticléricale. 
xxxv un film de propagande chercherait à nous démontrer que l’ouvrier ne peut pas retrouver son 
vélo et qu’il est nécessairement pris dans le cercle infernal de sa pauvreté. De Sica se borne à 
nous montrer que l’ouvrier peut ne pas retrouver son vélo et qu’il va sans doute à cause de cela 
retourner au chômage. Mais qui ne voit que c’est le caractère accidentel du scénario qui fait la 
nécessité de la thèse au lieu que le moindre doute sur la nécessité des événements dans le 
scénario de propagande rendrait la thèse hypothétique. 
xxxvi Comme on le voit… les événements et les êtres ne sont jamais sollicités dans le sens d’une 
thèse sociale. Mais la thèse en sort tout armée et d’autant plus irréfutable qu’elle ne nous est 
donnée que par surcroît. C’est notre esprit qui la dégage et la construit, non le film. 
xxxvii le témoin intime, le chœur particulier attaché à sa tragédie 
xxxviii Ce qui importe, c’est de ne pas placer le professionnel dans son emploi habituel : le rapport 
qu’il entretient avec son personnage no doit être grevé pour le public d’aucune idée à priori. 
xxxix il ne peut même plus être question qu’un figurant joue plus ou moins bien, tant l’homme est 
identifié à son personnage… Ce n’est pas l’excellence singulière de cette ouvrier et de ce gosse 
qui nous vaut la qualité de leur interprétation, mais tout le système esthétique dans lequel ils sont 
venus s’insérer. 
xl était inséparable d’une conjoncture historique… Mais la nouveauté et surtout le piment de 
cette crudité technique ayant épuisé leur effet de surprise, que reste-t-il du « néo-réalisme » 
italien… 
xli Mais le pire de tout, ce fut l’apparition d’une sorte de super-production « néo-réaliste » où la 
recherche du décor vrai, de l’action des mœurs, de la peinture du milieu populaire, des arrière-
plans « sociaux » devenait un poncif académique. 
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xlii « une mayonnaise tournée »… « l’huile du réalisme »… « d’œuf des bonnes intentions »  
xliii C’est bête et c’est peut-être aussi naïf que l’éloge que faisait Beaumarchais des larmes du 
mélodrame, mais dites-moi si, en sortant de voir un film italien, vous ne vous sentez pas 
meilleur, si vous n’avez pas envie de changer l’ordre des choses, mais de préférence en 
persuadant les hommes, du moins ceux qui peuvent l’être et que seuls l’aveuglement, le préjugé 
ou la malchance ont conduit à faire du mal à leurs semblables. 
xliv De Sica gagne à tout coup sur le tableau où… il n’a pas mise. 
xlv Amour et refus du réel 
xlvi La poésie n’est que forme active et créatrice de l’amour sa projection sur l’univers. 
xlvii Le drame, au contraire, consiste en ceci: Dieu n’existe pas, le dernier bureau du château est 
vide. Voilà peut-être la tragédie spécifique du monde moderne, le passage à la transcendance 
d’une réalité sociale enfante d’elle-même sa propre déification. Les peines de Bruno et 
d’Umberto D. ont des causes immédiates et visibles, mais nous nous apercevons qu’il y a aussi 
un résidu insoluble, fait de la complexité psychologique et matérielle des rapports sociaux, et que 
l’excellence des institutions aussi bien que la volonté de notre prochain ne peuvent suffire à faire 
disparaitre. La nature de celui-ci n’est pas moins positive et sociale, mais son action nait 
toutefois d’une fatalité absurde et impérative. 
xlviii le paradis terrestre serait situé en Suède, où les bicyclettes restent jour et nuit le long des 
trottoirs 
xlix l’amour, qui demeure une affaire privée, d’homme à homme 
Epilogue 
i N’est il pas significatif que le psychiatre ait repris ici le terme de catharsis à Aristote ? Les 
recherches pédagogiques modernes relatives au « psycho-drame » semblent bien ouvrir les 
aperçus féconds sur les processus cathartique du théâtre. Elles utilisent en effet l’ambiguïté 
existant encore chez l’enfant entre les notions de jeu et de réalité, pour amener le sujet à se 
libérer, dans l’improvisation théâtrale, des refoulements dont il souffre. Cette technique revient à 
créer une sorte de théâtre incertain où le jeu est sérieux et l’acteur son propre spectateur. L’action 
qui s’y développe n’est pas encore scindée par la rampe, laquelle est de toute évidence la 
symbolique architecturale de la censure qui nous sépare de la scène. 
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